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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question: why do ostensibly similar
ethno-national conflicts within a system of settler-colonial domination see such wide
variation in their outcomes? How they emerge from conflict through power sharing and
social integration versus the endurance of separation and systems of domination and
control? The study identifies causal paths that resulted in the decline of domination
systems of this type.
Ethno-national conflicts that feature certain similarities develop in different trajectories
due to certain conditions that culminate in transforming the structures of these conflicts
towards integration (the establishment of a single political entity) or separation
(independence in separate entities). The goal of the dissertation is to examine the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict through a comparative lens in order to specify the conditions
that led to the persistence of the two-state solution and to examine the prevalence or lack
of necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a one civic-democratic state.
Building on the comparative approach I argue that ethno-national territorial
underpinnings of the conflict and the “regimes of territorial legitimation” of the dominant
group are the most crucial explanatory factor in determining the trajectory and outcome
of the conflict. “Regimes of territorial legitimation” are the practices, procedures, systems
of meaning, and institutional designs that found the relationship between a nation, people,
ii

or ethno-national group and geography/territory. The dissertation features a qualitative
structured and focused comparison of the conflicts in South Africa, and Palestine.
Method of difference is applied for a case-oriented interpretive inquiry that focuses on
the complexity of each of the two cases and aims at capturing the historical diversity of
these similar cases.
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Chapter I
Introduction

Patterns of ethno-national conflicts: Divergence and convergence
Ethno-national conflicts show similar characteristics and patterns as protracted,
violence, and persistent. Examples of these conflicts can be found in Europe, Asia, and
Africa. All of which challenge the established nation-states and their political as well as
geographical boundaries. Research on the phenomenon is ample and diverse. Main
features and patterns of these conflicts are similar, their trajectories, however, vary. Gurr
and Harff identify two main kinds of ethno-national groups on the bases of their political
demands; “collectivities that demand representation within the state they live in, and
separatists – groups who demand autonomy from the state that rules them (Cited in BenYehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010: 3).
In general the trends these conflicts have shown, especially in the last two decades,
towards separation indicates the irreconcilability of some national demands for
sovereignty and independence. However; in some other cases a reverse trend prevails and
leads to a variety of shared and integrated polities; South Africa is a cases in
consideration. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict in its current state of affairs exhibits these
opposing trends and patterns. The conflict is in a stalemate or more specifically has been
in an interregnum where the Israeli military occupation is still as valid and vibrant as it
1

has been for decades while a pseudo authority was established apart from accomplishing
the Palestinian aim of national self-determination and statehood. What accounts for this
divergence of outcomes of similar conflicts? In other words: why do some ethno-national
conflicts terminate in unitary political entities (integration) and others in various forms of
autonomy or power-sharing while other end in separation; what causes this divergence?
Looking at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from the perspective of ethno-national
conflicts this research examines the developments of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a
trajectory that has led until today to the persistent of the two-state approach. Although
profound changes in the properties of the conflict have accumulated specific conditions
ostensibly conducive to a One-State outcome the separation rather than the integration
agenda gains supremacy. In other words, the conflict is fixated on ethno-national
territorial underpinnings whereby democratization is excluded from political and
diplomatic agenda as well as from public debate. In this sense liberation based on ethnoterritorial determinants has excluded democratization. What are the conditions that
culminated in the persistence of separation and ethno-national territorial aspects of the
conflict? Although it stands at odds with international and domestic consensus on the
two-state solution as the acceptable outcome of the conflict, the one-state agenda merits
systematic examination as to its plausibility and attainability, let alone its normative
appeal. The contradictions inherited in the two-state solution, namely the discrepancy
between reality on the ground and the political vision of separation is a key issue in the
debate over the One versus the Two State solution to the conflict. It reflects the push and
pull factors that may lead to the implementation of the right of national self2

determination and independence or, alternatively, to diverse types of self-rule, autonomy
or unitary states. This is not unique to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; similar conflicts
show the same contradictions.
A good starting point to answering this question lies in the very definition of ethnonational conflicts and ethno-nationality. Ethnic-nationality is defined as “a common
identity of a group based upon perceptions among members of the group and
nonmembers”, therefore it has subjective and objective aspects that are ingrained in their
identity (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010:

3). The fact that ethno-nationalism

encompasses tangible and intangible elements that establishe the common characteristics
that homogenize the group and unify it makes the concept hard to discern. Ethno-national
conflict, therefore are elusive to explain and to resolution: the factors and forces the one
may consider explaining ethno-national conflicts are enormous. There is no single factor
that has the capacity to account for the phenomenon. Some studies emphasize the
foundation and formation of the modern nation state (e.g. Amdife and Warhola 1993 on
the African context) others focus on the decomposition of the state and civic
configurations (e.g. Noutcheva and Tocci 2004 on the European cases). Studies also
examine the prospects of ethno-national conflicts in traditional societies (e.g. Kloit 1989
on the Mediterranean ethnic conflicts) While some research (e.g. Mychajlyszyn 2001 and
Sanz 1994) is dedicated to discern ethno-nationalism in Post-Soviet republic. Moreover,
there are a number of studies that attempt to understand the phenomenon from the
perspective of political systems especially the Parliamentary system and it role in
accommodating ethnic plurality (e.g. Tse-min Lin 201). More to do with this research,
3

some studies focus the attention on the role of territory in the conflict (e.g. Yiftachail
2002), while others focus on the protractibility of ethno-national conflicts and its
implications (e.g. Yehuda and Mishali Ram 2006), and the demographic effects
(Cederman 2009) whereas some research examines the international links and
protractibility of these conflicts (e.g. Mishali Ram 2006). There exists a wide agreement
in those studies that ethno-national peoples/groups are those who contend the state with
political demands; political relevancy of a group or a people is central for its emergence
as an ethno-nationality (Gurr, cited in Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010: 3). Drawing
on these previous efforts this dissertation presents the premises of our inquiry to
demarcate the conceptual terrain of our research that introduces certain factors that have
not been fully, or at all, examined by previous research. This research departs from these
conceptual propositions:
•

In ethno-national conflicts within a settler-colonial setting, territorial and spatial

underpinnings play the most crucial role in determining the trajectory of the conflict and
its outcome. The political geography of the conflict and its relationship with identity offer
a plausible explanation of the divergence of outcome these conflicts exhibit; and
•

Territorial-national nexus and the ‘regimes of territorial legetimation’ it relies on

determine the conflict’s patterns of domination and exclusion-inclusion. Conditions of
either integration or separation emerge from the structures of domination and exclusioninclusion that shape the main properties of the conflict. Systems of settler-colonial
domination premised on ethno-territorial exclusion obtain a high degree of sustainability
and durability due to their integral nature; and
4

•

Both ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ and structures of domination that serve

their persistence are subject to internal dynamics of change and transformation as well as
external influences. The most important among which are: the characteristics and
political strategy of the challenging ethno-national group/people, and international
legetimation or delegitimation of a certain definition of the ethno-territorial
underpinnings of an accepted outcome.
The conflicts in South Africa and Palestine offer a rich illustration to these interrelated
and combined factors. As ethno-national conflicts they are characterized with the
persistent pursuit of self-determination for the subordinate groups, the Africans and the
Palestinians peoples. Ethno-nationalism represents the ties that bound a group of people
that has “a common origin and ‘tribal’ [kinship ties] affiliation of its members, a shared
history, culture, language, and, most often, a common dominant religion” (Klein
2010:10).

The interrelatedness between these factors makes particular ethnic

peoples/groups politically significant and relevant; they pursue political goals and they
are politically mobilized and organized to achieve these goals. Different aspects of these
conflicts and their multidimensionality and inter-group splits do not make them less
ethno-national (Connor 1990: 19). Moreover, inter-group splits may be a result of the
conflicts’ politics and internal rivalries and competitions over the most appropriate means
to achieve independence or autonomy; they do not necessarily imply different
interpretations of the underlying stakes of the conflict. For instance, although religious
beliefs have a clear correlation with national identity especially in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, it is fundamentally a struggle over national identity, territory, and civil rights. In
5

South Africa the complexity of the conflict and the different affiliations of the adversaries
do not undermine the comparability to the other conflicts in terms of its clear ethnonational dimension (Conor 1990: 20-21). To be sure, ethno-nationalism was prevalent
and turned the conflicts into protracted and complicated struggles for the realization of
national identity and self-determination, which makes forging a single national
consciousness rather less likely taking into account their ethno-national rigidity.
The establishment of a unitary state under this condition seems less likely. Indeed,
when the conflict implies aggressive and violent struggle between two imagined or real
national identities it becomes rather elusive to attain an integrative outcome of the
conflict as the protagonists see the existence of one as the negation of the other. The
struggle in this case is ostensibly a zero-sum game whereby the achievement of one’s
national goals implies vanquishing the other.
Ethno-national conflicts of the type discussed in this research are multi-dimensional,
protracted (and at some point intractable), they reflect endemic asymmetrical power
relationships and identity struggles; these features result in violence and bitter
antagonism between opposing groups” (Nic Craith 2002:12) in which subordinate groups’
demand for self-determination represents group’s persistent sought for political
recognition as a collective national. Thus, national movements in both settings waged
their struggle against the state for the achievement of self-determination for their peoples.
More to the purpose of this research, the divergence in outcome of the two cases is
striking and merits systematic examination of the conditions that created it. Whereas
Africans’ self-determination in South Africa was uplifted within a democratic liberation
6

struggle namely, the achievement of civic self-determination, the Palestinian struggle
developed in the sought of national self-determination (theoretical treatment of the
national versus civic self determination is illustrated in chapter II). A cursory look at the
current state of the Israeli –Palestinian conflict set the stage for articulating the
parameters of the research, the logic of comparison, and research methodology that
follow.

Reshaping ethno-territoriality in Palestine

The two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in a structural impasse:
While the existence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is circumscribed and crippled by
Israel’s military domination, the territorial and spatial domain of the Palestinian state is
shrinking by Israeli colonial settlement expansion. During 1990s-2000s the PalestinianIsraeli protracted conflict has entered an era of stalemate under the auspices of Oslo
agreements1. The agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) developed in a protracted “peace process” 2 in which Israeli occupation has
rearranged its domination over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), and the PLO
turned into an authority whereas its declared objectives were not achieved especially
1

Officially the Accords are called ‘The declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”
(DOP).
2

The term refers to the protracted negotiating rounds between the two parties; PLO and Israel since 1993.
The phrase, as William B. Quandt (2005) correctly indicates, is used to describe the USA approach to the
Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This approach is characterized by a gradual step-by-step- strategy to
resolve this conflict. USA diplomacy in this regard focuses more on the process than on the substance of
the issues at stake; how to resolve these issues rather than what substantively should be done.
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national self-determination. As Klein (2010) notices the Oslo process has turned the
conflict into a struggle over borders between two, supposedly distinct political and legal
entities rather than a struggle over national self-determination.
However, following the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000; Israel conquered and took
over the areas under the Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction, which reversed the conflict
dynamics back to their ethno-national territorial properties as a struggle for national selfdetermination. Taking into account Israel’s continued control over most of the OPT and
the enclavization of the Palestinians within major residential areas (main cities) coupled
colonial settlement expansion, the realization of a Palestinian independent sovereign state
has become more elusive.
Nonetheless, the two-state outcome remains the targeted, and negotiated, outcome of
the conflict. It represents Palestinians’ political and national aspiration for selfdetermination on OPT as declared by the PLO in1974and in 1988 as we discuss in
Chapter IX. This outcome receives Israeli formal acceptance and international
community’s endorsement. Moreover, it seems that the validity of the two-state outcome
derives strength as it provides both adversaries with what they are seeking: independence
for the Palestinians and disengagement from the Palestinian population for the Israelis.
The latter understanding of this outcome complicates a compromise that may lead to the
achievement of a sovereign Palestinian state: disengagement from the population while
controlling the territory renders this outcome meaningless.
International legitimation of the two-state solution reflects international rejection of
Israel’s military occupation of the OPT since 1967. The legitimacy Israel gained for its
8

territorial boundaries is enshrined the United Nation Resolution 181 of 1947 that
partitioned Palestine in two states; Jewish and Arab. Therefore, Israel’s occupation of
1967 remains illegal and the resolution 181 is still the legal basis for Israel’s existence.
Thus

Israel “has not been able to induce widespread acceptance of the de facto

extension of its borders achieved through its victory in the 1967 war” (Farer 2008: 181),
which maintains the status of the OPT as subject to relevant international covenants on
self-determination and belligerent occupation.

In reality, though, Israeli authorities

practice the power of a sovereign authority in large parts of the OPT. Thus, inasmuch as
the establishment of a Palestinian state is a subject of an apparent consensus and many
UN resolutions and other International covenants and laws3, it seems today far away from
reality.
The establishment of a Palestinian state under Israel’ control of most the area of the
OPT creates a chasm between territorial integrity essential for the realization of statehood
and the right of national self-determination; two inextricably linked aspects of modern

3

For example, when the International Court of Justice conducted its legal proceedings In July 2002 on
Israel's apartheid wall on the West Bank, the World Court invited the State of Palestine to participate in
the proceedings. In other words, the International Court of Justice recognized the State of Palestine. The
ICJ ruled that the Israeli Wall is illegal. The ICJ justified its rule by recognizing that “the construction of the
wall and its regime create a fait accompli on the ground…it would be tantamount to de facto annexation”
of large areas of the OPT. This legal foundation of a Palestinian state was created long before the ICJ rule.
For example the UN security Council, in resolution 465 (1980) stressed that “all measures taken by Israel
to change [any aspect or feature] of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967…have
no legal validity…and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting
peace in the Middle east”(Abunimah 2006: 32-36).
Palestine has Observer State Status with the United Nations Organization, and basically all the rights of a
U.N. Member State except the right to vote. Effectively, Palestine has de facto U.N. Membership. These
manifestations have their roots in the U.N. General Assembly's Partition Resolution 181(II) of 1947 that
called for the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state in the Mandate Palestine. Furthermore, it is a
widely accepted position that Palestinian people has a fundamental right to self-determination as
recognized by the United Nations Charter and general principles of public international law, and that
Israeli military occupation of the OPT is subject to the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949.
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statehood. It is a well-established principle in international law that the nation determines
the future and the political form of the region/territory not the opposite (Falk 2000: 47).
Moreover, behind this principle there exists as well a
“power moral concern, namely the creation of the conditions that enable people to give
coherent shape to their sense of collective identity…A gathering of people in place to
which they have been randomly or arbitrarily assigned, cannot accomplish that” (Farer
2008:182).
Israeli control over the territory and space of the OPT prevents Palestinians’ ability to
form, sustain, and develop this collective right without which a state would be a mere
construct void of meaning and at best a client state (See Khan, Giacaman 2004: 4-6, 5053 and 112-115) whereby Palestinians can enjoy the trappings of sovereignty and some
symbolism of statehood while Israel maintains actual control and sovereignty over the
territory. The requirements of the establishment of a sovereign nation-state are missing in
this blueprint. As Aruri (2003: 174) rightfully stresses, a state
without sovereignty, without geographic continuity, and without control over its
borders, airspace, and economic and water resources… In fact it would be a
state within Israel, but not alongside Israel.
A Palestinian state under these circumstances would be a bi-furcated state that
enjoys no more real autonomy than has South African Bantustans” (Fare 2008: 188).
However, while the Bantustan policy in South Africa was defeated in favor of none-racial
and ethnically neutral democracy, it prevails in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a proxy
for separation and Palestinian statehood. This research aims at answering this question
using the comparative approach.

10

Parameters of the Study

Ethno-national conflicts are classified, in a broader sense in ways that assist interpreting
their properties. Heraclides, for example, presented a detailed classification of ethnonational armed conflicts that range from irredentist to secessionist and separatist
autonomous movements (Cited in Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010: 4). These cases
represent a larger universe of similar cases of ethno-national conflicts with diverse
outcomes that range from realizing the principle and right of national self-determination
and independence to the creation of a unitary democratic state and in between these two
extremes. This classification of ethno-national conflicts serves as a leading analytical tool
to explaining their paths. Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2007: 6,42, 43)detailed study on powersharing and power-dividing institutions after the termination of civil wars includes a
useful resource to learn about the dynamics that may lead to this type or another of
outcomes of a conflict. Among thirty-eight conflicts they have examined between19451999 they identify but few cases resulted in extensively or highly institutionalized
integrative political entities; South Africa stands as a leading example. The model,
inasmuch as it provides us with important insight to the similarities and differences
between conflicts included in this research, it is limited to power-sharing/power-dividing
negotiated outcomes whereas the comparison in this study seeks explanations of ethnonational conflicts, which travels beyond civil wars and power-sharing treatments. It
examines a broader phenomenon and more varied results. From the establishment of a
Federal Constitutional Republic in Nigeria in 1960 to the emergence of a Democratic
republic in India 1974-1950, and from Kashmiri autonomy crafted in 1947 to Timor
11

Leste’s independence of 1999-2000 and the stalemate status of West Saharan conflict, the
striking divergence of outcomes merits extensive systematic examination and represents
the wider context of my research and the universe of cases from which the cases
evaluated here are selected (See also Nic Craith 2002:136-138 and Erin Jenne 2006: 79).
The two cases of South Africa and Palestine differ in many aspects: they are
characterized by diverse social, economic, geopolitical and other important features,
which make comparison challenging. However; they share at least one key similarity:
they are to different degrees coming out of their respective conflicts following different
approaches to peace and political settlement and different levels of integration-separation.
Therefore, they are selected on the variation they show in their outcome (the dependent
variable). Thus they present a laboratory to in-depth interpretation the patterns of ethnonational conflicts and the conditions that generate their convergent outcomes.
This research sees the diverse outcomes as different points on a continuum that depicts
the dynamics of ethno-national conflicts and their demise. The cases selected represent a
plausible representation of this diversity of outcomes. Had we drawn all cases on a
continuum with conflict climax is in the center, South Africa would have occupied the
left extreme and embodies full integration in a unitary state, and Palestine-Israeli case
lags at the right side of the center with the outcome is still in the making but preoccupied
with separation. In this the Palestinian case resembles other cases such as Timor Leste
whereas one finds different degrees of institutional arrangements for power sharing and
autonomy in between these two extremes such as the Northern Ireland power-sharing.
12

Thus, the main consideration has been taken into account in case selection of this
research is to find incidents of variance of the outcomes of the conflict across cases.
However, the embedding the cases of this dissertation in the broader phenomenon of
ethno-national conflicts does not suffice in order to fully justify some important aspects
of the comparison, which requires further illustrations.

The question of comparability

This research implements the comparative case study based on structured and focused
approach of similar cases, South Africa and Palestine in order to explain their divergent
outcomes. The study treats the two cases as principally types of ethno-national conflicts
that resulted from the dynamics and excesses of settler-colonial domination systems; each
of which has developed and concluded in a different outcome.
In principle, the comparative approach is an important research tool in discussing the
conditions that prevail in Palestine/Israel as a whole and their relationship to the question
of the emergence of a democratic outcome of the conflict. As discussed below,
comparisons are meant to capture similarities and differences between Israeli system of
domination and the South African regime of segregation and apartheid. In this sense
peculiarities of each case are as crucial as commonalities. Thus, this study is not aimed at
labeling. Nor it seeks to introduce normative perspectives or ideological claims. Rather, it
examines systematically the parallels between two similar cases of unique types of
domination systems to explain their different outcomes. Nonetheless, comparing South
13

African apartheid with Israeli regime in Palestine stirs contentious debates as to its merits
and foundations. This research challenges the claim that the two cases are incomparable.
The contentious nature of the comparison
Some prominent Israeli politicians and statesmen use the analogy with apartheid at least
as a looming threat to the state of Israel: Former Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
stresses that the failure of the two-state solution will lead to a situation similar to South
African apartheid (quoted in Bakan and Abu-Laban 201:1 336). Current Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak roars warning his fellow Israelis that the failure to achieve peace
with the Palestinians would end up in a state where Israel has no Jewish majority or an
apartheid regime (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2011: 338). These statements indicate that a
system of certain type of apartheid is developing in the OPT. However, drawing
comparisons between South African apartheid and Israeli domination over the Palestinian
people, within the state of Israel and in the OPT, is a source of discontent and refusal by
the Zionist movement and Israeli politicians, and many adherents of Israel in the USA,
Canada and to a lesser degree in Europe.
For those who reject the comparison, comparing Israel to apartheid is a deliberate
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state itself. The efforts made by Israel
and its allies in the western countries to prevent all attempts to comparing Israel and
apartheid resulted in boycotting some international conferences and forums by the USA,
Canada, Israel and other states. Two UN sponsored ‘World Conferences Against Racism’
in 2011 and 2009, which are global in their focus, were interrupted by calls to boycott
because they were planned to discuss Israel in relation to international law, racism, and a
14

new kind of apartheid. Perhaps no single book on Israel’s domination as apartheid has
generated heated debates more that former US President Jimmy Carter’s Palestine: Peace
not Apartheid (2007). The book is a New York Times Best Seller and has generated a lot
of criticism and debates as to the degree it represents or depicts reality in Palestine.
Palestine: Peace not Apartheid aims at presenting facts about the Middle East that are
largely unknown in the USA. Carter argues that the main two obstacles to peace in the
M.E are that some Israelis insist on confiscating Palestinian lands and colonizing the
Palestinian people and the insistent of some Palestinians to respond with violence. In the
face of growing roars against the book, Carter’s defense is that the book was not about
Israel; rather it is about “Palestine; the occupied territories; forced segregation in the
West Bank and terrible oppression of the Palestinians create a situation accurately
described by the word” apartheid (quoted in Bakan and Abu-Laban 2010: 334). He goes
on to clarify that he sees Israel as a
…wonderful democracy where everyone has guaranteed equal rights, and where,
under the law, Arabs and Jews who are Israelis have the same privileges about
Israel. That's been most of the controversy because people assume it's about Israel.
It's not.”
The core issue in this respect is that comparison with apartheid implies the existence of
state sponsored racist practices and policies, which utterly rebuffed by Zionism and the
state of Israel. Zionist’s arguments presented to defy the charge have a common thread of
reasoning: the Zionist movement is actually a national liberation movement that emerged
and established its own national-state while being fundamentally inclusive and
democratic. Accordingly, the Jewish never claimed superior to any other peoples or races;
thus Israel was founded as, and is still pluralistic. Jews themselves come from a wide
15

array of racial identifications that Israel absorbed without exception, so the argument
proceeds (Tilley2005: 137). To these arguments this research presents two responses; the
first has to do with the broader permissibility of the comparison, and the second with the
substantive justifications for comparison.
The comparative approach of this study is meant to contribute to the discussion on the
hindrances that impede, until today, reaching a political settlement to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. Comparison in this sense is a useful and necessary venue to
understanding the stakes of the conflict. It seeks to capture the properties of domination
structures embedded in Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and its relationship
with the very nature of Israel as a state. In comparing Israeli domination system to
Afrikaner nationalist rule and apartheid in South Africa this research is interested in
deconstructing the asymmetrical relationships and modalities of power and exclusion that
distinguish settler-colonial societies and their underlying ethno-territorial configurations.
Thus the comparative perspective is important to providing better understanding to
ethno-national conflicts and their divergent outcomes. Moreover, this comparison is a
useful tool for understanding state formation and dynamics of change. Thus it aims at
exploring systematically the conditions that are conducive to a democratic solution of
such conflicts. To reject the comparison on ideological or political grounds deprives the
research on the phenomenon from a rich source of empirical revelations on the nature and
development of settler-colonial societies.
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Terminology and substantive comparison
Apartheid represents a case of racial contract that underpins racist domination as a
relationship between unequal groups: racism here defined as any system of differentiation
and inequality. UN Resolution 2016 of 1965 clearly defines racism in terms that render
Israeli policies against non-Jews a racist action. Apartheid is a generic policy associated
with all colonial-settler states and it is a policy framework that is based on racial and/or
ethnic exclusivity as the resolution eloquently states. As this study contends, Israel’s
domination over the Palestinians in the entire Palestine is characterized essentially and
primarily by its ethno-national differentiation system. From this perspective, the
comparison with the South African apartheid regime consists with international law. The
United Nations Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid (or the Apartheid Convention) although was established to deal with the South
African regime of apartheid it is applied generically regardless of the country or specific
context. The fact that neither the pre-state Zionist movement nor the state of Israel has
ever spelled out an official policy of discrimination against the Palestinians, and Israel
did not institute discriminatory practices in one fell swoop doesn’t conceal the structural
discriminatory properties that defines the state of Israel as a self-defined Jewish state.
Discrimination, inequality, and differentiation on ethno-religious bases worked in a
piecemeal fashion to constrain Palestinian rights and access to resources especially land.
In other words, separation in the OPT has been a process whose legal contours are
harder to discern and whose name has yet to circulate abroad while discrimination in
Israeli proper against Palestinians cannot be denied. Thus apartheid as a generic concept
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applies to Israeli domination over the Palestinians as much as it pertains to the white
Afrikaner subordination of the Black Africans although it doesn’t replicate it. Nor the
absence of a name for Israel’s settler-colonial domination over the Palestinians implies
that the concept of apartheid does not apply. Israeli/Zionist Jewish domination over nonJews in Palestine is primarily a “racial contract between the state of Israel and powerful
allies [that] has worked to absent Palestinians through extreme repression and
statelessness” (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2010: 332). Obviously this contract granted the
Jewish immigrant society a super-ordinate status in political, social, economic, and
cultural realms. Approaching Israel’s domination system from the point view of apartheid
categorizes its system in order to explain its properties and the conditions it created that
pertain to our main task: identifying the conditions that made the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict unique in spite of the fundamental similarities it has with South Africa.
Israel’s system of domination is based on a fundamentally discriminatory jurisprudence;
its basic laws differentiate between Jews and non-Jews where nationality and a wide set
of rights attached to it are granted exclusively to Jews. Whether in the Israeli proper or in
the OPT rights and obligations are predicated upon individuals’ ethnic affiliation, their
geographical location, and their ethno-nationality defined in terms of Jewishness. Thus,
this research approaches the whole Palestine as a single unit of analysis: Israel has
established its domination by creating dual structures within Israel and within the OPT
both relate to the same origins and utilize different degrees of discrimination and
exclusion, which makes the analogy with South Africa more relevant.
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Similarities and dissimilarities
The cases of South Africa and Israel/Palestine are not identical. Nor the Israeli settlercolonial domination replicates that of apartheid in South Africa. This dissertation
recognizes that the prevalence of historical contexts and structures of colonial and ethnonational domination that establish the initial conditions for comparison, doesn’t obfuscate
the importance of peculiarities and specificities of the two cases. Thus, although this
research recognizes Israel’s system as apartheid, it contends that Israel’s represents a type
of its own.
The first similarity that makes the comparison warranted is that the two cases sprung
from colonial-settler settings; in both settings settler societies were transformed into
ethno-territorial peoples. They represent the product of ethno-nationalist specific claims
to territory and hegemony over indigenous populations. Afrikaners and Zionist Israeli
Jews are settler societies in domination.

However; none of those societies’

spokespersons use any of the terminology of colonization and do their best to distant their
practices from the heritage of colonialism (Oberschall 2007: 158). Each society, on its
own account, justified its colonization by constructing collective myths and ideologies
that justify aggressive colonization of their respective terrains. Zionism and Afrikaner
nationalism were defensive and self-contained and applied different levels of exclusion
and subordination of Black Africans and Palestinians (Akenson 1992: 120). As settler
colonial systems, the two regimes were challenged by national liberation movements that
sought self-determination and developed through various stages over the greater part of
the 20th century (Pearlman 2011:187).
19

The main feature of these struggles can be assessed in terms of conflicting ethnonationalist claims of political control over a specific territory, which endowed these
conflicts with common particular properties, as presented in the conceptual framework
(Chapter II) of this study. Both the South African and Palestinian national movements
fought the state and another ethno-national group that the state preserves. Preserving the
survival and supremacy of the dominant ethnic group by the state generated the dynamics
of exclusion/inclusion that shaped the asymmetrical relationships of the adversaries and
defined the types of power deployed to maintain domination. In this respect, different
levels and degrees of exclusion and inclusion that characterize the two systems are
considered one of the most crucial differences that shaped the ethno-political geography
of the two conflicts.
Finally, and perhaps the most important, both regimes applied regimes of territorial
segregation and separation to undermine the ability of their adversary to gain political
viability. In South Africa territorial separation was instrumental in confining the Black
African while exploiting their work force. Thus, as Farsakh (2005) puts it, Afrikaner
nationalists, especially the National Party since 1948 sought to control the land and the
people together especially in the wake of 1948 by implementing the Bantustan policy.
Zionist movement in the pre-state phase sought to control the land without the people,
and in 1947-8 it opted to expulsion and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. Following
the 1967 war, the complexity of Israeli territorial separation was deepened with the
establishment of Jewish-only settlements in the OPT. In both cases the Israeli/Zionist
underpinnings of territorial control and separation, as we discuss in our empirical analysis
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differs from that of South African apartheid. This point brings us to the dissimilarities
between the two cases.
The dissimilarities between the two cases are important and they hold the key to
understanding the conditions that prevailed and made the democratic outcome possible in
South Africa while impeded the same conclusion in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Initially, the most striking difference between the two cases is the extent to which the
Zionist movement stretched the logic of ethnic-territorial separation much further than
the South African regime did. The Zionist movement and the state of Israel ethnically
cleansed the indigenous Palestinians and attached fundamental meanings to territorial
acquisition and spatial expansion as an imperative; territorial control and total exclusion
are the main two properties of Israel’s domination system. Although the white ethnonationalism in South Africa included land confiscations, segregation and territorial
separation, these features were sought functionally and exclusion practiced was partial.
The climax of South African racial-colonial system was reached in the implementation
of apartheid and the Bantustan policy that “reflected some effort at genuine separation
and, to few Afrikaner dreamers, the possibility of securing an overwhelmingly white state”
(Tilley 2005: 136). Therefore total ethnic (racial) cleansing of the indigenous in South
Africa was never entertained by the white society. Indeed, a certain degree of inclusion
prevailed in all stages of the development of the regime; economic inclusion and a
minimum political incorporation (See Younis 2000) of African population created a kind
of de facto integration of the Blacks although as a subordinate cast. Exploitation, political
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exclusion, and social and ethnic-racial differentiation were the fundamental organizing
elements of the white domination system in South Africa.
The case with the Zionist domination in Palestine differs in terms of the total exclusion
of the indigenous Palestinians it practiced from the outset. “Hebrew Labor” policy that
the movement applied in the Yishuvs (Jewish communities in Hebrwe) by which jobs
were exclusively preserved for the Jews reflected a doctrine of Jewish ethno-nationalism
not a mere economic mechanism. As a movement that aimed at spiritual, political, and
cultural fulfillment of Jewish ethno-religious identity, it focused on redemption and
spatial insulation as the core tenet of Jewish-nationalism. This peculiar property explains
the expulsion of the vast majority of the indigenous Palestinian population in 1947-8 in
order to create a Jewish majority.
Finally, the responses to domination and apartheid by the Palestinian and South African
national movements show a significant difference. The African National Congress (ANC)
and most elements of the anti-apartheid movement never accepted regimes classifications
of the South Africans on the bases of their racial-ethnic affiliation. These forces
consistently challenged the regime for the establishment of South Africa as a unitary and
democratic non-racial state. The Palestinian national movement, by contrast, dropped the
goal of liberation and democratization in favor of national-self determination within the
OPT. Thus it accepted the ethno-territorial logic of Zionism and the state of Israel as the
base for a political settlement. The implications of this difference are enormous as this
research unveils.
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International position in the two cases is another important difference. The discrepancy
in international intervention in both cases “illuminates the political and moral inadequacy
of Western critical reticence” (Tilley 2005: 139) and helps to understand how and why
racial colonialism and apartheid in South Africa couldn’t escape the logic and image of
settler-colonial racist regime while Israel could. These powers never used the discourse
of “mutual recognition”, “dialogue”, mutual concessions”, “land for peace”…etc in the
South African conflict that it applies to the Palestinian-Israeli one. Rather international
pressure was aimed at the very foundation of domination relationships in South Africa.
Whereas international community supported the South African anti-apartheid movement
in demanding a full democratic and non-racial regime and national unity, it stands
strongly behind separation and ethnically-based solution in Palestine, which validates
ethno-national domination of the Jewish and endorses the Zionist exclusivist ideology.

Research Methodology

This research departs from a methodological commitment that social phenomena do not
result from or the function of a single ‘most important’ factor. Rather, it is more likely
that phenomena such as ethno-national conflict that we entertain here stem from, develop,
and terminate from dynamic and overlapped factors. The decline of a given ethnonational conflict is not a linear effect of correlated independent and dependent variables
(IVs and DVs); rather it reflects the effects of overlapping factors. Thus, this research
problematizes different systems of domination and separation deployed by a dominant
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ethno-national group against the indigenous group/people. The goal in this sense is to
uncover the causal path/s and causal chains that enable us to understanding the conflicts
in South Africa and Palestine and how they developed in a divergent manner in spite of
their similarities.
Ultimately, the methods deployed in this dissertation seek answers to the questions:
What are the characteristics in common between these cases, and where and how they
diverge to produce different outcomes? How similarities and dissimilarities between them
enable us to understand the current state of affairs of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
especially the prospects for the emergence of one-civic-democratic state in Palestine? In
other words, we seek to show how ostensibly similar situations have led to different
outcomes. To be sure that the research is not comparing ‘calk and cheese’ the comparison
is conceptually-oriented by concepts that pertain to the two cases, presented in the
conceptual framework in Chapter II. Concepts of settler-colonial domination systems,
ethno-national territorial nexus, separation and segregation, and apartheid are introduced
as the anchors of comparison which embrace the two cases.
This research is a case-oriented for an in-depth empirical investigation of the two cases
in hand through comparative strategy - ‘that is, it aims at rich descriptions of a few
instances of a certain phenomenon…[and] seeks to understand the complex units’ (della
Porta 2008: 198). As such, this inquiry aims at revealing the processes and explaining the
causal chains that make a particular outcome of the two conflicts prevalent. Thus, this
study presents an “interpretive case study” using theoretical frameworks to provide an
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explanation of particular cases using two strategies: ‘method of difference’ and ‘process
tracing’.
There are three major approaches to comparative inquiry that aim at studying social
change or different historical trajectories of specific social phenomena. Each one of them
has its own logic and has its strength and weaknesses (Skocpol and Somers 1980). This
inquiry applies the ‘method of difference’ to contrasts ‘positive (affirmative) case’ whereby ethno-national struggle ends in integration- to other ‘negative case’ whereby the
integrative outcome is not existent in spite of important similarities the two cases exhibit.
The figure below illustrates this strategy. Factors a through d are the similar properties of
the cases examined and analyzed while factors e through g represent the combination of
causal variables that explain the difference in outcome that appears in the last row of the
table. The table below shows the logic of difference this research implements where the
factors X represent the core conceptual attributes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
explain the difference of outcome it exhibits.
The research also applies the method of “process tracing” for within case comparisons.
Process tracing is aimed at identifying the processes linking a set of initial conditions
(colonial-settler domination systems in our research) to particular outcomes (integration
and separation in our cases). Thus it examines multiple features of each case to assess
causal and constitutive relations between factors; this requires a close examination of
causal mechanisms that make the correspondence between these factors and their
ultimate outcomes more concrete.

25

The importance of causal mechanisms in this sense is to go beyond correlations and to
uncover the links between causes and their effects. Causal mechanisms reveal why and
how these causes produce particular effects, which better captures the complexities of a
unit (case) and empower the research with a tool that takes analysis beyond descriptive
treatment toward explanation and understanding (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Moreover,
causal mechanisms explain why the same factors, in a comparative setting, can produce
different outcomes. This is the ultimate goal of our research: why the same certain set of
factors trigger different mechanisms and henceforth why the processes culminate in a
very different manner. This approach aims at uncovering the ‘cogs and wheels’ that make
the relationship between explanatory factors and their effects possible in the first place
(Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 8). In this light the research aims at examining the
following hypotheses:



The salience of exclusive “regimes of territorial legitimation’ as the defining
element of settler-colonial ethno-nationality and the mechanisms they triggers
endow the conflict with an indivisible subjective dimension that stiffens political
demands and galvanizes identity manifestations. It therefore gives the conflict an
existential property that reduces significantly, if not terminates integration;

•

A segregation and separation system of domination is institutionalized on territorial
and spatial imperatives; combining political power with geographical and spatial
exclusion and control, further prolongs ethno-national conflicts and impedes

26

forging a common national identity necessary for integration. However, it may have
unintended consequences that under specific conditions leads to integration;
•

The dual international effect of legitimating and de-legitimating the antagonists’
demands to an ethno-national conflict plays a key role in integration or separation
by creating convergence of external and internal pressure for regime change.

‘Positive (affirmative) Case’4 :

‘Negative (disconfirming) Case’:

South Africa

Palestine

State Foundation and properties

State Foundation and properties

Demographic attributes

Demographic attributes

Key actors’ interests and perceptions

Key actors’ interests and perceptions

Duration of the conflict

Duration of the conflict

National-territorial nexus

X

Organizing elements of the domination

X

system
External factors

X

Outcome: Decomposition of domination

Outcome: conflict continuation and

and integrated political entity

separation

4

‘Positive’ ‘negative’ and ‘control’ cases in this context do not imply any normative or value-laden
expressions. They are a mere methodological tool to show the cases that show consistent outcomes of
the same phenomenon and the others that their outcomes vary (See Skocpol and Somers 1980).

27

Outline of Dissertation Chapters

In addition to this chapter, this dissertation consists of another eight chapters and a
closing section. Chapter II details the conceptual and theoretical framework of the
research. First it offers a critical review of the comparative research on the subject matter
of the dissertation and then discusses the boundaries of ethno-national conflicts and the
challenges and aspects of peoples’ struggle for self-determination. Then it proceeds to
establish the centrality of ethno-national territorial nexus as the core concept that I
represent the main analytical tool of the study. Finally it presents the concept of “state
contraction” to examine the plausibility and explanatory power of the theoretical
approach.
Chapters III to VI address the South African case within a historical approach: in
chapter III addresses the foundation and underpinnings of racial-colonial Afrikaner
ethno-nationalism to show the role of “regimes of territorial legitimation” in shaping the
structures of the conflict; chapter IV presents an interpretation of apartheid as an ethnicnational territorial system of domination and separation; and chapter V discusses the
decline of apartheid and the failure of Afrikaner ethno-nationality to re-establish the
conflict in terms of ethno-territorial properties.
In chapters VI through IX the study engages in empirical examination of the main
properties of the conflict as an ethno-territorial construct. These chapters are analytically
formatted to discuss main themes of research conceptual treatement: chapter VI
underlines the perspective of the study on the one-state solution; it critically presents
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prevailing discussion on the issue and shows that approaching it as an emergence
property is more useful to capture its conditions. Then the chapter addresses the origins
of the conflict as a settler-colonial-indigenous struggle over ethno-territorial existence.
Chapter VII presents a territorial-spatial interpretation of the Zionist movement’s settlercolonialism and examines the formation of the state of Israel in terms of its “regimes of
territorial legitimation”. It emphasizes the ethnocratic nature of the state that makes it a
peculiar type of apartheid. Chapter VIII addresses the expansion of Israel’s ethnoterritorial domination well over the entire of Palestine in the wake of 1967 war and the
occupation of the OPT. Finally, chapter IX addresses the rise and development of the
Palestinian national movement. It emphasizes the dialectical constitution and reconstitution of the movement in its relationship and responses to Israel’s ethnoterritoriality. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to discuss Israeli exceptionalism
in terms of international effects on the main properties of the conflict. Chapter X presents
the conclusion and main comparative findings of the research.
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Chapter II
Conceptualizing the national-territorial nexus of self-determination
Introduction
This research, from a theoretical perspective bridges on the dichotomy between
structural and agent-based approaches to ethno-national conflicts. In this sense, the
research differs from traditional conflict resolution treatment that emphasizes decisionmaking and elite politics in explaining the conflicts in South Africa and Palestine (e.g.
Gidron 2002, Knox and Quirk 2000). This study focuses on major structures and
processes without undermining the effects of interaction between structures and human
agency. Thus it complements holistic approaches (e.g. Akenson 1992, Connors 2000, and
Macdonald 1990) by calling for attention the dialectics of events, actors’ actions, and
contingency along with major structures in creating causal chains that determine the
trajectory and outcome of the conflict.
This research draws on structural-historical analysis to understanding ethnonationalism and conflicts related to ethno-national systems of domination and their
trajectories. Thus it takes the settler-colonial origins of these conflicts as the reference
point of conceptualization and analysis. However, structural-historical analysis does not
tell the whole story of divergent outcomes of similar ethno-national conflicts: historical
contexts and big structures have to be combined with the specificity and peculiarity of
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each case to uncover the dissimilarities between cases that show how each case
developed in a unique trajectory and different outcome.
Conceptual framework that follows addresses ethno-national conflicts as an
eclectic approach through three moves: First it situate the issue of self-determination
within the question of settler-colonial settings, then it highlights the main characteristics
of ethno-national conflicts and their implications for the question of integration versus
separation. Second, this chapter turns to examine the origins of ethno-national conflicts
to show how the initial structures of the conflict determine the trajectory it takes; Third it
discuss the centrality of territorial-national ideologies or ‘regimes of territorial
legetimation’ as the most important factors in shaping the trajectories ethno-national
conflicts take. Finally theory of “state contraction” presented in the way of examining the
plausibility of the concepts suggested toexplain the divergence of outcome in ethnonational conflicts.

Self-determination in Settler-colonial domination systems

The importance of the principle and right of self-determination is that it represents
one of the most powerful sources of legitimacy for the struggle of both peoples against
their respective adversaries. Indeed, the principle has been the premise upon which many
national and ethno-national groups gained independence in Africa and Asia. The power
of the principle and successful struggles in these regions has emboldened Africans and
Palestinians’ struggle to gain the right of self-determination. It is remarkable the extent
31

to which this principle “developed into an anti-colonial norm of international law in the
second half of the twentieth century” (Hannum 2006: 61); it reflected the change of
international order as a whole in terms of embracing new norms and principles pertaining
to the shifts in world-politics.
Although international order and regional configurations of power have changed the
efficacy and prevalence of the principle of self-determination have not diminished or
eroded. As far as colonial legacies are concerned, the principle still holds. For example,
Farer (2008:177) asserts that the term “colonial entities acquired the generic name of
‘non-self-governing territories’ is applicable to Palestine” under British mandate of 1922.
Farer argues that although the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, that restricts or
qualifies the principle of self-determination by the consideration of ‘territorial integrity’
of states, the principle still applicable to two precedents of “dividing non-self-governing
territories where the desire of separation” is plain and evident; these two cases are India
and Palestine.
Resulting from partitioning a particular country, or by colonial settlement
enterprise, or by direct military rule, indigenous people’s right of self-determination is
indisputable in international law (see Falk 2002: 31-66). However, the two cases of South
Africa and Palestine show a very unique type of settler-colonialism by which the settlercolonial society developed an ethno-national identity and the structures of a distinct
people. Dynamics of these types of conflicts show a number of patterns as to the ways in
which the right of self-determination is being sought: from separation to integration and
in between them different types of autonomy and power-sharing. In South Africa
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democratization and civic self-determination prevailed while in Palestine liberation and
national self-determination is still the main character of the conflict. Theoretically
speaking, this divergent merits an appropriate approach to account for its underpinnings.
Characteristics and manifestations of ethno-national conflicts

The three most important of characteristics of ethno-national conflicts are: The
asymmetrical power relationships inherited in them; demographic balance or the
minority-majority syndrome; and their protracted character. They are embedded in the
literature on ethnic-conflicts as the explaining factors of the rigidity they show, as
discussed below. We derive from the discussion of each character the mechanisms and
dynamics that underlay ethno-national conflict and shape their trajectory. This
dissertation approaches these characteristics as interactive and overlapping system of
subordination and domination in which the state plays a central role. The practice is
aimed at depicting the circular manner in which these characteristics generate each other
to yield a complex of grieves and grievances that galvanize national identities and
increase the propensity of violence and hinders democratization.

Asymmetrical Power Relationships and Domination
Ethno-national conflicts arising from settler-colonial settings embody deeply
rooted and persistent asymmetrical power relations between the adversaries.

The

dominating regimes in these settings have ruled the subordinate groups by means of force,
coercion, exploitation and exclusion. State power in this context is harnessed by the
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dominant ethno-national group to sustain and preserve its political hegemony and socioeconomic privileges. We draw on Michael Foucault’s conception of power and
domination as complementary forces deployed to create a sphere of deep influence over
the subordinate with minimum costs and liabilities for the dominant. Thus the state resort
to three strands of power: disciplinary (creating conformity in the behavior of individuals
to norms and laws exerted by the state), bio-power (silencing the group as a collective
mass by oppressing it political organization and preventing its mobilization) and
sovereign power (imposing state sovereignty; juridical and legal systems partially or
totally) to dominate, control, and silence the subordinate ethno-national challenger. The
state implements a set of institutional and procedural instruments: economic, social,
political, civic, and statistical in order to atomize the population and bore its national
identity (Gordon 2008: 11-15). Domination, therefore, is defined as the processes, tools,
institutions, and procedures that aim at directing the actions of individuals and the
population in conformity with expected conduct. The role of state power in this sense is
central in sustaining ethno-national and territorial underpinnings of domination and to
tame, oppress, and annihilate national aspirations of the challenger.
One of states’ most prevalent structures of domination is exclusion and separation
and/or segregation that implemented in different levels at differing capacities. Ultimately
they aim at preserve the supremacy of the ethno-national dominating settlers’ society.
Drawing clear lines of differentiation between ethno-national groups (defined racially, or
on religious or ethnic grounds) assumes a powerful and central state with high degree of
statism and institutional coherency to sustain such a system. Settler-colonial regimes
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show a distinct level of statism as Akenson (1992) argues; they are preoccupied with
asserting sovereignty and self-righteousness vis-à-vis the external world and internal
challenges posed by the subordinate ethno-national group. State sovereignty and
legitimacy in these contexts takes a supreme priority over all other considerations
including democratic imperatives and the secular basis of modern liberal democracy.
Statism implies the endowment of the state with a moral purpose (a higher purpose of
preserving the ethics of a single ethnicity) that elicits loyalty to the state by invoking
ethno-national and/or religiously-based discourse. Therefore liberal democracy can
hardly provide answers to the questions of inclusion vis-à-vis exclusion that face any
state with these structural properties (Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan 1996) and adopting
democratic political systems and ideological justifications of domination invoke to give
the regime legitimacy.
Under circumstances of power asymmetries subordinate ethno-national groups that conceive of themselves as distinct and “affiliated to actual or commonly perceived
ancestry with language markers and national or regional origin” (Nic Craith 2002: 136)
tend to pursue some degree of independence whether in a sovereign political entity or in
some form of autonomy or self rule to protect their existence and/or interests from state
power. Self-determination, under these conditions turns into a mobilizing force deployed
to challenge the central government or the state once the subordinate group has some
leverage to squeeze political, economic, and social reforms from the state (Jenne 2006: 7).
The levels and degree of exclusion and segregation decide the shape and component of
self-determination whether in a civic or a national/ethno-national manner.
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The effects of exclusion and domination coupled with oppression turns nationalist
sentiments into a powerful driving force that imply, in the words of Bauman “exclusive
sets of assigned rights and duties…moral significance and behavioral principles” (Cited
in Nic Craith 2002: 139). Clearly this shows that coercion and domination do not turn
into legitimate governance nor they imply the ability of the state to control the
subordinate group. Force of ethno-nationalism may manifest and seek fulfillment in terms
of civic nationalism: through civic strife and civil rights movements and revolutions that
aim at transforming the polity and social relations into an inclusive democracy. National
self-determination, in contrast, exceeds the limits of civil rights toward statehood as the
fulfillment of ethno-national identity in a distinct polity (Nic Craith 2002: 139).
Uncovering the patterns into which ethno-national conflicts develop and transform in
either direction of civic or national self-determination is a key to explaining their
divergent outcomes and types of accommodation of ethno-national demands. Dynamics
of demographic change play a crucial role in changing the patterns of interaction between
adversaries whereby the status of each group in the demographic balance is crucial.

Minority-Majority dynamics
Numbers matter in social and political interaction and “Regardless of the political
context, there always seems to be power in numbers” (Cederman 2009). In ethno-national
conflicts numbers account even more especially as they are loaded with identity struggles,
long standing oppression and exclusion that give the conflict the urgency of existence
struggle. Demography drives its efficacy from the ‘resource mobilization’ mechanism
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(Tilly 1978) whereby substantial increase in subordinate groups’ numbers provides an
opportunity and affects its members’ willingness to act collectively and to raise the
ceiling of their demands up to the demand of political independence. Henceforth, the
efficacy of numbers is primarily politicizing ethno-national groups and endows them with
legitimacy. By contrast, dominant groups, as Connor (2000) notices, struggle for the
preservation of a considerable majority status that enables them to sustain supremacy by
establishing coherent democratic regimes to justify their policies against the minority
group. The logic is simple; in a world that embraces more democratic rule the domination
of minority groups is a scandal especially if applied by non-democratic means. In
addition, the principle of proportionality is widely accepted as a main organizing political
element of political power.
However, numbers do not transform into political collective action automatically.
Demographic superiority needs other factors that turn it into a politically influential force:
unity, purpose, resources and leadership among those factors. Primarily, these factors
annul or diminish the effects of demobilization and internal divisions. Dilemmas of
collective action, and inter-group splits are antithetical to group political efficacy.
Assuming that the benefits of non participation in collective action are minimal, and
inter-group splits come second in importance at a specific point, demographic balance
and numerical increase of the subordinate group triggers powerful dynamics. Gurr
(1993:123-129) clarifies that ethno-political activism is motivated by peoples deep-seated
grievances about their collective status as subordinate and excluded which facilitates
collective protest and revolt. Indeed, the more the state exclude, oppress, and deprive
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these groups the more they become willing to act in a politically organized fashion.
Dynamics of demographic change and their political implications do not show the
direction of political protest; toward what end and objectives?
When the dominant group is a majority and shows no recognition of the
minority’s political, cultural and civic rights, violence is expected to rise. Violence
increases in ‘no-exit’ settings: if the minority is increasing in numbers and seeking relief
from domination by assimilation that is being denied by the majority (Oberschall
2007:13-15). The ‘no exit’ impasse leads to coercion and militancy by the challenger and
accommodation becomes far more elusive. Furthermore, the change in demographic
balance whether it was real, impending or foreseen as pertained to the dominant majority
drives it to initiate confrontation under the pretext of which the dominant majority “takes
the move to curb what it perceives as a threat to its position and style of life” (Oberschall
2007, and Mishali Ram 2006) and strip it from sources of political leverage: unity,
political organization and mobilization, territorial contiguity, and economic viability.
Demographic balance especially when it coincides with specific geographical
attributes is found to affect significantly the prospects of conflict demise in ethnonational settings. In a quantitative research that covers the whole world between19512005, Cederman shows “that the conflict probability of marginalized group increases
with the demographic power balance [of the minority] compared to the group(s) in power”
shifts in favor of the former and leads to the minority rebellion (Cederman 2009). These
ethno-political mechanisms hold for all ethnic conflicts, as Cederman’s study shows, and
is crucial to understanding ethno-national conflicts and their patterns. The demographic
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factor seems crucial to both protagonists, but a majority in rule would most likely resort
to specific demographic policies that aim at countering the balance in its favor, which
exacerbates the conflict and pushes the minority group further towards militancy and
coercion that characterize protractible conflicts.
Protractability and intractability
Duration of the conflict matters. Protracted conflicts are defined “as hostile
interactions that occur over prolonged periods of time” (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali Ram
2006), and therefore, they are processes, not events; they proceed in time and have no
distinguishable point of termination. Being protracted, ethno-national conflicts gather
their own life cycle and generate compound nature and magnitude that is affected by the
time factor, which makes these conflicts seem intractable (paralyzed, intensive, stuck and
destructive, and irresolvable). In this sense these conflicts “seem irresolvable; even when
the ‘shape of a solution’ emerges such as in the two state solution of Israel/Palestine case,
“the parties can’t seem to reach it” (Babbitt 2006: 116). Moreover, protractability of the
conflict increases the prospects of its intractability by bringing new issues and actors into
the scene (Oberschall 2007). Protracted conflicts transform into intractable under certain
conditions as Babbitt (2006) indicates; the most important among which are: (a) when
Group Identity (emphasis in origin) is essential which turns conflict into an existential
struggle; (b) when leaders are not willing or unable to compel to negotiations because of
political calculations; and (c) when there are external parties support factions to the
conflict and hence contribute to the divisions’ sustainability.
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The circular relationship between protractability and intractability suggests that breaking
this circle is a key in accommodation and political settlement of ethno-national conflicts.
However, the question is about the effects protractability and intractability has on the
outcome of the conflict. In this sense protractablity seems an intervening element. The
compound or multidimensional nature of protracted conflicts hinders resolution. As Ben
Yehuda and Mishali-Ram’s comparative research shows “a compound nature, or a
primarily ethnic characterization of a conflict, not only prolongs the confrontation but
also diminishes the prospects of conflict resolution” (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali Ram
2006). Indeed, Bar-Tal (Cited in: Gidron 2002: 7) defines intractable conflicts as those
that are protracted and because of this the parties to the conflict accumulate hatred and
prejudice that give the conflict a sense of existential struggle; “The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, for example, can be described as an existential conflict between two parties,
each of which sees its very existence as a national group at stake” (Kelman 1997: 195).
This spiral worsens as the parties to the conflict have interest in its continuation and
makes vast investments that impede its resolution. All these features exacerbate the
conflict by turning it into an all out confrontation that penetrate “the cognitive repertoire
of individuals [that captures] the public agenda” (Bar-Tal, cited in: Gidron 2002: 7) and
renders accommodation close to impossible.

Although complex, deeply entrenched, and elusive to resolution, ethno-national
conflicts are not irresolvable. The evidence from different regions in different periods of
times shows that these conflicts are not zero-sum games. Attaining a political settlement
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to these conflicts is not a question of whether or not, but a question of when, how and
under what conditions. This study contends that whenever, and wherever, the one finds
asymmetrical power relation and domination, especially in the shape of state power that
is based on coercion and subordination, ethno-national demands of national self
determination rise. This is typical to settler-colonial systems of domination in which the
state acts as an ethnizied entity; a state as-an-ethnic group syndrome that creates a type of
a buffered colonialism that renders accommodation rather much less likely. There exist a
number of factors that exacerbate these patterns of relationships amongst which the
salience of identity, the demographic balance, oppression, and territory are the most
crucial. Any given combination of these factors determines the trajectory of the conflict
and its eventual outcome. However, none of the factors (characteristics) discussed here:
state power and systems of domination, demographic balance, and protractability is
sufficient to explain accommodation and integration or alternatively separation. They are
necessary for the realization of the conditions required to reach a political settlement of
the conflict as vital in shaping groups’ positions and demands contextually.
The trajectories ethno-national conflicts are determined to a large extent by the role of
–national-territorial nexus or the ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’. The explanatory
power of this factor is that it dialectically linked with demographic balance, power
asymmetries and domination, and systems of segregation/separation. States’ territorial
imperatives and ideology, and spatial aggrandizement essentialize the factors discussed
above and give them a dynamic dimension as a single coherent system of exclusion and
domination that faces not only the ethno-national challenger that lives on the same
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territory, but also the dominant groups internal transformations as well as International
intervening factor that legitimize or delegitimize the dominant state system. Considering
state’s ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ is founded and developed along the very
properties of settler-colonial ethno-nationality where the dynamics of the conflict are
shaped and shifts of structural features of the conflict change. We now turn to the
foundation of these conflicts in order to show the centrality of the territorial-national
nexus in the trajectory of the conflict, its direct and profound effects on systems of
domination, and the effects it has on the rise and politics of national liberation
movements.

The national-territorial nexus

Settler- colonial societies in domination present a more challenging and more
complex type of ethno-national conflicts; they differ substantially from foreign rule (or
imperialism and empires) by the process of implantation that transforms settlers’ societies
into distinct ethno-national collectivity. The tendency settler-colonial regimes show to
exclusiveness, exploitation, oppression, and racism explains, to a large extent, the nature
of ethno-national conflicts. Settler-colonial societies as (Wynne 2002) notices dominion
creates self-sustaining societies that gain life of their own that is combined with the traits
of foreign rule that is “constituted by the annexation of territory; and by the rule of
foreign metropolitan center [and] the insertion of military order; the expropriation of
wealth; and the imposition of an external culture”. This combination, unlike traditional
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colonial rule, establishes settler-colonial societies in as socially, economically, politically,
and psychologically buffered societies vis-à-vis the indigenous peoples. They establish
entities within a zone that inoculates their settlers’ society from the contamination of the
indigenous peoples that is necessary for these societies to develop a strong sense of
ethno-nationality that sustains their political and socio-economic texture. Harnessing state
power is the precondition for this endeavor to succeed especially to contain the challenge
of the ‘other’ ethno-national people who occupy the same territory.
Wynne (2002) remarks, colonial settler societies tend to extend their domination and
supremacy over political, physical and cultural terrains. The ubiquitous presence of
domination in territorial and spatial spheres of life creates the structures of a
multidimensional conflict with the indigenous people over territory, identity, political
power, and socio-economic resources. Being distinct- a key element to staking group
integrity vis-à-vis other groups, dominant states tend to emphasize ethno-linguistic or
ethno-religious aspects of its cultural-historical collective presence in order to consolidate
an integrated territorial-national identity correspondence. By the same token national and
ethno-national movements tend strongly to stake national identity they invoke to
particular territory as a means of legitimation and survival especially if the subordinate
group is a minority (Cederman 2009: 505). The contradictions and conflictual properties
of territorial claims of national movements in the face of territorial and spatial control of
the state represent the scheme within which the conflict takes place. In defiance of state
exclusion and domination

and to protect their distinct existence ethno-national

groups/peoples often perceive territory as “a defining attribute of their identity,
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inseparable from their past and vital to their continued existence as a distinct group” (Toft
2003: 19) whereas for states-as-ethnic-groups territory represents its demarcated
boundaries in terms of recognized borders as well as a defining factor of their foundation
and identity.
Different configurations and types of state regimes of territorial legitimation and
the territorial-national nexus produce different types of ethno-national conflicts and
outcomes. One can propose four types that derived from the discussion above and that
illustrate the concepts that this research focus on: (1) Integration: The establishment of a
unitary state and integrated polity non-ethnic political systems. This type shows
minimum prevalence of exclusive “regimes of territorial legitimation”; (2) Quasiintegrative: The articulation of a power-sharing institutional design that in effect
preserves ethno-national distinctions within one political system. Ethno-territoriality in
this context is contingent on minority-majority balance and the geographical distribution
of ethnic adversaries; (3) Minority Rights-based: types of autonomy and self rule
especially among minority population in multi-ethnic states whereby minorities are
concentrated geographically and have no separatist demands; (4) Separatist:
Independence in a sovereign national state based on the realization of national selfdetermination. This type exhibits high degrees of exclusion and ideologically,
institutionally, and culturally entrenched “regimes of territorial legitimation.
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This typology is certainly not the only way to categorize the phenomenon5. Rather,
it provides a conceptual tool to understanding the range of variance of outcomes these
conflicts show in reference to the structures of territorial legitimation and ideologies.

‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ in ethno-national conflicts
The analytical utility of the concept of “regimes of territorial legitimation” is that
it uncover the dynamics of nation-building and state formation especially in settings
where the regime in question is ethnocratic 6 , discriminatory, racial-ethnic or plainly
traditional colonial one. Indeed, it helps to avoid the conflation of states and nations by
thinking of states as, territorial constructs” (Murphy 2002:208). Thinking of states as
such pinpoints the importance of territory as a homeland that is rationally perceived by
the state and the challenging ethno-national group/people as the condition for survival
and identity preservation. Whereas nation-states focus on the objective meaning of
territory and space, states-as-ethnic groups or states of settler-colonial origins focus on
the subjective meaning of territory and its indivisibility.

5

For example, Cederman (2009: 505) suggests that there are two main types of ethno-national conflicts in
terms of the goals/ends raised by the challenger: (1) The goal is to seize political power from the ruling
government (domestic cvic); (2) A territorial-political goal in which the challenger seeks to obtain
sovereignty over a well defined territory.
6
Yiftachel (2002: 220-221)define these regimes as “regimes [that] exploit the international legitimacy and
autonomy bestowed on the ‘nation-state’, as the sole expression of ‘national’ self-determination, to
facilitate the expanding political and material resources by the dominant ethnic group, often at the expense
of minorities and peripheral groups. Ethnocratic regimes, which are chronically unstable, can be found in
cases such as Serbia, Northern Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Malaysia, to name but
several notable examples.
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The dialectical relationship between the settler-colonial state and the challenger
constitute and reconstitute their ethno-territorial limitations; dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion derived from the “regimes of territorial legitimation” draw the political
geography of the conflict. This dialectic finds its antecedent in
two geographic circumstances: the political-territorial status of states at the time
of entry into the modern state system (whether they were pre-existing independent
units, fragments of a waning empire, colonies, initiated by external powers, etc.)
and prevailing ideas about the cultural-historical character of state territory
(Murphy 2002:193, 200).
It is also a function of the challenging group’s capabilities and chance to control the
territory in addition to its believe in the legitimacy of the cause of the group (Toft 2003:
21).
Territorial and spatial dimensions of the conflict and the dialectical relationships
it has with demographic change and systems of segregation and domination has the
potential to strengthen our understanding of ethno-national conflict as territorially
anchored struggles for national recognition. Ethno-nationalism, in one main aspect, is
deeply sentimental and abstract, and thus inter-subjective phenomenon “centering
normally around a shared place and always on a shared identity” (Farer 2008:182). The
space becomes inseparable from national identity and manifests all the collective
meanings, symbols, emblems, narratives, and imagery of the group. As Yiftachel (2002)
argues, territoriality (the where of the nation as he puts it) of the conflict, especially for
expansionist colonial-settler societies becomes the “kernel of mobilization” for that
society. This society generates its political coherency, consensus, its socio-economic
interests, and political supremacy around territorial perceptions.
46

In settler-colonial settings territorial and spatial control is designed to exclude, deprive
and alienate a particular ethno-national group/people. This phenomenon is the condition
for the historical construction of the settler-colonial society as a people that has distinct
cultural-historical mythologies (narratives) anchored necessarily to territorial ideology as
two mutually constitutive processes. Understanding ethno-national demands for
independence is necessarily linked to state
…forces against which minority and stateless movements are struggling…As
such, it is imperative that we seek to understand the national territorial ideologies
of groups that are in power within modern state system” (Murphy 2002:197).
This takes place within a dialectical and ongoing process of conflict with the challenging
forces of subordinate ethno-national groups/peoples. Territory, in this sense, is the spatial
arena of the conflict while the history (the when) turns into a tool to galvanize the
territorial struggle. Territoriality becomes the most rampant aspect of ethno-national
identity if not the supreme justification of collective self-defined history. The “where” of
ethno-nationalism turns into the defining element of the nations, and “when the (when)
and the (where) of the nation are still intimately intertwined, it is the later that provides
the core of nation building” (Yiftachel 2002: 216). This attribute is typical to all colonialsettler societies. To be sure, the linkages between political processes especially nationbuilding and state formation on the one hand and territory and geography on the other are
evident. It includes renaming of geographical sights and locations to conform to a certain
ideology upon which the state and the nation are articulated. For example, Israeli policy
of renaming a countless number of locations in Palestine is a “symbolic expression of
Israeli nationalism in the face of Palestinian Arab opposition” (Cohin and Kliot 1992:
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654). Giving names to settlements (colonies) that reflect national/religious ideology of
“God-given” boundaries is paramount in this context. What are the implications of the
centrality of the territorial-spatial dimension of ethno-national conflicts and how it is
related to domination systems and segregation regimes?

Territorial exclusion and segregation: Patterns of domination
The construction of settler-colonial society as an ethnic-national people implies
the establishment of necessary correspondence between ethno-national identity and
territorial boundaries. Facing another ethno-national people the dominant group opts to
alienate them from land and strip them from their own correspondence to territory, space,
and historical relevancy. Since the nation is
always constituted through territory (e.g. blood and soil), the attempt to erase the
nation is also an attempt to undermine the connection between the people and
their land and the right of the people to self-determination” (Grodon 2008:17).
The persistent challenge that all articulated ethno-national settlers’ communities
face is that that they have to confront, at some stage of their own life, the presence of
other ethno-national group/s on the same territory (Tilley 2005:132). The nationalterritorial nexus and the dynamics through which it develops, plays a decisive role in
determining whether the conflict may or may not transform into a civic-democratic one
or remains ethno-national and territorially driven. Ethno-national-territorial nexus
endows the conflict with a normative dimension that stiffens political demands and
galvanizes identity manifestations. This nexus travels beyond mere geography towards
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ethno-national fight over the meanings, symbols, and heritage. Therefore, “Territory has
been, and continues to be, a major issue in [ethno-national] conflicts” (Ben-Yehuda and
Mishali-Ram 2006: 86).
The nature and levels of territorial control, exclusion, occupying spatial spheres,
and alienation determine the nature of the demands made by the challenging ethnonational group/people. Mechanisms of domination and political manipulation
implemented by the state intervene the effects and exigencies of the ‘regimes of territorial
legitimation’ adopted by the state. An ethno-national conflict that remains civic or
transforms into a civic and communal struggle is the one, as (Tilley 2005:163) notices,
that entails the re-definition of the state based on universal democratic imperatives that
render territorial and spatial control irrelevant. By contrast, as the settler-colonial
imperatives prevail the state turns into chauvinist-ethnic regime (Tilley 2005: 163) for the
fact that the ‘the national project’ under such conditions does not aspire to merge a nation
and state attempts to essentialise and segregate group identities” (Yiftachel 2002:216),
which hinders exit from the conflict for long periods of time especially when the systems
of segregation/separation and exclusion are deeply entrenched and internalized as state
systems to which state and polity ascribe deep ideological and political significance for
the survival of the state and society.
Separation and segregation serve the intentions of the dominant group in
perpetuating the asymmetries in power relations and sustaining domination; they
institutionalize that practices, laws, and policies that signify one type or another of
apartheid regimes. Segregation works on different levels: psychological, legal, and
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physical that may have different combinations in different cases and different periods in
the same case. Examining variations in segregation types enables us to examine different
types of state domination and their effects on the development of the conflict. The most
important aspect of segregation is the dualism it creates through sign-posted areas,
invisible albeit effective measures, and legal means. Segregation is also perceived as “a
mechanism for coping with physical threat…for preserving group identity from alien
influences, and to conserve cultural heritage and life style” (Oberschall 2007:5-6) and
then serves to boost national-territorial nexus and hinders the development of mixed and
integrated institutions, polities, let alone a common sense of nation-hood between the
protagonists.
The context, shape, and ‘legal’ forms in which ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’
and domination systems are introduced are crucial for the state to harness international
acceptance and legitmation. Presnting the regime as a democratic system plays a vital
role. Strong state apparatuses alleviated by democratic political system serves a twofold
strategy: sustaining a domestic coherent polity based on consensus over the conflict; and
harnessing international legitimacy of an otherwise regime of oppression and a pariah
state. International dual effect of legitimating and de-legitimating a particular process as
the end of ethno-national conflicts has played a crucial role in sustaining or, alternatively
eroding regimes of ethnic or ethno-national segregation. The adoption of a Western-like
democratic political system by the dominating state affects international assumptions on
the conflict and their legitimation or castigating the regime. International community’s
acceptance or rejecting ethno-national domination on racial, religious, pr ethnic grounds
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plays a crucial role in conferring lawfulness or exposing a regime of domination. Along
with domestic developments of the conflict it determines the direction the conflict would
take. Identifying with Western values has been a key factor that justified ethnic cleansing
and mass expulsion of subordinate ethno-national groups. Farer (2008:201) remarks that,
in the case of Kosovo for example
The dominators imagine themselves as part of Western civilization, as the forward
edge of that civilization in a nasty part of the world, and invoked the West’s
support in terms of their common values.
The Westernized discourse of the dominators is a pivotal strategy that shields
them from international criticism, punishment, and delegitimizing. Regardless of the
specific name that segregation, submission and expulsion might take, international
legitimizing and de-legitimizing of regimes of domination is evident. However, this
factor has to do with the changes in world-politics environment; the post-Cold-War era
has witnessed a profound change that affected regional and intra-state conflicts in
divergent manners. The demise of the Cold-War rendered some conflicts less important
than others as the game of power-politics has changed. Upholding international law and
various international Covenants on key norms and principles that pertain to ethnonational conflicts (self-determination being the most prominent) have become more a
question of contingency of interests and balances of power. One of the most important
elements that determine international level and pattern of intervention is that of the
possible spillover of the conflicts to international conflict and crisis. Ethno-national
conflicts, in this sense have multidimensional impact upon international conflict (Mishali
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Ram 2006:584-585) and therefore international intervention has a crucial role in their
developments and termination.

Theory of “state contraction”

The properties of ethno-national conflicts discussed in this part result in a
stalemate that is very hard to sustain for it is prone to violence eruptions, exposed to
internal dynamics of socio-economic, political, and demographic changes as well as
external effects. Analyzing the exit from stalemate depends on dynamics of the conflict
how they materialize through certain structures and events at turning points. The ultimate
answer to ethno-nationalism lies in democratization of nation and state building; however
this process does not suggest how to forge national heterogeneity within a nation-state as
Connor (1994) rightly contends.

That is because ethno-nationalist conflicts emerge

where the state does not “include and integrate the vast majority of the population into
the imagined community of the nation” (Cederman 2009). Indeed, there is a profound
distinction between state-building as an institutional project and the inclusiveness of
nation-building that is a social construct. Colonial settings that represent the climax of
exclusion and coercion are the least likely to accommodate ethno-nationalism in a noncoercive and legitimate manner.
Non-coercive means through which ethno-nationalism could be accommodated
depend therefore on the foundation, properties and the composition of the state; the
interests it represents; its perceived identity; and its institutional frameworks that may be
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conducive to nation-building efforts and hence generates loyalty to the state that lead to
integration and ethno-national heterogeneity. The case of foreign domination and settlercolonialism is the culmination of this state of affairs; settler-colonialism domination gives
rise to territoriality as the material basis for the actualization of collective national
identity, which exacerbates the conflict. These societies are dynamic political
communities and they constitute “arenas of constant struggles over the very geography of
the polity in question” (Yiftachel 2002: 222). Henceforth, understanding the dominant
state system in terms of its institutional structures, the socio-economic and political
configurations and interests it protects is a key task to examine the decline of ethnonational conflicts. Ian Lustick’s theory of state contraction is a useful analytical tool to
accounting for the initial dynamics of conflict decline and ultimately the resolution of
ethno-national conflicts in a colonial setting.
Lustick presents the state as an institution and examines different aspects of
‘institutionalization’ and ‘de-institutionalization’ of the state to explain its expansion and
contraction (Lustick 2002:202). The ‘state as institution’ is a dynamic concept that
enables us to answer the question of “what endows states’ boundaries with long term
political significance and how and why they may change?” Boundaries are borders
between political arenas and institutionalized constraints that set the rules according to
which groups are included in, and those excluded from, the political game. The dynamics
that may lead to state deinstitutionalization are depicted in the concept of contraction
which is, as Lustick (2002: 204) puts it
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…expected to trigger shifts in the distribution of power within a state by changing
resource allocation among different groups and, ultimately, by changing
prevailing norms and legal arrangements to correspond with the interests of newly
dominant groups. Accordingly, unless the border of the state is accepted as an
immutable given, different groups within the state will, under some circumstances,
adjust their perceptions of what the proper border of the state should be based on
their chances of achieving and /or maintaining political power.

This conception enables us to understand long term changes in state border as a
contingent dimension of state attributes. Lustick explains why state contraction takes
place less often than state expansion. He argues that there are thresholds of
institutionalization whereby state boundaries expand or contract; the thresholds divide the
state institutionalization process into three stages each of which entails a different degree
of difficulty to contraction. This difficulty depends on the degree to which state boundary
is deeply ingrained in the polity: The more threatening contraction is to the integration of
the polity, the institutional building of the state, and the prevailing ideology, the harder
contraction will be.7

7

The three contexts of Britain/Northern Ireland, France/Algeria, and Israel/West Bank-Gaza included in
Lustick’s study are set to examine this comparative framework; each case represents a case of state
expansion and contraction (institutionalization and deinstitutionalization). In the Britain/Northern Ireland
case British deinstitutionalization (contraction) of 1922 by the partition of Irish Islands was the culmination
of a “long process deinstitutionalization of the territorial shape of The British state as it was
established…early in the nineteenth century.” Britain had to cross the two institutional thresholds
(Ideological hegemony and Regime thresholds) to disengage from Ireland which took along incremental
development from 1845 to the 1920s. The French colonization of Algeria did not culminate in creating a
hegemonic belief that Algeria was an integral part of France. However, France had established Algeria as
part of its central institutional buildup beyond the ‘regime threshold’. This threshold implied more
difficulty to disengage from Algeria than the decolonization of other French colonies overseas. The case of
Israel/Palestine reveals the same dynamics as the PLO negotiated with Israel on the OPT of 1967. These
territories have not been institutionalized hegemonically as an integrated part of the state of Israel; however,
they were institutionalized at the regime threshold and beyond towards expansionism especially starting the
year 1977 when the right (Likud party) took power in Israel. Crossing regime threshold amounted in more
difficulty in disengaging form the OPT.
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This research applies the theory of “state contraction” to assess the extent to
which the South African regime involved in state contraction as it yielded to
democratization and the abandonment of apartheid, and the extent to which Israel’s
involvement in the peace process was an act of contraction. Ultimately this inquiry aims
at assessing the conditions that may or may not lead to democratization in the latter case
by examining the effects of the combination of national-territorial nexus, domination
systems and processes embedded in conflict dynamics. However, this research qualifies
Lipstick’s model by bringing to attention another crucial conceptualization of the state;
the state as a political-territorial entity. Introducing the concept of “regimes of territorial
legitimation” as the founding construct of the state is a decisive factor in interpreting
state contraction and expansion in settler-colonial settings. The institutional constructs of
the dominating state in our understanding is affected profoundly by the determinants of
state’s territorial

ideology.

State

contraction, furthermore,

as

a

process

of

deinstitutionalization is the embodiment of a dialectical relationship between state forces
and challenging ethno-national groups/peoples. This dialectical relationship and its
manifestations in a struggle over identity and territoriality induces dominant colonial
states to establish regimes of domination and segregation in an attempt to sustain its
‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ and subordination. The struggle over identityterritorial boundaries as Lustik remarks is then a struggle over the rules of the political
game: a struggle over transforming or changing the structures of domination and power
asymmetries between ethno-national protagonists within a unitary state system. The
following empirical chapters illustrate these conceptual treatments.
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Chapter III
Ethno-national colonialism in South Africa
Introduction
The dramatic escalation of the conflict in South Africa in 1970s and 1980s
reflected an advanced stage of regime’s erosion and the downturn of Afrikaner
nationalism. The rise of African nationalism within a deeply divided society indicated to
a dynamism that would have led to the total collapse of the state (Horowitz 1991). Indeed,
the increased levels of violence between the years 1984-1992 and the rise of a African
nationalist and anti-apartheid civic-democratic movements on the one hand, and regime’s
oppression on the other made the sustainability of the regime more costly. Moreover,
regimes regional failures and international increased pressure that turned South Africa
into a pariah state. R. W. Johnson (1977: 314) remarks that regimes police strategy in
dealing with anti-apartheid movement, and its regional setbacks that stemmed from
regimes aggression undercut its ability to endure. The eclipse of apartheid also marked
the downfall of Afrikaners’ racial ethno-nationality as the basis of political life and socioeconomic privileges. The latter represented the essence of apartheid regime as well as the
source of Africans’ discontent and resentment that led to the convergence of African
nationalism and civic democratic organizations on the objective of thwarting apartheid.
At the point where African nationalism was gaining the higher political and moral ground,
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the regime of racial-ethnic domination was losing ground. Dan O’Meara (1996: 136)
maintains that “by the end of 1977, virtually all commentators were agreed that on the
burning issues of economic, social, and political policy, behind the overt face of hard-line
control and repression, the government was virtually rudderless” (O’Meara 1996: 136).
The erosion of Afrikaner domination, however, started long before the 1970s as
this chapter argues: apartheid collapse was a staged process that accompanied and sprung
from the very structures of exclusion, territorial separation, and domination systems that
were based on racial differentiation and premised on Afrikaner ethno-nationalism as the
defining essence of state system. However, the contradictions and weaknesses of the
racial-ethnically based regime rendered its sustainability rather precarious. Historical
developments that led to the collapse of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial
democratic regime makes the case of South Africa illustrative for the purposes of our
research: unveiling the conditions under which a racially base ethno-national conflict
resulted in an integrative outcome. Thus our analysis addresses the conditions; structural
and contextual that culminated in the collapse of a failing regime of ethno-territorial
domination. As such the inquiry here is not concerned with the process by which the
regime and the Africans’ national movement negotiated the provisional democratic
transition; we emphasize the premises upon which the parties came to negotiate an
integrative, unitary political entity that would preserve South Africa as one nation8.

8

Research and scholarly contributions on the process are many. To mention few: Lowendberg and
Kaempfer (1998) and Lipton (1986) emphasize the role of domestic interest groups in the process; Sisk
(1995), and Friedman and Atkinson (1994) are leading examples of research agenda that focuses on actors’
perspectives, opportunity, constitutional and institutional design using core concepts such as ‘mutually
hurting stalemate’ and elite politics. Other studies’ pursue the effects of the combination of internal-
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Initially, the conflict in South Africa was rooted in a settler-colonial enterprise
that was characteristic of settler-colonial type of domination discussed in our conceptual
framework. However, Afrikaners’ regime territorial ideology and the ‘regimes of
territorial legitimation’ it adopted were not conducive to the construction of the whites as
an ethnic core that is united and coherent to create and sustain a white South Africa.
Moreover, dynamics of partial exclusion and exploitation contributed significantly to the
failure of the regime to ethicize the conflict by ethnically homogizing the African people
and the white society that was divided between Afrikaners and English-speaking
communities. There are four major explanations for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism to
power, its racial-colonial tenets, and the dynamics that led to its demise: (1) emphasizing
ideology as the main driving force of racial-colonialism apartheid in 1948 (e.g. Jan J.
Loubser 1968, p 379-80, and W.A. de Klerk 1975); (2) Economic explanations that focus
on economic imperatives and the contradictions (especially exploitation and production
relations) they created in the establishment and the collapse of apartheid (e.g. Legassick
1974, legassick and Innes 1977, Lowendberg and Kaempfer 1998 and Lipton 1986); (3)
racist-colonial analyses that focus on white domination as a system of institutionalized
unequal distribution of resources and opportunities based on skin color. Ultimately, this
system aimed at the construction of white society with the Afrikaners in its core as a
nation endowed with cultural and ethnic euphemism (Adam 1979: 33) and sometimes
scientific discourse (see Rich 1994); (4) An eclectic perspective that looks upon

especially structural and external factors that led to regimes acceptance to negotiate the conditions for its
own end (e.g. Fredrik van Zyle Slabbert’s 1999). These perspectives explain the dramatic transition from
apartheid and white domination to what Arend Lijphart (1994: 222), depicts as a consociational democracy
and “optimal power sharing” political system based on constitutional arrangements and majoritarian rule
that is prone to sustainability
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socioeconomic structures and their dynamics as well as structures of meanings and
subjective aspects of the conflict as determinant sets of factors that contributed
significantly to the eclipse of white rule in South Africa. Herman Giliomee (1995, 1979)
shows how structural factors: a weak demographic base, a dramatically different regional
and international conditions, and economic recession led to a serious debate within the
white polity, which made the transition to democracy conceivable.
This research takes into account the dialectical relationship between two main sets
of factors: the relationship between structures of territorial legitimation and separation,
and systems of domination on the one hand and the certain events and interactions
between the adversaries on the other, as combined forces that led to the staged demise of
white rule in South Africa. The apartheid regime represented a rational group dictatorship
of a collective social entity justified and partially driven by ethno-national ideology of
racial differentiation, which was by and large mutable and adoptive to socioeconomic and
political power shifts. Therefore, what accounts more is to pinpoint the features and the
unique forms of racial segregation and apartheid as domination systems of a settlercolonial society seeking to reconstruct itself into ethno-national people. The causal chain
that led to the demise of white domination rule is found in four principal factors:
First: the inability of the regime to create a valid separated territorial ideology
accepted externally and ceded internally. Afrikaners’ regimes of territorial ideology’
were contingent, instrumental and indeterminate;
Second: the persistence of white cleavages that prevented coherency and unity
based on an ethnic core that may have gained the properties of a nation/people;
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Third: the minority status of the white society undermined its ability to sustain
domination as an ethnic-territorial group; and
Fourth: indeterminate territorial ideology and lack of ethnic unity had yielded
two weaknesses: first the dynamics of exclusion and exploitation showed contradictory
consequences that gave Africans a political leverage, and second divisions and weak
ethno-territorial identification generated the inconsistency of the ideological justifications
and mobilization especially in 1960s and 1970s. Weaknesses and inconsistencies were
worsened by the rise of African nationalism starting early 1960s. African nationalism
challenged the kernel of Afrikaner objective manifested by Bantustan policy and showed
that Africans have maintained their sense of national identification with South Africa.
The following empirical interpretations examine these factors through a process tracing
method within a historical deep description narrative of the development of the conflict
from colonial segregation to separation and apartheid as outlined in the introduction
chapter of this research.

South Africa: British imperialism and Afrikaner colonialism

Afrikanerdom; Afrikaner ethno-national ideology was shaped and developed its
political aspiration for power within a dual conflict: (1) a conflict with the British
colonialism and English-speaking settlers that resulted in the wars of 1880-1 and 18981902. However, the convergence between British colonial interests and Afrikaners’
ambition for statehood yielded the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910; a
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new member of the Commonwealth that would serve British objectives in the region.
Taking over the keys of power in the new state divided the white colonial communities;
Afrikaners and English-speaking settlers. White cleavages have remained a salient
challenge for the regime that compromised the unity and cohesion of the white polity and
amounted in governments’ inability to “achieving complete political hegemony over
society as it was much more difficult for the government to take action against white
opponents” (Guelke 2005: 23) who possessed considerable economic, cultural and
political power. This structural condition will affect regime’s pursuit of ultimate
domination and shall hinder the efforts to construct a white ethno-nationality as one
nation; (2) the conflict with the indigenous black people and other ‘Coloured’ groups
who struggled for their right of self-determination, which had been a great challenge to
white domination and a core factor in its eclipse.
Internal challenges and external uneasy relationship with a colonial superpower
founded the historical initial conditions that determined the main properties of the state as
a settle-colonial construct. The Union of South Africa (read the Union) represented a
system of state power based on racial differentiation. For the Afrikaners state power was
the main source of political power that would enable them to establish their hegemony as
a distinct ethno-nationality vis-à-vis other whites and in the face of the indigenous
Africans. For a small minority (in 1904 the white community was roughly one-third of
the population) capturing state power was a decisive condition for their supremacy in
social, economic and political spheres of life. The state in this context was born outside
and against the will of the majority of South African society whose exclusion and
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subordination was a necessary condition for the success of white settlers’ enterprise.
However, the foundation of the state, although externally imposed by Britain, had
maintained the territorial integrity and contiguity of South Africa as a single country. The
implications of political-territorial demarcation of the state would have fundamental
effect on the political-geography of the conflict with the African national movement. The
Union gained recognition as a modern state within this condition. Thus, slicing the
territorial or spatial spheres of the country would be too costly for the regime while a
system of segregation and exclusion would take a racially-based scheme whereby
territorial segregation is instrumental in serving other supreme goals and objectives.

Racial colonialism: Segregation and exploitation

Although racial prejudice and segregation prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries
prior to the establishment of the Union, it was fragmented as each of the four European
colonies enacted its own policies and measures. Lack of conformity in racial policies was
fostered by geo-political fragmentation of Afrikaners’ ‘republics’ and British presence
that blocked the emergence of a solid Afrikaner collective identity. Afrikaner identity
emerged as a colonial-nationalist articulation of scattered settler groups in their fight
against the natives for resources, and as a self-proclaimed anti-colonial (British)
domination. The formation of the Union was welcomed by the Afrikaners as a perceived
bottom-up process of state building that they were entitled to control in order to protect
their interests and self-proclaimed national identity which otherwise was conditioned by
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frontier (inland struggle for a foothold) conditions; a period that is out of the scope of our
study and aptly covered in many studies (e.g. Giliomee 1979, Giliomee 2003, Worden
2000, Adam 1971, and Thompson 1995). The Frontier conditions are considered, in some
accounts, to have shaped Afrikaners’ deep sense of distinctiveness as a nation superior to
natives and distinct from English-speaking white settlers in their struggle for political
power within a racially defined context.
White society in general was the locus of domination, coercion, and disdain of
non-whites especially following the discovery of gigantic reserves of minerals in the
interior. White settler, supported by the British colonial power became superior vis-à-vis
the Black Africans (Guelke 2005: 56-58). Capturing the interior turned the settlement
enterprise of white Europeans into extremely brutal and inhuman practices. Hobson
(1900: 53) describes modes of coercion, subordination and enslavement of the indigenous
and taking over their lands which placed them “in such a position of political and
economic weakness that they are unable to refuse wage work upon terms offered by
white masters.” The conditions Hobson depicts, in agreement with most of his
contemporaries9 had created the foundation for formal policies of colonial rule in which
9

John Barrow; the British traveler in Southern Africa in his book An Account of Travels into the Interior
of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798 shows the features of frontier Afrikaners’ attitudes. He
blames the Afrikaner for the plight of the indigenous who were pushed to live under conditions comparing
to which slavery is a better life. It is remarkable that he doesn’t attribute these practices to any notion of a
divine mission or religious mandate. He asserts that they are the inhuman deeds of peasantry that took place
away from any government’s eye, which gave them the opportunity to practice absolute power over the
indigenous. Dr. John Philip’s Researches in Africa corroborates Barrow’s conclusion on the underlying
reasons of Afrikaners’ inhumanity in this era. He noticed that oppressive practices of the colonists had not
sprung from peculiar religious traditions or racial ideologies; rather they were in large part due to material
interests namely finding forced labor. By the same token the Missionary David Livingstone articulated the
objectives of the Christian mission in Southern Africa as being the “promotion of commerce, imperial
expansion, and the general diffusion of the ‘blessings of civilization as intimately and providentially linked.
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territorial separation and segregation served a racially defined socio-economic system of
differentiation and subordination. However, the economic imperative coupled with
political power considerations were also combined with ideological justifications and
other typical European colonialist notions. Other explanations recognize the effects of the
frontier as the structure within which Afrikaners’ racial practices developed.

Divinity and secularism in Shaping Afrikaner ethno-nationality
Ideological explanations focus on Afrikaners’ Protestant Calvinist10 belief that the
Afrikaner community constructs a Chosen Biblical people. This ideology remained
salient and represents a major source of Afrikaner ethno-nationalism. Thus B. J Vorster
(South African Prime Minister from 1966 to 1978) pressed the messianic role of the
Chosen Afrikaners by stating: “Yes, I believe profoundly, as always, that we have been
appointed by Providence to play a role here and we have the human material to play that
role” (quoted in Adam and Giliomee 1979: 17). Afrikaner nationalism as a grid of ethnoreligious thinking and ethno-national identity offers a plausible explanation of racial

Livingstone though attributed the brutality and racial attitudes of the frontier Afrikaners to the conditions
they endured that had a degenerative effect on their morality. (Cited in Du Toit 1989: 933-4, 939)
10

The origin of the Calvinist myth (the chosen people) leys in the fact that the pioneering Afrikaner settlers
were Calvinists who came to the country with the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) whose main aim was
to take South Africa as a refreshment point on the long trip to and from India. As Calvinists settled in the
country they brought with them some Calvinist cultural traits (Du Toit 1989: 923). This implies that neither
these settlers were fully indoctrinated as Calvinists nor they settled for primarily ideological reasons. Most
early settlers, as Adam and Giliomee (1979: 24) remark, arrived to South Africa as individuals and
employees of the DEIC “many of them adventurers, usually representing the opposite attitudes of those
found in a cohesive persecuted religious community.”
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segregation and, for this matter apartheid. However, the effects of Calvinism and the
Covenant ideology remain controversial in terms of the degree to which they shaped
Afrikaners’ racial attitudes and policies. Calvinism, beyond its religious prevalence, was
a system of social and political affiliation that provided for integration and constructive
social life. It provided for the demarcation ad safeguarding of the relationship with the
other may it be the indigenous or the other white British settlers. Thus Calvinist ideology
was a politico-religious system of differentiation with political implications based on
cultural supremacy of a nation in mission to carry on a divine mandate to redeem the
culture of Voortrekkers (the pioneering settlers in the frontier) and reduce the heathens
(as Afrikaners described the Africans) to a position of perpetual servitude (Du Toit 1983:
920).
Calvinism had fulfilled political, cultural and social functions that shaped
Afrikaners’ self-conception and distinct identity as an ethno-national people. Calvinism
was functional in drawing the lines of relationship between the Afrikaners and other
peoples according to their racial biological origins. The effects of ideology were
intertwined with typical European secular colonial notions of modernization that
introduced Afrikaners as a civilizing force. Both discourses converged to produce a
single practice characterized with conquest of the indigenous people and taking over their
land (Du Toit 1983: 920) while segregating them to maintain distinctiveness.
The colonialist-secular nature of Afrikaner’s racialism becomes striking when we
move from racial attitudes of individuals to social sphere where the structures of social
relations unveil the political nature of racism in a colonial setting (Adam and Giliomee
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1979: 20). The functional nature of Afrikaners’ Calvinism indicates its mundane origins;
Afrikaners’ minority status resulted in high levels of anxiety, which made security and
the privileges accrued from unity and conformity paramount. Cohesion and conformity
are crucial for the sustainability of the social system of domination and racial segregation
that protected white supremacy. Indeed, once well established, Afrikaners’ notions of
nationhood and distinctiveness were a major source of political thinking and mobilization
that bolstered racial discrimination and segregation as the base of political power and
domination, and for social supremacy. In this sense Afrikaner ethno-nationalist
sentiments

was an adaptive response to particular opportunities as well as new

exigencies of the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions at the eve of
establishing the Union and along the track that led to apartheid.
To be sure, Afrikaner nationalism was not articulated and materialized as an
organized political force until the last decade of the 19th century. Afrikaner Bong that
was established in 1881 as the first political expression of Afrikaner national unity was
indecisive in its politics as to whether or not it would attract the votes from groups
(Giliomee 1979:101) other than the Afrikaners. Afrikaners’ racism and political
organization was the product of a sphere of struggle within the white society and between
the whites and native Blacks. The construction of Afrikaners as an ethno-nationality had
to endure this structural difficulty of Black African existence as an overwhelming
majority and the privileged English-speaking white competitor. Thus, the term Afrikaner
itself was an exclusive that applies to white settlers of Dutch or Huguenot descends and
Afrikaan speaking persons who believed in the common cause of Afrikaners as a nation.
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The salience of Afrikaner ethno-nationality in this sense exacerbated the divisions within
the white society and among Afrikaners as segments of them supported unity with British
while Afrikaner nationalists sought independence from British influence: this cleavage
would prevail until 1948 when the Nationalist Party ascended to power. The rise of the
white as a distinct ethno-nationality based on the notions of Afrikanerdom remained
blurred, weak, and adoptive to the developments in the social and, socio-economic, and
political spheres at certain historical contexts (Giliomee 1979: 83). Ideological
underpinnings of Afrikaner ethno-national identity were immutable, protean and subject
to political power configurations and socioeconomic changes related to shifts in the
economic system of exploitation intertwined with the sought for political power.
Afrikaners’ racial colonialism was shaped under the conditions of the ‘frontier’
conditions that created what Du Toit (1983: 931) conceptualize as the “Degeneracy
Paradigm”. This syndrome depicts how Afrikaners’ morality had been by the harsh
struggle for viability to the extent whereby demonizing the indigenous was inevitable.
Thus lack of morality and religious constraints drove Afrikaners’ racial prejudices rather
than religious impulse. Moreover, the minority status of the Afrikaners –and whites in
general- generated another syndrome: security dilemma. Confining indigenous Blacks
and dominating them can be seen through this lens (Laundahl 1992, cited in Loenberg
and Kaempfer 1998: 31). Perceptions of security threat worked on two levels: separating
the non-whites and solidifying Afrikaner identity; both processes required a certain
degree of political power and institutional arrangements. Afrikaners’ ability to practice
such a power in per-state period relied on the geographical isolation they had in their
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barren colonies from a central government. In the inland colonies Afrikaners exploited,
by brutal means, the indigenous for their own material interests especially as forced and
cheap labor. Therefore ideas of national destiny and mission can be understood as a
rationalization of expansionist and greedy actions.
Practices of racism were materialized through a set of legislations in the Colonies
that aimed at achieving two complimentary imperatives: to territorially separate Africans
from white communities and simultaneously to provide for labor in mines and farms11.
Colonial governments and local Afrikaner republics enacted several laws that separated
black farmers from their lands. At one level Africans’ success in managing their own
farms enabled them to compete with white farmers and in some regions black peasant
farmers earned higher returns than white smallholders (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998:
33). Eliminating the competition was necessary for white economy to flourish. At another
level, alienating blacks from the land was a modality of subordinated through which
landless Africans were forced into a property-less labor in white-owned farms and mines
(Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 33) and to live in reserves at the periphery of white
communities. Black workers were crucial for the performance of South African economy
as cheap and manageable work force but at the same time they were perceived as a
menace to Afrikaners’ sense of distinctiveness and the social order they espoused.

11

As Loenberg and Kaempfer (1998) notice South African economy had suffered from the shortage of
working force in farms and mines and the “existence of a viable and flourishing black peasant sector raised
the opportunity cost of black labour to white farmers” and min-owners who relied on coercive measures to
deprive blacks from their lands and later to rely on state power to enforce political and legislative tools to
achieve this objective.
These governments resorted to a variety of methods to deprive the blacks from their land including the
imposition of cash taxes, outright confiscation of land from Africa tribes, and the confinement of black land
ownership to designated reserves.
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Thus, territorial separation and the creation of reserves was not the linchpin of
racist colonial enterprise; it rather was instrumental although it exhibited certain
ideological aspects to justify it. The main feature of territorial segregation until the
enactment of apartheid in 1948, therefore, was the separation of residential areas that was
perceived by Afrikaners and English-speaking whites in terms of “different geographical
regions of white and black land settlement” (Rich 1990: 667). It did not show any
profound territorial ideology beyond drawing the boundaries of Black communities in the
low areas and regions that are clearly less developed, over-crowded, and stigmatized. To
be sure prior to 1910 the main features of territorial segregation were determined by each
of the four former colonies and republics, each of which “had pursued separate policies
of residential segregation” (Christopher 1989: 421) 12 . They had some conformity at
specific aspects of segregation such as the colonies of Good Hope and Natal’s policy of
denying citizenship and the right to hold land to all who were not officially white. The
core issue of racist segregation was depriving non-white communities and especially the
Africans of all means of economic, social and political viability and simultaneously
exploiting them. Social and political was structures along a partial exclusionist policy that
allowed exploitation. Partial exclusion, segregation, and exploitation would become
systematic, formal, and consistent in the post-state era.

12

For example, the British colony of Good Hope maintained a nominally colour-blind franchise policy
where segregation was based on class and wealth. By the year 1910 this colony had diversified its system
of segregation. The Natal colonial government on its turn was far more restrictive whereby blacks were
expected not to remain in the towns except as single workers (see Christopher 1989: 425-6)
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The Afrikaners: from Republics to state ethno-nationality

Understanding

Afrikaner

nationalism

as

a

system

of

settler-colonial

differentiation and segregation starts from the point where Afrikaners revived as the state
system of the Union of South Africa (USA). This development wouldn’t have been
possible apart from British colonial policies. British Empire and English settlers in South
Africa played a major role in shaping the nature and dynamics of South African white
rule before and after the establishment of the Union. British colonial authorities turned a
blind eye to the practices of settlers in the interior and failed to uphold a color-blind
franchise; instead and in spite of British victory in the 1898-1902 the Treaty of
Vereeniging of 1902 that ended the war enshrined the white-only franchise (Guelke, 2005:
63) which was the most important legalizing underpinnings of segregation that served the
interests of English-speaking white settlers who sought the perpetuation of the precapitalist economies in the African reserves” (Rich, 1990: 665). Indeed for Englishspeaking whites who captured the biggest chunk of the economy, segregation was crucial
for them to maintain the source of their economic power and social supreme status
through exploiting Black labor. However, and in contrast to Afrikaner’s total segregation,
they opted to maintaining a narrow separation system that would create social
differentiations within the African community that facilitate containment. This contrast
was deepened by the question of the relationship between the new state and its backer,
Britain.
The formation of the state was a compromise between English-speaking settlers
allied with segments of Afrikaner community who espoused a lasting tie between South
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Africa and Britain on the one hand, and the Afrikaners who sought independent from the
Empire as a free nation on the other. Thus the issue of white settlers’ unity had been a
fundamental concern for the Afrikaner ruling elites that was threatened by these opposing
trends. Afrikaner control over the state and the political system would be undermined by
white divisions and their sought to establish their ethno-national identity would be
compromised by lack of unity. Divisive pattern would be exacerbated by Afrikaner
control of the state as we discuss below.
The establishment of the Union in1910 was a major turning point in the
institutionalization of racial-colonialism that provided Afrikaners with the source of
political power they pursued for decades. Primarily, this development sparked Afrikaner
ethno-national colonial ambitions (Rich 1994: 55) as the first and most organized and
coherent institutional success they gained. As of 1910 the dynamics of social
relationships and socio-economic structures of racial domination and segregation would
become the state system and settler-colonial practices would become systematic and
guided by vision of exclusive racial ethno-national nation-building. However, this task
was conditioned by the compromise upon which the state was established. Until 1948, the
rise of apartheid, Afrikaner efforts to ethno-nationalizing racial-colonial state system was
significantly hindered by this condition (Giliomee 1979:104). Both parties that ruled the
most in this period; the South African Party (SAP) and the United Party (UP) focused
their political and institutional energies on creating one white nation out of the two
competing settler groups.

71

Unifying efforts had been opposed by a strong Afrikaner political force of
nationalist leaders mainly J. B. M Hertzog (Prime minister from 1924-1939) and D. F.
Malan (Prime minister from 1948-1954) who believed that South Africa was entitled to
separate development and full independence from Britain; the Afrikaners, within the
political entity they espoused, “Should retain their unique nationality” as Hertzog
contended. Malan went further to give this claim a divine dispensation (Giliomee 1979:
105-6). Separating the development of the two white communities was perceived by
nationalist Afrikaners as a precondition for the development of their community to
achieve parity with the English-speaking white community who was much more well-todo economically and stronger culturally

13

. For Afrikaner nationalists asserting

Afrikanerdom was more important than unity and their ethnic identification preceded
their class affiliations, which resulted in the deepening of the divide within the white
society and widening the colonial buffer that separated white settlers from natives.
Although the nascent capitalist economy exploited Afrikaner workers as well as Blacks
and Coloureds, for Afrikaner nationalists it was ethnic and racial issues that came first
and prevented cross-class interactions and coalitions.
Afrikaner community was mobilized mainly by language, Afrikaans, in order to
establish the social and political bases of racial segregation within a hierarchy that would
guarantee Afrikaners’ supremacy as a collective ethno-national group within production
relations that prevailed in this period. Job market - already segregated when the Union
13

Comparing to the well-established urban Anglo workers the Afrikaners who migrated to the towns
often entered the job market at a low point of wage and skills beneath their Englishmen counterparts.
The vast gap between the two communities in terms of their wealth was striking; the ration of the per
capita income of the Afrikaners and the English is estimated at 100-300 in 1910 (Gilomee 1979, p107)
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was established- was distinguished by the significant gap between black and white wages
whereby the later gained much less than the former for the same job14. This competition
explains partially white workers prejudice against their African counterparts and white
workers refusal to receive the same rates as blacks for the same job in the same market
indicates that underlying assumption that white workers must have a European living
standard that blacks were not entitled to. As Malan put it “The white man, because he is
white, is expected – whatever his chances in the labor market – to maintain a white
standard of living” (cited in Gilomee 1979: 108). Segregation in this sense was not only a
system of exploitation but also a means of asserting white supreme identity as racially
defined ethnic group.
The exigencies of unity coupled with Afrikaner’s effort to tighten their grip on
state institutions postponed the creation of a well-defined segregation strategy.
Segregation of races between 1910 and 1930 remained fragmented. However Afrikaner
colonial ethno-nationalism with its strong segregationist impulse has had the appeal as
the locus of white supreme status and privileges among the majority of the Afrikaner
community. Opposing trends within the white community rendered the question of the
Native an ultimate issue in the first years of the Union. This was a period of Afrikaner
turmoil in which the effects of early capitalist industrialization 15 and urbanization
generated different reactions in the white society especially Afrikaner community. The

14

For example, between 1900-1940black workers in the cities accepted to do unskilled jobs for two
shillings and six pence per day while white workers were not willing to do the same job for less than three
shillings and six pence (Giliomee 1979: 108)
15
At the beginning of the 20th century only 10 per cent of the Afrikaners lived in cities and villages; in
1911 this figure had risen to 29 per cent and to 41 per cent in 1926 to 75 per cent in 1960 (Giliomee 1979:
104).
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latter, under the effects of modernization had shown diverging levels of ethnic-national
affiliation which represented a threat to Afrikaner nationalist sought to reconstruct
Afrikaners as an ethno-nationalist people.

Following its victory in the war of 1899-1902 Britain enacted the legislation of
South African Act of 1909 that founded the legal bases of the ‘Constitution of the Union
of South Africa’ that enshrined white minority rule. Britain was preoccupied with
retaining its power over the country through the Commonwealth, and had maintained its
economic lucrative ties with it while offering vocal support to peaceful change and
majority rule (Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 44). The formation of the Union contributed
significantly to the rise of Afrikaner ethno-national mobilization and segregationist
practices. State system would become the main source of power utilized by Afrikaners to
consolidate segregation as the defining system of social relationships. Harnessing state
power enabled Afrikaner nationalists to mobilize Afrikaans speaking whites regardless of
class status or social affiliation, behind a common objective: the achievement of
Afrikaner nationalism involved the pursuit of both cultural and political goals. Invoking
Afrikaner nationalism transcended the particularistic class interests within the group and
inter-group relations alike. The result was the emergence of powerful collective
nationalist actors (Adam 1979: 62) especially political parties and nationalist associations
who believed in Afrikaners as a nation. Indeed “It was the entrenchment of Afrikanerdom
as a political class, encompassing all economic classes of the ethnic group that made
possible an ethnic revolution through the capture of state power” (Adam 1979: 36), which
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gave significant popular support for the implementation of segregation as a state system.
In this sense, segregation was a dual system of social status differences and unequal
political entitlements on the one hand, and exploitation of the subordinate group on the
other.
In the social realm it was a system of expected conduct by the subordinate group
that conforms to the criteria of the super-ordinate especially separate residential locations
and social hierarchy; the defiance from such a conduct was intolerable. State discipline
power and bio-power strands were deployed to facilitate exploitation and to tame political
dissent while maintaining a certain level of exclusion. It was through administrative and
regulative methods in the realms of economic and social relationships that the state
sustained and consolidated segregation in this period. Segregation and its modalities
were conditioned upon Africans political weakness and fragmentation; in so far as
African nationalism was tamed state power worked on those two levels (discipline and
bio-power) which endured until 1930s where sovereign power was also introduced to
entrench racism and social differentiation. It was in the wake of 1948, though when the
state deployed a blanket sovereign power to reconstruct racial relations within ethnonational separated terrains as we will see.
Thus, segregation policies in the 1910 until early 1920s remained contextual but
primarily aimed at excluding non-white communities from property rights regime and
from central political institutions of the state but not from the production process as a
work force. Indigenous Black community was confined and exploited simultaneously;
two inseparable imperatives for the white society to accumulate and dominate within a
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growing capitalist and rapidly industrialized country. To be sure, Afrikaners had shown a
persisting permanent existence through which they invested capital and resources, which
further increased their collective sense of identity and entrenched their interests in
sustaining and maintaining racial-colonial relationships. Afrikaners conceived of their
existence as an independent nation rather than compradors for a metropolitan center,
Britain. As argued in chapter I, settler-colonial dominant groups differ from classic
colonialism in this particular aspect that is a necessary condition for their transformation
into an ethno-national entity. Therefore, formalizing and institutionalizing segregation
practices was crucial in order to mobilize and unify the white and especially Afrikaners
and give them a viable and stable system of social relations that champion and uplift their
distinctiveness and independence taking advantage of state power and a tradition of
segregation established before state formation and Afrikaners’ ascendance to power
Shortly before 1910 Lord Alfred Milner (the British High Commissioner of South
Africa, and Governor of Cape Colony since 1897) formed the Lagden Commission16 in
1903 to examine what he described as ‘native policy’. The aim was to found a
compromise between racial extremism within the white community that demanded an
overt racist interpretation of political life on the one hand, and the colonial establishment
that sought to reduce the effects of racial extremism on the other. The Commission
represented the need for a unitary or an agreed upon policy on the Native issue (Rich
1990: 670) and it proposed that the existing division of land and separate holding of land
should be the foundation of territorial separation between the Africans and the whites,
16

It was dubbed the “’South African Native Affairs Commission”, 1903-5 and was chaired by the secretary
of native affairs in the Transvaal, Sir Godfrey lagden.
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while it “recognized that Africans’ reserves could serve as labor reservoirs for the white
areas” (Guelke, 2005: 64). Thus the recommendations espoused a segregated territorialresidential social sphere within which the inclusion of African labor in economic
processes imply social costs for the white society namely, the ability of Black Africans to
disrupt white endeavor for a distinctiveness. “Proletarianizing” the Black African work
force as an indispensable factor for the development of white capitalism granted the
former to practice political leverage over the latter. Spatial and territorial separation
wouldn’t become absolute or sought as a precondition for the constitution and
consolidation of Afrikaner or white racial ethno-nationality. Lagden Commission’s
propositions were formalized in the Native Land Act of 191317 which meant to create
conformity of social practices to organize an already established social reality of
domination and subordination structured in territorial separation. The Act was a victory
to segregationists amongst the Afrikaner community and deepened state involvement in
shaping segregation policies including labor market regulations and resources allocation.
The colonial buffer separating settler-colonial society from the indigenous was expanded
by a top-down and formal procedure that attempted to circumscribe the effects of Black
integration in the economic system of the state but also it represented the interests and
attitudes of white electorate (Christopher 1989: 421).
The conformity with which the state sought to practice segregation was a
necessary policy for the articulation of a unitary white political entity that was otherwise
split over the question of the natives and over white intra-group relations. On the level of
17

The Act defined the areas designated for the Africans as reserves owned and used by Africans, which
comprised less than 9% of the country. Moreover, it enacted that purchasing or renting land outside these
reserves is prohibited for the Africans.
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white politics state adoption of segregation as a formal policy aimed at bridging over
divisions that plagued white politics through ethnic-class stratification across races
whereby the widening gap between people of the same class category and different ethnic
affiliation became more pervasive. Introducing state power to homogenize the whites and
non-whites created a distinct domination system whereby African ethno-national identity
and their class status and economic exploitation intersected to accumulate grievances of
economic exploitation, social status and political injustice within a socio-economic
structure of partial exclusion.
In spite of state efforts to legalize and institutionalize segregation the Afrikaner
polity remained inconsistent in its position over the level of segregation necessary for the
social order and economic system to hold (Guelke 2005: 44). Thus while some political
leaders warned against extreme segregation measures such as General Smuts who
believed that such a policy would cause the gravest trouble for South Africa (Quoted in
Rich 1990: 673), the supporters of all-out segregationist policies demanded more state
intervention in consolidating segregation and differentiation especially labor regulation
and residential areas. Moreover, for some Afrikaners segregation and especially the
resettlement of the African population in reserves - that is required for segregation to
work - would disrupt the pattern of paternalistic structure of colonial control that was
established in the preindustrial era (Rich 1990: 673). The most important outcome of
these opposing currents was the politicization of the question of black-white relationships
against the background of increasing anxieties accompanied the beginning of industrial
era that gave more salience to Afrikaner national mobilization. Socio-economic changes
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of industrialization and the salience of the native question turned political process
especially elections into a tool of mobilization based on racial issues (Adam 1979: 67-68).
Thus, white politics would be one of the most decisive elements in the development of
segregation and racial-colonialism in South Africa as the Union entered the 1920s and
well into the 1930s.

White politics and the climax of segregation 1920s-30s

The SAP lead by Jan Christiaan Smuts dominated the political arena since the
establishment of the Union. The main opposition party was the English-speaking
Unionist Party. However, socioeconomic changes emanating from the transition to a
capitalist industrial economy came to change this balance of power. The main social
force that stood behind political alignment shifts was Afrikaner workers who demanded
political arrangements that promote their interests and protect them in the face of rapid
urbanization and the increase of black competition. With the increase of industrialization
as Giliomee (1979: 108) remarks Afrikaner workers were more attracted to nationalist
notions of separate unions and separate classes in order to preserve Afrikaners’ status and
privileges. Industrialization processes of 1920s had triggered profound dynamics of
socioeconomic changes that formed the social base of political polarization within the
Afrikaner community. One of the most striking socioeconomic changes of the era was the

79

increase of the poor among the Afrikaner population18 especially in the cities and towns,
which resulted in a remarkable rise of nationalist sentiments.
The increasing Afrikaner nationalist sentiments had driven those workers away
from white unions especially because most these unions were led by non-Afrikaners and
considered foreign entities. On the psychological level Afrikaners in the 1920 through
1930s faced social dislocation that stemmed from urbanization and resulted in a deep
sense of insecurity and uncertainty. Poorest Afrikaner strata and middle class (especially
clergy and educators) were the most attracted to nationalist rhetoric and political
mobilization (Giliomee 1979: 111) in support of Afrikanerdom. Questions of racial and
national affiliation and political identification had become overwhelmingly prevalent and
were related to the native question and segregation policies; the later would become one
of the most – if not the most, important issue in polarizing white society as it pertained to
the very interests and social superiority of a wide social strata of Afrikaners.
Social stratification resulted from industrialization only exacerbated malicious
political cleavages that started to surface as early as the formation of the Union.
Following the election of 1910 J.B. Hertzog; the leader of the Orange Free State defected
from the government and formed the National Party (NP) in 1914. Further divisions
occurred as a result of South African participation in the First World War alongside
Britain. This decision instigated a white military rebellion that was soon crushed by force.
Although the SAP remained in rule it could not sustain the support of majority

18

The Carnegie Commission Report of 1932 estimated the number of poor white population at 300,000 or
17 per cent of the white population (Guelke 2005:76).
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Afrikaners19 (Barber 1999: 76) following the workers’ uprising and the controversy on
the war. South Africa’s participation in the war allowed the regime to gain a regional role
as an imperialist regional power 20 which strengthened an outward focus of Smuts’
government that contributed to SAP loss of the 1924 election. Regional focus of Smut’s
government overshadowed crucial domestic issues of racial relations and the amelioration
of social repercussions of industrialization.
The election of 1924 had shown the serious political polarization in the white
community: The SAP lost for the alliance of the National Party (NP) and the
segregationist South African Labor Party (SALP), which was a significant victory for the
proponents of overt segregation and nationalist intransigence. While the SAP was
supported by land and mine owners, and industrialists the winning alliance was widely
supported by white labor and farmers. These allegiances were reasonable taking into
account socio-economic changes we mentioned above that brought with it a strong
unionized white labor aristocracy in new urban centers (especially in Witwatersrand and
Orange Free State). For white workers segregationist policies will serve their interests by
protecting them from black labor competition and by legislations that will promote their
19

The National Party under the leadership of Hertzog gained 78,000 while the South African Party polled
94,000 votes. Taking into account that the SAP had the English-speaking whites’ support whereas the NP
gained his votes exclusively from the Afrikaners, the results were indicative of the change of political
power.
20

South Africa was appointed the status of a Mandate over South West Africa with the support of the
British government. South Africa went so far in its Mandatory jurisdiction to allocate vast areas of land for
the settlement of white settlers. This encouraged the regime to start seeking the annexation of Southern
Rhodesia as well (Gulke 2005: 71). This expansionist attitude will witness a reinvigorating effort later by
the P.W. Botha government in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, Smuts’ government could not change
the territorial boundaries of the state that remained the same until 1960s. But the regional role the regime
fulfilled and the alliance with Britain consolidated regimes position and the Union’s importance as an
influential state in the politics of Africa.
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standard of living (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 35). Thus segregationist policies
appear to have been the result of interest groups pressure on the regime. However,
although economic and status calculations played an important role in these political
shifts, mobilizing Afrikaner working and middle classes relied heavily on cultural and
identity discourse. This was evident even as both the NP the Purified National Party
(PNP) of Malan resorted to Afrikaner nationalist rhetoric to mobilize political support for
diverging, and indeed conflicting, political goals. While Hertzog sought to redefine
Afrikanerdom by building a white cross-ethnic middle-class coalition, Malan sought to
unify the Afrikaners politically to go it alone and achieve their political superiority
(Giliomee 1979: 113).

Moreover, tightening segregation and territorial separation

coupled with increased Afrikaner nationalism was bound to the structural changes rather
than to merely the pressure of certain groups. To be sure, social order during the
transition into a modernized capitalist social system and economic performance depended
on state measures to protect whites’ interests and at the same time to maintain economic
vibrancy and stability of the country. The latter goal required the preservation of the
‘reserve economy’ that provided for a portion of the means necessary for the
reproduction of the migrant Black work force to urban white areas. The imperative in this
era was to “maintain separate areas with distinct production relations” (Legassick 1974:
6), which formed the basis for segregation in terms of its spatial, territorial and property
rights spheres.
Segregation policies continued apace in the 1920s as well as in 1930s their
territorial and spatial aspects. The government tightened influx control measures to
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restrict Black Africans from moving from their reserves to white towns and cities. Influx
control and other geographical constrain on black mobility and property rights increased
the number of black workers who moved constantly to and from urban white working
areas to their reserves. The increase of black workers in urban industrial projects driven
by capitalist sought of more profits gained from cheaper labor raised the levels of
competition with white workers. Therefore restricting the number of black workers turns
to be a condition for better wages for the whites. White farmers also benefited from the
existence of a large pool of unskilled black workers (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998:
37).Thus to say that segregation was driven mainly by white working class and farmers’
interest groups is partial as the whole change in the structures of the economy and social
relations required a remodeling of segregation policies and territorial separation.
Racial segregation remained the dominant state policy during the 1925-1939
regardless of the controversy within the Afrikaner community in particular and the white
community in general over racial policy. Following on the footsteps of former
governments 21 this period witnessed an intensification of measures that extended and
confirmed the essential features of segregationist strategy. However, resorting to
legislation was increasingly characteristic to segregation policies in an indication of
increased state sovereign power to sustain racial differentiation. Governments’ main
focus in 1920s-1930s was urban areas and aimed at restricting Black integration in white

21

Between 1913 and 1930 consecutive South African Government of different political affiliations
enacted a number of legislation: The Native Affairs Act of 1920, The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, The
Native Administration Act of 1927, and the Act on Land and Franchise.
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social life and to fixate the geography of racial boundaries22. The Pact government (19241938) under the Premiership of J.B. Hertzog23 enacted a series of measures to protect
mine-owners and white workers from the shortage of labor and from African labor
competition24. The ultimate aim was to secure a higher level of life for white workers and
a cheap African labor for the mining industry. The Pact government also curtailed the
electoral power of non-Whites especially in the Cape, and furthered the system of
allocating reserved areas for Blacks as permanent homes while regulating their
movements in the remainder of the country. These measures not only created conformity
of the social order but also, and a result, contributed profoundly to relaxing white class
and ethno-national cleavages and tensions between Afrikaners and English-speaking
communities and within the Afrikaner community between nationalists and their political
rivals as Legassick (1974) notices.
Policies of racial segregation in this sense were a safeguard to mobilize the entire
white community in defense of white settler power and domination, and the preservation
of controlled influx of forced cheap Black labor that was a condition for economic

22

For example, the Housing Act of 1920 remained intact and unchanged well through the 1920s-30s. It
provided for financial assistance to municipalities in building housed for the poorer section of the
community. The condition for this project was to establish racially homogeneous housing estates. The Act
resulted in the creation of mono-racial belts of residential arias on the margins of white urban towns.
(Christopher 1989: 426)
23

Hertzog was Prime Minister and also Minister of Native Affairs, while his comrade in the nationalist
Afrikanerdom stream D.F Malan was the leader of the NP in the Cape, and became Minister of the Interior,
Public Health and Education. The English Labour Party was rewarded with tow ministries (ministry of
Defense, and Ministry of Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs as a sign of gratitude by Hertzog for the
Party’s help in getting him into power.
24

The most important measure was the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which created
an industrial council with the powers to lay down minimum wages in particular industries. This Act was
complimented by the Wage Act of 1925, which enabled the government directly to set minimum wages for
the employees who are not part of a trade union.
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performance of white economy. Neither of these two related goals was achievable, the
way Afrikaner elites saw it, apart from forming a coherent white community through an
organized effort of mobilization and nation-building of racial ethno-national quality. The
base of mobilization had changed at this turn; language alone was not sufficient to
mobilize diverse political perspectives and the need for all-white unity rather than
Afrikaner unity and ethno-nationalism, which was the core of Hertzog believes. This was
a reasonable change as Afrikaners gradually became more confident in their grip over
political power and their socioeconomic and cultural status vis-à-vis the Anglo whites
and the natives. The accommodation of English-speaking community within Afrikaners’
polity had become of a paramount importance for the creation of a single ethnonationality that will provide for the hegemony (Terreblanche 2002: 261) that Afrikaners
lacked over the social sphere. Indeed white-white cleavage was a profound hindrance to a
successful and ethnically viable nation-building and the consolidation of Afrikaners’
political power on a unitary white state.
English-speaking whites, Rich (1990: 666) remarks, were in favor of a segregation policy
based on discipline power and social control rather than segregation. Disciplinary power
in this sense would suppress class struggle and stratifies African community along social
rather than racial-ethnic lines and reduce its ability to political mobilization. Therefore
they aimed at the establishment of a social rather than a racial hierarchy, which gives the
regime a significant degree of legitimation from the society at large including certain
segments of the native Africans and Coloured communities. Afrikaners, by contrast, were
more preoccupied with racial and latter with racial-ethnic hierarchy as the system that
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guarantees white supremacy regardless of the degree of legitimacy it derives from the
non-white. The success of the Pact government to silence these cleavages in the 1920s,
however, changed at the turn of the decade.
The divisions within the Afrikaner community in 1930s were more salient;
according to C.T. Loran’s classification three strands of thought on racial relations
prevailed: “repressionists”, “equalists”, and “segregationists” with the latter hold the
middle ground (Cited in Rich 1990: 667). Many justifications of racial inequality were
articulated to support the segregationist perspective and present it as a benevolent
endeavor that aimed at upgrading non-white in separation from white communities,
which allows both communities to develop each on its own right and by its own means.
Segregationists’ camp gained a new force with the emergence of the PNP (1935)25 that
advocated Afrikanerdom and the supreme objective of constituting Afrikaners as Volk26.
Malan protested the silencing of Afrikanerdom and aimed to counterweight what he saw
as United Party selling out of Afrikaners’ interests to the British Empire. The UP that
found its social base mainly among capitalist strata of Afrikaners and Anglo settlers
represented a direct threat to the Afrikaner petty bourgeois that saw it as an imperialist
coalition with the UK. By the same token, Afrikaner middle class (lawyers, teachers,
25

The formation of the PNP resulted from a break away from the National Party of Barry Hertzog as the
latter formed the United Party as the merger of the NP and Smuts’ SAP. Daniel Malan and other 19 MPs
protested the step and defect the NP to establish the PNP.
26

The expression volk had a twofold function: in the first it asserted the distinctiveness of the Afrikaners
from the indigenous not only as a race but more importantly as an ethnic-nationality with well defined
boundaries, which amounted in the enactment of apartheid. It also emphasized the struggle to wrest the
country from the English-speaking British and place its future in the hands of the Afrikaners, which
indicates the long and eager lust for sovereignty and political power. In the latter sense it is striking that
once the NP was in power in 1948 English-speaking bureaucrats, soldiers, and state employees were
sidelined by reliable Afrikaners, with key posts going to Broederbond members. The electoral system itself
was manipulated to reduce the impact of immigrant English speakers.
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professors, and low-level civil servants) saw their positions and status threatened by the
influence of English language, English bureaucrats, and the more sophisticated English
culture. Moreover, UP strong commitment to capitalist development implied the denationalization of the Afrikaner working class as a result of mobilizing class relations
rather than racial affiliation (Giliomee 1979: 110-14) under the influence of Englishspeaking elites. These material interests and cultural anxieties culminated in a wide range
of polarization and mobilization between the UP and the PNP; both resorted to Afrikaner
Nationalist tenets that each party defined and interpreted in ways that suited its political
aims. The chief victor of this era was Afrikaner national identity and the revival of strong
Afrikaner cultural sentiments, which the two political rivals competed to uplift and utilize
in their political rivalry and struggle for power.
The PNP strong tendency in favor of “extending the scope, depth, and details of
segregationist policy (and apply it to the Coloureds) gave a high degree of saliency to its
nationalist stance. The main success of the NP in this period was rallying most
intellectuals - who joined other social forces that opposed UP policies -

to form the

‘Afrikaner Broederbond’, which focused its energy in the cultural arena and the
promotion of Afrikaner language27 as well to “igeologize Afrikaner history and identity”
(Giliomee 1979: 112) as sacred, which amounted to the evolution of a civil religion or a
politico-religious thought in the Afrikaner community based on the belief that Afrikaners

27

By the year 1937 over 300 organizations were affiliated to the Broederbond, which put the movement in
the lead to reinvigorate the cultural and ideological aspects of Afrikaner identity: the resurrection of the
Great Trek mythology and its meanings that reminded the Afrikaners with the frontier settlement and
heroism of the pioneering Dutch who colonized the inlands of South Africa.
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belonged to an elect people. Notions of Afrikaner bond gave political rise and social
viability to the aspirations of Republicanism and Afrikaners’ nationalism.
The period of 1930s was strikingly an era of a politico-religious grid of thinking among
Afrikaners as the bedrock of establishing the Afrikaner nation. Thus the NP “with its
immediate concern to preserve the ‘taal’, the ‘Kultuur’ and the priority of ‘South Africa
first’ within the politics of the larger Commonwealth” (Rich 1994: 56) gave it more
political viability especially with Hertzog powerful concept of a united Afrikaans and
English-speaking volk united in a new Afrikanerdom. Hertzog’s new approach, which
indicates a profound change in the ideological underpinnings of Afrikaner ethnonationalism, can be considered the intellectual genesis of apartheid: escaping the logic of
racial colonial features of white-native relationships by ethnicizing the conflict as
between one ethno-national group (the white) and other ethno-nationally defined black
groups. Perceptions of white ethno-national entity increased significantly as political
elites where in the race to win the minds and hearts of Afrikaners through nationalistic
outbidding. This process will be seriously disrupted following Smuts government’s
decision to participate in Second World War alongside Britain, which instigated fierce
opposition within the Afrikaners especially within the UP government.
Segregation and territorial separation until the turn of 1940s was part of a wider
pattern of modernization processes that engulfed South African society” (Rich 1990: 666)
and turned it into a capitalist system of social relations. Racial differentiation ideology
and practices are less the product of Afrikaner unique cultural roots than the result of the
ideological labors of modernizing elite seeking to insure social cohesion in transitional
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times (Du Toit 1989: 9520) that threatened the already divided white community.
Consequently, socioeconomic changes and political volatility radicalized the Afrikaner
community and resurrected Great Trek ideology and culture, which reemerged not only
from mere convictions; rather, as an outcome of a set of social, economic and political
dynamics that spurred further evolution of the Afrikaner nationalist agenda. However;
World War Two came to interrupt this pattern and divide the Afrikaner community again
and to set the scene for the ascendance of the Nationalist Party apartheid. Smuts decision
to take part in the war alongside Britain, in the words of Giliomee (1979: 114) “rekindled
all the old anti British and anti-imperialist sentiments and was ultimately decisive in
persuading the majority of the Afrikaners to go it alone politically, which gave rise to
forces of apartheid.
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Chapter IV
Apartheid as an ethno-territorial control system

Introduction
The landslide victory of the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party
from the PNP and the faction that had merged with the SAP) in the election of 1948 was
a dramatic event that changed the political landscape in South Africa and introduced new
notions of racial relationships and political power. The victory came within a process of
mobilization of the Afrikaner community led by Malan who stirred Afrikaners’ bitterness
against British taking advantage of wide opposition to participation in the war. In this
sense the political appeal of the NP in the election can be seen through the lenses of
Afrikaner strong identification with their sense of distinctiveness and their longing to
ultimate political independence from British influence. However, NP revival in 1948 is
fundamentally related to the dynamics within the Afrikaner community and its political
identification that made this victory possible. Until 1948, Afrikaners did not seem to be
close to their original objective to constitute their distinctiveness into a coherent
territorially based ethno-national people. As a minority threatened by a vast indigenous
and partially integrated majority and another adamant rival, Afrikaners’ drift toward
chauvinist ethno-nationalism under the leadership of the NP represented a strategy that
would impede assimilation and integration. Apartheid can be seen as an answer to the no90

exit stalemate within the system of segregation and an answer to white society fractured
ethno-national identity.

The National Party and the advent of Afrikaner ethno-territoriality

The tenets embedded in apartheid were not entirely new to Afrikaner nationalist
leaders of the NP. D.F. Malan assured in 1944 that one of the aims of the ‘Republic’ and
the NP was “to insure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization by the
honest maintenance of the principle of apartheid and guardianship” (Guelke 2005: 3).
Malan’s statement reflects Afrikaners’ disillusionment with their achievements after three
decades of rule where rapid socioeconomic changes allowed the Black community to
achieve a measure of social and economic viability and thus political leverage that
threatened to bore the segregation system from inside out. Processes of modernization
had given African community a chance to develop their income, education, and unionist
bargaining power and therefore created a feeling among the Afrikaners that their “selfproclaimed racial superiority over the black Africans was melting away” despite racist
legislation (Olson and Stedman 1994: 41). Afrikaners’ feeling of threat also stemmed
from the rivalry with the English-speaking community that possessed economic and
cultural edge, which raised the stakes for the Afrikaners to unify their ranks in order to
gain preponderance within the white society. Apartheid as the centerpiece of the NP
portfolio was the gravitating notion that attracted Afrikaner electorate and at least
partially explains NP victory.
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National Party’s ability to interrelate ideology and notions of Afrikaner culture
with political and socio-economic policies granted it a remarkable appeal among the
Afrikaner electorate: its adoption of the demands for South African National
independence, the promotion of Afrikaners’ economic interests, and its championing of
the Afrikaans culture (Giliomee 1979: 114-115) put the NP in an undefeated position.
The NP invoked not only nationalistic ideology, but equally asserted what the Afrikaner
middle class (professionals, educators, and civil servants) saw as a redemption of the
their country and the reclamation of their own political control over the state from the UP
that sold it out to the British. The NP presented itself and apartheid as a salvation force
that has the capacity to give nation-building efforts of white society a significant
momentum through total territorial separation of putative ethnicizing of the population.
Apartheid came to assure Afrikaners the security and certainty they sought: Although
they maintained control over political power they were uncertain about their survival as
minority that needed constant, stronger and more penetrating legislations that will secure
their survival in the face of all challenges and threats real and conceived, present and
forthcoming. The NP seemed to have the potential to achieve these goals and bring about
unity of the white race as ethnicity.
Apartheid: the creation of the ethno-national nexus

Racial relationships of segregation had been institutionalized and pervaded every
corner of South African society when the PA -group relations and intra-group affiliations
(Adam 1979, p32) in an irreversible way. Introducing sovereign state power to change
the constitutional and legal underpinnings of the state by changing the political92

geography of the conflict was assumed to provide the answer ascended to power in 1948.
As a qualitatively different system of domination Apartheid came to change the
expressions and modalities of social relationships through changing the patterns of inter
for Afrikaners’ debacle. Territorializing the domain of the conflict along ethnic-national
stratification would have the effect and consequences of reshaping the entire structures of
social, economic, and political aspects of racial-colonial relationships. Redefining racial
inequality in accordance with new developments within the structures of the society was
the main objective of apartheid; the differentiation of distinct ethno-national groups
rather than races would be less costly and more durable for the survival of Afrikaner rule.
Racial segregation within a minority rule system was doomed to failure taking
into account socioeconomic shifts in the South African society as a whole especially
African community’s socioeconomic developments and the shifts within the white
community. Racial segregation fill short from materializing the Afrikaner nation-building
project based on racial differentiation and subordination. Indeed At the turn of 1950s
Afrikaners and English-speaking communities were still racially self-defined ethnonational groups occupying the top two positions in a racially defined social hierarchy.
Redefining the conflict in ethno-national terms has had the capacity to unify the whites in
general as a unitary ethnic group. To be sure Afrikaner identity within apartheid became
a question of an ethno-national group that has fundamental claims of a privileged status
in a country it perceives as its own (Giliomee 1979: 127). Cross-ethnic and cross-racial
interactions based on class affiliation, regional belonging and interest are less likely in
this context, and therefore social and political integration less conceivable; ethnicity
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becomes the element that determines political behavior and identification. Apartheid, in
this sense preserved and quantitatively deepened discrimination and exploitation directed
against Africans and other non-white communities. Simultaneously it introduced
qualitatively new ideological justifications of a different type of domination based on
ethno-national differentiation and representation. Analyzing apartheid in depth is an
exercise to grasp on the convergence and divergence between two distinct but interrelated
eras through which the system of white domination evolved. Apartheid can be looked
upon and assessed as a move of state contraction to preserve white supremacy with
minimum costs to Afrikaners in terms of economic, political as well as cultural costs.
Seen from this perspective, apartheid was a dynamic and adoptive response to
particular socio-economic and political developments that South Africa had witnessed in
four decades since the establishment of the Union. Thus one would not question apartheid
per se as much as examining the conditions within which it sprung and developed.
Therefore this section of the research contends that the state had been a unitary actor in
the pursuit and the implementation of apartheid and it did not merely responded to the
interests of these or other political or social actors28. Rather the state practiced its central
institutional capacities and sovereign power to produce as a purposive actor aimed to
maintain a distinct and privileged social status for the Afrikaners, and to enforce the
separateness of white from other ethno-national groups (Giliomee 1979: 118); the state
was acting as an ethno-national group. In this we assume the presence of a high degree
28

In this we contrast most of economical perspectives that assume certain supporters (workers and farmers)
and particular opponents (capital owners and industrialists) of apartheid amongst the Afrikaner social
stratum. This approach further assumes that politicians who sought to maximize their electoral gains
enacted apartheid policies following these calculations. The state within this reasoning was a passive player
that responded to these rational calculations (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 42).
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of conformity between the state as a political system and the socioeconomic structures in
producing social relations of domination and inequality that led to the emergence of
apartheid; a feature that can be seen in state intervention in labor market and economic
processes as we discuss below. Thus the victory of NP and the enactment of apartheid is
not a mere result of interest groups pressure as some analysts suggest (e.g. Merle Lipton
1986; Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998). Rather, it is the emergence of a specific system
of social domination that stemmed from and responded to certain historical developments
within which the Afrikaner community maintained its demand for social and political
hegemony that was not exclusively related to apartheid; it has been the main
characteristic of Afrikaner politics since early 1920.

Changing the political-geography of the conflict by partitioning

At one level, apartheid represents a quantitative extension and continuation of
racial segregation in two ways: it expanded the system of forced and unequal labor to
include the increasing urban industrial production, and in the significant increase in state
intervention in economic processes and labor market through legislative measures. Both
reflected the resilience of exploitation as an imperative for the secondary industry
characteristic to the rising industrial society (Legassick 1974: 9). However, exploitation
under new conditions required more strict political and union organizations measures29

29

As the Board of Trade and Industries put it: “The extension of manufacturing industry can be stimulated
through a reduction of the high cost structure through increased mechanization so as to derive the full
benefit of the large sources of comparatively low-paid non-European labour” (quoted in Legassick 1974:
10).
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that would circumscribe Black labor unionism and political mobilization. This would not
have been attainable without state intervention in labor regulations and in market
operation at large. Thus state institutions regularized labor market through measures such
as labor ‘color codes’ and ‘work-roles’ that assigned certain jobs’ classification on an
ethnic basis to preserve white (mostly Afrikaner) workers. White working class enjoyed
many privileges and was turned into a kind of aristocratic working class, but it was under
constant threat of cheap black workers competition that market preferred, which drove
the government to intervene and fix what it saw as a replacement of European by nonEuropean labor. Two measures were put forth: restricting black labor mobility within
urban areas and between different jobs, and raising the wages of white workers; both
measures were apparently antithetical to capitalist economic growth. However, as
Legassick (1974: 6) notices, rising white workers’ wages did not make a whole difference
in economic performance. NP government’s labor policies hadn’t differed but a little
from that of the 1940s and by the time the legislation of ‘job color bar’ was implemented
in 1956 South African economy was in a boom phase, which marginalized the issue of
labor replacement. To be sure “South African economic growth since 1948 has proceeded
apace – exceeded in 1960s only by that of Japan- while at the same time the system of
racial discrimination has grown more effective and pervasive” .This explains why the NP
government applied job color bar in a dynamic way that followed the requirements of the
industry and the market rather than ideology. Therefore apartheid existed as a result of
something essential within the structure of social relations that yields different benefits

As the minister of Economic Affairs stated, the government “will not lose sight” of this problem in “the
formulation and application of its industrial policy” (quoted in Legassick 1974: 12).
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(material and ideal) and that is a priori to mere capitalist economic growth imperatives,
which manifests in a racially stratified socio-economic system.
Apartheid came to deepen and perpetuate the intersection between ethnic-national
affiliation with class and social status exerting an ascribed status allocation in a raciallyethnicized social hierarchy. Thus privileges that certain social groups accrued were one
major aspect of the socioeconomic structure and the political economy of domination not
a contradictory element. While it is true that private capitalists might not had reaped the
full benefits of their business in a system of labor restrictions and state’s heavy
intervention in the economy, but capital would not have made huge profit margins
without state suppression of bargaining capabilities of the black unions, and without the
low social costs of production that resulted from apartheid (Adam 1979: 46). Therefore
apartheid deepened and intensified social, economic and political inequalities prevailed
before 1948. But more equally important and dialectically linked to these continuities are
the qualitative features of apartheid that made it a unique domination system.
Capitalist industrialization in South Africa since 1920s and the accompanied
modernization processes (economic growth, urbanization, education, and the spread of
communication) did not culminate in effective nation-building and national integration of
diverse ethno-national peoples in the mainstream of national life. Modernizing South
Africa had been exclusive “due to the fact that … implementing the modernization
process [was] controlled by a single ethnic group at the political center” (Simpson 1994:
463-474). Dynamics of economic integration and social and political exclusion of
Africans coupled with indefinite Afrikaner territorial-national identification created a
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situation whereby neither assimilation and full integration ensued nor ultimate separation
realized. ‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ of the South African regime remained a
function of a socio-economic and political dynamics and the reemergence of Afrikaner
ethno-nationalism in s 1940 had to overcome undetermined territorial contours of an
ethnicized system of differentiation and separation. Apartheid was a response to the
prospects of cross-race, cross-class and cross ethnic affiliations and aspired to prevent the
fusion of national life that transcend ethno-national affiliation through the establishment
of a new regime of territorial legitimation as the defining structure of ethnic-national
distinct identities. The ultimate goal was to craft a white South Africa by permanently
excluding Africans in a separate sphere of political, economic and legal context. To serve
this end, NP had envisioned the notion and policies of ‘separate development’ of white
and non-white communities as the rationalization of permanent ethno-national separation
that would totally ‘Afrikanerize’ the state.
Apartheid was a partitioning solution to a ‘problem’ that had been adamant; the
existence of the indigenous Africans as part of the state. Partitioning is a form of
territorial arrangement usually embodies in it the element of sovereignty, necessary for
the formation of a new state. However, political ‘sovereign’ entities result from
partitioning, as Muir (1975) described are ‘politico-territorial anomalies’ with a de facto
sovereignty, and represent a geographic realignment of political forces (Falah, 2007:
1344-1345). In essence Africans would be totally territorially and legally separated from
state structure as foreigners of other ethno-national sovereign entities. As the last resort to
solve the challenge of the Africans, apartheid was alleged to enable Africans to claim
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their separateness not as a race rather as putative ethnicities. Afrikaner political
leadership introduced the policy as a measure of justice, progress, prosperity, and peace.
However, the new sovereign power deployed as embedded in apartheid only deepened
inequality and exclusion which revealed how illusive notions of separate freedoms and
development were. But, these inequalities were not any more justified by crud racial
ideology; rather by economic and political realities of life that “do not allow the gap
between black and white wealth to be narrowed more rapidly” as H. F. Verwoerd (Prime
minister of South Africa 1958-1966 and the mastermind of apartheid) contends. He
further argued that the causes of inequality were historical differences that do not allow
but a separate development of the white and the black; it is not because blacks are inferior
race, as he puts it, but because Afrikaners are different from others and will not give up
their different status (Simpson 1994: 463-474).
Thus apartheid represents a redefinition of social relations in terms of ethnic
differentiation to block the development of South Africa into a plural society of mixed
and integrated social groups that form one national identity based on equal civil and
political rights (Posel 1991: 1). The erosion of racist colonialism loomed as the levels of
industrialization and urbanization brought more Africans and Coloureds to the city and
skilled labor market, which the NP was determined to reverse (Guelke 2005: 25). The
‘influx control’ policies before 1948 set the stage for apartheid as a legal practice based
on the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, which restricted the rights of Africans to stay
in urban areas. It responds to the failed in reducing the number of Africans in cities and
towns that had increased by 60 per cent during the World-War Two years ( Guelke 2005:
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87)30 . In this context, apartheid incorporated more in-depth measures based on social
engineering to control black labor as an organized and militant working force and as a
political and social menace. Complete physical territorial separation was presented as the
ideal solution for the non-white and particularly the Black indigenous existence in the
state; a solution that would propagate Afrikanerdom and Afrikanize the state permanently.
Two levels of apartheid were introduced in which state sovereign power prevailed: ‘petty
apartheid’ and ‘grand apartheid’. While the former embodied Afrikaner racist attitudes
against social intercourse or cross-racial interactions through total separateness31, grand
apartheid aimed at constitutionally enforce a system of territorial ethno-national
separation and partition.
Grand apartheid is a qualitatively profound social engineering that creates ethnic
classifications and separate spheres of life and the achievement of racial homogenization

30

As early as the year 1942, the South African government criminalized black workers’ strikes and took
measures to tighten up the pre-war influx control. In 1945 the government enacted the Native (Urban Areas)
Act to achieve this control. But the number of Africans in Urban areas maintained an annual increase of 7
per cent.
Petty apartheid was a set of legislations: The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 that made
marriages across races illegal; The Immorality Act of 1950 which outlawed sex across color lines; the
Population Registration Act of 1950 which compels every citizen too have an identity certificate showing
his race, The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 that consolidated daily life segregation; Bantu
Education Act of 1953 and The Extension of University Education Act of 1959 aimed at a separate
educational systems. The latter illegalized the admission of non-white student to certain universities except
for those the government allows on an individual basis.
31

Petty apartheid was a set of legislations: The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 that made
marriages across races illegal; The Immorality Act of 1950 which outlawed sex across color lines; the
Population Registration Act of 1950 which compels every citizen too have an identity certificate showing
his race, The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 that consolidated daily life segregation; Bantu
Education Act of 1953 and The Extension of University Education Act of 1959 aimed at a separate
educational systems. The latter illegalized the admission of non-white student to certain universities except
for those the government allows on an individual basis.
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of residential areas32 territorially separated from each other. In this respect the dominant
group doesn’t seek to control territory or to expand in the spatial sphere of the
subordinate group. Rather, the dominant ethnic-national, especially as a minority, seeks
exit by guaranteeing total disengagement from the indigenous population. Thus grand
apartheid works on the level of collective entities per se to change their constitutional,
political, and territorial identification.
Apartheid, in addition of being a state system, concentration and separation of
races reflected a strong attitude within the Afrikaner community to separate itself from
other non-white communities (Christopher 1898: 428). State regulations before the
enactment of apartheid responded to these attitudes, which sharply increased levels of
urban and residential separation and ‘harmonization’ of races (Ibid). More significantly,
patterns of white settlement were not related to the size or location of the land or the
place, which indicates further the instrumentality with which residential and territorial
separation in general played. Apartheid then represents a qualitatively different set of
domination modalities of state sovereign power whereby the regime established physical
and territorial segregation that aimed at articulating new boundaries of state sovereignty
and the control of non-white communities as collective ethnic entities mainly through
legal measures (legislations) 33 . The most important pillar of apartheid legislative and
32

The NP governments were determined to curb black residency in urban areas not only through ‘influx
policies’ but beyond it forced the removal of Blacks living in privately owned or rental properties in or near
the centers of towns, and their resettlement on the urban periphery. One of the most known among these
evections was the elimination of Sophiatowm in Johannesburg. Moreover, they exerted pressure on the
employers of Blacks to reduce the number of those living in white areas (Christopher 1989: 427)
33
The regime imposed ‘separate representation’ on Coloureds’ and they were removed from the common
roll in the Cape in 1956 before this policy was abolished in 1968. Likewise, Africans were excluded by the
Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 that set the legal basis for the creation of the ‘homeland system’ of
territorial separation.
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institutional base was the Population Registration Act of 195034 that classified the entire
population of the country (Guelke 2005: 25) in terms of assigned ethnic affiliation.
Ethnically classified and zoned, Africans were to be the reserve immigrant labor that
works for the whites without being part of whites’ life.
The NP aimed at achieving this ethnic hierarchy through realizing three objectives:
(1) to create an entirely separated communities that would preserve Afrikaner identity; (2)
to sustain and secure white control over political life and the related economic privileges
against all threats; and (3) to achieve Afrikaner parity with the English-speaking
community (Olson and Stedman 1994: 41). These goals that are reminiscent of D.F.
Malan’s statement of 1944 we cited earlier, epitomize the ultimate end of apartheid:
guaranteeing white domination in perpetuity through separation and control practiced in
terms of sovereign arrangements. The most striking aspect of apartheid was the
implementation of the ‘homeland’ policy that was claimed to be a benign policy aimed at
separate development. In essence apartheid fragmented the African community into
separated homelands based on the classifications enshrined in the Population Registration
Act and The Self-Government Act of 1959. The policy reestablished black community
into a number of ethnic groups35 which was meant to trigger new local and territorially
based Black identities in place of collective sense of national identity. Simultaneously,
this policy gave boost to Afrikaner and white identity as a distinct ethno-nationality not

34

The Act classified the population into three main categories: Native: the black; white; and Coloured. In
addition, the Group Act of 1950 also came to enforce mobility restrictions and the zoning of non-white
communities.
35
The Self-Government Act of 1959 classified African community that lived until then in black reserves
into eight initial ethnic groups: North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa, Shanagaan-Tsonga,
and Venda. Ndebele were added later to raise the number to nine.
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merely a white race divided in two groups. Afrikaners of different classes and political
affiliations were mobilized behind the apartheid regime by the power of ethno-nationalist
political discourse rather than a cultural and linguistic parlance. Afrikaner identity in the
apartheid era turned into a political code of status and privileges that gave Afrikaners a
hegemonic edge where interests, spoils, and privileges are protected and sustained by
political control and separate development. The completeness with which apartheid
sought was an effort to reconstruct South Africa as a pure white state surrounded by belts
of pauperized and client pseudo-autonomous African homelands.
Against all the opposition that the Bantustan policy encountered domestically by
the African National movement and on an international scale, the South African
government was persistent to carry it on as the only answer to the question of racial
relationships. Prime Minister Verwoerd pushed the plan forward and worked consistently
to turn South Africa into a Republic. Apartheid and ‘homeland’ policy was presented as
an actual implementation of the right of self-determination and independence for the
Africans; a step akin to formal decolonization as Afrikaner elites alleged (Olson and
Stedman 1994: 41). To make it more formal the NP government recognized the
Bantustans as independent sovereign homelands. As a matter of fact conferring
‘independence’ on some Bantustans amounted to a major violation of the principle and
the right of Self-Determination as the UN General Assembly ruled

36

36

. As a

Separate development plan envisioned the establishment of 10 Bantustans on area that comprises 13 per
cent of the total land of South Africa. The plan aimed at the resettlement of 50 per cent of African
population in the country. These Bantustans were territorially separated from one another by white-only
integrated areas. This policy did not change the applicability of United Nations Charter on decolonization
especially article 2(7) on apartheid. Bantustan policy cannot be considered as an implementation of the
right of self-determination as the regime invoked. The UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2775 E
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geographically-based independence plan the Bantustan policy amounted to a gross
violation to international law as it forced the resettlement of 900,000 Africans in 800
exclusively designated areas separated from white areas (Richardson, 1978: 186-7). The
most important aspect of the plan is that it deprived Africans in the Bantustans from their
South African citizenship and turned them to foreigners. Moreover, the fact that the
white community at the time represented only 19.3 per cent of the population of South
Africa (out of which 58 per cent Afrikaners and 38 per cent English-speaking), popular
support for the Republic and Bantu policy was shallow (Guelke 2005: 102), which
undermined its legitimacy significantly. Africans’ resistance to the policy would soon
ensue and reveal the inherited injustice embedded in apartheid. The implementation of
the plan counterproductively revealed the very nature of apartheid as a neo-racial colonial
system that embodied “a complex new version of a type of colonial nationalism in its
dual capacity to secure white interests while directing black political aspirations towards
disengaged ‘homelands’” (Rich 1994: 60).
The profound change of the structural properties of the conflict apartheid
introduced triggered the powerful dynamics of two forces that exposed the essence and
features of apartheid: the polarization and divisions within the Afrikaners, and the
African national opposition and resistance. The interaction between these two forces
helps us to a large extent to understanding how the regime survived the crises of 1960s
and 1970s while, comparatively speaking it could not endure when the crisis of 1980s hit.

(XXVI) that stated that the Bantustan policy was in the pursuance of apartheid and it condemned it as a
violation of the right of self determination and as prejudicial to territorial integrity of South Africa. The
resolution was again consolidated by UNGA Resolution 3411 D (XXX) of 1975 on the same grounds (for a
detailed discussion see Richardson 1978)
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The most remarkable shift that started to take place as a result of this process in the
1970s-80s was that the locus of political mobilization and power moved from the
Afrikaner to the African National movement arena; a momentum shift that changed the
balance of political power in favor of the later and contributed significantly to the eclipse
of apartheid and white domination.
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Chapter V
The Decline of Afrikaner ethno-nationalism

Introduction

The African uprising of early 1960s made apartheid a politically obsolete project
as it unveiled its lack of legitimacy. Opposition and resistance to apartheid uncovered the
illusions of separate development and deepened political divisions within the Afrikaners
on the efficacy and consequences of the ‘homeland’ policy. Along with international and
regional environments that became profoundly more conducive to Africans’ struggle for
self-determination, these developments put the country at the onset of a spiral of
escalation and violence. Nonetheless, the regime endured the 1960s and achieved
economic growth and crushed the uprising, and survived the 1970s crisis. There are three
reasons that enabled regime to endure in this period: the first is the ideological
pragmatism of the Afrikaner political elites that bought apartheid more time and ability to
maneuver and combine flexibility with coercion that helped the regime to circumscribe
the scope of protest and violence. The second is the limited ability of the African
nationalist movement at this turn to mobilize on a mass popular scale against apartheid
for long enough time that would make the persistence of the regime more costly than the
regime could manage. Third, International inconsistent rejection to apartheid provided the
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regime with a measure of legitimacy and endurance. We turn to discuss these factors in
some detail for their importance in understanding the decline and ultimate demise of
white domination and apartheid.

The Contradictions between ethno-territoriality and social stratification

Afrikaner political elites during the 1960s were more assertive and clear as to the
response conceived adequate to the black challenge; oppression was the answer. Regimes
police strategy against anti-apartheid movement would turn into one of its greatest
misgivings as it pitted the whole non-white population against a brutal state oppression.
The inability of the regime to implement territorial separation, the hallmark of apartheid,
through modalities of bio- power and sovereign power triggered coercion as the only
method remained. The dynamics of this phenomenon would yield more challenges to the
regime in the coming years. However, the Sharpeville massacre 37 not only showed
regime’s brutality and willingness to coerce descent but more importantly revealed
Afrikaners’ political strong grip over the state and its apparatuses and their selfconfidence as a nation defending their white state from African menace. Facing a
growing mass upheaval and protest, Afrikaners became mobilized more strongly on the
bases of their ethno-national identity and the political unity their leaders espoused.

37

The ANC had announced that it would hold a massive protest against the Pass Law. The protest was
called for on 31 March. The PAC, in a move to pre-empt this call announced for a demonstration to defy
the pass law on 21 March. This latter took place in front of the police station in Sharpeville. The police at
the station opened fire against the peaceful crowd killing 69 and injuring another 180 people.
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Crushing the African upheaval of the early 1960s and oppressing their most organized
and influential political organizations; the African National Congress (ANC) and the
South African Communist Party (SACP) had given the government and the community a
sense of strength and control that extended well into the early 1970s when a new African
nationalism protest and resurrection irrupted.
Thus 1960s was a decade of tranquility and economic growth that resulted in serious
shifts in Afrikanerdom notions; it created an atmosphere within which the deracialization
and denationalization of the Afrikaners would not have been a threat to their unity and
status. The identification that Afrikaner elites sought to emphasize was broader and more
to the purposes of apartheid, namely with the state per se (Giliomee 1979: 122-4). The
state at this point was to a large extent Afrikanized and imbued with white identity and
politics and Afrikaner nationalist ideology became less significant and more flexible.
Gerritt Viljoen, head of the Afrikaner Broederbond, stated: “Apartheid is neither an
ideology nor a dogma. It is a method, a road along which we are moving and is subject to
fundamental reassessment” (quoted in Giliomee 1979: 120). Self-confidence and
tranquility of 1960s would recede in 1970 with the renewal of African nationalist
militancy and upheaval.
African resurrection of 1970s and the rise of violence reintroduced the most
fundamental questions of Afrikaner domination: political survival, unity, and socioeconomic status. Unprecedented levels of violence and adamant African nationalism
triggered the mechanisms of survival for a minority undetermined on the path it would
take to solve the challenge of indigenous majority. African rising challenge in 1970s had
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provoked significant changes of Afrikaners community’s attitudes, values and political
perspectives toward partial accommodation. Regime choices of action and policy in
response to the 1970s events became more complicated but less costly in terms of internal
cohesion of the Afrikaners. To be sure, although more than 80 per cent of the Afrikaners
in the 1970s still supported the NP there existed serious divisions on the most crucial
questions of political survival and the aspects of Afrikaner identity that must be stressed38.
Opinion surveys in this period reveal these trends and their underlying political values:
the strong Afrikaner commitment to the notions of ethno-national distinction envisioned
by the NP in the 1950s and 1960s has changed significantly in the 1970s 39 . Surveys
indicate the growing agreement among Afrikaners on a more relaxed notion of politics,
and the relative acceptance of less restricted labor policies. More striking is the
persistence of Afrikaners’ opposition to social intercourse; The same period has shown
that a minority of Afrikaners (between a fifth and a third) accept measures of social
integration such as the admission of blacks to white churches and schools and an increase
in Afrikaners’ support of the prohibition of mixed marriages. These trends show that the
Afrikaners were willing to expand the scope of economic interaction while maintaining
38

Giliomee (1979: 121-6) identifies three strands of Afrikaner identification with the group and its
relationship with the other in this period: (1) exclusion; seeing Afrikaners as an exclusive nation; (2)
integration; seeing Afrikaners as the core and hegemonic power of a white South African nation ; and (3)
there were Afrikaners who envisioned the de-ethnicizing South Africa. Afrikanerdom in this view is seen
as one of several identifications and Afrikaners as an interest group in a South African nation that
encompasses all ethnic groups without exception.
39

In 1972 45 per cent of the Afrikaners indicated that they would call an Afrikaans speaking Coloured an
Afrikaner. The same survey was repeated in 1977 and showed the increase of this figure to 52 per cent. In
another survey undertaken in 1975, 47 per cent of Afrikaners thought that Coloureds shoud represent
Coloureds in the Parliament. In the realm of labour regulations only 32 per cent of Afrikaners in 1974
agreed that nonwhites should be trained for the ame jobs as whites and receive the same pay, but in 1976 42
per cent of Afrikaners agreed to the abolition of job reservation, and 62 per cent accepted the admission of
nonwhites to the same jobs as whites in 1977. Also 62 per cent accepted the principle of equal salaries for
whites and nonwhites.
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their social and political hegemony, which makes a lot of sense if we take into
consideration socio-economic changes within the Afrikaner community in this period:
Social and economic developments within the white community during the 1960s-70s
gave rise to significant social forces that didn’t give a blanket support to apartheid
policies.
The Afrikaner middle class grew significantly; a bureaucratic stratum in diverse
administrative institutions came to share portion of the political power; and a new
business class arose out of the economic boom of the early 1970s resulted from
industrialization. These new social configurations, as much as they benefited from the
system, they developed certain vested interest in the political stability of the country to
sustain their status. It is also important to notice that the 1970s were alarming for the
regime as white immigration rates to South Africa declined, which testified to the
widespread pessimism and uncertainty about the future of the regime. It is against this
background and the pressure accompanied with the Soweto uprising of 1976 that
Afrikaner political elites had to enact a new policy. As Adam and Giliomee (1979: 7)
remark, inaction was not a choice facing rising costs of apartheid. The alternative policy
will also have costs and was to be calculated against its consequences on the Afrikaners’
interests and unity.
The government has had to enact a synthesis between coercion and police strategy
and co-optation. Ruthlessness and political oppression were proven to have their limits
and constraining conditions amongst which maintaining white community’s unity is
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paramount. The persistence of English-speaking and Afrikaner split40 and the existence
of a strong concern among the whites to present their rule as just and legitimate; police
brutality deprives the ideologues of their rational and ability to make justify apartheid.
Large scale oppression would have alienated important segments of Afrikaner
community and threatens the already delicate unity of the white in general (Adam 1979:
27-29). Unleashed oppression was also perceived as a source of political and institutional
threat to the state for it implied the increase intervention of strong and powerful security
and military apparatuses, which would require more centralization of the state, the
hegemony of a one-party and the rise of authoritarianism. Oppression assessed, as well,
in terms of its economic consequences since it will be directed to black community
whose workers represented 80% of the working force of a capitalist economy that can’t
afford sacrificing these workers to the nationalist movement.
The inability of the regime to gain the consent of Africans for the homeland policy
made the regime realize the need for having allies within the black and the Coulouerd
communities in order to confer a measure of legitimacy to apartheid. Co-optation of
particular segments of the non-white communities that goes hand in hand with coercion
was the optimal alternative. Thus on the one hand the sustainability of apartheid in the
1960s through 1970s and its ability to avoid revolutionary change refer to the
sophistication of the coercion system it had established that stratified to permeate all

40

Although This period showed the increased anxiety within the Afrikaner and English communities alike
following the Soweto upheaval it revealed different attitudes in regard to the best policy to face the Soweto
uprising: “two-thirds of the white electorate expected a lower living standard for their children, as well as
black upheavals…there is also 75 per cent who were ready to fight rather than make concessions among
Afrikaners…but the enthusiasm for war instead of accommodation is markedly lower among the Anglowhites” (Adam and Giliomee 1979: 6)
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aspects of life and followed very well calculated measures. Heribert Adam (1971:16, 61)
argues that apartheid was “one of the most advanced and effective patterns of rational,
oligarchic domination” and the power with which the system sustained was derived from
the combination of coercion and a legal system that justified oppression and introduce the
state as an impartial arbiter, which helped in concealing oppression. Co-optation of the
Africans in the new policy still relied on atomizing their community by offering certain
segments short term benefits within the Bantustans. The new policy meant that the same
course was followed with some insignificant changes. Verwoerd and Vorster’s insistence
to implement the self-government Bantustans policy reveals that the regime was running
out of ideas to overcome the conundrum of sustaining white rule in the face of all
contradictions and protest. As Paul Rich (1994: 60) eloquently puts it:
The Afrikaner fascination with group identity, ethnicity, and government by
‘own affairs’, has been the constant answer which has run like an ideological
thread through modern South African history.”
The fascination was actually the only alternative of reality in which a mass society;
the majority of black South African was determined to achieve access to state system and
into a common society. NP policies in this period can be understood as a state contraction
move towards a narrowly defined political entity with clear territorial boundaries and
institutional and social contours.
The contraction that might have been achieved through the implementation of the
Bantustan policy would have granted the Afrikaners what they have sought for so long; a
free and united folk of whites in their own state. The move would not have threatened
Afrikaners internal cohesion in terms of their identity; it rather was in part a response to
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Afrikaners’ attitudes as we noticed above. Territorial disengagement from the majority of
the Black community was not conceived as a concession; rather it was the prerequisite for
realizing a white South Africa. The meaning of territory and territorial boundaries was
subjugated to a supreme value: Afrikaners pursuit of a state and nationhood based on
their sense of exclusive ethno-national identity that had not been necessarily
corresponded with a territorial ideology or particular regimes of territorial legitimating.
As we noticed earlier territorial segregation and separation were instrumental and
prevalent ideology and political power requirements had not confer a pivotal meaning on
the territory as such and focused on peoples and racial-ethnic differentiation. The
minority status of the Afrikaners was also a major factor in this respect; the prospects for
the political survival of the white rule were proven very uncertain and a short-term
endeavor in the face of great majority of discontent and increasingly militant Africans.
Territorial separation, apartheid seemed the only chance for Afrikaner hegemony to
endure.
To be sure, the NP consolidated its parliamentary political power by winning the
elections of 1970 and 1974 with a comfortable mandate (54.9 per cent and 56.2 per cent
of the votes respectively) and put its white rivalries in a weak position. Economic
performance of the country showed strong indications of growth; and the regime regained
the West acceptance if not support, which reinvigorated its international legitimacy. The
government took advantage of these circumstances to expand and consolidate apartheid
and furthering state contraction in terms of territorial and institutional disengagement
from the African population. Within this context two new important legislations were
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enacted: the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homeland
Constitution Act of 1971: The former turned the entire Africans into citizens of their
assigned homelands where very African now has a citizenship outside his mother country
South Africa. The Bantu, whether an African had ever lived in or not, had become a
homeland with pseudo political power. The later Act gave the government the authority
to confer self-government on those territorially invented entities. These Acts implied that
the end result of Bantustan policy would be cleansing South Africa from the majority of
the Black community. Africans who stayed ‘illegally’ in the white urban areas were now
regarded as ‘foreigners’ and their presence in these areas amounts to violation of another
state’s rules (Terreblanche 2002: 327).
African nationalism: restoring the political geography of the conflict

Ironically the Homeland policy made Africans more aware of their mutual faith as
one native people and a majority ethno-national group under the rule of a minority group
that is self-identified as a racial ethnicity. Separation and exclusion dynamics made
Africans more conscious about the injustices inflicted upon them by the white society. In
spite of governments’ oppressive laws and measures African opposition to apartheid only
increased and gathered momentum. Apartheid came to dismember an already long
entrenched South African identity of Africans. The dynamics of partial exclusion and the
levels of economic integration and undetermined regimes of territorial legitimation of the
segregation era resulted in a strong African identification with South Africa.
Democratization rather than liberation and ethno-territorial self-determination prevailed
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especially in 1980s with the emergence of mass democratic anti-apartheid movements
that coalesced with the ANC to further consolidate this inclusive African identification.

The 1960s uprising and the prevalence of democratization
Although in early 1960s organized black opposition was smashed, African
resistance was resurrected in the 1970s through 1980s more persistent to achieve the end
of apartheid (Posel 199: 1). The main African militant opposition during this period came
from three politically organized movements: Black labor unions, the alliance of the ANC
and CPSA, and the popular democratic mass movement of the 1980s. South African
apartheid regime relied heavily on large and powerful arsenal of security laws and orders,
and had launched unprecedented assault on its political enemies in the 1950s and 1960s
in order to prevent the development of any effective and mobilized African resistance.
Thus the government illegalized and outlawed any actions of resistance to government
policies41. However, oppression added to the grievances of the Africans and raised their
militancy and will to mobilize. The ‘defiance campaign’ and the Sharpeville massacre of
1950s and early 1960s, although were limited and did not persist set the background for
African nationalist movement politics and organization.
Following governments measures in 1950s the ANC adopted a ‘Program of
Action’ that put forth the objectives of the struggle to end white domination and
41

In 1950 the government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, which outlawed the CPSA and
empowered the minister of justice to take a wide range of measures to suppress political opposition. The
Act granted the minister the jurisdiction to declare any similar organization illegal, to restrict political
activities, to prohibit gatherings. The Act considered any ‘political, industrial, social or economic change
by the promotion of disturbances or disorder’ as communism as subject to suppression.
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achieving self-determination through militancy and the use of mass protest including civil
disobedience. The declaration was followed by the joint initiative by the ANC and the
South African Indian Congress (SAIC) in 1959 to launch the Defiance Campaign against
the injustice of apartheid (Guelke 2005: 94). The campaign was peaceful in a large
measure and aimed at virtual ‘violation’ of government segregationist policies. The
campaign gave rise and political legitimacy to ANC and SACP as mass movements with
a wide base of membership ( Guelke 2005: 95) especially following ANC adoption of
the “Freedom Charter” that drew the political philosophy of the movement as achieving
racial unity and the reform of the state system on the bases of democracy and human
rights. The charter established African nationalism’s consistent political position as
nationally not ethnically driven movement; a feature that was further strengthened in the
1980s and had been a major factor in the failure of the regime to creating a white South
Africa by ethnicizing Black community. However, this progressive position did not
prevent the emergence of radical nationalist African movements. The more the
government implemented apartheid measures and oppression the more rigid some
African nationalists became. The leading example of this trend is the emergence of the
Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 1959.
The ANC represented a profound challenge to the regime precisely because of the charter
that aimed at abolishing the very core of apartheid and white rule; democratization and
inclusion were the antithesis of racial ethno-nationalism of the Afrikaner rule.
Confrontation turned more violent and showed regimes determination to quill this
challenge; the government outlawed the AVC and the SACP while the Sharpeville
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massacre of 1960 and its consequences that a serious blow to the apartheid regime
domestically and on the international arena. The massacre had changed the nature of
opposition to the apartheid from protest to resistance and militancy; it radicalized the
ANC and other anti-apartheid movements. The ANC formed its armed wing: the
Umkhonto we Sizwe (the spear of the nation or the MK) which gave the organization
more legitimacy and capacity to mobilize. Protests over the ‘pass law’ were launched and
the government imposed a state of emergency over the country.
Banning the ANC and the SACP allowed the emergence of new Black
movements such as “Black Consciousness’ in the early 1970 that was soon crushed as
well. For the regime it was too risky to tolerate such a movement especially as black
workers’ organization and activism started to regain momentum and self-confidence in
the early 1970s. Economic changes of the 1960s and early 1970s that resulted in a
significant increase in the employment of skilled and semi-skilled non-white workers and
the ability of African workers to organize mass strikes42 uplifted their bargaining power
and organizing capacity, which represented a major platform for African nationalist
struggle against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s. Government’s measures to restricting
black workforce mobility and bargaining power had caused disruptions in the functioning
of the economy and put whites’ interests on the line (Olson and Stedman 1994: 60).
Moreover the resurgence of African nationalism in the region (in Rhodesia, Mozambique,
South West Africa, and Angola) has complicated the South African regime’s status in the
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In the first three months of 1973 there were 160 strikes involving over 61,000 black workers (Guelke,
2005: 123).
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region and at home43 ; a pattern that continued to collect momentum especially after the
Soweto uprising of 1976 that reintroduced the question of ethnic racism and the failure of
the Bantustans policy.
The Soweto uprising and beyond: popular resistance and convergence
Soweto uprising was a bottom-up movement that emerged in the townhomes of
the Black population44, thus it represented “new path of liberation which was based on
the lived experience of ordinary people” (Mamadani 1996, cited in Neocosmos 1998:
200). The resurrection gave the struggle against apartheid a profound democratic feature
as more people participated and a number of popular democratic organizations emerged
as the protest accumulated more strength and continuity in the 1980s, which played a
decisive role in toppling apartheid. The uprising of 1976 planted the seeds for the eclipse
of apartheid as it announced the vibrancy of African national sentiments and their strong
identification with South Africa (Neocosmos 1998) and the persistent rejection of the
homeland policy. Soweto laid the grounds for the rise of people’s power in the face of
state hegemony, which gradually but consistently mobilized most of the African
population and segments of the white community in a sweeping anti-apartheid movement.
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Following regime change in Portugal in 1974 and the resulted decline of Portugal’s colonial rule in
Southern Africa, South African Nationalism was gaining momentum by the impact of decolonization in the
neighborhood. Angola, in this context, was the most significant case. The involvement of South Africa in
the civil war in this country that ended with defeat had exposed the regime and gave an opportunity to its
opponents to take the initiative. It was at this juncture when the Soweto Africans’ uprising of 1976 irrupted
to represent a major turning point in the history of the country along with the Sharpeville massacre of 1960.
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The uprising was triggered by police oppression to schoolchildren who protested the imposition of
Afrikaner language as a medium of instruction in Transvaal. The imposition of Afrikaner language was
offensive and provoking, and police brutality against students came to exacerbate the situation and spark
the uprising.
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People’s power and wide range participation in the resurrection reflected social
developments within the African society: economic growth of the 1960s-70s resulted in a
huge increase in the employment of black workers in industry (from 308,332 in 1960 to
780,914 in 1980). It also witnessed a remarkable increase of educated Africans45, and
simultaneously the rise of blacks’ consumption of domestic production. All of which
made Africans more vigilant and willing to mobilize and protest against their inferior
status as a majority, which undermined significantly the legitimacy of the regime and its
ability to endure.
Although Soweto uprising had dealt a serious blow to regime’s ‘internal stability’
(Saul 1993: 2) it did not undermine its ability to endure in terms of the capabilities of
state power and institutions that was able to absorb the shock. The significance of Soweto
uprising is that it marked the beginning of a shift in the locus of political action from
Afrikaner internal politics and socioeconomic changes to African nationalism arena and
its vigor to take the initiative, and hence a significant shift in the balance of political
power in favor of African nationalism was in the making. These indecisive elements
prevented a revolutionary change of the regime or its entire decline in the 1970s but as
African masses flooded the streets of townhomes and reserves, the issue became clearer.
The conflict was on the verge of a new phase where African nationalism would
consistently challenge the foundation of the state as a racial-ethno-national regime while
the state would persist on apartheid. Minority-majority syndrome would compel the
Afrikaners to grasp on what they gained while territorial separation failure would make
45

Between 1965 and 1975, the number of black students in secondary schools increased nearly fivefold,
while between 1980 and 1984, their enrollment doubled from 577,000 to over a million; the number of
graduates tripled during the same period (Neocosmos 1998: 200).
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African nationalism more assertive to overthrow the regime. As Johnson (1977: 290)
argues:
There is no precedent in history anywhere of an ethnic minority of over 4
million people voluntarily dismantling the dominance they enjoy over more
than 20 million ethnically different others; anything other than white supremacy
is, in this sense, unthinkable.
The Afrikaners were not in a position to give up their preponderant status nor to give in
and offer any significant concessions to the Africans, which created a state of impasse
that would put the adversaries in a spiral of escalation and ‘mutually hurting stalemate’
that prevented revolutionary change but paved the road for thwarting the regime.
The eradication of Afrikaners’ ethno-territoriality
The ill management with which Vorster’s government handled the rising
nationalist attitudes inside South Africa and the surrounding countries in the 1970s and
its economic consequences compelled business elites allied with high-ranked military
officials and pressured Vorster to resign 46 . Vorster was blamed for his government’s
“unwillingness to reform apartheid to allow greater labor mobility, the training of black
skilled labor, and recognition of organized black labor” (Olson and Stedman 1994: 61).
Vorster clearly couldn’t realize or recognize the changes in Afrikaner values and attitudes
discussed above that brought more willingness to reform specific aspects of economic
and political systems. P. W. Botha; the new Premier and the President has had to
overcome the impasse that the regime was facing; at the core of this impasse was the
46

The official statement referred Vorster’s retirement to ill-health. Some resources indicate the role of the
dubbed ‘info scandal’ or Muldergate. Vorster was accused of misappropriation of funds as his government
sought to buy influence abroad (Guelke 2005: 136).
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need for new racial policies and the restoration of South Africa’s regional and
international role as a major African player. Botha’s government was fortunate that it
came to power when the main conflicts in the region (Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia)
were resolved, and at the time of right-wing revival in key Western countries: Ronald
Regan administration in USA and Thatcher’s government in UK, which presented an
opportunity for the South African regime to recover and to have a considerable margin to
maneuver and adjust domestic and regional policies. Botha adopted the dubbed’ total
strategy’ 47 that aimed at accomplishing three interdependent objectives: turning South
Africa into a military state; destabilizing the region of Southern Africa; and reforming
apartheid.
(1) Militarizing the state: militarizing South Africa was primarily a response to
international embargo on arms sales that was imposed earlier by the UN.
Counterproductively, the embargo gave the government every reason to seek military
strength by establishing a strong military industry, which gave the regime a political edge
over its domestic and regional opponents. South African white rule seemed to be in a
position to endure as a result of this military might, it has been argued. Comparing to the
decline of Portugal’s colonial power as Gann and Duignan (1981: 291) argue South
Africa was well prepared to deal with domestic insurrection and regional challenges.
Whether this assessment is warranted or not is debatable. The military might of the
regime did not eliminate domestic opposition to apartheid; the use of military might
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‘Total Strategy’ was not entirely invented by Botha. As a matter of fact attempts to reforming apartheid
took place in the last year of Vorster’s government; the concept of ‘total strategy’ was incorporated in a
Defense White Paper in 1977, and this was followed by the appointment of two commissions to inquire
into labor issues in order to introduce some reforms in labor regulations and laws.
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domestically has its limits and constraints as we discussed earlier. Botha’s government,
while aware of the regime’s shaky position sought to strengthen it to a degree whereby
adopting reforms would not weaken its grip on political power and security. This was
clear as the government of Botha continued to implement the Bantu self-government plan
by adding two more Bantus: Venda and Ciskei (Guelke 2005: 139). Military strength in
this sense has to be seen through the other two elements of the strategy, destabilizing the
surrounding and political reforms.
(2) Destabilizing the surrounding: the establishment of a strong military power
was deployed to gain a regional dominant role. To the contrary of Vorster’s ‘out-look’
strategy that aimed at stabilizing the region in order to gain the acceptance of the West,
Botha’s destabilizing belligerent strategy against neighboring Soviet-backed countries
aimed at taking it by South Africa’s own initiative to gain regional hegemony and
simultaneously introduce the regime as a pillar in containing Soviet imperialism in the
region. Gaining this role embedded South Africa within the West and particularly the
USA strategy of containment, which diffused international rejection to apartheid. The
strategy found encouragement and acceptance by Regan’s administration that soon
showed its intention to establish close working relationships with South African
government and enacted the new policy of ‘Constructive Engagement’ 48 with South
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The way Chester Crocker; the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs –who crafted the policy
put it, the USA wants to open a new chapter of relationships with South Africa based on the mutual
interests of the two parties in the Southern African region and their ‘shared perceptions of the role of the
Soviet Union and its surrogates in thwarting’ these interests. He goes on to describe the co-operation
between the two countries as indispensable for the efforts to stabilize Southern Africa, and to assert that
this co-operation should be premised on US ‘recognition of South Africa’s permanent stake in the future of
Southern Africa’ and South Africa’s recognition of US ‘permanent interest in Africa as a whole’ (quoted in
Guelke 2005: 140).
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Africa; in effect the policy gave the latter carte blanche to militarily destroy the
neighboring countries 49 and to carry on a new domestic policy with a modicum of
international legitimacy that allowed the regime to carry on apartheid and implement
more of the Bantustan policy within a ‘reformed’ political structures.
(3) Political and Constitutional reforms: Botha aimed at introducing a new
concept of apartheid that has the potential to sustain Afrikaners’ political and economic
domination while permitting a margin of flexibility to co-opt certain segments of the
black and Coloured communities into the state system (Olson and Stedman 1994: 61).
The main goal of the plan was to grant the regime a measure of domestic legitimacy
especially for the Bantustan policy, and to gain world’s acceptance to an otherwise a
pariah state. “Total strategy” represents a major amendment to segregation and apartheid
alike. Although the majority of black community in townhomes (reserves) was excluded
from the agenda Botha’s version of apartheid accepted for the first time the
accommodation of non-white political demands in the central state institutions. This
metamorphosis in essence aspired to stratify the non-white population in another
dimension: the first being through the Bantustan policy. Political and constitutional
reforms would have established a dual non-white social reality by selectively
accommodating some of the political demands of some significant non-white social strata
in part of the country. The concept re-classified non-white population in terms of their
eligibility for the entry to white state system. To achieve this goal the new policy
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Between 1980-6 South Africa had involved in number of assaults against the surrounding countries: it
invaded three capitals (Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique) and our other countries (Angola, Swaziland,
Zimbabwe, Zambia); backed dissident groups that had brought chaos to two countries (Angola and
Mozambique); disrupted the oil supply of six countries and attacked export and import railways of seven
countries. (Guelke 2005: 140)
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categorized the black community into ‘useful blacks’ - those who would benefit the
economy as a labor workforce and specific elites who may function as intermediaries
between the regime and the whole community, and ‘recalcitrant blacks’ - who continue
their struggle against apartheid and then had to be oppressed. To make the reforms
permanent constitutional reform and legal steps in the realms of political life and labor
were enacted
The centerpiece of constitutional reform was the ‘tri-cameral’ Constitution Act of
198350 that mimics some aspects of power-sharing that would enhance regimes domestic
position vis-à-vis the rise of African nationalism and introduce South Africa as
democratic state. According to this plan African ‘useful blacks’ especially the urban
growing middle class were to be upgraded socially and politically, which represents a
profound departure from Verwoerd’s total apartheid that suppressed social differentiation
and mobility normal to a capitalist society (O’Meara 1996: 323). In order to gain some
credibility within the African community, especially the working class and its rising
organizations, the government amended the Industrial Conciliation Act which
distinguished between white workers as ‘employees’ and Africans as not employees and
pealed the job reservation policy that discriminated against black skilled and semi-skilled
workers and other previous Acts that restricted the development of skilled black workers.
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According to the Act the parliament will be consisted of three chambers: white, coloured, and Indian
each served by its own ministerial council and have jurisdiction over its community’s own affairs. In case
of a dispute among chambers over ‘general affairs,’ disputants refer to the ‘President Council’. The latter
body is formed proportionally from chamber representatives: 4 whites, 2 coulrds, and 3 Indians. The new
constitution also provided for the election of the president, who was to be both the president and the head
of the government.
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The ‘total strategy’ and the momentum shift
The ‘total strategy’ and particularly constitutional reform agenda put the regime
in the defensive as it became clearer than ever that the regime is running out of answers
to the growing difficulties apartheid was facing especially regime’s inability to find a
permanent solution to the problem of a growing mobilization of indigenous. The reforms
provided the African national movement with an opportunity to take the initiative and
mobilize for new wave of protest and popular resistance to apartheid. The government
allowed a significant margin of political expression in order for the reforms to succeed,
which gave opposition forces a significant margin for political movement and
organization that it took to undermine the reforms. African nationalist opposition to the
plan sprung for the limited scope of reform and for the fact that it excluded the majority
of Africans. Reforms further deepened Black Africans’ sense of demoralization and
alienation at the time when the reforms offered Coloureds and minor black strata some
political and social gains. It was clear that the regime will never entertain the
accommodation of the Black African into the system and the plan aims at perpetuating
the Bantustan policy.
Nevertheless, the government rectified and put the reforms in effect in 1984
following its approval by a white-only referendum in 1983. Non-whites, ‘Colourdes’ and
‘Asians’ were to be represented disproportionally in the new parliament, while whites
were assigned a majority veto on general affairs, which implied that the structures of
political power will not be changed in any significant way. The arrangement granted the
government the final say in all “general affairs” of the country leaving “own affairs” of
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each racial configuration to its vaguely self-ruling entity. The reforms, although limited,
attest the failure of the regime since 1948 to recreate South Africa as a white state: the
inability of the regime to construct the Afrikaner community as an ethno-territorial nation
exclusively or through integration with English-speaking whites compelled the regime to
reconsider its strategy. Thus Botha sought to sustain the main features of the regime but
with the consent of particular non-white elites, which doomed the reform to failure
sooner than the government might have figured. The plan “intensified the impact of the
continuing denial of political rights to the African population outside the homeland
system” (Guelke 2005:

143) and provoked the Africans political will to act. The

opportunity and the deepening feeling of exclusion within the African community were
exacerbated by the increase of life expenses in townhomes 51 , which founded a
combustible mixture that resulted in a new nationalist uprising that irrupted in the
townships in the Vaal Triangle in 1984 and 198652 and was accompanied with workers’
campaign of strike in a major ‘stay-away’ from work. The African insurrection of the
1980s had been more organized, largely mobilized in a bottom-up manner that made it a
popular uprising bar excellence. It also was more succinct in terms of its political
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The economic crisis of 1980s had left many Africans unemployed. Over 25 per cent of the Africans’
working force was unemployed, and two-thirds of them were under the age of thirty; most of whom lived in
the townships where the economic crises coupled with governmental measures that raised the rent costs
through Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. Moreover and in order preempt black workers’ unionism and
‘stay aways’ the government enacted the Industrial relations Act of 1979 that aimed at restricting union
activities to the workplace.
52

The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) estimated that 175 people were killed in the last
two months of 1984 in addition to another 20 at the beginning of 1985 when government troops used live
munitions to quell a protest in commemoration of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Violence continued in
1985 causing the death of 859 people half of them killed by security forces according to SAIRR while the
rest were killed in within-black clashes.
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demands as a democratic and civic movement, which the regime found more difficult to
quell.
Popular insurrection of 1980s: peoples’ power reveals
The reform agenda triggered the unified the organizing effort of wide range of
South African civil society movements in challenging the apartheid. The vibrancy of civil
society movements in South Africa was vital in the emergence of a strong popular antiapartheid movement. Civil society movements in 1980s offered an opportunity to large
numbers of people to get involved in the process of liberation that encompassed a whole
variety of social organizations: parties, trade unions, women’s organizations, youth
movements, and peasant cooperatives, to mention few. All of which represented the
aspirations of the oppressed population for equality and freedom. These organizations
“had distinct forms of organization and demands for social transformation, popular forms
of democracy and equality, which went beyond the slogans of political parties”
(Neocosmos 1998: 197) although it worked in coalition with them especially with the
ANC.
The movement was inspired by the non-racial stance of the ANC and the SACP
and adopted its notion as the main slogan of the anti-apartheid movement especially the
United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF main slogan “UDF Unites, Apartheid Divides”
reflected the essence of the ‘Freedom Charter’ that espoused a non-racial democratic one
South Africa. The democratic essence and popular character of the mass movements and
its convergence on a single goal namely, overthrowing apartheid made it a dangerous
challenge to the regime. The movement established peoples’ politics in the face of state
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power.

An African activist from the Eastern Cape postulates (cited in Neocosmos

1998:195)
Generally I can say that the community is the main source of power, because the
state has really lost the control over the people. [The state] has no power over
the people in terms of controlling them…What has been preached in the past
about the Freedom Charter, even now we are trying to do that particularly.
This political strength and clarity of vision contributed significantly to the momentum
shift in the conflict in favor of African national movement and anti-apartheid mass
struggle. As one UDF leader asserts this democratic goal can be summed up in the
principal slogan of the Freedom Charter: “The People Govern” (Neocosmos 1998: 206-7)
The unifying philosophy of the movement and its political slogans attracted a
huge number of civil society organizations which increased their ability to organize
popular resistance to the regime. At the peak of its activism the UDF included seven
hundred affiliate groups with a total of over two million people. The activities it espoused
were mainly actions of civil disobedience (bus and rent boycotts, housing movements,
squatter revolts, labor strikes, etc), and the most important popular organizational aspect
of it was the formation of “street committees”53 that served as local governments in the
ungovernable areas where the state lost control. The well-organized efforts of the UDF to
boycott the election of the tri-cameral parliament undermined the legitimacy of the
reforms as the vast majority of the Colureds and the Africans boycotted the elections. The
UDF not only encompassed a variety of local community associations in the black
53

Street Committees flourished on a wide scale in urban townships. For example the year 1987, 43 per cent
of the inhabitants of Soweto were reporting the existence of those committees in their neighborhoods. The
committees provided for rudimentary services, maintain order, settle disputes, and formed ‘peoples’ courts’
to check and punish criminal acts. Furthermore the committees initiated a program of ‘peoples’ education’
in an attempt to bring local schools under the control of the people.
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townships, militant student groups, and organized labor, but also the established alliance
between with the ANC, which galvanized the latter’s political standpoint. The new
resistance coalition was able to turn most of the country into arenas for protest, strikes,
riots, and demonstrations during 1984 to 1986. Along with the organized activism of
labor unions under the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that was
instrumental in pushing the business to exert pressure on the government to negotiate
democratic transition African national movement gained a profound political power visà-vis the state per se.
Facing an escalating revolt and widespread violence the government imposed the
state of emergency in most of the country, which turned 1986 into one of the most violent
times of the decade. The government sent the South African Defense Forces (SADF) into
townships to restore order, which only further undermined regimes legitimacy. Even
worse was the involvement of the government in a clandestine campaign to assassinate
UDF and ANC leaders, and its conspiracy to train and instigate black groups to create
violence and chaos in townships. During the 1986 security apparatuses imprisoned and
isolated more than 25,000 people, which crippled the organizational and contact capacity
of the UDF and the Committees; the popular aspect of the struggle was seriously
damaged by these measures. The UDF moved to a more territorially based activities
espoused by a national leadership and the scope of popular resistance had shrunk
remarkably and substituted by a militaristic and militant activism. Nonetheless, the spiral
decline of the regime that started in the late 1970s was deepened and there is no question
that African Nationalist revival and bold reaction to Botha’s reforms was one of the most
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important factors that caused its failure. However, there is another crucial factor that
contributed profoundly to this failure: Afrikaner divisions on the ‘total strategy’.
‘Total strategy’ provoked instant and bitter debates within the ruling party and the
Afrikaner polity. The first reaction came soon after the revelation of the agenda in 1982.
A group of NP members of the parliament defected from the party and formed the
Conservative Party. The reforms had put the National Party in the defensive and the
pursuit of political survival as it abandoned the orthodoxy of apartheid: white only
political control and domination. Botha’s attempt to salvage white-only rule by partial
accommodation of non-white aspirations had failed particularly since it explicitly implied,
no matter how superficially, changing the structure of social relations and political power
dispensation. This move as it failed amounted to disastrous political consequences: it
created an irreversible serious crack in the edifice of the apartheid. Constitutional reform
that franchised ‘Coloureds’ (even within a well-designed social engineering) is
considered as “the first decisive break with the concept of a white nation” (Knox and
Quirk 2000: 152). After more than thirty years of apartheid white Afrikaners could not
turn their sense of shared identity into an ethno-national people with well-defined
territorial, legal, and psychological boundaries. Effects of undetermined regime of
territorial ideology doomed Afrikaner ethno-nationality precarious and fill short of facing
an overwhelmingly mass revolution that aspired integration and democracy. The control
over state power and using it to perpetuate the system of racial domination was proved to
be insufficient to “dislodge imbedded social structures, or alter the economic ‘facts of
life’” (Cohen 1988: 95) that were in the making for decades and within which African
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nationalism maintained its affiliation with South Africa that prevailed over the narrow
and ethnically based Afrikaner notion of a white state and nation.
The revolt of 1985-6 unleashed international condemnation of apartheid on large
scale. Protests against apartheid in many countries especially in the USA that were
widely covered on the media demanded the overthrow of apartheid and exerted
significant pressure on Western governments to take serious steps against South African
government. Under this immense pressure and in spite of President Regan veto the
American Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in October 198654.
The Act imposed a wide range of sanctions against the regime in South Africa, part of
which were to be suspended if the regime made significant steps towards a non-racial
democracy. The last of the six steps the Act listed reveals that the role of South Africa in
the containment strategy was dwindling and with it the cart blanch the US gave the
regime

to

destabilize

the

region

and

maintain

apartheid.

Botha’s

reign

counterproductively exacerbated regime’s impasse and created new political facts that
were very hard, if not impossible, to reverse.
International sanctions against the regime escalated and with it economic crisis
worsened, and the later had generated more opposition and protest. The spiral decline had
turned into a major crisis that the new government had to manage. It was clear more than
ever before that apartheid could not be maintained, at least not the way it had been
54

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act listed six measures that the South African government was
expected to take, the most important are: repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of
equal justice under the law for citizens of all races; the release of all political prisoners at the top of them
Nelson Mandela; establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws; negotiate the future of political
system with representative of all racial groups in South Africa; and end military and paramilitary activities
aimed at neighboring states.
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crafted and amended by different governments of the NP. Botha’s government sought to
implement the reform agenda by coercion when carrying it out failed by way of
persuasion and co-optation. Oppression against opposition not only was directed to
African Nationalists but also to political opposition within the Afrikaner polity especially
against Afrikaners who demanded to open the system and conduct a dialogue with the
ANC. As a result the divides within the Afrikaner community were deepened as the
government “excoriated critics who advocated and indeed practiced dialogue with the
ANC, such as the Afrikaner intellectuals who travelled to Dakar in Senegal to meet with
leading figures in the ANC in exile” (Guelke 2005: 154). By late 1988 white polity’s
disaffection with Botha’s policies was insurmountable and Botha stepped down and F.W.
De Klerk assumed power.
State failure or democratization
The new government main task was to control the pace and scope of political
changes required to reform the system for it had become a commonplace to see that
apartheid could not proceed on the same path. When De Klerk became the prime
minister – and afterwards the president in 1989- he recognized that the NP policies
derived from ‘total strategy’ reached a dead end (Olson and Stedman 1994: 131). Taking
advantage of the majority the NP gained in the election that followed his inauguration55
De Klerk launched his reform agenda starting with the dismantling of the National
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Although the NP lost ground to the Liberal Democratic Party and the right-wing Conservative Party, it
maintained majority; 48 per cent of the turnout. De Klerk as well took advantage of the political support of
the Liberal Democratic Party, which had replaced the Progressive Federal Party. It is important to notice
here that the Conservative party came second in elections with 13.2 per cent of the votes (39 seats) whereas
it gained 26.4 per cent in the previous election of 1987 These results indicate that fluctuation of voters’
political affiliations that reflected the volatile and uncertain political processes in South Africa in the 1980s
that resulted from the failure of strategies and the lack of answers to the challenges the regime faced.
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Security Management System that Botha established and the release of eight long-term
political prisoners including leading figures in the ANC. Furthermore, De Klerk
announced that his government has repealed the ban on the ANC, the PAC, and the
SACP, and that Nelson Mandela would shortly be released. These dramatic steps were
considered a leap forward towards the liberalization of the political system. However, it
seems that De Klerk realized the irreversible nature of the changes during 1980 and
sought to minimize the damage by containing the trend. In this De Klerk’s policy can be
seen as a logical extension of his predecessor: Botha in spite of his rigid stance before he
left office had met with Nelson Mandela and he acknowledged that in public, and he
released a leading member of the ANC; Goven Mbeki. However, De Klerk reforms went
a qualitative step ahead of Botha’s reforms. As Saul (1993: 67) remarks, De Klerk’s
agenda was more assertive than Botha’s in pursuing the reformation of a new political
terrain and thus it has to be assessed in terms of its further departure from the orthodox
apartheid tenets. Thus in December 1989 De Klerk announced that his government
“accepts the principle of power-sharing and the involvement of the ANC in the process”
(Guelke 2005: 157).
Power-sharing was envisioned as an institutional arrangement that would
maintain the underpinnings of the current social relations order although it was perceived
as a step that detached political power from the old convictions of Afrikaners nationalism.
The latter would not have tolerated any claims to political power of non-whites and
political supremacy had been the clearest and most important domination tool in the
disposal of Afrikaners as a minority. Therefore the arrangement De Klerk sought was
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primarily a power-sharing that gives the non-white a share in political authority and
keeps the power of the state, in the hands of the Afrikaners. Thus De Klerk offered a
power-sharing formula based on a bi-racial rather than a non-racial political system and
institutions in an attempt to prevent the total surrender of political power. De Klerk stated
bluntly: “I do not believe in the existence of anything like a non-racial society in the
literal sense of the word. What we have to build is a non-racist society…the diversity of
our people would not disappear in such a society” (Rich 1994: 53).
The new strategy was totally and fiercely rejected by African nationalist
movement that saw the offer as euphemism of Botha’s reforms in which the center-piece
of apartheid namely, racial ethno-national differentiation prevails. Racial domination and
apartheid had strengthened the ethno-national identity of the Africans within a context
where the nexus of national-identities and territory was not a decisive element which
accentuated ethno-national demands for civic self-determination and democratic political
system for all South Africans; a formula that De Klerk power-sharing fills short of
accommodating. This dynamism suggests that assimilation in a single nation-building
process rather than consociationalism was the answer for African nationalists, which De
Klerk sought to bypass since it will lead to majority rule. Instead he attempted to offer a
plan that will freezes ethnic divisions and “elevate ethnicity to the status of primary
organizing element of political life of society” (Simpson 1994: 469). By offering a
power-sharing plan De Klerk attempted to reach a synthesis of the apartheid and a
democratic state based on the concept and prerogative of citizenship; a synthesis that
would sustain certain and core aspects of domination.
134

De Klerk’s rapid move came to the surprise of every observer of the South
African conflict and to those involved in it, especially the ANC. In some accounts, De
Klerk was profoundly affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall; as he himself writes, this
moment implied that one of South Africa’s greatest fears; the Soviet threat and its
influence on the ANC had disappeared. This looked as a window of opportunity “for a
much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable” (De Klerk 1998:
160-1). This development also meant that the ANC had become weaker since one of its
main sources of support disappeared, which gives De Klerk the opportunity to reach a
better political deal for his power-sharing agenda.
These events around the world and in the region affected De Klerk’s perspectives.
However, these events did not weaken the ANC alone, the regime in South Africa also
and maybe more profoundly, was weakened by world events. The regime was deprived
of a major pretext to justify his position and diffusing international castigation:
containing communist threat in the region became obsolete. Moreover, the debacle South
African government faced was exacerbated by the politically-oriented as well as market
driven sanctions against the regime. These dynamics had embodied the intersection
between political reality of increasing resistance to apartheid regime within the country
and abroad, and the economic reality of growth decline. The growing linkages between
democratic anti-racist struggle and resistance to capitalist system that overlapped with it
have become a source of great threat to the white economic and political existence, which
moved the reform program of De Klerk.
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On the face of it, De Klerk seems to have engineered political changes from
within the power structure of a coherent and impervious system by a top-down revolution.
A closer insight to the events that preceded De Klerk’s moves shows that necessity rather
than choice drove his policies. Inasmuch as he had the strength and political will to
pursuit his agenda he could not stand against the forces of change and the dynamics of
the conflict that had led to the impasse we above detailed. As a matter of fact De Klerk
was a hard core Afrikaner and he came to power “because the elite group would no
longer tolerate the obstinacy of his predecessor, P. W. Botha” (Rich 1994: 103). Internal
pressure on the government to change course sprung from diverse interests and
ideological transformation within the Afrikaner community. De Klerk was the head of a
seriously fractured regime and polity that was in a state of division and profound changes.
Thus, a lot of pressure came from the business strata - a successful class of entrepreneurs
and professionals to profoundly reform the regime. More telling are the demands for
reform that came from one of the main leading Afrikaner ideological organizations; the
Broederbond. This indicates that changes took place also on the level of convections
reflected in the Broederbond call for an inclusive polity, which gave De Klerk’s initiative
a significant measure of legitimacy within the Afrikaner community. The Broederbond
circulated a secret document in 1989 that argues that
…the exclusion of effective black sharing in the political processes at the highest
level had become a threat to the survival of the white man…there could no
longer be a white government and the head of the government did not necessarily
have to be white” (Olson and Stedman 1994: 133).

136

This position was a watershed in Afrikaners’ attitudes towards apartheid; a major
ideological and political shift that contributed to De Klerk’s aggressive agenda and the
dismantling of apartheid.
One can conclude that De Klerk’s agenda came in tandem with already ripe
conditions for the changes he put forth. Needless to say that he did not expect that his
policy would trigger dynamics of its own that will yield different outcomes: he did not
anticipate that his reforms will “lead to black majority rule and the end of Afrikaner
nationalism before the end of the decade” (Sparks 1994: 12). Therefore it can be said
that without the conditions prevailed when he came to office De Klerk wouldn’t have
been in a position to present his reforms. It was in this context that De Klerk took the
“bold steps of February 1990 seeking to break the political log-jam” (Saul 1993: 69) that
crippled the country for years and threatened to push the country into chaos. The release
of Mandela was yet another remarkable step in this direction. However, to many
observers De Klerk’s new stance was dangerously limited as he envisioned a multiracial
South Africa based on the protection of “group rights” with strong veto power to the
white South African community which would have maintained the structures of power
intact. Moreover, De Klerk’s expediency can be seen as he sought to regain political
initiative and reclaim the locus of political power. His rapid move was designed to create
a novel arena that was not familiar or comfortable to the ANC and other nationalist forces
who found themselves in a hard position to respond to De Klerk’s proposal.
The apparent weakness of the ANC was perceived by De Klerk as an opportunity
to speed the pace of reforms to capitalize on the moment. However; regional
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developments especially in Angola and Rhodesia gave rise to African Nationalism in
general and to South African National movement led by the ANC in particular. Late
1970s through 1980s were catastrophic to apartheid as we discussed above. In contrast,
the 1980’s had witnessed the reemergence of the NAC as a central political force in the
broad resistance movement by virtue of its ‘historical legitimacy’ and its ability to sustain
unity and to adopt ‘armed propaganda’ (restrained armed resistance) against apartheid.
The ANC had shown a remarkable political skill in uniting the broad resistance
movement (including the UDF and the COSATU) around its slogans and program mainly
the slogan: ‘first, ungovernability’ and then ‘from ungovernability to people’s power’
(Saul 1993: 15). The legitimacy of the ANC enabled it to mobilize the masses behind
these slogans that were virtually implemented during the townships revolt of 1984-6.
Thus the ANC popular appeal and its leading position in the South African national
movement gave it a political edge over De Klerk especially with ANC consistent political
vision that was based on two mutually enforcing pillars: (1) to establish a counterapartheid hegemonic socio-political base relying on a broad class front of black Africans
in alliance with other anti-apartheid movements in order to overthrow the regime by
means of mass action; (2) to perceive the conflict as one of democratic struggle against
injustice and racial discrimination, not as an ethnic conflict. The apparent weakness of
the ANC was at best contextual and was compensated to a significant degree by the
strength and effectiveness of other national movement forces such as the Communist
Party and the UDF. Thus when the ANC announced its willingness to involve in
negotiations that would transform South Africa into ‘untied democratic and non-racial
country’ it did not give in its core objective of thwarting the apartheid regime. Thus De
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Klerk’s power-sharing offer was rejected and the ANC maintained its demands for a
profound structural change that goes beyond the reforms of De Klerk.

South African from a regional power to a pariah state

The events of 1960s in Southern Africa and worldwide had affected apartheid
regime in contradictory ways; while at one level they undermined it, at another it gave the
regime a measure of legitimacy and strength. As Guelke (2005: 100) notices “even
without the Sharpeville massacre, the 1960s would have presented a severe challenge to
the South African government” as many African countries gained independence. The
decolonization era and the change in international political climate that upheld peoples’
right in self-determination and human rights represented a challenge and a source of
threat to European settlers and colonists in Africa. South African white settler rule echoed
this threat with the most assertive manner. The fear of the spill-over effect of this trend
urged South African regime to resort to a new form of colonialism; one that would escape
the logic of decolonization; apartheid. However, the severity and brutality whit which the
regime sought to implement apartheid instigated international condemnation that
undermined regime’s legitimacy. One of the earliest among these reactions was the 1960
British Prime Minister’s ‘wind of change’ speech to the South African Parliament that
generated deep discontent among the Afrikaner political leaders as it regarded African
Nationalism as an irresistible force (Calvocoressi 1961: 9-10). The speech was followed
by a short-term investment crisis as the confidence in the country’s stability declined as a
result of Sharpeville massacre. Capital fled South Africa at a rate of 12 million rand
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(domestic currency of South Africa) a month (Spence, 1965: 47). However, international
pressure on the regime was inconsistent and fluctuated in accordance with regional and
international political environments and the interests of the super powers and Western
countries. It was until a late stage of the conflict in 1980s that international pressure took
a constant rise and gave a measure of conformity to all efforts aimed at thwarting
apartheid.
Fluctuating international attitudes and policies toward South Africa had played a
crucial role in the ability of the regime to endure. The early 1970s had witnessed the
failure of South African government to relax its regional relations through dialogue
(Guelke 2005: 115-16), which undercut the ability of the regime to gain regional power
that would have strengthened its domestic position vis-à-vis African nationalist
movement. However, a counterbalance development came from the USA when the newly
elect president Richard Nixon adopted a policy to establish
broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage
moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in
reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to
encourage improved relations among states in the area (Guelke 2005: 115-16).
This policy clearly turned a blind-eye to the apartheid and accepted the presence of South
Africa in South West Africa as a de-facto situation that was expected to sustain. It was a
significant gain to the South African government at all levels and was further reinforced
by the ascendance of the Conservative Party to power in Britain in 1970 that soon
resumed arms sales to South Africa and sough diplomatic disengagement from Southern
Africa through a settlement with the South African government. These important
developments came in the context of the Cold-War as the two superpowers entered an era
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of détente in which each power tacitly recognized the spheres of influence of the other
and refrained from intervening in one another territories. Western powers’ interests in
the region at this juncture were linked to their ties with the regime in South Africa as the
latter was expanding its regional influence especially in security affairs creating its own
sphere of influence. South African leaders in their turn claimed that their regional
growing power and identification with liberal democracy could make them “serve as a
bridge between Europe and Africans in the region…as profoundly anti-colonialist” force
(Olson and Stedman, 1994: 45).
In 1976 the USA administration of President Jerald Ford adopted a policy that
promotes stability as the ultimate consideration whether achieved by majority rule or
otherwise. In order to engage this policy in a way that put South Africa in position as the
guarantor of regional stability, the government of Vorster adopted a stabilizing strategy
with neighboring countries; playing such a role would allow more implementation of
apartheid with minimum international objection. This policy had its own detrimental
consequences on the regime. Government’s acquiescence to the transformation of
political power to a nationalist movement in neighboring Mozambique that was a price
for stabilization precipitated a spell over effect that hit South Africa and weakened its
position in the face of the nationalist challenge especially following the South African
disastrous intervention in Angola in 1975-6. South African ability to maneuver on the
international arena also was diminished after Jimmy Carter’s victory in the Presidential
elections in the USA. The new Administration, with Carter’s doctrine of Human Rights
protection dealt a serious blow to the South African position. In Africa this new doctrine
141

implied that the USA would back mainstream African opinion and work closely with the
non-aligned bloc to reduce military intervention in Africa and especially the Southern
region. It also implied that America would align with non-aligned bloc’s commitment to
liberate this region from white minority rule (Guelke 2005: 134); apartheid regime was
going to be at the top of the list.
In response to these developments that had put the regime in a precarious position
and in order to pre-empt the rise of nationalism inside South Africa, the government
resorted to far reaching measures to undercut the nationalist tide. International reaction
was prompt; in 1977 the UN Security Council adopted a mandatory ban on arms sales to
South Africa. It seemed clear that further sanctions were to follow as the South African
government went further with apartheid policies especially after the election of 1977 that
gave the NP more political power in the domestic arena as it gained 134 out of 164 seats
of the Parliament. The victory, as much as it revealed Afrikaner strong commitment to
apartheid, couldn’t conceal how rudderless the government was under the circumstances
we discussed; the major sign of this precarious position was the changing the prime
minister Vorster. P.W. Botha had become the new prime minister who entertained a
different strategy to remedy regime’s maladies.
Conclusion
In early 1990’s South Africa seemed to be at the brinks of chaos and collapse. The
rising stalemate threatened the country with the danger of political vacuum that may have
led to an all-out civil war or state failure. Negotiations seemed to promise the least evil
for the adversaries since sustaining the status quo was perceived as a costly alternative
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that either party was prepared to accept. The stakes were high for both adversaries: for
the Africans accepting racial-ethnic classifications and ethnically-based power sharing
was anathema to their long and persistent struggle for restitution and justice in a
democratic life. It also amounted to conferring legitimacy on a regime they fought to
delegitimize and overthrow. As a majority that identified with South Africa as a single
country and nation, Africans possessed the political leverage to change the foundation of
the state. Afrikaners on their turn sought to preserve the political power they obtained for
decades as the main guarantor for their status and privileges; their ultimate fear was that a
democratic majority rule will strip them of all privileges and status they possessed
through racial domination over the majority of the population.
In spite of Afrikaner’s efforts to transform their settler-colonial domination into
ethno-territorial neo-racism through apartheid, African national movement’s struggle and
consistency coupled with international pressure had exposed the inherited weaknesses
and vulnerabilities of the segregation and separation domination system.
First and most decisive, the regime couldn’t find a permanent solution to the problem of
the indigenous especially as the latter represents a strikingly vast majority of the
population and has a crucial role in the economic system of the country. Nor were
Afrikaners able to augment their minority status by any source of European settler groups
of immigrants.
A majority, especially when ethnicized and entirely excluded from the central
structures of political power and resources while exploited and demoralized can’t be
easily, if at all, dismissed. Afrikaners’ domination system manifests the dynamics of
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majority-minority syndrome in all its complications. A minority in domination finds it
harder to manage its political power and supremacy that secures its socio-economic
interests when the majority comes to shape its collective awareness and shared identity,
and mobilizes through struggle against domination. As a permanent small minority
whites in South Africa were not able, and could not, totally exclude the indigenous as the
latter labor was crucial for the economic system of the white to operate and function
properly. The permanent minority status although generated deeper fears of political and
social annihilation had significantly weakened the vey structures of the white political
system as a democracy; the intersection of skin color and deprivation and
disfranchisement of a huge majority mocked white regime’s attempts to confer a veil of
liberal democracy on an explicitly racial domination system. Minority-majority
relationships in South Africa can be considered as the main factor that impeded territorial
total separation thus also undermined Afrikaner sought for gaining the properties of a
territorial ethno-national people. As the Afrikaners did not seek to ethnically cleanse the
indigenous Africans they decided to establish a racist system of domination. However,
African existence in itself represented a structural impediment to racial exclusion and
domination. Under apartheid the African majority for itself became a hindrance to
establish a territorially defined white entity as African became more aware of their
identity and common goals.
Second, South African regional surrounding remained elusive to control. South
African efforts to impose hegemony in the region failed and the policies it implemented
created a hostile region especially with the revival of nationalism in surrounding
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countries. Third, although white regime gained independence from Britain’s direct
influence and South Africa succeeded in constructing a strong economic and military
state, international pressure only increased against regimes racial policies. These
vulnerabilities affected directly and profoundly regime’s ability to maneuver as it
involved in the negotiations with the ANC.
The negotiations between the ANC and De Klerk’s government was a struggle
over the main features of the nation-building process in South Africa that will take the
place of apartheid and white domination. On the micro level negotiating nation-building
within the context prevailed in South Africa reflected the conflicting elements embedded
in each party’s perspective and political demands. However, on the level of macro
conditions, and as the history of the conflict attests there were four conditions that
sustained and deepened Afrikaners’ regime vulnerabilities above-mentioned and led to
the prevalence of the democratic solution and a nation-building that enshrines the rights
and prerogative of equal citizenship in a unitary state system:
(1)

The inability of the dominant group to form an inclusive nation-state out of the

conditions at state formation moment: first, white population is a small and divided
minority. The formation of a nation-state would have threatened Afrikaners status and
their sought for political and social hegemony. However, the minority status and the lack
of a strong ethno-national territorial identification impeded the construction of Afrikaners
as an ethnically-defined people; second, modern state in South Africa was formed within
a territorially integrated geography whereby territorial legetimation of the state was
bound to top-down institutional process based on racial differentiation. This constitution
145

implied that the main goal of the state system as a settler-colonial project was aimed at
managing the indigenous majority rather than shaping the state as a territorial and spatial
construct. Thus state formation and territorial ideologies it espoused targeted the
population of the subordinate group in order to preserve the dominant interests and status.
Afrikaners and white society cleavages had weakened the coherency required to
constitute a well-defined ethno-national group. Moreover, the lack of clear and well
demarcated territorial boundaries which the establishment of a white state would
actualize. In fact Afrikaners on the level of elites and the populace –and to greater degree
English-speaking whites- had shown weak territorial self-identification. Although
Afrikaners possessed a significant degree of self-identification as a nation, they were not
able to establish their entity as an ethnic core of a broader process of nation building.
They were preoccupied more with establishing their political power position by
controlling state institutions through which they guaranteed their domination over the
non-white groups. In this sense the Union of South Africa was not a coherent nation-state
that identify with solid territorial boundaries. As a matter of fact Afrikaner elites did not
peruse a project of a nation-state; rather they espoused the perpetuation of a separated
society.
The case of Afrikaners’ rule shows that a minority in rule remains unable to
establish a strong claim of territorial-national ideology that shapes the material and
subjective bases of ethno-national political identity and institutions. This factor rendered
Afrikaner identity and believes not fixated and the types of segregation and separation
they practiced contextual. Furthermore, profound divisions within the white society
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between Afrikaners and English-speaking communities have weakened the claim of
racial supremacy and prevented the articulation of a unitary white ethnic-national group.
Even when the regime attempted to overcome this structural condition by collapsing the
whites in a single group after 1948, Afrikanerdom was perceived as the hegemonic social
and political power that provided the process with its tenets.
(2)

The weakness of the national-territorial ideology as the bedrock of demarcating a

well-defined nation-state was dialectically linked to the contextually established
domination and separation systems deployed by the Afrikaner ruling elites. Since
Afrikanerdom had never envisioned the establishment of a nation-state, territorialnational nexus lacked the driving force to be materialized and consolidated in state
system and institutions. Afrikaners were mobilized on the bases of language during
racial-colonial segregation era, and on the basis of their cultural identification as a volk
during the 1939-1960s and at a very late stage they were mobilized and identified with
the state per se. The belonging to a territorial nation-state arrived in a very late stage of
ethnic-national constitution, which unveils the undetermined regime ofo territorial
ideology of Afrikaners. Territorial separation at all phases of white domination was
sought for its instrumentality and the political functions it provided and aimed at
confining the Black community not for drawing institutional and normative boundaries.
Thus state contraction that was embedded in the Bantustan policy was implemented with
minimum divisive consequences for the ethno-nation identity of the Afrikaners that was
not linked essentially to territorial underpinnings. This is why in the 1970s Afrikaners
were able to redefine their ideology and self-identification in order to redefine the core of
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their tenets that was perceived as immutable before 1970s events. Moreover, the
weakness of the territorial-national nexus overlapped and at least partially explains the
contextual nature of the systems of domination Afrikaners implemented in different
phases of the conflict. As we discussed in details neither racial-colonial segregation
policies nor apartheid represented integral systems and their modalities and
organizational elements were associational; they were protean, adoptive, and at many
levels pragmatic. This characteristic allowed the gradual decay and erosion of the whole
system as cracks within its edifice started to surface especially when challenged by a
well-organized counter-hegemonic project of the African National movement, and faced
external shocks; sanctions, castigation, and regional failures.
The indeterminacy of Afrikaner ethno-territoriality was further deepened by the
partial integration of the Black African population in the white economic and to a lesser
degree at different times- into the system. Exclusion in this sense was based on social
differentiation of racial-ethnically defined grounds not on ethno-territorial grounds
although it included territorial separation before and during apartheid. The dynamics of
economic integration and exploitation mitigated the effects of segregation and territorial
separation and enabled the African national movement to assume political leverage and to
develop a strong sense of national belonging to South Africa as such not to territoriallydefined affiliation. This factor maintained African struggle as a pursuit of
democratization.
(3) The dynamics above-mentioned had diminished the ability of the dominant group to
atomize their adversary and turn their struggle into a centripetal rather than centrifugal
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force. One of the main features of Afrikaner rule in South Africa was its failure to widen
the colonial buffer that separated the dominant group from the rest of the population; the
subordinate Black majority. Although the regime resorted to the three strands of power:
disciplinary, bio-power, and sovereign power in order to widen and consolidate legal,
social, political and territorial buffer of white settler-colonial society the dynamics of
partial integration and the indeterminacy of territorial ideology rendered the buffer less
effective. Apartheid and ‘homeland’ policy represented the climax of this paradox: as
segregation and other differentiation racial measures filed the regime attempted to
homogenize the white race in a single territorially separated ethno-national group and
atomizing

the

Africans

into

distinct

putative

ethnic

groups.

Apartheid,

counterproductively have strengthened the sense of African collective national identity
and sentiments of belonging to South Africa among African as a majority. African
struggle for self-determination had shown a great deal of consistency in the sought for
equality, justice, and self-determination in civic terms; a pattern that was strengthened
and consolidated in the most decisive periods of the conflict in the 1980s when popular
democratic elements of Africans’ struggle prevailed.
(4) International legitimation that fluctuated through different phases of the conflict and
in accordance with changes of world politics. The point at which international and
regional effects against apartheid and white domination converged in terms of
delegitimating it and legitimating African struggle for self-determination, the regime
couldn’t endure the costs of sustaining white minority rule. The minority in a world
where democratic notions of governance and the eclipse of colonization and
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authoritarianism lost all possible justification to protect its rule and it became clear that
democratic transition is the least costly of all other alternatives; the most prevalent of
which was a racial civil war that might have weathered a way all that white settlers
accomplished.
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Chapter VI
Democratization, self-determination and liberation in Palestine
Introduction
In the wake of the second Palestinian intifada and after a decade of the peace
process initiated in 1992 the Palestinian national movement found itself in a precarious
position as it neither remained a national liberation movement nor it achieved a genuine
independence and a sovereign state. For Israel, the decade enabled it to reorganize its
occupation: Israel now is practicing occupation with less liability and responsibility
towards the Palestinian population while simultaneously Israeli authority consolidated its
grip over the Palestinian people in the OPT and has introduced a new set of segregation
measures: The construction of the separation wall that “graphically illustrates the
territorial essence of the conflict” (Roy 2004: 32); cutting of Palestinian territories from
each other by a regime of military check point (more than 500 military checkpoints had
been established since the year 2000), by-pass roads, and permit policies; and isolating
East Jerusalem from the rest of the OPT and the establishment of border-crossing gates
between the city and the WB, all of which only consolidated Israeli virtual control of the
space and time of the Palestinian population and reduced the Palestinians into groups of
noncontiguous cantons—essentially, Bantustans.
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Palestinian population in the years of the peace process and especially after 2001
(the high day of the Intifada) has become more dispossessed and slowly dismembered
like it never has; “Not since 1948 perhaps have Palestinians faced such loss and
displacement” (Roy 2004: 32). The prevalence of virtual Israeli sovereign power through
its control over the vast majority of the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, and its
control over the borders of Gaza Strip, and the tremendous increase in the establishment
of Israeli-Jewish-only settlements 56 virtually impedes the formation of meaningful
Palestinian state. Rather, these policies and changes stiffen the status quo and stifle
Palestinian efforts to gain self-determination.
The PA possesses a nominal jurisdiction over main residential urban areas that
Israeli military forces conquer whenever Israeli authorities render necessary for security
considerations. While the PA is responsible to provide civil services in the rest of the
OPT, Israeli authorities maintain direct military, security and legal control over the
territory and resources. This matrix not only turned the Palestinian territories into
enclaves but also has red Israel from its legal responsibilities towards the population. The
realities Israel created under the auspices of the peace process are reminiscent, and indeed
resemble, the Bantustans (African Homelands under apartheid) and can’t be hoped to
transform into a sovereign state that embodies Palestinian’s right of self-determination.
To be sure, a genuinely sovereign state and the right of self-determination cannot be
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In the 10 years since the Oslo peace process began, the Israeli government has expropriated at least
70,000 acres of Palestinian land, largely for Israeli settlement expansion and the construction of new
settlements and settlement infrastructure. The settler population has doubled since 1993 to more than
220,000 people (excluding East Jerusalem) living in 150 settlements in the West Bank and 16 in Gaza
(before Israel’s redeployment in Gaza) (Roy 2004: 31).
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achieved apart from the territorial integrity of the OPT and the monopolization of
coercion by this state: both conditions are not present.
The only aspect of the peace process that has been sustained is the process itself
and the institutions it founded; a protracted peace process “in which original causes of the
conflict persist and are exacerbated by new grievances sparked by the peace process”
(Darby and MacGinty 2003: 3). To make it grimmer for the Palestinians the Gaza Strip
has been under Hamas control since 2007 following Palestinian-Palestinian division and
fight. The Palestinian national movement has become divided not only in a factionalized
fashion that prevailed for decades, but also geographically fractured, which added more
challenges to realizing a Palestinian state.
After more than six decades of the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and four decades of
Israeli occupation of the WB, GS and East Jerusalem the Palestinian national movement
have failed in realizing any of its announced objectives apart from sustaining the
Palestinian cause (question) alive and persistent on the political map of regional and
international affairs. Without undermining this accomplishment Palestinian ends in
national liberation and the establishment of democratic unitary state, in establishing an
independent state on the OPT, in achieving Israeli recognition of their national rights,
were all unfulfilled. The latter has been the most disillusioning following almost twenty
years of negotiations with Israel. A two-state solution as
engendered by the current Israeli-PLO agreements will remain dominated by Israel…not
only will Israel’s domination persist through control over security, foreign relations,
immigration, and the territories’ water resources, but the economic annexes to the Oslo
agreements lock the Palestinians entity’s economic development firmly into Israel’s
(Younis 2000: 4).
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It is hard to see how a Palestinian government, with nominal jurisdiction and facing
structural hindrances, could operate effectively to establish a viable institutional base for
a sovereign state whether in terms of its ability to run a viable economy (Roy 2004:32)57
or provide security for its constituency or to tame Palestinians’ eagerness for selfdetermination.
The elusiveness, even disillusionment of the two-state solution not only justifies,
but substantiates the examination of the conditions prevailing in Palestine/Israel to assess
other likely developments including a one-state solution or particular formulas of power
sharing and bi-nationalism or the continuation of the current state of affairs where Israel
is exerting a “creeping apartheid” in the words of Yiftachel (see Sussman 2004, and
Yiftachel 2005). With the conditions for a two-state outcome are dim and Israel’s
colonial expansionist policies proceed apace, the status quo has become more critical and
fraught malicious dynamics. Among the most serious exits for Israeli policy-makers is
the transfer policy.

Transfer (whether hard by means of force or soft by way of

increasing pressure on the population as to make people leave) of Palestinians from the
OPT to Jordan has a strong appeal for many Israeli political leaders, as discussed below.
Although transfer would generate regional and international objection and create serious
and long-term security threats, as Tilley (2005: 5-6) remarks, the history of the conflict
and the difficult strategic choices Israel has suggest that transfer cannot be completely
57

The Palestinian economy as Roy asserts was devastated by the effects of Israel’s continued occupation
and control over Palestinian land and resources. According to the World Bank, it will take some 20 years
to return the Palestinian economy to where it was on the eve of the current Intifada, and According to UN
figures, real GDP is presently below its 1986 level, declining by 24 percent in 2001 and more than 22
percent in2002. Indeed, despite unprecedented levels of international financial assistance amounting to
$315 per person per year, the World Bank calculates that the Palestinian economy has contracted by half
(Roy 2004: p32).
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dismissed as a possibility. Furthermore, Taking into consideration the creeping
segregationist system of Israeli domination, it is not less probable that Israel impose its
full sovereignty over the OPT and establishing Greater Israel with a system of overt
discrimination. The chapters that follow focus on the conditions that may or may not lead
to the emergence of a one democratic-civic state in the Mandatory Palestine. This entails
examining centrifugal forces within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that push in the
direction of separation and those countervailing centripetal forces that may converge to
create dynamics and conditions for the emergence of democratic one-state.
This chapter proceeds as follow: first it presents to the political debates on the
question of one-state versus two-state solutions and then provides this research
understanding of the one-state solution as a concept and as an emergent property of the
conflict. The two sections that follow introduce the historical origins of the conflict with
emphasis on Zionism and its correspondence with European colonialism and racism,

The term one-state

Literature on the one-state solution lacks clarity as to the type of integration
considered when talking about a one-state solution; a bi-national state, a secular
democratic-civic state, a bi-ethnic or power-sharing or otherwise (e.g. Abunimah 2006,
Ibish 2009, Klein 2010). This study considers the secular democratic-civic state that Tony
Judt, Uri Davis and Virginia Tilley defined in their analysis of the conflict. Judt argues
that the Israeli-Jewish settlement movement and its influence and power in Israeli politics
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burry the prospects of two-state solution. He makes an unequivocal preference for the
democratic-civic state that is based on the dismantling of Jewish ethno-national structures
of Israel. In this sense Judt conceives of Israel as colonial system of Jewish supremacy
and presents the one-state as the alternative (quoted in Sussman 2004: 38).
By the same token, Uri Davis (2003:15) presents the one-state as the state of all
its citizens. His normative take on the issue focuses on a vision of justice that is based on
Kantian categorical imperative of equality of individuals and collective groups. This
vision, he contends, cannot be achieved without a struggle that challenge political
Zionism as a colonial power by “the native indigenous (non-Jewish) of Palestine.”
Virginia Tilley (2005) argues for a civic-democratic one-state in which structures of
politico-religious Jewish domination structures are challenged and replaced with
universal democratic imperatives.
The following analysis draws on the conception of the democratic-civic one-state
where individual rights is the ruling political form of governance (the one-man one-vote
system) not group rights that is characteristic to bi-nationalism (the recognition of two
distinct groups within one political entity). The democratic-civic state entails that systems
and structures of domination are to be transformed into constitutional democracy that
guarantees equal rights and obligations of all citizens with strong bill of rights and
institutions that prevents majority tyranny.
Adopting a clear concept of the ‘One-State solution’ is necessary in order to
examine the conditions that make it worthy to pursue apart from political manipulations
and speculative exercises. Although the idea of one-state has not been entertained at any
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stage of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, many political leaders especially on
the Palestinian side utilize the idea as a reaction to the stagnation of the peace process. In
this sense it looks more of a threat aimed at convincing Israel to strike a deal with the
PLO (Ibish 2009: 105-109). For Israelis, however, this kind of pressure “does not carry a
whole lot of credibility” as Michael Tarazi (a legal advisor of the PLO during the 1990s)
remarks (Cited in Abunimah 2006:162). Nevertheless, these political maneuvers echo, at
least partially, certain transformations of conflict following the political developments of
the 1990s as mentioned above. Politicians on both sides of the conflict realize that the
changes took place have transformed the stakes for any solution. The democratic solution
(one-state) is examined here against these developments as an emergence.

The One-State solution: a choice or an emergence?

The discussion of a one-state solution has gathered some momentum in the last
decade especially since the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. However, groups and
individuals who reject the two-state solution as a waning option and advocate the onestate agenda do not constitute a mainstream whether in Israeli or Palestinian politics or
populations 58 . The main force in this camp is concentrated in leftist groups in
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It is indicative that the One-State idea has an appeal among the Palestinians, especially after the year
2000. In a survey conducted by the Near East Consulting (NEC) in February 2007 in the OPT and involved
over 1200 individuals (The margin of error is +/- 3.4% with a 95% confidence level), principal 75% of
Palestinians do not think that Israel has the right to exist, 70% support a one-state solution in historic
Palestine where Muslims, Christians and Jews live together with equal rights and responsibilities.
http://electronicintifada.net/content/survey-70-percent-palestinians-support-one-state-solution/6773
Surveys, however, remain less reliable in such a dynamic context. Other surveys indicate that a significant
majority of both adversaries’ public opinions reject the one-state idea and endorses the Two-State solution;
74% of Palestinians and 78% of Israelis would be willing to accept a two-state solution, while 59% of
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international arena and in Palestine/Israel especially among Palestinian Diaspora
intellectuals, Palestinian thinkers inside Israel, and Leftist Jewish scholars and thinkers.
The idea is not unprecedented within the Palestinian and Israeli/Jewish political thinking.
The PLO endorsed a one-state vision in its National Charter of 1968: The Charter
envisaged an Arab Palestinian state not a bi-national one (Ibish 2009: 19-20). While the
PLO sought to redress Palestinian peoples loss of home and land it made a clear
distinction between Judaism and Zionism perceiving the latter as the enemy, it adopted
“ a progressive, democratic, non-sectarian Palestine in which Christians, Muslims, and
Jews will worship, live peacefully, and enjoy equal rights” (Younis 2000: 109).
However, this integrative program was abandoned in 1974 in favor of a new agenda that
espoused Palestinian independence on the OPT. Within the Israeli-Jewish community, the
bi-national state was envisioned as early as the 1906s. This idea can be traced to the ideas
of a number of Jewish thinkers; the founders of the organization B`nai B`rith and the
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Palestine Rabbi Judah Leib Magnes 59 , and in
1940s the ideas of theologian Martin Buber are the most prominent in lobbying for the
one bi-national-state in Mandatory Palestine that could blend the interests of the two
people. Their ideas, however, waned and did not attract any significant support. Current
Palestinians and 66% of Israelis find a single, bi-national state to be unacceptable. These figures turn to be
more elusive as core issues of the Two-State arrangement involved in the survey.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/22/israel-palestinian-survey-two-state-solution.
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Magnes wrote “we must once and for all give up the idea of “Jewish Palestine”, and “Jewish and
Arabs…have each as much right there, no more and no less, than the other”. He also was discontent about
the Jewish state that established a Jewish ruling class; a political primacy rather than political equality,
which contains the seeds of resentment and conflict, as he asserts. Buber mistrusted ethnic-nationalism and
spend most of his professional life invoking a bi-national state. Along with Magnes and others, Buber
founded the organization Ichud (unity in Hebrew). In 1947 he wrote describing the program of the
organization “as that of a bi-national state-that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two
peoples living together” (cited in Tilley 2005: 214-215)
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debate on the issue is not entirely cut off of this early precedence. But it differs
fundamentally in terms of the context within which it takes place as we mentioned. The
failure of the peace process and particularly the less likely two-state solution is the main
premise upon which most arguments for a One-State solution are based.

The two and the one-state solutions: correspondence?
Most advocates of the one-state solution predicate their arguments on the failure
of achieving Palestinian people’s right of national self-determination in an independent
state on the OPT. This failure, or more particularly the conditions that created it, seem to
generate a situation that makes a One-State solution the only alternative. Opponents of
the idea argue for the viability of the Two-State solution as the sole acceptable for all
actors. The more leftist intellectuals reject the two-state solution on the grounds of
castigating ethno-nationalism; they call for a democratic state and the dismantling of
Israel as a Jewish state. They see Zionism as a “discriminatory ideology and Israel as an
inequitable and pariah state” (Sussman 2004: 37).
For many commentators and scholars Israel will never allow the establishment of
a sovereign Palestinian state West of the Jordan River. John J. Mearsheimer (2010), for
instance, asserts that
Regrettably, the two-state solution is now a fantasy. Instead, those territories
[the OPT] will be incorporated into a “Greater Israel,” which will be an
apartheid state bearing a marked resemblance to white-ruled South Africa.”
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Other thinkers indicate the almost inevitable development of the conflict toward
integration in one-state. Palestinian intellectuals, especially those who live inside Israel
and in the Diaspora such as Edward Said, Azmi Bishara, and Nadim Rouhana wrote in
favor of a one state solution from the same perspective. Edward Said (Cited in: Aruri
2003: 220) argues
The whole idea of trying to produce two states is at an end. The Oslo peace
process is really in tatters…The lives of Israelis and Palestinians are hopelessly
intertwined. There is no way to separate them…in reality there is a common
history. So we have to find a way to live together. It may take 50 years….
But it will take place as Said asserts because the future of Israel is to turn toward the Arab
world and this turn cannot be realized without the Palestinians. Said goes on to embed his
point within a political and empirical context; “Of course, on the West Bank, the settlers
and Palestinians interact, through antipathy and hostility, but physically they’re in the
same place”, which cannot be solved through separation especially with the demographic
reality that prevails in Palestine as a whole: Palestinians will realize demographic parity
with Israeli Jewish in Palestine in the coming two decades Said remarks, and Israel
comparing to South African apartheid, will not be able to maintain apartheid regime.
Said concludes: a bi-national state “is the one idea that will allow people to live with- and
not exterminate- each other.” (Aruri 2003: 220)
The correspondence between the failure to establishing a Palestinian state in the OPT and
the creation of a one bi-national state in all Palestine has been reinforced, unintentionally,
by the repercussions of the peace process that created new realities and transformed the
conflict in ways that make the one-state scheme more appealing. Nadim Rouhana (2003)
argues that
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The failure of the Oslo process to yield a viable Palestinian state could lead to
the convergence of interests of all segments of the Palestinian people [those
living in the OPT and in Israel, and in Diaspora] in calling for a unitary state in
Palestine.
Palestinians as Rouhana stresses will not accept
a Bantustan system of government in the West Bank, but the development of a
mainstream political program that redefines the conflict from one over territory
and sovereignty to a conflict over power sharing and equality …in the form of
a binational or secular state- the same issue that the Palestinians in Israel are
struggling for (Aruri 2003: 222).
A number of Israeli intellectuals and researcher have been grappling with new
realities and structures of the conflict especially changes in the political-geography and
dynamics resulted from the excesses of the peace process and the second Palestinian
Intifada. Benvenisti (1990) argues for a re-definition of the conflict and contends that it
has changed profoundly and “has shrunk to its original core, namely Israeli-Palestinian
inter-communal strife” (Benevenisti 1990: 119). Originally, the conflict, as Benevenisti
remarks, is one of a clash between settlers and indigenous people, which has been a zerosum conflict. Therefore ‘means-ends’ approaches to settle this conflict are doomed to
failure because of their linearity. The asymmetry between the two adversaries has
deepened since the war of 1967 after which new political, institutional, socio-economic
and administrative systems emerged to consolidate Israeli rule of all Palestine and
rendered the demarcations between Israel proper and the OPT blurred and meaningless.
For Benvenisti the question is not any more about binationalism, rather about the model
to choose. He contends that the two-state solution can’t work because it “doesn’t reflect
the depth of the conflict and doesn’t sit with the scale of the entanglement that exists in
large parts of the country”. This reality, Benvenisti concludes, calls for a model that is
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based on personal and collective equality within one regime throughout the country
(Cited in Tilley 2005: 185). Following the steps of Benvenisti the prominent Israeli
journalist Daniel Gavron announces: “The territory between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River must be shared and cannot be sensibly partitioned”. The solution for Gavron
is Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in one nation (Cited in Abunimah 2006: 171-172). The
idea of one nation inasmuch as it reflects an inclusive precept it is still ambiguous as to
the institutional underpinnings it would engender or the base of legitimacy it represents.
Inclusive and universal democratic principles entails a political system and state
legitimacy whereby forms of domination and inequality being eradicated and dismantled.
The founding principle of political life in this state is neither ethnicity nor religion; rather
it is the one-man one-vote principle.
Whether the two-state agenda is making any significant breakthrough or is
stagnant, and that a One-State solution requires an in-depth inquiry of the origins of the
conflict, its underlying properties, and changes in its structures, manifestations, and
actors. Such an inquiry not only pinpoints the causes that stand behind the stagnation of
the two-state formula but also explain the impediments facing the One-State model. The
conflict is primarily and essentially a territorial struggle; territoriality and the linkages it
has with ethno-national identity and life viability implies that “land and its control lies at
the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” (Roy, 2004: 32). Indeed, Israel’s control over
the territory was further entrenched during the peace process and has benefited for the
process to making occupation invisible: by suppressing the distinction between the
occupied and the occupier, the powerful and the powerless the Oslo process created an
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unusual situation whereby the abnormal (foreign military occupation) is being normalized.
In comparison to South Africa, as Knox and Quirk (2000: 163) notice, the Palestinian
Authority coexisted with the occupation whereas the ANC and mixed its position in favor
of democratic transformation with a firm rejection to apartheid and Afrikaner racial ethno
nationalism. ANC and its allies have turned most of the country into ungovernable zones
and exerted peoples politics and rule, which undercut regime’s ability to sustain.
Without close treatment of the conditions that made the conflict deeply ingrained
in territorial legetimation and the dynamics that may lead to the decomposition of this
feature the attempt to understand the conflict remains partial. The task, thus, entails
tracing down the conflict to its roots and how it developed the way it did. This chapter
presents a thorough interpretation of the nature of the Zionist settler-colonial enterprise
and how it shaped the conflict and its main properties and what were the consequences of
this type of colonialism on the relationships between Israeli-Jewish society and the
Palestinian people at different turns of the conflict? This approach emphasizes Zionist
and Israel’s national-territorial identification as an ethnocratic-religious entity and the
Palestinian reaction to it. Understanding these effects and conditions they created offers
better grasp on the key to assessing the decline of Israel’s domination system that is
based on ethnic-territorial exclusion. This decline is the precondition for the realization of
either solution; two or one state as the arguments presented here contend. Tony Judt’s
ideas stand as the most clear in rejecting the ethno-national grounds on which the state of
Israel is premised and the two state solution that legitimate ethno-nationalism as the
organizing principle of nation and state building (Quoted in Sussman, 2004: 38).
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Therefore, the main task of this research is to deconstruct the structures of domination
and their consequences and to examine the processes and dynamics those structures
triggered on the level of the dominant and the subordinate actors to the conflict.

The democratic-civic One-state as an emergence
A one-state is a matter of emergence60 not an outcome of voluntarism or human
agency. Nor it can be assessed in a linear manner where the one would connect current
events with normative considerations without examining the deep structures of the
conflict and there interaction with certain events and contexts. Emphasizing emergence,
however, does not undermine the role of human agency as much as it is concerned with
big the structural contexts within which human actions takes place and conditioned by.
This approach departs from the most fervent advocates of the one-statemodel and their
opponents alike. Hussein Ibish (2009) asserts that the idea of one-state is an illusion that
lacks any significant support whatsoever and contends that “while Israel cannot and will
not be compelled or persuaded to relinquish its control of 22 percent of the territory under
its rule” it cannot, and will not be persuaded to give up its control over 100 percent of
Palestine (Ibish 2009: 29). In contrast, Abunimah (2006) premises his advocacy of a onestate solution on a normative basis; the idea of reconciliation. He notices the presence of
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The concept ‘emergence’ refers to social phenomenon as a “coming into being of qualitatively novel”
(Bunge 2003 p1,10) political entity or structure that stems from within the interactions and dynamics of the
conflict, has the capacity to capture the dynamic nature of the conflict and its underlying causal
mechanisms that may or may not result in a specific outcome.
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two communities in Palestine, both have the right to exist and none of which can dismiss
or exclude the other. Partition under these conditions is failing now as it failed in the past,
as he remarks. The only conceivable way to end the impasse between the parties to the
conflict has to be premised on “absolute equality” and freedom ala South African model
whereby the establishment of an inclusive democracy is the best basis for legitimacy and
recognition.
Linearity and voluntarism prevalent in these accounts obscures the necessity of
analyzing particular internal and external, structural and non-structural effects that may or
may not allow the democratic solution to surface in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the
way they had accumulated and staged in the South African case. It implies that
problematizing Israel’s system of apartheid, as a unique type of differentiation and
domination is necessary. Political actors’ realization and will to espouse an integrative
outcome of the conflict as the optimal and less costly than all other alternatives is not a
mere function of human agency’s rational calculations; this was the case in South Africa
and there is no reason why it should not be in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this sense
assessing Israel’s regime as a settler-colonial system that implements a particular type of
apartheid is aimed at uncovering the prevailing dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and the conditions it endures to examine the one-state emergence.
The suggestion that the failure of the separation agenda to the conflict and the
need to redefine it in such a way to conform with a one-state trajectory reflects a
mechanical and linear interpretation to the most crucial developments of the conflict.
These developments have consolidated the structures of asymmetrical power relations
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that Israel established and metamorphosed and led to the widening of the colonial buffer
separating the Jewish society from the Palestinian society. Israel’s apartheid in this
perspective is distinguished by the ultimate exclusion it imposes on the subordinate
people. Without addressing and challenging the question of power and domination
underlying such a system of domination neither outcome, two or one state can be realized.
The changes in the conflict in the last two decades that resulted primarily and largely
from Israel’s domination and its territorial-national ideology do not necessarily lead to
the transformation of the conflict into an inter-communal strife. Rather they indicate the
deepening of domination that has taken new shapes under the auspices of the peace
process and concealed new systems of domination that is breaking asunder Palestinian
national, social, economic and political networks by segregation regimes that turned the
OPT into separated Bantustans and noncontiguous enclaves. Israel’s policies since 1987
(the first Palestinian intifada) and especially after the initiation of the peace process and
the eruption of the second intifada in 2001 have a consolidating effect of a system of
apartheid that has been established since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Under
these conditions a two-state solution is designed to preserve the Jewish purity of Israel
while enabling it from controlling more territory within the OPT. By the same token a binational state within this context would perpetuate ethno-religious and ethno-territorial
underpinning of Israel and the conflict. A one-state solution under these conditions will
be at best a mere expansion of asymmetrical power relations and domination. At worst it
would be a one-state dominated by Jewish nationalism and embodying Greater Israel; a
state of affairs advocated and sought by Zionist movement mainstream leaders since the
establishment of Israel as we show. Those forces support carrying out an ethnic-cleansing
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of the Palestinians and call it ‘transfer’ or the establishment of overt apartheid (an explicit
system of official differentiation and discrimination) to maintain Jewish hegemony on the
Land of Israel.
Noam Arnon; an Israeli Jewish settlement leader sets it as the follow:
…if there is a contradiction between this [Jewish] essence and the character of
the government, it is clear that the essence takes precedence, and that steps are
taken to prevent damage or changes to this Jewish essence. Democracy cannot
be exploited to destroy the Jewish State” (quoted in Sussman, 2004: 39).
Arnon’s ideas, as we show later, are not marginal in Israeli politics and Zionist founding
ideological tenets. Efi Eitam; Chairman of the Israeli National Religious Party and a
Minister in Sharon’s government in 2003 recently declared his vision for a one-state
Jewish entity between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean. He introduces ethniccleansing in terms of transfer as he suggests that the Palestinians who wished to remain in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be offered “enlightened residency,” as opposed to
citizenship. Those unwilling to accept this status would have to relocate (quoted in
Sussman, 2004: 39).These ideas lie in the heart of Israeli ethno-territorial regime of
legitimation and upon them the state constructed its principles and policies to create a
unique and covert type of apartheid in the Mandatory Palestine with differing levels of
capacity in Israel’s proper and within the OPT. Challenging these foundations and social
reality they are aimed at preserving is the locus of the processes that may lead to a
particular eradication of Jewish ethno-religious system of differentiation and set the
grounds for a democratic outcome of the conflict.
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In this sense, the actualization of a Palestinian national identity and national selfdetermination has become a prerequisite condition for the creation of a civil-democratic
one-state in Palestine. The reasoning is straightforward, without the fulfillment of
Palestinian national aspirations that implies the abandonment of Zionist Jewish doctrine
of Greater Israel the status quo and stagnation of the peace process will persist.
Achieving Palestinian national self-determination implies the invalidation of the JewishZionist doctrine of ethnic-Jewish supremacy and domination over the Great Land of
Israel and over Palestinians. Challenging Israel’s own type of apartheid in Palestine and
the abandonment of Zionist national-territorial ideology requires the convergence of
Palestinians’ organized effort in the OPT, Israel and Diaspora to engage in a process of
democratic-liberation struggle along with Israeli-Jewish democratic inclusive forces and
international delegitimation of ethno-religious nationalism as an accepted form of nation
and state building are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of a OneState solutions and for ending Israel’s occupation of the OPT as the precondition for the
democratic alternative to emerge. Without the decline or the breakdown of Israeli system
of domination that is organized around the fundamental linkages between four elements:
the Jewish identity as an ethno-national icon; the state as the ultimate sanctuary of this
identity; the land (territory); and the ultimate economic, social, and political exclusion of
Palestinians (within the OPT, in Israeli proper, and in the Diaspora) the emergence of a
democratic-civic One-State remains unfounded.
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European Colonialism and Zionist implantation

The promises Britain made to the Arabs, particularly to Sharif Hussein Bin-Ali of
Mecca in 1915 as articulated in Hussein-McMahon Correspondence61 to recognizer Arab
independence in Asia and support Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire were not kept.
As a matter of fact McMahon promises in the Name of the Kingdom were at odds with
other simultaneously given promises and pledges: one with Britain’s colonial ally France
as enshrined in the Sykes –Picot agreement 62, and the other to the Zionist movement
made in November 1917 by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Walter
Rothschild on behalf of the British government and to be transmitted to the Zionist
Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. Whereas McMahon exceptions made on the Arab
territorial boundaries was to keep the British-French division of the region between the
two colonial powers intact, the Balfour declaration remained as unfettered a commitment
that Britain kept aiming at the establishment of a Jewish “homeland” in Palestine. The
degree to which the Balfour declaration was consistent or non-consistent with the
McMahon pledges to Hussein Bin-Ali has been a matter of controversy. It is not in our
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Hussein-McMahon Correspondence is a set of letter-exchange between the Sharif of Mecca Hussein BinAli and Sir Henry McMahon; the British Higher Commissioner in Egypt between July 1915 to January
1916. Britain, needy of Arabs as ally against the Ottomans pledged to support Arab revolt and
independence when the War (World War Two) ends. In his letter dated 24 October 1915 McMahon
clarifies the territorial boundaries of the Arab independence and declares that “Great Britain is prepared to
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories in the limits and boundaries
proposed by the Sherif of Mecca”.
62

The Sykes-Picot agreement was signed in secret between the UK and France in May 1916 with the
consent Russia; their ally at the time. The agreement defined British and French “spheres of influence” in
countries of Western Asia (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon) as the War comes to an end and the
Ottoman Empire defeated as expected. The negotiations were led by British and French Foreign Ministers:
Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, respectively, and hence they dubbed Sykes-Picot. The
agreement remained secret until the Russian communist revolution exposed it following its ascendance to
power.
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intention to examine the validity of rival interpretations of the declaration. The British
government reiterated its pledge for Arab independence and unity when the Arab
revolution forces were advancing northbound well into Jordanian territory. In 1918,
Britain dispatched its Higher Commissioner in Egypt to Mecca to convey a letter by Sir
Mark Sykes on behalf of the British government in which Britain once again stressed its
recognition of Arab independence and Arab unity as a nation. British government, the
letter firmly stated, was intent to maintain its commitment for the Zionist movement. The
letter unequivocally states
Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favor of a return (my emphasis) of
Jews to Palestine and in as much as this opinion must remain a constant factor,
and further as His Majesty's Government view with favor the realization of
this aspiration (my emphasis), His Majesty's Government are determined that
insofar as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both
economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization
of this ideal.
The letter neatly restates the provisions of the Balfour declaration of 191763. It
represents the first and most instrumental international recognition of the Zionist colonial
ambitions in Palestine. The letter added to the terminology the term “return” to depict
Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the term “aspiration” to refer to the aim of
establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Both terms to be of the main pillars of
Zionist political claims in Palestine and kindle the animosity between the Palestinian
Arabs and the Zionist movement. The latter justified its endeavor in Palestine primarily
by claiming that Jewish people has a divine right in the return to Palestine and that Jews
63

The Balfour declaration states that “His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status
enjoyed by Jews in any other country” (Davis, 2003: 27).
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have for a millennia aspired to reestablish their nationhood in the Promised Land. The
implementation of the Balfour declaration had meant primarily allowing unlimited Jewish
immigration into Palestine and thus seeding the seeds for the implantation of a settler
community from tens of different nationalities.
The immediate and profound effect was that Jewish immigration that increased in
the last quarter of the 19th century and was spontaneous and ideologically neutral, turned
into a systemic, enormous, ideologically motivated, and organized by the Zionist
movement. Immigration of this magnitude and sort was a watershed in the onset of the
Palestinian-Zionist/Israeli conflict. The implantation of the Jewish in the land of Palestine
alarmed the indigenous population and triggered their disillusionment with British
intentions and their resentment in the face of Zionist creeping colonialism onto their land.
Jewish settler colonialism would increase exponentially through the first there decades of
the 19th century and the implantation of the Jews would take particular organizational
features and establish its own buffered and isolated sphere of life. British colonial
government, while restraining Palestinian institutional and economic viability, either
supported or turned a blind eye to Zionist practices. In particular British allowance for
Jewish immigration was significantly essential for the success of the Zionist movement to
gain ground and strength; gathering more Jewish immigrants to Palestine was the
precondition for the creation of a viable settler-colonial society.

British policy of

allowing the Zionist movement to establish its own administrative structures and to gain
autonomy in running Jewish communities was significantly instrumental in Jewish settler
community’s leverage over the indigenous population.
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Crafting Zionist religious ethno-territoriality
Jewish immigration to Palestine up until the last two decades of 19th century; the
pre-Zionist immigration fluctuated in numbers and point of departure. Jews immigrated
to Palestine in an almost regular manner in small numbers from different European and
Middle Eastern (Arab) regions. Jews immigrated to Palestine in the 17th and 18th
centuries primarily for religious reasons, and then the persecution they suffered in Europe.
Numbers of immigrants were in increase in the early and mid of 18th century (see Arie
Morgensten 2006) for immigrants’ belief of the arrival of the Messiah in the Hebrew year
5600; 1840 on the English calendar. Declining life conditions and persecution and
pogroms in Eastern and Southern Europe drove more Jewish immigration to Palestine, as
well. Moreover, political and economic changes in the region attracted Jews from
Southern Europe and some Arab countries; notably more Jews immigrated to Palestine
during the expanding rule of Mohammad Ali in Egypt in 1832. Starting 1882, however
the pattern and drivers of this immigration were fundamentally in a remarkable transition.
Rates of Jewish immigration to Palestine starting the last two decades of the 18th
century were one of the highest, and the capital transfers that accompanied it was
unprecedented in the world. Substantially, Jewish immigration had become an organized
effort orchestrated by the ascending “political Zionism”64. The implantation of Jewish in
64

Uri Davis (2003:7) distinguishes between “spiritual Zionism” and “political Zionism”. The school of
spiritual Zionism inside the movement opposed the project of “political Zionism”. As the latter committed
to a normative and practical project for turning Palestine into a Jewish sovereign state, the former, led by
Asher Ginsberg (Ahad-ha-Am) opposed the project. Following his visit to Palestine in 1891 published a
critique of political Zionism titled “Truth from Eretz Israel” in which he defies the claim that Palestine was
a barren land void of people. We draw on this distinction and wherever this study uses the terms: Zionism,
Zionist movement, Zionists it refers to ‘Political Zionism”.
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Palestine by means of organized and well-funded Zionist effort represented the
convergence of interests between certain segments of Jewish capital in Europe with
Jewish labor in the creation of self-sufficient and exclusive settlements in Palestine
(Younis 2000: 55) with the consent and protection of the British colonial government that
recognized Zionist institutions as legitimate. In fact the British Mandate Government
following the enactment of Balfour Declaration recognized the Jewish Agency for the
Land of Israel (Jewish Agency JA) “as the appropriate public body to advise the Mandate
administration in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the
establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine” (cited in Davis 2003:28).
Initially, capital and labor without military power enabled the Zionist movement to
establish viable isolated communities (yishuvim and Kibbutzim) that benefited from
capital to construct advanced industries, agricultural projects and residential settlements.
The Jewish settler society constructed its social, administrative and institutional,
and economic structures in isolation from, and at odds with the indigenous Palestinian
population and their livelihood. Isolation from, and exclusion of the Palestinians were the
main two characteristics of Zionist colonization of Palestine and they, in effect, founded
the principal bedrock for the constitution of the Jewish immigrants as a distinct religiousethno-nationality bound to the space (territorial and socio-economic) it occupied. The
pattern of total exclusion and isolationism that distinguished the Zionist endeavor from
other types of colonialisms produced a wide buffer that was initially territorially based.
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The degree of exclusion that Zionism implemented had been very unique and was
consolidated in tandem with the increase of Jewish immigration. Thus after the arrival of
the second through Fifth Jewish immigration waves between1904-1928, exclusion was
tightened and galvanized through and reached a climax with the establishment of the state
of Israel. State phase of the Zionist enterprise came to officially and formally adopt this
type of differentiation and exclusion; an apartheid of a distinct type, as further illustrated
below. Immigrants of these waves, and most of subsequent waves, were ideologically
motivated and driven by the Zionist motto that Palestine was “a land without a people”
for “a people without a land” that negated the Palestinians altogether. Negation of the
indigenous Palestinians, economically, politically, and physically culminated in the
Zionist movement’s emphasis on conquering the land and the establishment of selfsufficient and well administered and well-defended Jewish entity. The viability of Jewish
settlement communities was pivotal for the establishment of the state of Israel: they
provided the infrastructure, institutional and economic bedrock, ideological coherency,
and military power that contributed significantly to the ability of Israel to come into life
and sustain
Jewish settler-communities were economically, socially, and politically structured
to meet the main objective of the Zionist movement, namely the “restoration of the
Jewish people as an independent and self-sustaining community in its homeland;
Palestine” (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 659). The ‘ingathered’ of Jewish and the
implementation of the Jewish labor policy “Hebrew work” that aimed at the restoration of
the immigrants as a nation distinct and separated from the indigenous Palestinians were
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the primary pillars of Zionism in this era. ‘Restoration’ took the form of establishing the
settler communities; Kibbutzim (communal villages) and Yishuvim (residential villages
and towns) that have viability to receiving and absorbing more Jewish immigrants. The
more Jewish immigrants arrived, the more these constructs the more settlements were
consolidated and with that differentiation and separation between Jewish settlers and
Palestinian increased.
Differentiation and exclusion implied a dual mechanism: dispossessing
Palestinians from their land and prohibiting their employment in Jewish labor market.
This policy founded the grounds of the notion of segregation and isolationism that make
Zionism a system of apartheid on its own right. The absorption of vast numbers of Jewish
immigrants especially after World War Two65 has given a crucial boost to this process by
virtue of numbers right before the creation of the estate. Virtually, exclusion, land
acquisition, and immigration were the main tools that Zionism –and later the state of
Israel- has deployed in order to solve the main problem that faced the consolidation of the
Jewish settler colonialism in Palestine: the presence of another people, the Palestinians
(the Canaanites). Zionist motto of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’
did not rest well with this fact, and the question becomes on the relationship between the
Jewish settlers of the indigenous people. Ironically, Biblical wrath and fury is not
directed to the peoples who enslaved or exiled the Jews, rather against the inhabitants of
Palestine. Biblical reasoning of this is that the presence of an alien people in the land of
Israel could threaten the political structure of the Chosen people and could possibly
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By the end of the war, and at the eve of establishing Israel the Jewish community of Palestine consisted
302 farming communities, and 28 urban communities. Between 19949 and 1952 687,000 Jewish
immigrants arrived to Israel (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 659).
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undermine the cultural and religious character of Israel. Goyim (aliens) will contaminate
the purity of the Jewish state and people. The answer to Goyim presence in the Promised
Land is to enslave and abuse them, not to mix with them if not cleansing them altogether
as Moses instructed the Israelites as they were about to enter Palestine. These perceptions,
although not explicitly invoked by mainstream Zionists or Israeli officials in general can
be observed in the practices of Zionism in the pre-state period and by the state of Israel
since it was established.
Zionist exclusivist character prevented to a large extent any mechanisms of
integration or significant cross-cutting interactions along the divide that was widening
between the Jewish community and the Palestinian population. One of the main
consequences of total exclusion was that the indigenous population was unable to affect
or challenge Jewish preponderance from within the system they established; a feature that
distinguishes Israel’s apartheid and represents the bedrock of the domination system it
established in the whole of Palestine. Thus the structures of settler-colonial Zionism did
not permeate the Palestinian society at any level and the colonial buffer that separated the
settlers from the indigenous population was ultimate. In order to give cultural life and
vibrant ethno-national dimension of the nascent settler-colonial Jewish community
Zionist movement cemented the ethnic ties within through the use of Hebrew as the
dominant and only language. Virtually, this mobilization tool has deepened the
differentiation and distinctiveness of the two groups; Jews and Arabs. While a discourse
of secular-nationalism amalgamated with religious precepts was deployed to ‘ingather’
the Jews in Palestine and convince them to immigrate, Hebrew was the main tool of
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mobilization and unification within the immigrants. Hebrew, in addition to resurrecting
many religious symbols and preserving them was the central core of the construction of
the Jewish society as an ethno-linguistic group. Although the language spoken by the
majority of immigrants and of the Palestinian Jews (whose homeland is Palestine prior to
the arrival of immigrants) was the Yiddish, Zionists preferred Hebrew for its ancient
connection to Abraham and the Bible and for the differentiation it consolidates.
Total exclusion, segregation, and hegemony; rather than exploitation were the
pillars of a blueprint that was the hallmark of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Zionistist
colonialism in Palestine encompassed features of European colonial practices intertwined
with religious ethno-national attributes that make it a unique type of a buffered
colonialism: colonial ethno-territorial force that aimed from the outset to negate rather
than control and exploit the indigenous. Thus Zionism encapsulated, in the words of
Yiftachel (2010: 226) the
ethos of ‘collective survival-revival [and] an Orientalist colonial attitude typical
to Europeans in settler societies [that] created a dual society, manifested in
separate residential areas, education systems, cultural milieu, labor markets, and
political organization,
that established Zionist apartheid system before the creation of the state of Israel.
Zionism and the racial answer to the Jewish question in Europe
The creation of Jewish colonial presence in Palestine finds its justification in
Zionist ideological tenets derived from Biblical myths 66 ; particularly to the Old
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Myth in this doesn’t mean an untrue context has the power of factual historical event. We subscribe to
Akenson’s definition of it as a true set of views about historical events; “views of the past that take on
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Testament and Talmudic narratives

67

. However, early European initiatives and

discussions on the implantation of European Jews in Palestine dates long before the
founding of political Zionism in 1897, and at some point it intersects with Zionist’s
efforts and pleas for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Ideological zeal of
Zionist Jews for the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine was also driven by
materialistic; economic and political/strategic underpinnings within the broader European
colonial ambitions in the region. Theodor Herzl; the founding father of Zionism himself
was not an observant Jew; he was born to an assimilated western European family and
had received no Jewish education. The underlying material aspects were not unique in the
era of colonialism except for the fact that European colonial powers (French and Britain
in particular) instead of establishing their own setter-colonial communities (as was the
case in India, Algeria, and South Africa, for example) they espoused the implantation of a
proxy that has sufficient justification and motivation. Thus, Zionism was preceded with
European calls for Jewish colonization in Palestine to serve the interests of European
powers; the private secretary of Napoleon III in 1860 promised that all Europe would
support Jewish acquisition of Palestine (Ab-Lughod and Abu-Laban 1974: 22) to serve
extraempirical meaning, by virtue of being closely related to the society’s views of its collective identity
and it special, virtually divine, origin.” (Akenson 1992:138).
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The Old Testament contains the only available record of the ancient state of Israel. It encompasses three
main beliefs: (1) Jews are separate and exclusive people chosen by their God to fulfill a destiny, and
therefore they are a covenant and elected people as opposed to other neglected peoples; (2) the covenant
grant the chosen a definite and exclusive ownership of the land of Canaan (Palestine) for them and their
descendants; (3) the reclamation of this land is a divine duty of all the Jews and the Jewish purity of the
land is sacred. These beliefs and justifications are prevalence in Zionist leaders’ thinking secular and
religious alike. Ben Gurion calls the Bible “the sacrosanct title-deed to Palestine” for the Jewish people
“with a genealogy of 3500 years” (Ab-Lughod and Abu-Laban, 1974 p4), and therefore the redemption of
the land of Israel and the return of the Jews to the land of the birth moladit is called aliah. The claim of
divine mission and exclusivity farther entrenched by a strong convection that the Jewish people has some
essential characteristics that no people possesses, which make the Jewish history incomparable in terms of
its history and longing to the land of Israel, as Abba Eban; a modern and moderate Zionist, asserts. (Eban
1968).
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European interests in the region. Thus religious ontology of Zionist foundations doesn’t
negate the existence of timely philosophy and material basis for Jewish settler-colonial
project in Palestine. One of the most prominent Zionist thinkers, Moses Hess endorsed
the colonial argument and the mutual interests that may materialize out of ZionistEuropean colonial cooperation. Since European powers will need to establish colonies
along the new trade routes to the east after the work on the Suez Canal, Jews would serve,
as a colony, in establishing channels of communications and mediation with far Asia.
Herzl made the same argument:
If His majesty the [the Ottoman] Sultan was to give us Palestine, we could in
return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. We
should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of
civilization against barbarism. We should as a neutral state remains in contact
with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence” (Ab-Lughod
and Abu-Laban 1974: 23).
Herzl emphasized the mutual benefits that European (British, German, and French)
powers and a Jewish state would reap as a result of establishing and protecting a Jewish
colony in Palestine. Herzl spearheaded Zionist efforts to establish a broad Jewish
coalition supporting his ideas and Zionism succeeded in bringing to the action Jews from
different class affiliations including bourgeoisie, middle and working classes. In this
sense Zionism and the colonial ambitions it represented was a phenomenon embedded
within the broader current of European colonialism as well as European industrialization
and its discontents.
Zionism emerged as a set of ideas bound to the concrete social, economic, and
political conditions surrounded its founding in Europe. It represents a colonial movement
that claimed to have a solution to the Jewish question in Europe using European methods:
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colonization. Capitalism and socio-economic changes accompanied it at some level
precipitated racial tenets of nationalism and fascism. Zionism emerged in the era of
European industrialization with all its malaise including the most two prominent strands
of thought: enlightenment and racism. For the Jewish, this historical process was a
double-edged sword: in the one hand it brought them emancipation and legal equality
under the rule of law and democracy in some countries. On the other hand, the rise of
racism and national chauvinism created anti-Jewish trends, which materialized in
persecution, pogroms, and mass-murder of Jews. As a consequence, Jewish communities
either opted to secular liberalism and democracy in their respective countries, or
committed to secular racism as the base for ethno-national resurrection embodied in
Zionism (Davis 2003: 9).
European racism was met by a response of the same kind by Zionism; the answer
for Jewish negation in Europe was “not to destroy our lives in miserable indecision and
spiritual sorrow” wrote Rabbi Joachim Prinz in 1934. Prinz further clarifies that the
answer to persecution and anti-Jewish sentiments is the creation and sustaining of Jewish
racism
The theory of assimilation has been destroyed. There is no longer any hiding
place for us…We want to posit instead of assimilation something new:
undertaking the yoke of joining the Jewish people and the Jewish race. Only a
state based on the principles of the purity of the nation and the race can
possibly endow dignity and honor on [and only] on those Jews who
themselves subscribe to this principle” (Italics in origin) (quoted in Davis
2003:10).
Therefore, Zionist justifications of the colonization of Palestine and claiming
exclusive right to the land were generic
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they were the same arguments employed in the previous centuries by the
Australian colonists concerning the aborigine…the Afrikaners concerning the
Xhosa and Zulu…The same canonical justifications were used by all Europeans
imperialists when explaining why it was all right for the colonists to bash the
indigene” (Akenson 1992: 170).
Zionists arguments in this respect were real and typically colonialist regardless of their
content of truth or logical coherence: Palestinian Arabs were not really a people; their
emotional and historical ties with the land are weak; they are backward, not productive
and they were not really dispossessed and by extension they have a lower level of rights
than the Jewish; and that Zionist colonization of Palestine was good for the Arabs. In this
sense Zionism sat very well with liberal notions of postindustrial Europe and therefore
was able to convert the processes it launched in Palestine. Thus, as Said (1992: 87)
argues
The Jews were not supplanting, destroying, breaking up, a native society. That
society was itself the oddity that had broken the pattern of a sixty-year Jewish
sovereignty over Palestine which had lapsed for two millennia. In Jewish
hearts, however, Israel had always been there, and actuality difficult for the
natives to perceive. Zionism therefore reclaimed, redeemed, repeated,
replanted, and realized Palestine and the Jewish hegemony over it. Israel was
a return to a previous state of affairs, even if the new facts bore a far greater
resemblance to the methods and successes of nineteenth-century European
colonialism than to some mysterious first-century forbearers
This line of argument has been the hallmark of the Labor wing in the Zionist
movement and embodies the rationality of pioneered modernists and liberals who argue
that their endeavor is messianic and aims at civilizing the uncivilized peoples (Nady,
cited in Nic Craith 2002: 37). However, similar to other ethno-national colonial societies,
Zionism created and consolidated a spiral of exclusionist and segregated system of
domination. One of the major differences is that Zionism resorted to profound religious
fundamentalist precepts to consolidate its colonial discourse and practices.
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Religious ethno-national exclusionism and isolationism of the settler Jewish
community in Palestine was a reflection of the circumstances that precipitated the
emergence of political Zionism: European racist anti-Jewish sentiments argued that,
given the fundamental incompatibility of non-Jews and Jews, Jews -as individuals and as
a group- cannot be equal citizens and free in non-Jewish communities. These were the
same premises upon which the Afrikaners in South Africa justified, at some point, the so
called “separate development” that would, so claimed at the time, serve the interests of
both Black Africans and white Afrikaners. Isolationism of the settler-colonial Jewish
community in Palestine entertained and practiced what European anti-Jewish racists
called for: since incompatibility is evident by definition, the answer is separating the Jews
from the Gentiles in Europe and in Palestine alike since
For political Zionism, Jewish society must also be segregated outside the body
of the Gentile society, in this case in Palestine redefined and reified in Zionist
ideology as the Land of Israel” (Nic Craith 2002: 11).
Zionism, thus was a cross-class movement that represented a classic colonial
resolution to the Jewish question in Europe in direct and close coordination with the
European powers of the time. However, it needed a more profound and articulate solution
to the issue of mobilizing the Jews to rally behind the project and to create a moral and
sufficient ideological justification that would provide the secular colonial nationalism
with ethnic depth.
Constituting Zionist Jewish ethno-territorial ideology

The secular and class-based coalition that Zionism was predicated upon and the
Oriantalist colonial underpinnings of European origins were necessary but not sufficient
182

for the success of the Zionist colonialism in Palestine. Mobilizing Jewish support and
immigration to Palestine especially when the vast majority of Jewish emigrating from
Eastern Europe preferred Western Europe or Northern America as their destination
required justifications beyond secular nationalism and vulgar colonial interests; the
resurrection of Jewish national identity provided the answer. Primarily, Biblical myths
constitute the main authority the Zionist movement invoke to support the claim of an
exclusive Jewish right in Palestine. The central piece of the claim is that the Promised
Land (Palestine) was actually occupied by other foreign peoples for hundreds of years,
and that time has come for the Jewish people to redeem what is his. This right is cited as
God’s ordainment given and sustained by the Covenant between him and the Chosen
People (the Jewish people). Chaim Weizman, the founder of the institutional
infrastructure of Zionism in Palestine, articulates the concept of redemption with its
political implications as follows:
It seems as if God has covered the soil of Palestine with rocks and marshes and
sand, so that its beauty can only be brought out by those who love it and will
devote their lives too healing its wounds (Quoted in Said 1992: 85).
The divine exclusive right of the Jewish people in the Land of Palestine is
strengthened by attaching to it a burden that the Jewish people have to carry; the
fulfillment of God’s commandment to establish the just society in the Land of Israel. The
covenant and the scripture works as a “conceptual grid” in which land, exodus, and blood
sacrifice are the reflex points or the ultimate principles and great sensitivity touching
them “energizes the entire grid and calls forth an immediate, focused, sometimes violent
response” (Akenson 1992: 31) to threats that might undermine the sacred connections
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between God, the Land, and the unity and purity of the Chosen. Territory and space in
this sense is more than a Jewish property but also the burden of making it what God
commanded. Intertwining this religious-ethnic claim with secular notions of colonial
precepts and Jewish suffering in Europe, Zionism was able to present itself as a national
liberation movement, even as anti-colonial. A claim that would not survive the question
of practice: The question here is not whether political Zionism was a national liberation
movement or a settler-colonial enterprise. Rather, “the critical question is what actions
and /or omissions adherents of political Zionism justify in the name of Zionism” (Davis,
2003 p8). Emphasizing the practices of the Zionist movement and revealing social,
political, economic and institutional reality it created in Palestine has the priority over an
abstract discussion on whether it was a national liberation movement or not. Where
ideology reveals the nature of the movement is ultimately in the realm of reality.
The most striking aspect of Zionist ideology is not only the religious belief it
exhibits but rather the ethno-nationalistic territorial component it incorporates and
justified by religious precepts. In effect, invoking the exclusive divine right of the
‘Jewish people’ in the land of Palestine implies controlling the land as one element in an
inseparable triad: God, the People, and the Land. Zionism cannot be divorced from this
profound devotion to the land in spite of its nationalistic and socialist character (Davis
1974 quoted in Cohen and Kliot 2011:664) and Zionist Jews, whether religious or secular
share the belief that the Jewish people have a missionary task that makes its connection to
the land very special and its spiritual unity as a nation a unique feature because of the
Promised Land upon which the establishment of today’s Israel (“The Third Jewish
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Commonwealth” as it is called by Zionists) is the continuation of the ancient Kingdom of
Israel (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 662). The logical outcome of such articulations is the
sought of Jewish purity in Jewish Land, which by definition implies exclusion and
territorial control. Both are intertwined and constitute the politico-religious grid centered
and focused on the essential connections between the land and ethno-nationality that
distinguishes Zionist settler-colonialism.
Exclusion of the other non-Jewish and the imagined organic connections between
the land and the people implies that notions of bi-nationalism and universal inclusive
democracy entail the dissolution of the spiritual aspect of the nation and its unity.
Realization or even discussion of bi-nationalism or inclusive democracy have a more
stunning effect on Zionists than political considerations. From this perspective Israel
embodies, in full terms, the “State of the Jews” Der Judenstaat envisioned by Herzl in his
book that has the same title. This property is best illustrated by Zionist territorial
legitimating regime and ideology as an expansionist colonial power driven by a type of
apartheid without which realizing Jewish domination as a nation over the Land of Israel
would not be possible. The expulsion of the native population is concomitant to these
precepts; Jewish nationalism cannot be constructed with the presence of the non-Jewish.
As Herzl put it in his Diaries
We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by
procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any
employment in our own country. Both the process of expropriation and the
removal of the poor must be carried discreetly and circumspectly (Quoted in
Said 1992: 13).
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Zionist pre-state Territorial ideology: total exclusion and negation
Underlying Zionist territorial-nationalism is a legitimating system of meanings
derived from ethno-religious connections to the ancient history of Palestine. Based on
biblical scripts, Zionism has established the Jewish claim of the Land as the sole property
of the Jewish people. It gave the name ‘Zion’ to Palestine although the Biblical name of
Palestine is not Zion. Rather, it is Canaan or the Land of Israel. Zion is the name of
sanctuary built by King Solomon in Jerusalem. Conflating Zion with Palestine, as
Weissbord (2011: 192) remarks was to justify a choice that was not reasonable from a
secular point of view. This can be noticed in Herzl’s initial proposal for the location of a
Jewish state; Herzl in 1895 accepted any place for the establishment of Jewish entity and
location was not relevant. Naming Palestine as the destination and location was
reasonable only in its religious and ethno-national sense. The debate within the Zionist
movement over the location settled down in favor of Palestine during the First Zionist
Congress in 1897. The arguments deployed in favor of Palestine are highly indicative of
the territorial ethno-national ideology of the movement. Phrases such as: “There is no
Zionism without Zion”; “Even if we are shown the lushest countries, full of milk and
honey, we will prefer the bare rocks of Palestine, because they are in Palestine”; and
“Zion is the country we love, the land of our aspiration…there is only one country which
has such an attraction for the entire people and that is Zion”. The conflation of religious
beliefs, territorial aspirations, and nationalistic notions come together to create a unique
type of ethnic colonialism
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The principal difference between Zionist settler-colonial adventure in Palestine
and other colonial-settler regimes, such as the white in South Africa, is that Zionist
movement claims “to be the restoration of a state that had temporarily been disrupted”
(Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban 1974: 3) by reconstituting the Jews from all over the world
in a single ethno-nationality bound to the territory in the manner we discussed.
Ethnicizing the conflict and endowing it with essential territorial-spatial dimension is
unique for the Israeli regime in Palestine. Territorial absolute exclusion of the indigenous
embedded another major distinction of Zionist colonialism; unlike other European
colonial efforts Zionism did not seek the colonization of the indigenous and their
dispossession and exploitation. Rather it sought their ultimate dispossession and ultimate
exclusion which makes the consequences more disastrous for the Palestinians (Davis
2003: 27) Whereas other examples of similar regimes can be found in Serbia, Estonia, Sri
Lanka and South Africa, these cases have not necessarily incorporated rigid territorial
ideologies based on ethno-religious premises. As such, the specificity with which the
movement identified its project with territorial boundaries is remarkable and has
profound implications for the development of the state of Israel and the territorial
legitimating regime it employ to justify the expansionist nature of its colonial policies
and its domination system.
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Essentializing territory and ethnic identities
Leaders of the Zionist movement justify Jewish immigration to Palestine by
secular values such as justice, humanitarian principles, creating psychologically sane
people, etc. Simultaneously, they invoked basic religious justifications to reinforce their
secular discourse. In the words of Syrkin these secular values must be the guidelines of
the Jewish state so that “the hope for a Messiah…may be converted into political fact”
(Quoted in Weissbord 2011: 193). The arrival of the Messiah cannot be seen apart from a
certain territory; Palestine and amongst a certain messianic people; the Jewish. The
redemption and possession of the Land of Palestine becomes an imperative and an end
sought for its own sake as an ultimate duty of the Chosen people. The reconstituting of
the Jewish history and the resurrection of Jewish people cannot be achieved in any
territory other than Palestine, which turned Jewish nationalism into a-historical
phenomenon “providing a unified linear and repeatedly recited backdrop for
contemporary practices of territorial expansion” (Yiftachel 2010: 224). In effect this has
conferred a state of homogeneity on the Jewish history that exempted, even suppressed,
any attempt to question it, or even to question Zionism as the bearer of this mission.
Zionism, in this sense is the embodiment of the reconstruction of ancient and
continuous ties and connections between the Jewish people and their land. The ‘Jewish
people’ although had never seen this land had dreamed of it for generations as Abba Eban
contends (Eban 1968: 17). Perceiving the Land of Palestine as the exclusive property of
the Jewish people is a matter of consensus within Israeli Jewish community and polity
and world Jewry. Territorial claims are the less ambiguous aspect of Zionist ideology.
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As Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban (1974: 9) remark “while the question of people (Who is
the Jew) may be open to…interpretations, and the problem of the indigenous population
may be subject to some moral considerations, the right to the land is so basic that it is
hardly contested: “Eretz Israe as defined in the Bible is not an ambiguity”. In Biblical
terms territorial considerations are paramount and supreme to all other imperatives. Thus
territory has been essentialised and given a-historical subjective meaning that pertains to
the core of Jewish identity.
Perceiving territory in an essentialist manner confers a subjective sacred meaning
to the spatial component of nation-building and turning it into an ethno-religious
endeavor. The other non-Jew (an individual or a group) has no place within Jewish
nationality understood and articulated in ethno-territorial terms. Establishing the
correspondence between the land and the Jewish people, as Buber (1952) clarifies, is
a consummation that could not be achieved by the people or the land on its own
right but only by the faithful cooperation of the two together …land is not a dead
passive object but a living active partner… [both needed each other] to realize
the fullness of life.
The unique connection to the land is further essentialised by the belief that the
Jewish people as a whole share transcendental spiritual attribute by virtue of this unique
connection to the land and God’s grace which makes territory and land the equivalent of
ethnicity, nationality, religion, and the state. For some Jewish scholars (e.g. Shilhav
1985:111-124) the missionary precept of ethno-religious Jewish nationalism hinders the
morality of this mission by worshipping territory and turning it into an end and confers an
essentialist meaning to controlling territory and alienating it from the indigenous. The
sanctity and essentialist precepts of territory and spatial sphere turned the land into an
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indivisible subject and extra-territorialized the spatial domain of the conflict and the
connotations of the nation.

Extra-territorializing the geography
As an ultimate subject, the redemption of the land of Palestine from the foreigners
and establishing Jewish settlements and Jewish sovereignty on it becomes an act of piety,
righteousness and religious must. Whether within the Israeli proper or in the OPT, Jewish
settlement building is considered a higher value and described as a pioneering practice;
“The land of Israel was, with its borders, defined for us by Divine Providence. Though
shalt be, say the Almighty, and there is no power on earth can alter that which was
created by him” as Rabbi Nissim (chief Rabbi of Israel in 1968) puts it (Shilhav 1985:
111). Legal and political implications of this belief can be found in early legislations
enacted after the establishment of the state of Israel. Since the land of Palestine is the
property of Yahweh (God) it shall not be sold to non-Jews, which represents the mandate
of the Jewish National Fund (JNF)68. The extraterritorial value Zionism conferred on the
land and especially the OPT can be best captured by noticing the nature and scope of
Israeli settlement grid. Ironically, the portion of Palestine allotted for the establishment of
Israel in UN resolution 181(II) of 1947 includes low-lands that do not have the same
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The JNF was one of the first institutions the Zionist movement established for the aim of redeeming
Jewish land in Palestine. Herman Schapira proposed the establishment of this organization to the First
Zionist Congress in 1897. The funds allocated to the JNF were to be spent on land purchase and
development. Although land acquired by the JNF is to be the Jewish people’s ownership, land should not
be sold to the Jewish settlers; rather to be leased for specific period of time question of terms and renewal.
The JNF became active shortly, and in 1905 it made its first purchases, and by 1907 it managed to
purchases a total of 12,400 dunums. In 1936 the JNF possessed up to 370,000 dunums. In 1948 the JNF
became the largest landowner in Palestine holding the title of 53.8 per cent of the Jewish-owned land.
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religious relevance to the Bible comparing to the highlands of the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. “The Jewish realms of antiquity were located primarily in these highlands, and
the West Bank settlements are promoted to potential Jewish immigrants on grounds of
“redeeming” or “returning to” the long-lost Jewish homeland” (Tilley 2005: 34).

Therefore the importance given to settlement in the WB by the Zionist movement
has been entrenched not only by settler movements such as Gush Emunim (The Block or
League of the Faithful). Conferring a subjective indivisible and extraterritorial meaning
to the space has yielded not only Jewish fundamentalist movements like Gush Emunim;
the movement encompassed religious-national extremism of the National Religious Party
(NRP) combined with military hardliners to form a messianic front to expand settlement
construction and oppose any attempt to withdraw from any part of the occupied Arab
territories of 1967 (Ishay 2011: 72, 78).

It also underlies systemic state policies and

military measures that aim at transforming property rights of the land, confiscating it, and
ultimately Judizing the entirety of the spatial sphere of the land by a variety of methods
as we discuss in the Third section of this chapter. Moreover, Zionist tenets and Israel’s
laws have extraterritorializede the meaning of the nation/people to include world Jewry
regardless of their nationality. For Jewish people all over the world the territory of
Palestine is their ethno-national home, which leaves no right whatsoever for the
indigenous Palestinians in the land. Exclusion in this sense transcends the typical
implications of apartheid as the world knows it in the South African case; it negates the
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Palestinians out of territory and out of history all together. This can be seen through the
patterns of territorial control and expansion in the pre-state phase of Zionist colonialism.

Territorial-national nexus in the pre-state colonialism
Land possession by the Zionist movement in pre-state phase using the intensive
capital flows from European Jewish investors and donors took advantage and exacerbated
a process that had been generated by Ottoman regulations especially high taxes imposed
on land, which rapidly turned more and more Palestinians into landless masses. British
colonial effective methods of tax extraction contributed significantly to this process69.
Dispossessed as they turned to be, Palestinians were excluded from the labor market in
public sector as a result of the “civilized labor” policy of the British Mandate that paid
higher wages for Jewish employees (Younis 2000: 64). In the private sector, those
peasants migrated to cities where the Palestinian industrial sector was small and restricted
whereas the Jewish sector was advanced and heavily supported with capital. The latter
was exclusively opened to Jewish labor as an implementation Zionist policy of “Hebrew
labor only” and the creation of an exclusively Jewish entity. Under these circumstances
the Zionist movement was in a position to consolidate the settler community that
sustained by its own means and gained a life of its own capabilities especially the
69

The combination of British land laws and taxation, Zionist land purchases, and the Ottoman Land Code
of 1858 (the code aimed at raising the revenue to serve the increased debt of the empire) Palestinian
peasants (three-fourths of the Palestinian society in the period) rapidly and steadily lost their land holdings.
They lost access to communal land (musha`) and huge portions of land turned into privately owned to
wealthy individuals who afforded taxation. Zionists could pay and henceforth possesses large tracts of land.
These dynamics resulted in dramatic increase of landless Palestinians in the 1930 where 30.7 per cent of
rural families lost their access to land, and more than an additional one-third of peasants owned less than
the minimum required for subsistence. The average size of Palestinian holdings decreased steadily from 75
dunums in 1930 to 45.3 dunums in 1936 (Yunis 2005: 63-4).
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exclusive control of land. The core Zionist agency that implemented and sponsored land
control and economic development of the Jewish settler community in this ear was the
Jewish National Fund (JNF).
The JNF was established to carry on land purchases, development, and settlement
expansion. Laws by which the JNF operates assert that the land is “the inalienable
property of the whole Jewish people. Arabs may not buy or rent it. The importance of
JNF’s role was crucial in determining the bounding linkages of different aspects of the
Zionist enterprise in Palestine: Land purchases it made and agricultural development it
funded contributed significantly to linking “national policy, security, and strategy… with
the settlement objectives, all being welded together into a united, systematic, purposeful,
and far-seeing policy” (Younis 2000: 64). Asserting the Land as a sacred asset of the
Jewish people was further stressed by political accounts of Zionist leadership. To be sure,
Ben Gurion declared in 1937 that “no Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the land of
Israel” (Younis 2000: 11), clearly referring to the Mandatory Palestine since at the time
the boundaries, let alone the establishment of Israel was not yet a political reality.
Nonetheless, the concept of the Greater Israel was debated within the Zionist
movement following Herzl’s definition in which he refers to the Biblical definition; “Our
slogan shall be: The Palestine of David and Solomon” (Younis 2000: 13). Therefore,
Zionism in the pre-state phase was clearly a self-conscious colonizing force and its
creeping land control reflected this attribute through settler communities it established.
As Akenson (1992: 166) notices, “…the Zionists of the Yishuv were indeed settlers and
they engaged in a collective act of colonization” that was driven by the plans and
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strategies put forward mu the Zionist movement institutes. The 16th congress of the
World Zionist Organization’s resolution of 1929 states under the Article titled
“Colonization Policy” that
The congress declares that it must for all time be the fixed policy of the
Jewish Agency [established in the same congress] to use every effort to ensure
the development and expansion of the Jewish agricultural colonization in
Palestine to the furthest possible limit in accordance with the principles laid
down by the Congress for cooperation in the Jewish Agency” (Akenson 1992:
166).
For Labor Zionist concealing this feature was paramount. However, for
Revisionist Right Zionists such as Vladimir Jabotinsky colonization was explicitly sought.
Jabotinsky wrote: “Colonisation can have only one goal. For the Palestinian Arabs this
goal is inadmissible. This is the nature of things. To change that nature is impossible.”
(Akenson 1992: 166)
Territorial acquisition and control by the Zionists have imbued the conflict from
the outset with ethno-national enmity and mutual exclusivist attribute. For both
adversaries the spatial dimension of the conflict has been turned into the kernel of
national identity, socio-economic viability, cultural continuity, and political rights.
Palestinian nationalists confronted Jewish immigration to their country not only as ethnic
menace but rather as a national identity challenge deployed by taking over the land and
the dispossession of the Palestinians. Extraterritorialization of the spatial realm of the
conflict not only turns territory into a subjective and indivisible value but has also fixated
the conflict as an ethno-territorial one and makes political-geography of the conflict the
defining element of the struggle. In this sense space becomes the ultimate embodiment of
national identity, culture, history, collective memory, religious beliefs and future
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(Yiftachel, 2010: 216); all of which were institutionalized and internalized in Israel’s
social milieu, polity, and ethnic-national identity through state system and its legal
structure. Therefore Israel foundation and formation, and its “regimes of territorial
legitimation” are pivotal for understanding the development of the conflict.
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Chapter VII
Israel’s anachronism

Introduction

This chapter highlights the institutional attributes of Israel and the fundamental
characteristics of its system of exclusion, differentiation, and sublimation predicated on
ethno-national tenets. The main argument presented here is that Israel is not a nation-state
in the normal sense of the term; rather it was established and remained an ethno-territorial
construct. The chapter starts with showing the ethno-territorial base of Israel and the
foundation of its “regimes of territorial legitimation” and then moves to discuss the
characteristics of the state as an ethnocracy. Finally, the chapter discusses the peculiar
aspects of Israeli settler-colonial system as a type of apartheid. The analysis focuses on
the ideological, institutional, and economic underpinnings of Israel’s regime in Palestine
as a single geographical and political unit; a factual aspect created by Israel’s virtual
domination over the whole region of the Mandatory Palestine. Thus “regimes of
territorial legitimation” are de-constructed into their practices, institutions, laws, and
procedures to unveil their nature as a system of differentiation and structural
discrimination. The foundation of the state of Israel has structured the main character of
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the conflict as ethno-territorial in which the political-geography plays the most crucial
role in determining the trajectory the conflict has taken. As discussed in chapter II, there
are three factors that shape the territorial legitimation system of a state: the politicalterritorial status of states at the time of entry into the modern state system and prevailing
ideas about the cultural-historical character of state territory” on the one hand, and the
challenging group’s capabilities and chance to control the territory; and groups believe in
the legitimacy of its cause.

Israel’s “regimes of territorial legitimation”

Chapter VI has shown how the Zionist movement succeeded in creating the
primary administrative, institutional, and economic bases for achieving statehood prior to
1947. By 1948, and following UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) Israel’s viability
was out of question. The Arab state, on the other hand lacked the necessary
infrastructures of all kind: The long and draining confrontation with the British
government and the Zionist movement; the dispossession and the expulsion of more than
half of the population; and British policy in hindering the establishment of self-sustaining
Palestinian economy and defense in the 1920-30s rendered the Palestinian society
fractured and lacks all means of livelihood, let alone the ability to head-off the wellarmed and organized Zionist forces. Labor Zionism within the movement was more
flexible to accept the partition resolution. Labor’s practical stance attempted to reconcile
colonial practice with the mainstream tenets of European enlightenment concealed and
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obfuscated the nature of the Zionist enterprise. Thus, Labor policy succeeded in
embedding Zionism within the ranks of modern secular racist and imperial expansionist
European stream (Davis, 2003: 19) by using intensive propaganda to generate popular
sympathy and diplomatic support to the newly established state. Zionism and the state of
Israel were presented as part of the enlightened European endeavor to bring civilization
and prosperity for otherwise backward and primordial population. This policy also helped
Israel to justify and maintain its expansionism following the war of 1948 (the War of
Independence in Zionist parlance).

The military victory Israel accomplished resulted in the expansion of Israel’s
territorial control to encompass 78 per cent of the mandatory Palestine (adding 22 per
cent to the 57 per cent allotted for the Jewish state in the UN resolution 181 of 1947).
International legitimation of the state of Israel as enshrined in the partition resolution has
three profound implications in regard to the main character of Israel as an ethno-national
territorial entity: first, it endorsed religious ethno-nationalism as a legitimate principle for
the organization of a political system of the state. In effect the resolution reinforced the
ethno-national aspects of the conflict and fixated adversaries’ identities upon their ethnonational affiliation. Second, in recognizing Israel as a Jewish state the resolution legalized
ethno-territoriality as the defining element of sovereignty and reinforced the
extraterritorial aspects of the state in terms of its boundaries and the people (nation) it
represents. A Jewish state in this sense has people (Jews) on its proper and beyond. In
essence the international community has legitimated a colonial settler adventure in the era
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of decolonization and accepted ethnic-control over space as a legitimate means to create a
modern state. Third, it endowed international effects with a crucial role in the
development of the conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most highly
internationalized conflicts of all times, and international involvement in the conflict at
many turning points proved to be decisive (we return to this point in the last chapter of
this part).
For Israel, this unprecedented legitimating was taken as recognition of all that
Zionism stood for. Israel in this sense was not a pre-existing independent unit except in
the claimed ancient Biblical history, nor did it emerge as a fragment of a waning empire
or colonies. Rather it was initiated by external powers. The recognition of Israel under the
circumstances abovementioned granted the new entity with the consent of the
international community as to its founding principles as a Jewish entity. In effect, this
encouraged Zionist forces to carry on a series of massacres against Palestinians and
ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of them in order to guarantee Jewish majority
and controlling the space of the region allocated by the will of international community.
The “purification of this space became a prime goal; buttressed by strong feelings of
historical mission and justice (Yiftachel 2010:227) that characterizes Zionist ideology.
The first two factors that determine territorial-national legitimating regime were
established and reinforced as early as 1948. The challenging national group; the
Palestinian national movement, as we discuss below, was not in any position that enables
it to challenge the Zionist movement.
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Primarily and most significantly, Israel was created as a religious ethno-national
entity. International endorsement of the establishment of a Jewish state was basically an
endorsement of Jewish nationhood with all its implications and excesses in regard to the
indigenous population, land, and nation building. Nation Building espoused by the
Zionist movement and institutionalized in the shape of a Jewish state represents an
anomaly, to say the least, to nation-state underpinnings where the state does not aspire to
“merge nation and state; rather and to the contrary it aimed at essentialise and segregate
group identities” (Yiftachel 2010: 215).
Therefore international community in principle endorsed a colonial apartheid state
system in the ear of de-legitimizing racism, inequality, and ethno-national exclusivist
tenets as principles of political organization, nation and state building, and governance.
Judt’s depiction (abovementioned) of the state of Israel as an anachronism sits very well
with the counter-historical manner in which Israel was created.

The modernity of the

Jewish community in pre-state and after the establishment of Israel coexisted with
Biblical beliefs in justifying Jewish settler-colonialism in Palestine and the establishment
of the state as the sanctuary of a religious ethno-national configuration of nationhood. All
Zionists regardless of their philosophical inclinations share the belief that Israel is the
embodiment of Jewish nationhood not Israeli nationality.
While the extreme version of Zionism calls for the restoration and the reestablishment of the Great Israel, the more liberal recognizes that the indigenous people
has some rights but at the same time holds that the Jewish people has an exclusive
historical right in Palestine. Arie Eliave; a prominent liberal Zionist remarks that the
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Arabs also have rights and this doesn’t negate or detract the full historical rights of the
Jews to the “undivided land of Israel- that is, the land of the Twelve Tribes” (quoted in
Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban, 1974: 8). Ben Gurion is more firm when it comes to the
right of the possession of the “land of Israel”. He presents a distinction between human
rights in general and the specific right of the Zionists in claiming Palestine exclusively.
Ben Gurion in this respect puts the divine right of “Return of the Jewry Dispersed” above
and in a supreme status vis-à-vis human rights, and the Bible with its supranational
concepts over human thinking and modern concepts of nationality.
The state of Israel as the supreme protector of Jewish nationhood within the
undivided land of Israel, the ancient and the contemporary, becomes ahistorical
phenomenon in itself and conforms to the ahistorical and essential conceptualization of
the land and the people, as mentioned earlier. Israel in this sense represent the
embodiment of “Jewish statehood and seen as essential or even sacred Jewish-nationalist
mission” (Tilley 2005: 9). Thus nation-building in Israel, from the early stages, was
coherent, well envisioned and followed a premeditated blueprint predicated on exclusion,
territorial control, and the sanctity of Jewish ethno-nationalism; Israel was established
and remained an “ethnocratic” entity as Yfitachel depicts it.

Israel as an “ethnocracy”

Yiftachel (2005: 126) captures the essence of the state of Israel as a religiousethnic group rather than a nation-state. The concept ethnocracy
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account[s] for regimes and societal processes found in contested territories in
which a dominant ethnic nation appropriates the state apparatus to further its
expansionist aspirations while keeping some features of formal democracy.
The inherited oppression and exclusion directed to the subordinate group; the indigenous
essentialize group identities and polarize territorial-spatial and political systems of
differentiation that is antithetical to universal democracy. The state in this sense is
perceived as the precondition for the Jewish people to survive and flourish, not as a
political and institutional expression of inclusive nation-building. In an ethnocratic
regime the state is the condition for the security of the Jewish people and its ability to
collectively express the unique social, cultural, and spiritual qualities of Jewish
experience. The loss of the state implies the loss and dissolution of Jewish national life
and heritage; defending the state becomes the equivalent of defending the survival of the
Jewish people that exceeds individual survival. “Statolatry” or the “worship of the state”,
in a Gramscian sense (see Ishay 2011: 70-2) essentialized the state and gave it a supreme
status over the civil society since it embodies the conflation of religious, ethnicnationalism, and territory. The unity of the Jewish nation on the Land of Israel ‘Eritz
Israel’70 became bound to well-defined, even pre-defined territory and the state of the
Jews.
Being the state of the Jewish people Israel has had, and still has, to face the
question of universal democracy and the incompatibility of Israel’s “ethnocracy” and the
70

The term Ertez Israel denotes the term Greater Israel in Hebrew. English translation of Zionist
documents and Israel’s discourse uses the term Israel, which gives an impression that the term refers to the
state of Israel. This duplication of official Israeli narrative plays an important role in the deception and
concealment of Zionist long term objectives of establishing Jewish sovereignty on the whole of the
Mandate Palestine. Thus the official English name of the Jewish Agency is the Jewish Agency for the Land
of Israel, whereas the Hebrew name refers to Israel as Eretz Israel; Greater Israel referring to the Biblical
boundaries of ancient Israel.
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democratic-civic state system. This question underlies the bitter debates inside Israel on
the one-state solution. The democratic civil One-State implies, by definition, the
dissolution of the Jewish character of the state and uplifting the prerogatives of inclusive
and equal citizenship and the dismantling of ethno-national dominations system of Jewish
supremacy. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 Zionism could claim Israel has been
a democratic state and simultaneously Jewish. In the words of Chaim Weizmann, the first
President of the state of the state of Israel, Israel would “be as Jewish as America is
America or England is English” (quoted in Davis, 2003: 19). Ironically the expulsion of
the Palestinian people and the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jews in their place
enabled Israel to establish a Jewish majority, which facilitated the claim of modern
democracy.

Nonetheless, the claim has been accepted and embraced in Western

democracies even though Israel’s is a democracy only for the Jews.
Israel, according to its own laws is not a nation state in the regular sense of the
term. Although technically all Israeli citizens (ezrahim in Hebrew) have equal rights such
as the right to vote, those citizens do not comprise the nationals of Israel. Israel is not the
state of all its citizens. Rather it is the state of the Jewish nation and non-Jews can be
citizens of the state but not nationals which make them virtually residents not citizens.
Therefore there is no such a thing in Israeli law as an ‘Israeli nationality. Juridical status
in the state is given exclusively to the Jewish with a great set of civil rights and privileges
attached to this status and not applicable to non-Jews.
Thus Israel can easily make the claim that it nurtures a universal democratic
regime while preserving unequal status for all other non-Jewish communities who have
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Israeli citizenship. In effect this discrimination deprives these communities from a great
array of privileges in building/construction and housing; public sector employment;
cultural and educational services; municipal development and governmental subsidies;
and above all property, in particular land possession rights. The state as ethnocratic
regime serves the interests of the Jewish people as individuals and groups and Jewish
national interests in general, not Israeli public interests. Differentiation and
discrimination against non-Jews in this context has been structured within state system
especially in determining the belonging of the spatial space and territorial considerations.
The primary element of recognition in Israel’s state system is the Jewishness of
the individual and the group. No matter how religious or observant or secular an Israeli
Jew or a group of Jews are the Jewish nationalist sentiment prevails over other
identifications. As Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook suggests
The spirit of Israel is so closely linked to the spirit of God that the Jewish
nationalist, no matter how secularist his intention may be, is, despite himself,
imbued with the divine spirit even against his own will (quoted in Tilley 2005:
56).
Ethno-religious foundations of Zionism are embedded within the founding principles of
Israel in ways that makes it anathema to modern liberal democracy. Chaim Weizmann’s
above cited statement reflects Labor Zionist deceptive discourse and attempts to escape
the reality that above this Jewish democracy (ethnocracy) and shadows it there exists an
inclusive ethno-religious definition of the state and the nation where either Judaism could
escape the logic of colonialism or colonial underpinnings of Israel could escape or do
without religious precepts. Religion, territorial essentialism, and ethno-nationality are
correspondent and inextricably linked in the state system of Israel. The separation of
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religion and religious institutions (whether tangible or intangible) on the one hand and the
state on the other that distinguished modern secular democracies is absent in Israel’s
ethnocracy.

The state and religion in Israel’s regime cannot be separated: while religious
precepts and believes provide for the ancient history of the Jewish people that has been a
core element in Zionist claims in Palestine and hence a source of legitimacy and
justification, secularism and modern norms of nationalism provide for the continuity and
contemporary underpinnings for a vibrant state system. Last chapter has shown how
Israeli-Jewish community and polity as the super-ordinate power have established their
preponderance from the belief in the covenant and the scripture (the chosen people in
their Promised Land) as the foundation of their set of values and practices. Religious
beliefs have been positioned in the heart of a “conceptual grid” in which land, exodus,
and blood sacrifice are the reflex points or the ultimate principles and great sensitivity.
Touching any element of the grid “energizes the entire grid and calls forth an immediate,
focused, sometimes violent response” (Akenson 1992: 31) for it threatens the collapse of
the whole system. Therefore religion and religiosity in this context transcend the regular
meanings and implications of state-religion relationships; both become conflated in a
single stream of legitimacy and coherency that bound the whole structure of the entity.
Lacking a modern history of the ‘Jewish people’ except for the Diaspora history,
Zionist movement led by Ben Gurion before and after the establishment of the state
adopted the ethnic-religious grid in order to establish the necessary territorial-national
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nexus of the state. Ancient history of Israel provided by the Bible is indispensable for the
coherency of Zionist claims and Israel’s policies to sustain. Without founding
connections between religious, ancient history of the Israelites, and modern secular
nationalist discourse justifying the settler-colonial adventure in Palestine and the creation
of Israel on secular ground would have been precarious. Thus “Israelis were defined as
the people who lived in the state of Israel, and the justification for claiming rights to this
territory was primarily historical” (Weissbord 2011: 197). The old history is emphasized,
and the Diaspora history is ignored. The former represents the period when the Jews lived
independently in their land as a nation. In order to reveal these ancient religious history
archaeological explorations has been emphasized by Ben Gurion and all his successors as
a substitute for the recent history of the Jews. In Ben Gurion words recent history of the
Jews matters “but in the state of Israel we aspire to some other Israeli wisdom”
(Weissbord 2011: 197).
Although self-defined as a “Jewish state” Israel is not quite a religious state; it
doesn’t introduce the teachings of Judaism as the source of the basic laws of the state or
social life. Jewish identity is not simply a religious affiliation but encompasses notions of
lineage, culture, and nationhood (the ancient history of the Jewish people). As Cohen and
Kliot (2011: 659) notice: “In Israel it is difficult to draw the boundary between the
ancient and the modern, between purely religious expressions and the secular goals of
modern nationalism”. Indeed Religiosity and secularism are bound together in the ethnoreligious basis of Jewish nationalism. Zionists seculars’ adoption of religious-based
discourse and imperatives doesn’t stem necessarily from religious fervor. Rather it is
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derived from the role Judaism (religion) played in shaping and materializing
Zionist/Jewish national identity. Religion in this sense provides a decisive source of
legitimacy and justification of the Zionist colonial enterprise.
Religious beliefs and justifications were at the core of the ideology that founded
the normative aspect of settler colonial nationalism of the Zionist project; a project whose
main pioneering force was not the Orthodox Jews or even nationalist-religious groups;
rather it was a secular nationalist force that was affected by European ideas of socialism,
nationalism, enlightenment and colonialism.

Conflation of religion and nationalism

remained effective and substantial in the formation and legal underpinnings of the state of
Israel. Although Israel is self-defined as a secular democratic entity “religion has
continued to play a significant role in [its] jurisprudence”… [and it] retained a peculiar
mixture of civic and religious law” (Weissbord, 2011:195). Furthermore, the state and
religion are not quite separated; Jewish religious institutions in Israel are legally
recognized and financed by the state, there is no civil marriage and no civil burial of the
dead for example.
The intertwined system of recognition in state system that brings religion (the
history of territorial legitimation) and Jewish nationalism (the modern continuity of
ethno-territoriality) manifests the structure of politico-religious foundation of citizenship.
This system defines who the Jew is, and therefore the rights and privileges pertaining to
Jews only. There is wide range of privileges and rights that are given exclusively to the
Jews which makes determining ‘who the Jew is’ a prime issue in Israel. The Law of
Return of 1952 defines the Jew as a person “who was born of a Jewish mother or has
207

become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion”. Waves of
Jewish immigration had included numbers of people whose Jewish affiliation and lineage
was problematic, which stirred fierce debates within the state and Jewish community on
the issue. In order to accommodate more Jewish into the state, Israel enacted the
Amendment 5714 granted the right of return to the Jews who do not meet the criteria
mentioned in the Law of Return but the Amendment did not recognize those as Jewish in
terms of their ethno-national affiliation. They can gain the status of citizens but not
nationals and the ministry of Interior doesn’t register them as Jews. They, according to
the law, can’t marry from Jewish persons, and can’t be buried in Jewish graveyards.
The debates and laws on the issue of Jewishness indicate the extent to which
Israel and Zionism are obsessed with ethno-religious purity. It might be said without
losing track that this obsession explains why Zionists have not attempted any missionary
efforts to convert non-Jews to Judaism. In a deeper level it indicates that Israel is more of
a Jewish tribe with traits of ethno-religious chauvinism. Corresponding secularist
nationalism and religious ethnicity in Israel might be explained as an act of political
expediency; the need for coalitions to make any government viable since no single party
could achieve majority in the parliament compelled big parties to give concessions to
religious and nationalist-religious groups. The demands of those groups and their political
parties were by and large in the realm of religious affairs not in economy or foreign
policy issues.
This is true as an explanation of coalition policies but not sufficient to explain the
intensified and constant use of religious discourse, religious definition of Jewish ethnicity,
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and emphasizing Israel as a Jewish state. As mentioned earlier the basic law of Israel
denies nationality to non-Jews, and therefore preserves the religious base for citizenship.
Disputes on issues of citizenship are settled by religious courts that possess the sole legal
right to determine who is a Jew and who is not and henceforth who may and who may not
enjoy the bill of rights that is attached exclusively to Jewish. In this sense Israel’s
political system and its internal dynamics not only created the correspondence between
religion and ethnic-nationality and the state but also buttressed the power that religious
precepts and their political manifestations gained in Israel.
The conflation of religion and the state, and the rise of religiously-driven political
parties in Israel since the mid-1970s can be also plausibly explained by the socioeconomic changes in Israeli society and their political repercussions on the one hand, and
the changes in the nature of the conflict on the other. Both resulted from the very
structures of Israel’s domination and justification system. Explaining the rise of
fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli context Ishay (2011: 70) draws upon Antonio
Gramsci’s analysis of the relationship between capitalism, fragmented civil societies, and
the rise of fascism; a phenomenon that Gramsci called “statolatry” or the worship of the
state. It is striking that religious and national religious parties in Israel have been in the
rise since the victory of the Likud Party in 1977 that, among other consequences led to
the emergence of the fundamentalist settler movement “Gush Emunim”. This trend that
has been consistent in the 1980-90s and had witnessed a dramatic increase in the
elections of 2006 and 2009 whereby right-wing extremist parties (Shas, the National
Union, United Torah, and Yisrael Beiteinu) gained significant victories.
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Ishay (2011) argues that globalization and the shift of Israel’s economy from a state-led
to privatization system has exacerbated tensions within the Israeli society and between
Israelis and Palestinians, and “forged the conditions underlying increasing religious and
nationalist radicalism” that undercut peace efforts. Social repercussions of liberalization
of the economy in 1970-80s especially the concentration of wealth and social disparities,
recession, and the fragmentation of the civil society, coupled with the intensification of
the conflict created a political and ideological void. Religious parties moved to fill this
void and provide for an alternative policy and socio-political affiliation. Within a
factionalized polity and a fragmented civil society, and the absence of a “Caesarits”
solution - an entity or a charisma that can reign over conflicting political forces- dark
anti-democratic forces will prevail.
This analysis of religious and secular fundamentalism in Israel provides a very
useful tool to look beneath Israel’s society’s rift to the extreme right. This rift has led to
the ascendance of the most extreme political forces in the history of Israel’s political
system. Whether Israeli domestic political shifts or the rise of radical national-Islamic
movements in Palestinian are best captured by accounting to the effects of asymmetrical
power relations, and the domination system Israel established and to a large extent
determines the dynamics of political processes in both societies. The fascist-like feature,
into which Israel’s politics are drifted, however, cannot be fully understood apart from
the conflict. As Ishay (2011: 72) remarks, the effects of “conflict over the occupation of
Palestinian land after 1976 is central to any account for rising religious and secular
extremism on both sides” .
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Israel’s policies contributed significantly to the rise of a fascist-like politics in
Israeli polity and the rise of religious extremism within the Palestinian national
movement. This can be captured by revealing Israel’s expansionist policy and its legal,
ideological, and political justifications that we now turn to discuss. It also sprung from
Israel’s systems and methods of domination practiced against the Palestinian people
within the whole region of the Mandatory Palestine as we present in the next chapter. For
now we turn to present the two phases of Israel’s territorial expansion and their
underpinnings in order to show how the properties of the state in Israel, abovementioned
led to its colonial practices and the rise of a unique form of apartheid as a state system
before the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967. The
following section shows how this apartheid system had been structured and consolidated
in the institutional configuration of the state of Israel and its legislative apparatuses.

Israel’s apartheid

The state of Israel took all measures and enacted laws that would make changing
the ‘nature’ of Jewish colonization and domination impossible. In this phase, territorial
and spatial expansionism had been established as a strategy that has been initiated the
next day after the founding of the state of Israel and has been developed through 1980s
when the Palestinian first Intifada irrupted. The focus here is on the consolidating of
Israel’s state system as a distinct form of covert apartheid. The overlap between this
phase and the one that followed 1976 in the OPT uncovers the continuity of state policy
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of territorial expansion and ethnic-national discrimination and domination. The ability of
Israel’s system to adapt to events and changes in its environment without losing its main
features is the most striking.
As discussed above, Zionism’s supreme goal in Palestine was the
establishment and consolidation, through the Jewish colonization of the
country of Palestine, of a sovereign state, a Jewish state, that attempts to
guarantee in law and in practice a demographic majority of the Jewish tribes in
the territories under its control” (Davis 2003: 19).
This prime objective was tailored in a more principled and policy-bound agenda
that was set by the Zionist Congress of 1951. The Congress adopted the “Jerusalem
Program” to replace the “Basle Program”. “Jerusalem Program” of 1951 stated that: the
task of Zionism is to consolidate the state of Israel and to ingather the exiles, and the
unity of the Jewish people. In order to achieve these ends the movement has to:
encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine and integrate them in agricultural settlements.
Land acquisition as the property of the people (Jewish people) is a crucial part of the
program. Land acquisition and control by the pioneers (Halutzim) is pivotal. The program
goes further to assert the “fostering of Jewish consciousness by propagating Zionist idea
and strengthening Zionist movement” (Tilley 2005: 170).
As such territory acquisition and control, unity of the Jewish community apart
from the indigenous population, and exclusion were the imperatives of the state of Israel
since to it the implementation of the program was assigned. Israel exclusivity in terms of
the defining elements of its identity is upheld by a cluster of laws that define Israel as
such. The newly founded state had committed its first expansionist steps in the same year
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of its creation: the takeover of another 22 per cent of the land of the Mandated Palestine.
Moreover, within an overnight the Palestinian population in these areas was reduced from
50 per cent to 20 per cent of the population of the newly established state within its
borders as defined by Resolution 181 (II).
The expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians by means of force was coupled and
followed by two policies: First, Israel in defiance to UN resolution 194 (III) of 194871
denied Palestinian refugees their right to return to their homes and property. In order to
assure that the expulsion of these refugees is permanent, Israel demolished entire
Palestinian villages; the number of which differs but approximated between 400-500
villages in the most conservative estimates. Second: in its effort to legalize expulsion and
territorial control over the property of the refugees and the ‘internally displaced’
Palestinians, Israeli government enacted the “Absentees Property Law” of 1950.
According to the law all Palestinians outside of the green line (the 1949 armistice line)
were denied their property rights as ‘absentees’ who were not present on their property at
the time of first Israeli census. They were also alienated from Israel’s legal system by
denying the citizenship. The law enabled Israel to out hand on 70 per cent of the territory
west of the armistice line; all of which was the property of ‘absentees’ (Fisk, cited in
Davis 2003: 33). Achieving a unified Jewish majority on the maximum territorial area
had been thus guaranteed by means of expulsion or transfer in Zionist discourse (Masalha
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United Nation General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) states that “the refugees wishing to return to their
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date, and
that compensation should be for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage of
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the
Governments or authorities responsible” http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r3.htm.
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1992: 199). The expulsion of Palestinians, in today’s term ethnic cleansing, would not
have been a successful without Zionist forces’ terror and massacres against Palestinians
in 1947-8; Deir Yasin, Tantura, and Al-Dawayma being the most shocking and best
documented 72 . Cleansing the indigenous population and taking over their property,
especially territories, was seen as a pre-condition for the achievement of Zionist goals. As
Israel Eldad (a former military leader of the LEHI; Fighters for the Freedom of Israel)
revealed in 1967 that “Had it not been Deir Yasin- a half million Arabs would be living
in the state of Israel [in 1948]. The state of Israel would not have existed…this country
will either be Eretz Israel with an absolute Jewish majority and a small Arab minority or
Eretz Ishmael, and Jewish emigration will begin again if we do not expel the Arabs one
way or another (Quoted in Davis 2003: 23).
Thus, by the end of 1948 Israel had guaranteed a Jewish majority within its
expanded territorial boundaries; the grounds were well prepared for the consolidation of
Jewish sovereignty and domination. In doing so, Israel was crowning the efforts of
Zionist organizations (World Zionist Organization WZO, the Jewish National Fund JNF,
and the Jewish Agency for the Land of Israel JA) that set the institutional bedrock of the
state in 50 years of Jewish settlement in Palestine. The consolidation of Israel and Zionist
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The three massacres took place between April and November 1948. Witnesses from the Israeli armed
formations Zionist National Military Organization (Irgun Tzvai Leumi; IZL or Irgun in Hebrew, and
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Lohamii Herut Israel; LEHI in Hebrew) who attacked the village of Deir
Yasin, and the International Organization of the Red Cross Delegate in the area leave no space for doubt
that the massacre in which nearly 250 (out of 750 the total population ) Palestinian were slaughtered
including children and women was planned and cold-bloodedly carried out. For the documentation of the
Tantura massacre, Theodor Katz; an Israeli scholar revealed in his research for the M.A degree at Haifa
University the events in Tantura. He describes the killing as an orchestrated slain of more than 200
Palestinians. AL-Dawayma massacre was revealed in the Official Hebrew daily of the Histadrut (General
Federation of Workers) ((see Davis 2003: 21-5). Although the number of such atrocities and their detailed
documentation vary it is evident that an act of ethnic cleansing took place.
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idea (as put forth by “Jerusalem Program” found their materialization in early laws Israel
enacted: the Law of Return of 1950 that grants any Jew the right to Jewish immigrants to
Israel. Upon arrival Jews immigrants under this Law are granted citizenship according to
the Citizenship Law of 1952. The Population Registry Law of 1965 provides those new
citizens the status of ‘Jewish nationality’, not Israeli nationality henceforth depriving the
non-Jews remaining within the Jewish state from a wide range of privileges and rights
that Jewish exclusively enjoy73.
Laws enacted before the establishment of the state of Israel also were sustained
and further entrenched the linkages between ‘Jewish nationality’ and territorial
boundaries as Jewish homeland. As a matter of fact Zionist organizations that were
‘voluntary’ before 1948 have become incorporated in Israel’s state system; state laws and
these organizations’ objectives became legal, compulsory and judicial. The World Zionist
Organization-Jewish Agency Law of 1952 authorizes Jewish Agency to administer most
of the state’s land, property, and other resources. According to the law the WZO and the
Jewish Agency for Israel (JA) are recognized as a sort of supra-state bodies primarily to
carry all practices and mobilize necessary resources for the purpose of “ingathering the
Jewish people in its historic homeland, Eretz Israel. In effect, all Zionist institutions in
close coordination with state agencies and institutions were fundamentally instrumental
in obscuring the nature of Israel as a colonial system involved in formal apartheid. The
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In addition to these laws Israel enacted the establishment of the Keren Kayemeth (Jewish National Fund)
Law of 1953. The Keren Kayemeth had been the main institution that executes land acquisition, water
extraction, and other land-connected development projects; none of which for the benefit of non-Jews
whether in Israel or in the OPT. Keren Kayemeth and other institutions relied on complementary laws
pertaining to land and agriculture; all of which consolidated Jews-only possession and development: the
Basic Law of 1960, and Israel Lands Law of the same year and the Agricultural Settlement Law of 1967.
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fact that Palestinian citizens of the state of Israel have certain political and civil rights: to
vote in local and general elections, to be elected and serve as members of the Israeli
parliament, and they have an equal standing before Israeli courts, doesn’t nullify the fact
that differentiation and discrimination is a state policy.
The rights abovementioned have been used to manipulate and misrepresent reality;
Palestinians are deprived of all rights pertaining to inherit property; to access material
resources of the state (particularly land and water), and to access social welfare system of
the state, to have equal or equitable allocation of resources for educational and local
authorities, and to gain equal access to public sector employment. Clearly, these state
policies fit in UN definition of apartheid abovementioned. They also represent policies of
racial discrimination; racial discrimination in this sense refers to the UN definition that is
incorporated in UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
2016 (XX) of 196574. The Convention states that
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent,
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights, and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or
any other field of public life.
In this sense Israel has three classes of citizenship: class A for those classified as “Jews”
who are allocated access to all state resources; class B for citizens designated as non-Jews
(Arabs) who are denied access to significant state resources. There exists class B of
Palestinians classified until today as ‘absentees’ (25 per cent of the Palestinian citizens of

74

To look at the full wording of
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm
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Israel) who live inside Israel and yet unrecognized as citizens and denied all their right
(except voting) although they are taxpayers.
Conclusion
UN Resolution 2016 of 1965 clearly defines apartheid as a generic concept that
refers to any a policy framework that is based on racial and/or ethnic exclusivity and
differentiation. Differentiation and discrimination regardless of the basis upon which
they are justified is an act of racism and apartheid. The United Nations Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (or the Apartheid Convention)
although was established to deal with the South African apartheid is applied generically
regardless of country specific context (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2011: 337). Therefore
apartheid is a state system of domination and discrimination where racism is being
regulated and formalized in laws and legislations.
Although the one may find forms of racism and discrimination in democracies all
over the world, the victims of these forms are protected by the constitutions and laws of
these democracies. This is not the case with Israel’s apartheid since it was established.
Israel admitted the UN on the basis of a clear commitment to the obligations of the UN
Charter. However, Israel violated systematically and consistently the Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to which Israel is a signatory state. The
laws and regulations abovementioned that Israel enacted are antithetical to these
commitments. In fact the admission of Israel in the UN was premised upon it to be
international law-abiding state; the failure to show obedience to international law would
have seriously put the recognition of Israel in jeopardy (Mazzawi 1997: 129). The
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Partition Resolution of the UN of 1947 is still valid and has not been undone by the UN
General Assembly. The first and most obdurate violation, without which Jews would not
have become a majority in Israel, is the massive ethnic cleansing of the indigenous
Palestinians in 1947-8.
The discriminatory foundation of Israel’s national-territorial nexus is founded in
the religious ethno-territoriality of Zionism and the exclusivist foundation of Israeli
‘regimes of territorial legitimation”. These are articulated and manifested in the juridical
system that discriminates against “non-Jews” as a category. This category is denied
access to state resources especially the land, and another set of rights and privileges that
Jews enjoy. It is for these formal, state-based properties of Israel - in addition to Israel’s
occupation of and policies in the OPT, that the UN General Assembly issued the
resolution 3379 (XXX) of 1975 that equates Zionism with racism, apartheid, colonialism
and neo-colonialism. Although the resolution was nullified in 1991 its efficacy as
pertained to the nature of Israel’s apartheid is still valid if we notice that the nullification
was part of a political process not a legal scrutiny of actual Israeli policies.
Israel’s strong affiliation to ethno-territorial identification represents the bedrock
of its domination and differentiation system that is aimed at depriving non-Jews from
property rights of the land. Thus, the state in Israel controls 93% of the land within the
Israeli proper that is designated for cultivation, development, and settlement by, of and
for, Jews only. The peculiarity of Israel’s apartheid is that in the realm of territorial
legitimation and state legislation (the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) it is more
radical than apartheid legislation in the Republic of South Africa. This peculiarity refers
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to Zionist territorial ideological underpinnings that embody the constitution of the state of
Israel and aim at advancing the interests of the Jewish community.
The fact that a significant array of apartheid policies is being implemented by
Zionist institutions has enabled Israel to conceal apartheid implications of its system of
differentiation. As strategic colonial-settlement expansion, land acquisition and
development were vested and hidden in Zionist Organization laws that are committed to
their own discriminatory constitutions, the state per se distanced itself from the
accusation of apartheid by not incorporating any terms of “Jewish only” or distinctions
between Jews and non-Jews in Israel’s laws.

However, these Zionist institutions act in

the capacity of state-affiliated entities and they represent a third party that has state
mandate and jurisdiction to act on its behalf. Moreover, racist aspects of Israel’s
apartheid are overt and structured in the body of laws, regulations and legislation of the
state, as shown above. This body of laws and legislation stems primarily from Zionist
colonial tenets derived from politico-religious precepts especially in regard to the land.
This was clearly stated by Zerah Wahrhaftig (Minister of Religious Affairs and Chairman
of the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament Constitution, Law and Justice Committee) as he
presented the Basic Law to the Knesset in 1961:
…to give legal grab to a principle that is fundamentally religious, namely ‘the
land shall not be sold forever, for the land is mine’…the law gives legal grab to
this rule and principle in our Torah…the holiness of the Land of Israel belongs
to me” (cited in Davis 2003: 24).
Territory in particular not only essentialized and extraterritorialized as an object
of religious belief, but also as a subject of identification and discrimination. Israel’s
sovereignty over the land as a Jewish sovereignty has been uplifted by the legal mode of
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thinking and behavior assigned to apartheid and colonization. Amongst which the most
prominent were the laws and regulations of land possession and acquisition. Politicoreligious nature of Israel’s legal structure reflects the dualism of sacred-profane stance
that pervades every detail of life. Israeli military rule of the OPT took a very similar
course in which legalism of occupation and land control constituted its own legitimacy.
The next chapter examines the properties of Israel’s national-territorial nexus beyond the
boundaries of its own proper namely, in the OPT since 1967.
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Chapter VIII
Post-1967: expanding the territorial-national nexus
Introduction
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967 can
be assessed as a new phase of the regimes of territorial legitimation” of Zionism and the
state of Israel. Zionist-Jewish colonization of the OPT took a strikingly similar pattern of
early Zionist settlement colonialism in Palestine: implanting Jewish settlers on the
Palestinians’ land and simultaneously separating the newcomers from the indigenes
population that has been alienated from the land. Dispossession and exclusion of
Palestinians were sustained as the main two pillars of Israel’s colonialism.
In post 1967 Israel’s occupation has renewed the ethno-national threat of Zionism
to Palestinian national aspirations and identity and buttressed the territorial-spatial aspect
of the conflict. The memories of 1948 and current day repercussions of Israel’s
occupation have deepened the animosity between the two parties as ethno-national
groups. Moreover, military occupation accompanied with settler-colonial control of the
land reintroduced Israel as a colonial territorial power; territory and space prevail in a
more profound level that reinforced segregation and fixated distinctions between
possessor and dispossessed, colonizer and colonized, and occupier and the occupied.
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The chapter is organized to capture the expansion and consolidation of Israel’s
ethno-territorial “regimes of legitimation” through the OPT to encompass the entirety of
Palestine. The second section examines the main features of Israel’s settler-colonialism in
the OPT as a grid that is aimed at controlling the Palestinian territory and space. The
following part of the chapter discusses the transformation of Israel’s national-territorial
nexus to encompass the Palestinian occupied territories and the last section illustrates
Israel’s domination system in the region that is derived from the imperatives of the
“regimes of territorial legitimation”. Ultimately this chapter shows how Israel’s
occupation of the OPT has established the structures (territorial, legal, political) of a
tripartite dualism of domination and subordination:
-A dualism of domination on both sides of the green line. While Israel subordinates its
Palestinian citizens through racial discrimination in a form of apartheid, as discussed in
the previous chapter it implements grand apartheid in the OPT. Disregarding Palestinians
in Israel as an ethno-national minority, and oppressing Palestinians in the OPT and
depriving them from their land and rights;
-the differentiation Israel established between Israeli Jewish settlers in the OPT and the
Palestinian population. At this level Israel has created a system of segregation that
extends Jewish privileges and stretches Israel’s national territoriality; and
-Israel has founded dual systems of coercion and separation within the Palestinian society
in the OPT. This layer separates Palestinians from each other in the OPT turning the WB
into Bantustans and enclaved areas.
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Expanding the “Regimes of territorial legitimation”
Israel’s occupation of the OPT in 1967 provided Zionism with a unique
opportunity to turn the extraterritorial value of the Land of Palestine as a whole into a
political, institutional, and demographic reality. In 1968 Zionist movement reasserted its
original objective of establishing Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel, Eretz Israel
and gave it a new ideological and political impulse. Territoriality is now being
intertwined with notions of unity, survival, and Jewish sovereignty over the Land of
Israel. Jewish sovereignty in this sense refers to the processes through which Zionist
organizations and state institutions systematically Judize the geographical and spatial
domains of Palestinian territories. The “Jerusalem Program” articulated by the TwentySeventh World Zionist Congress in 1968 stressed the new credo: survival-as-nationality
although Israel gained military and strategic advantages vis-à-vis its Palestinian and Arab
adversaries. The credo not only re-assured the correspondence of Jewish nationhood and
territorial ethno-religious ideology but also reconstructed the connections between the
sustainability of the Jewish people and its survival on the one hand, and the control over
the newly occupied territories on the other. Thus the “Jerusalem Program” stressed
Jewish people unity “beyond geographical and cultural barriers”; and that the “survival of
the Jewish people is a supreme and absolute Jewish and universal value”. It further
asserted “the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel in Jewish Life; the
ingathering of the Jewish people in its historic homeland, Eretz Israel” (Tilley 2005: 170).
Israel’s and Jewish people’s survival and unity have been organically linked to the OPT
as the heart of Eretz Israel and essentially linked to the existence and sovereignty of the
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state of Israel. In effect Israel would start to practice its sovereign powers and domination
over all the Mandatory Palestine not as a belligerent occupation force but as a Jewish
Sovereign. Short from imposing formal sovereignty on the OPT Israel practices the legal,
judicial, and institutional powers of a de facto sovereign.
Founding Jewish sovereignty by land control and spatial expansion has changed
the demographic, topographic, physical, and legal status of the OPT. Most importantly it
draws a new deeply entrenched level of ethno-national differentiation that would cut off
any possibility of integration or accommodation. Thus, apart from annexing the OPT
Israel’s territorial and spatial practices fixated the conflict on its ethno-national
foundation. Israel aimed at implementing a two-fold process: controlling the widest
geographical terrain on the one hand, and circumscribing Palestinian spatial sphere in the
minimal territorial periphery on the other.

Formal annexation of the OPT or

accommodation would have altered the demographic balance in favor of the Palestinians
in the entirety of Palestine. It also would consolidate Palestinian collective sense of
nationhood and would give rise to their demand for a majority rule and henceforth change
the very character of the state of Israel as the state of the Jews. Changing the foundation
of Israel as a Jewish entity is perceived by many Zionist as a dread and dark, and may
result in Jewish suffering if not expulsion (Tilley 2005: 10). The least evil for Zionism if
Israel annexed the OPT is the emergence of a bi-national or bi-ethnic state where Jewish
maintain and sustain domination over the Palestinians by means of discriminatory laws
and measures. However, overt discrimination would expose Israel as a racial state; a case
that is very hard to defend morally. Therefore, for many Zionists if a choice has to be
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made it would be a two-state solution that would maintain Israel as a Jewish and
democratic having not to include Palestinians within Israeli territory. However, the very
policies Zionist organizations and Israel implemented in the OPT have made the twostate solution less likely if not impossible.
For many hard-core Zionist leaders (those dedicated to the concept of Greater
Israel) the question of Jewish nationhood and Jewish sovereignty cannot be sustained
within the west part of ‘Eritz Israel’ (referring to the Mandate Palestine whereas the East
part is Jordan. See map 3) apart from taking permanent control over the territory with the
less possible Palestinian population living in them. For example, Joseph Weitz; one of the
leading architects of Israel’s settlement grid in the OPT, and Deputy Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the JNF from 1951-1973 contends that
…colonizing the liberated territories” [West Bank, Gaza Strip and East
Jerusalem] must necessarily answer three problems that Israel face following
the 1967 war. These problems or challenges are: regional security,
demographic security, and the settlement of the refugees [Palestinian
refugees].

Weitz’s solution for the demographic and refugee issues is the deportation or transfer of
Palestinians; “it is easier to carry our [Israel’s] surveillance over the activities of a
neighbor than over those of a tenant”, he asserts. This is true; he goes on, also for
the need to sustain the character of the state which henceforth be Jewish, and
obviously in the near future, by the majority of its inhabitants, with a nonJewish minority limited to 15 per cent…there is no place in the country for
both peoples together. The only solution is Eretz Israel, at least the west part
of Eretz Israel, without Arabs…and there is no other way but to transfer the
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Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, transfer all of them, not one
village or tribe should remain (Italics in origin, quoted in Davis 2003: 20).
Transfer, although has not been dismissed altogether by Israeli governments
especially the Labor Party, did not prevail as the official policy of the state of Israel.
Instead a middle ground policy had been enacted. The “Jerusalem Program”
(abovementioned) set the principal foundation for the policies in the OPT. It firmly states
that
This nation [the Jewish] is worthy and obligated to exist forever…the
recognition that the Jewish people must achieve national sovereignty in its
historic homeland” implies that it is the duty of every Zionist to “strengthen the
state of Israel through personal aliyah [immigration] to Israel”;
and the recognition of the centrality of the state of Israel in the life of the “Jewish people”
as the only living expression of Zionist values and the “focus of worldwide Jewish
identification” (Cited in Tilley 2005: 170).
Extending the main tenets of colonial Zionist principles to the OPT is to be
achieved by means of land Judization and the Israelization of the OPT as part and parcel
of the historical definition of the state. Judization of the territory of 1967, the heartland of
the Bible would materialize the long-awaited opportunity to manifest the primordial
spiritual and cultural ties to the entirety of the Promised-Land. Consolidating Jewish
control over the OPT has been seen as an actualization of the Jewish ethno-national
identity through re-establishing Jewish lineage that goes back to Abraham within the
entirety of Palestine. Orchestrated efforts to Judaize Palestine, with an intense focus on
the OPT represents a phase of colonial expansionism that consists of two interrelated
strategies: the continuation and assertion of Jewish-only immigration to Palestine, and the
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establishment of Israeli Jewish-only settlements on Palestinian land acquired by massive
land confiscation and expropriation.
The new strategy of Judizing the OPT went uninterrupted in any significant way
to an extent where the “green line” (the 1948 armistice line) was de facto abolished and
the Zionist strategy to establish Jewish sovereignty over the whole region of Palestine has
made significant success in terms of settlement construction75. Blurring the distinctions
between the OPT and Israel’s proper allowed the Palestinians within the whole Palestine
to sustain their ties and connections as and to cement their collective consciousness as an
ethno-national people subordinated by a colonial power. In addition to the concomitant
economic depletion of the Palestinian economy and the exploitation of the Palestinian
work-force from the OPT in the Israeli market (Hebrew employment has been outdated
as the state now guarantees subordination by other means rather than Jewish-only labor),
Israel’s territorial expansion and its oppression culminated in the first Palestinian intifada
(uprising of 1987).
The intifada represented the apex of Palestinian nationalism within the OPT and
Israel. In this sense it sent a powerful alarm to Israeli authorities on the decline of the
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Since 1967, Israel has built 120 settlements in the West Bank, and 12 settlements in East Jerusalem. The
Interior Ministry calls them “communities,” though some settlements’ land boundaries are not contiguous.
In addition to the settlements, Israelis have built 100 so-called “outposts” that don’t have the status of
settlements in the Interior Ministry’s eyes but do enjoy the same protection from the Israeli military, the
same funding from Israeli nationals and the same special treatment from Israeli authorities, such as roads,
utilities and schools for the exclusive use of settlers. The Jewish rate of population growth in the
settlements, at 5.8%, is far higher than in Israel proper (1.8%), leading to a rapid rise in settler the
population. In 2009, some 300,000 Israelis lived in the West Bank, not including East Jerusalem. At the
end of 2006, the total Jewish population of the settlements in the West Bank, according to Israel’s Central
Bureau of Statistics, had stood at 261,879. An additional 182,460 lived in East Jerusalem.
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sense of normalcy Israeli authorities sought to found and consolidate in the OPT. Most
importantly, the intifada redrew the ‘green line’ as the political geography of the conflict,
which rendered questionable the sustainability of the settlement enterprise in the OPT and
the durability of open-borders policy. In the early 1990s (the last two years of the intifada)
Israel started to change strategy towards segregation and more coercion to circumscribe
the rise of Palestinian nationality and consolidate settlement grid in the OPT. With the
initiation of the peace process and the changes in the regional and international
environments following the Gulf-War of 1990, Israel faced another element of pressure
on its colonial practices in the occupied territories. Israel’s territorially-oriented strategy
is now facing the challenge of time to accelerate its expansionist policies while the peace
process has been on track and the Palestinian state is in the wait. Initially, the new phase
has started in a territorial massive offensive combined with extreme harsh oppression that
aimed at the consolidation of “major territorial and political gains. These included
aggressive policies such as a wave of new “outpost” settlement, accelerated expansion of
existing settlements, increased “anti-terror” offensives, and the separation wall”
(Yiftachel 2005: 126) and at the same time show the willingness to relinquish minor parts
of the land.
Under certain circumstances such as those prevailed in Palestine in early 1990s
ethnic-territorial regimes may take limited contraction steps in response to particular
internal and external pressures but that can only be understood within the context in
which it took place. Thus Israeli redeployment in the OPT in 2005 (handing control over
major Palestinian cities to the PA) although a precedence in partial disengagement from
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parts of the ‘Land Of Israel’ was not a step towards decolonization. The redeployment of
2005 was accompanied with massive settlement expansion and land confiscation and
expropriation. Actually it allowed Israel to implement the twofold strategy
abovementioned: more land with less Palestinians under the cover of the peace process.
This marginal contraction eased Israel’s burden to manage its occupation by sparing
itself the management of Palestinian population who became confined in fractured
Bantustans nominally controlled and served by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Following
the construction of the separation wall a new Israeli consensus has ensued; Israeli will
take over all regions of the OPT west of the wall until the peace talks with the PLO take
off again. This entails, from Israel’s perspective Palestinian fulfillment of a series of
commitments and obligations especially in security issues. The last few years can be
marked as a period of conflict management for Israel rather than conflict resolution as
Sussman (2005) notices.

Reconstituting Zionist settler-colonial expansionism
This section aims at capturing the essence of Israel’s occupation of the OPT as a
colonial project that seeks the annexation of significant parts of these territories apart
from its population. Thus, it does not seek to present detailed informative data on Israeli
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Jewish settlements after 196776. Rather we seek to uncover the driving force, patterns,
main goals, and consequences of the settlement grid in the OPT.
Israel’s occupation of 1967 represents another dramatic transformation of the
territorial aspect of the conflict; it changed profoundly the political-geography of the
conflict and with it actors’ strategies. The conflict is now focused on a narrower
definition of ethno-national territorial boundaries instead of a struggle on democratic
liberation. In this sense Israel’s occupation of the OPT resurrected and buttressed the
ethno-national segregationist character of the conflict that it created in 1948. Israel’s
presence in the OPT and particularly its settler colonization of the West Bank, Gaza Strip
and East Jerusalem have extended Jewish ethnocratic rule to the whole area of Mandated
Palestine. Jewish settlement enterprise is
now placed in the midst of Palestinian population centers. Ancient Jewish time
was thrusted again into contemporary political moves, by settling at biblical
sites, thereby shaping anew the nature of Zionist and Palestinian geographies
and identities” (Yiftachel 2010: 231).
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There are currently 121 Israeli colonies, often referred to as "settlements" inhabited by a population of
some 462,000 Israeli settlers. 191,000 Israelis are living in settlements around Jerusalem and a further
271,400 are further spread throughout the West Bank. The settler population has grown consistently
between 4-6% per year over the last two decades, a much higher rate of growth than Israeli society as a
whole (1.5%). http://www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article7 . It is not in the scope of this
research to present any accounts for the types of Israeli Jewish settlements in the OPT. However, it is
worthy to notice that different types reflected the preferences of certain settlers’ demands and government
support. Particular political parties in the government supported different types of settlement and the same
party or settler political movement may sponsor more than one type. Types of settlements are: Kibbutzim
(communal villages); Moshavim (cooperative villages); collective Moshavim (a combination of Kibutz and
Moshav); Moshavot (private landholder villages); and Yishuvim Kehilatyim (community settlements). The
last category was especially supported by the Likud party and the nationalist religious parties, and it turned
the predominant type in the OPT (see Cohen and Kliot: 2011 p669)
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The occupation has deepened the ethno-national underpinnings of the conflict and
exacerbated the exclusivist natures of Israel’s domination. Thrusting ancient time in
contemporary political struggle required the construction of Jewish material existence in
the newly controlled territories; without which Israel’s control of them would have
remained precarious and subject to the dynamics of the decline of traditional military
occupations and foreign domination. Virtually, Israel’s military domination and Jewishsettler colonization of the OPT as a single system is best captured as a form of state grand
apartheid.
Israeli Jewish settlements in the OPT coupled with other Israeli draconian measures
are antithetical to Palestinian viability as a socially and politically integrated entity, a
viable economic structure, a territorially and geographically contagious space, and
ultimately hinders the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state on the OPT. As such it
embodies and galvanizes the strategies and goals set by the “Jerusalem Program” and
state policy that is derived from these goals. Israel presence in the OPT has been
sustained through policies of petty apartheid.
As Akenson (1992: 209) defines petty apartheid as the negative or administrative
practices through which Israel exerted its power on the level of Palestinians as
individuals and as a group of population (disciplinary and bi-power) and it consists of all
rules, laws, procedures that regulate social, political and economic life of two ethnonational groups segregated in a dual system of domination. Although total exclusion that
characterized Zionism in per 1967 phase has been slightly changed to encompass the
element of exploitation of the Palestinian workers from the OPT, those workers were not
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integrated in the Israeli economic system since they were fully immigrant labor (they
commute on a daily basis to their working places and back to their homes in the OPT).
Under these circumstances Palestinian workers couldn’t establish any basis for exerting
any significant political leverage on Israel’s politics, as Younis (2005) eloquently
illustrates. This quasi-inclusion resulted in a complex alienation of a significant segment
of the Palestinian society; the workers. Workers have become not only deprived of
political voice as part of the subordinate group, they were also deprived from their rights
in the marketplace as an unrecognized immigrant workforce.
Petty apartheid in this context enabled Israel from handling a cost-effective
occupation and to render the population amenable to its rules. In congruent with petty
apartheid Israel has established a system of grand apartheid; territorial arrangement of
segregation and social gerrymandering that targets the subordinate group with restrictions
and prohibitions pertaining to the land and other aspects of national identity expressions
and aspirations.
Colonial Settlement as a state policy
The Zionist assertion that ‘the land’ of Palestine belongs to the Jews only has
established “an exclusive ethno-national culture [that was] coded, institutionalized, and
militarized by the new state [Israel] in order to quickly ‘idegenise’ immigrant Jews, and
conceal, trivialize, or marginalize the land’s Palestinian past” (Yiftachel 2010: 228).
Alienating the Palestinian from the land by colonizing it has been carried with religious
ethno-national zeal that aimed at the negation of the Palestinians and replacing them with
new pioneer Jews. Settler-colonization of Palestine, now in the OPT, glorifies the frontier
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Jew; a ‘new Jew’, a settler fighter who negates the other Palestinian and the other
Diaspora Jew. Jewish settlement in Palestine is a prominent Zionist ethos through which
a new Zionist Jew is created; without “knowing, walking, settling, loving and staking a
claim to the land” (Yiftachel 2010: 228) Jewish ethno-nationalism remains incomplete.
Notwithstanding these attitudes settlement construction in the OPT was not an
outcome of religious zeal only or the result of right wing maximalist political forces
actions. Although those forces spearheaded the settlement project at different junctures
and succeeded to establish strong political blocks (in and outside the parliament), the
complicity of the state and governments in settlement building and expansion cannot be
obscured. Actually, “the entire settlement grid has been designed and subsidized by the
state, in coordination with the settlement movement” (Tilley 2005: 35) and relevant
Zionist organizations especially the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the
World Zionist Organization. Without an exception Israeli Prime Ministers facilitated and
endorsed the policy. Linking settlement policies exclusively to the Israeli right wing
politicians or the pressure of Zionist religious and national-religious parties is a common
misrepresentation of the actual record of settlement expansion. Settlement building and
expansion started under the rule of the Labor Party right after 1967 war and reached
unprecedented levels under the Labor government in the 1990s. During periods of
‘national unity’ governments (1984 and in the 1990s) settlement construction continued
apace, as well as under governments led by the Likud in 1977 and late 1990s through the
2000s (as we show below). Thus regardless of governments’ partisan build up colonizing
the OPT has been an immutable policy.
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State systematic involvement in settlement building and particularly the
promotions Israeli governments offer Jewish families and individuals encouraged more
and more Israeli Jewish citizens to move and live in the OPT 77 . Furthermore, Israeli
classified the OPT as “Class A National Priority” development zones in 1972, which
means that settlements are entitled for the same treatment other cities and towns in Israel
receive from the government in terms of tax exemptions and investment incentives.
These policies made some settlements hubs for economic, technological, and agricultural
development projects78. Let alone that settlements are a significant source of benefits and
profits for individuals, entrepreneurs, and companies who enjoy a wide range of
incentives and preferable terms for housing, investment, and other activities settlements
construction reflects the “deeper ties [that] concretize the state’s commitment to
[settlement] grid” and state’s identification with this enterprise as a defining aspect of its
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Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing provides generous loans for the purchase of apartments,
part of which is converted to a grant; the Israeli Lands Administration offers significant price reductions in
leasing land; the ministry of Education extends incentives for teachers, exemption from tuitions and fees in
kindergartens, and free transportation to schools; the ministry of Industry and Trade provides grants for
investors, infrastructure for industrial zones, etc; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs gives incentives
for social workers; and the ministry of Finance offers reductions in income tax for individuals and
companies (B’Tselem, Land grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank; Comprehensive Report,
Jerusalem, May 2005). Vast amounts of governmental and non-governmental funds were allocated to
establish and galvanize the settlements: the WZO estimated the costs of the ‘Major Plan for the West Bank’
of 1978-83 at IL (Israeli Lira) 32 billion for new settlements, and an additional IL 22 billion to ‘thicken’
existing settlements. This pattern remained steady through the years and in 2001 total spending on
settlements by eight Israeli ministers was US$ 553.6 million, military spending and transportation are not
included (Strasler2002).
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In 1984 the WZO distributed an ad that hailed ‘Judea and Samaria (the WB) as Israel’s new high-tech
industrial zone. It describes the WB as the scientific and technological anchor of the entire nation. The
Ministry of Science, as the ad confirms, was determined to establish a science-based park in the settlement
of Ariel in the heart of the WB, and a nuclear medicine facility in Ma`ale Efraim (Tilley 2005: 43).
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foundation79. Indeed “the policy to settle all of Eretz Israel not only runs deeply through
the fabric of Israeli politics but is embedded in the state’s very design” (Tilley 2005: 46).
As a matter of ‘national consensus’ among the Zionist Jews settlements in the
occupied territories have become in the heart of an orchestrated effort to nurture the
Jewishness of the Jewish state as the Jerusalem Program abovementioned states. The
mission of the settlement operation in the OPT is to implement a single vision of an Israel
united between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. To be sure Israel has never
shown the presence of any distinction between the borders of Israel and the occupied
territories; all the maps and publications made by Israeli authorities show Israel stretching
well through the OPT eastward to the Jordanian River (see maps 1 and 2). Taken from
the Israeli Foreign Ministry official website, Israeli maps depict the OPT as Judea and
Samaria (Yihuda vi Shomron in Hebrew) and/or ‘areas under Israeli control after 1967’.
Maps and official state documents never use the term ‘Palestinian Territories’. Before the
Oslo agreement the terms: Shtahim (regions) and ‘administered territories’ prevailed in
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According to Tel Aviv Macro Center for Political Economics the cost of construction in the West Bank
settlements over the last 40 years was a total of $17.4 billion. The cost of buildings for housing was nearly
$13.7 billion, which is 78 percent of the total." These numbers do not include the huge military spending on
the security of settlements. In the fiscal years 2000-2002 the Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing
allocated 47 per cent of its annual budget to local authorities of settlements in the West Bank. Israeli
government contribution to the budgets of these local authorities in 2006 reached 57 per cent whereas it
was
34
per
cent
to
local
authorities
inside
Israel
for
the
same
period
http://www.macro.org.il/lib/3218049.pdf. These subsidies reflect on the standards of life settlers enjoy. The
settlements receive more than double the equivalent per capita funding provided to municipalities within
the Green Line (when the security costs are added, an average settler receives about $9,000 annually in
extra funds. http://www.peace-with-justice.org/Israeli%20Settlements.htm. More recently, the Israeli
government spent well over US$533 million in sustaining Jewish settlements in the occupied territories in
2001, more than half the amount provided it by the United States as direct economic assistance during the
same year, according to a report released by the Israeli Peace Now movement.
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0127-05.htm Although Israeli authorities refrain from
announcing or revealing the detailed data on governmental expenditures in the OPT especially on
settlements and the income generated by controlling natural resources and investments in these areas a
study conducted in 2011estimates that since 1987 Israel’s occupation total cost reached $88.5 billion in
subsidies, security costs, governmental budget, and tax exemptions. http://liamgetreu.com/2011/10/09/theeconomics-of-israels-settlement-enterprise/.
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Israel’s official discourse. These are not isolated manifestations of linguistic guise or
formal correspondence deliberations; that represent a state policy that aims at altering the
spatial outlook of the territory and buttress Jewish historical lineage in Palestine.
Naming and Judaizing the space
Naming (and re-naming) policies are indicative if state policies in regard to the
status and the futures of the OPT; it illustrates state systematic effort to invade the spatial
sphere of the Palestinians and to establish Jewish existence in Palestine as an indigenous
presence. Meaning and connotations are the most important qualities of place-names for
any nation and political entity; however among all connotations (social, religious, and
political) Israeli Jewish naming of Palestine and especially the OPT aimed at altering the
spatial sphere by emphasizing Jewish ethno-religious ancient presence and suppressing
all non-Jewish existence. Naming and renaming policy has been concomitant to Israel’s
actions of land confiscation and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians since 1948 and
establishing Jewish residential centers in place of Palestinian expelled from them (Israel
built 400 Jewish settlements in the first 10 years after 1948). Naming embodies the
intersection of Zionist ideology, the symbolism it confers on the spatial sphere, and the
behavior of the state and non-state organizations and institutions that consistently and
systematically aimed at Judizing the geographical and spatial terrains of Palestine.
This pattern is prominent in all the Mandatory Palestine and has been “premised
on a hegemonic myth cultivated since the rise of Zionism, and buttressed by the ‘nationstate’ myth, that ‘the land’ (Ha’aretz) belongs to the Jews, and to them only” (Yiftachel
2010:228). Idegenising Jewish immigrants and reconstructing the new entity (the state) as
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a Jewish state required remarking and reshaping the space in accordance with the concept
of Eretz Israel, Israel of David and Solomon (see map 3). Judisation plays a crucial role
in establishing the extraterritorial value of the space that has become a vital aspect of
identification in the Israeli polity in reference to the whole region of Palestine.
The term Zionism itself is derived from a place-name; Jerusalem’s Mount Zion
that refers to the time of King David and the ancient name of the state Israel that was
chosen to take the place of Palestine. Naming and re-naming spatial spheres of the
territory conforms to the efforts to reconstitute the Jewish as a nation in Palestine; they
embody an ideological upheaval that aimed at reconstructing the history of the landscape
in accordance to the Biblical claims to the Land 80 . Thus “place names are symbolic
expressions of Israeli nationalism in the face of Palestinian Arab opposition” (Cohen and
Kliot 2011:654) and considered part of the effort to exert ideological clout and political
impress on the landscape. Ultimately the resurrection of biblical names emphasizes the
historical lineage of the Jewish people traced down to Abraham that was interrupted by
force. In order to materialize the claim of Jewish indigeneity in Palestine that precedes
Arab idegineity remapping history and remarking landscape in conformity to this
remapping is crucial to Zionism and Israeli-Jewish settlement to sustain. Renaming
policy has suppressed the non-Jewish presence in Palestine and uplifted and re-center not
the Jewish but the Jewish-national presence as the defining historical element of the land.
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The renaming processes started even before the establishment of the state of Israel as the Jewish National
Fund formed a Naming Committee in 1930. The committee’s mission was to eliminate Arab place-names
that are considered as carriers of Hebrew names from the regional map. In 1950 the state of Israel assigned
a governmental Naming Committee that took the burden of renaming the landscape.
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This pattern is as valid in the OPT as it has been within the Israeli proper in which Arab
names were suppressed and substituted by Jewish Biblical/Talmudic names81.
Naming and renaming have given a deep sense of supremacy of territorial and
spatial dimensions of the conflict more than historical narratives. Particularly after 1967
spatial and territorial excessive struggle has focused the conflict on
the temporary political spaces shaped by the people living in Israel/ Palestine
itself. Consequently, the main feature of the conflict during the last three
decades has pitted expansive Jewish settlement versus Palestinian resistance and
steadfastness (Yiftachel 2010: 217).
The conflict in this sense is not a struggle over narratives as much as on the
spatial/territorial domain that correspond to and consolidate the narrative. Naming in this
sense is an embedded element of the whole structures of domination and exclusion that
uplifts Jewish religious ethno-nationality.
The ethno-religious definition of the state and nationality as Jewish rather than
Israeli took a dramatic dimension after 1967 that brought world Jewry into a massive
identification with what became a reality: the entire Promised-Land (Weissbord 2011:
198-200). From that point on Israel has become the dominant political and legal entity in
the entirety of Palestine; in order to reestablish the historically symbolic relationship
between the state of Israel and the OPT, re-naming landscape took a new impulse that
also buttressed particular behavior: Israel’s Jewish-only settlement building in the West
Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. One short trip in the OPT can show the dramatic
81

Forty Seven per cent of Jewish settlements’ names in the OPT (Old Israel) are Biblical/Talmudic while
Twenty per cent of settlement established in the Israeli proper have Biblial/Talmudic names (Cohen and
Kliot 2011: 663). The discrepancy can only be explained by the exceptional sanctity with which the Zionist
movement and settlement planners perceive the OPT as the heart of the ancient Kingdom of Israel.
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and profound changes in the spatial outlook of the land that gives the visitor an
impression that she is travelling in a place that belongs solely to the Jewish people;
names of streets, squares, reservations, street signs and intersections, ancient sights, and
monuments were all changed into Hebrew Biblical/Talmudic names82. Signs that hold
names of Jewish settlements and the roads leads to them are exceptionally large and
positioned on eye-catching spots, while signs leading to Palestinian cities and villages,
and the roads leading into them are smaller, marginalized in side-ways and dwarfed by
those Jewish ones.
Renaming along with actual changes in transportation routes and settlement
expansion have marginalized the presence of Palestinian sights and uplift that of Jewish
domination over the spatial sphere. The reconstitution of the space to imbue Palestine
with Jewish religious ethno-national outlook is part of Israel’s efforts to create a new
reality not necessarily driven by religious interpretation as much as by political and
strategic ends. To be sure biblical names were conferred to locations and sights that have
no historical authenticity in terms of their particular geographic position especially in the
OPT (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 666). Since the settlement in the WB as a whole represents
82

A cursory look at the names of many Israeli Jewish settlement in every region in the OPT offers a strong
evidence of the Biblical underpinnings of settlement construction. For settler movements and Zionist
adherents of the notion of Great Israel Biblical sites abound in the heartlands of the OPT that witnessed the
prevalence of the Kingdom of David and Solomon and their successors. For example, the settlement of
Elon Moreh (to the East of Nablus) refers to Abraham’s trip to the land of Canaan; Brakha (on Mount
Gerizim adjacent to Nablus) means blessing and derived from the verse “Thou shalt put they blessing on
Mt. Gerizim and the curse on Mt. Ebal; Bet-El (house of the Lord) to the north of Ramallah is related to the
era of Abraham and the Second Temple; Bet-Horon (House of Horon) is mentioned in Joshua; Anatot (at
the Eastern tips of Jerusalem) is believed to be where Jeremiah was born; and the settlement Shilo (between
Nablus and Ramallah) is described as “where the Holly Ark and Tebernacles stood for hundreds of years”
(Cohen and Kliot 2011: 664).
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the materialization of the ‘Return’ to the Land of Israel the certainty of location matters
less. What matters in this respect is the process through which the OPT - as the whole of
Palestine should be Judized.
State policies withstanding, the development of the Jewish settlement enterprise
in the OPT has gathered a self sustaining political and social momentum within the Israeli
political system and society. Today, after more than four decades of settlement expansion
and military rule settlers’ community –numbered 500,000 in 2010- and political forces
uplift it represent an unstoppable political configuration. Settlement, colonization, and
land control have become inextricably linked to the very social, political, and economic
structures that hold Israel as a state and a polity together.

Transforming the national-territorial nexus

As early as first years of 1970s two mainstream perspectives prevailed in Israeli
polity: the Labor Party position and strategy stated that Israeli control over the OPT can
be sustained within a regional compromise with Arab neighboring states (not the
Palestinians). In such a compromise Israel would maintain certain strategic parts of the
West Bank and East Jerusalem and relinquish domination over highly Palestinian
populated parts. The motto “territory in exchange for peace” was perceived to serve
Israel’s strategic interests more than the insistence on controlling all the territories. The
other perspective adopted by the Likud Party and other right wing Religious National
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parties states that Israel must sustain its control over the entire OPT in perpetuity as part
of the Land of Eretz Israel. This block is known as the Greater Land of Israel camp.
The Center-Labor strategy triumphed in the first decade of Israel’s occupation
mainly because until the year 1977 Labor had been the dominant political party in the
Israeli governments. The Labor Party sought to materialize its ‘regional compromise’
strategy through diplomacy on the one hand and the consolidation of Jewish control of
the OPT in the other. Within this context it accepted the UN Security Council resolution
242 83 at the same time it established the first settlement in the OPT 84 . Settlement
expansion followed a pattern that conforms to Labor’s strategy: avoiding Jewish
settlement in highly populated areas in the heartland of the WB and GS while focusing on
the Jordan Valley and the parameter of Jerusalem as designated in the Allon Plan85 (see

83

UN Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 emphasized “the inadmissibility of the
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in
peace”. It further reiterate the commitment of all actors to the respect of the UN Charter especially Article
2. The resolution stated that just lasting peace in the M.E should include the application of two principles:
withdrawal of Israeli military forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, and the
acknowledgment and recognition of territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the
region. The French version of the resolution (as appears in UN archives) refers to the OPT with the definite
‘de territories occupies’.
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement
Israel has for so long asserted on the English translation that omits the article ‘the’ from the resolution. This
translation gives Israel a ‘legal’ leeway to claim that any withdrawal from the OPT is in effect an
implementation of the resolution 242.
84

As early as September 1967, Kfar Ezyon became the first settlement to be established in the West Bank.
It was established because of the pressure of a group of settlers, some of whom were relatives of the
residents of the original community of Kfar Ezyon, which was abandoned and destroyed during the 1948
war. http://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf.
85
The Labor government endorsed and adopted the “Allon Plan” (referring to Israeli Defense Minister in
1967 Yigal Allon) for Jewish settlement. Allon presented the plan as a political settlement plan with the
Arabs. According to the plan Israel would retain control over the Jordan Valley and the ‘back of the
Mountain’ (the precipice vas area leading to the valley). This would allow Israel to control the WB
militarily while granting Palestinians access to Jordan. Israeli military and settlement presence in the Valley
will prevent any military power from entering west of the Jordan, which would be the eastern borders of
Israel, so the plan suggests. Moreover, Israel would annex the corridor of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians
would be given control over three populated enclaves: a north enclave including the cities of Nablus,
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map 4). The plan espoused a permanent situation in which the Palestinian population in
the OPT would be reduced to separate masses connected to each other by a network of
roads and separated by belts of settlements and military bases. The ultimate goal was
convincing Jordan to accept the plan that would grant Israel sovereignty over most of the
OPT area while allowing the Jordanian ruling monarch to regain control over the rest of
the territory and over the entirety of the population; this would be dubbed ‘the Jordanian
Option’. Thus by 1976, about 40 percent of the OPT land had been confiscated and
became under Israeli control and some 4500 Israeli settlers were brought to reside in 30
settlements. Another 50,000 settlers were living in the settlements of Jerusalem 86 . In
effect, Labor’s strategy provided a solution to the problem of Palestinian population
intensity by a segregation plan that conforms to Likud’s perspective. The Allon Plan slice
the OPT into three separate areas with those highly populated to be turned to the
Jordanian rule whereas Israel would sustain control over most of the region. Settlement
was the main tool to carry on the strategy.
Starting of 1977, with the ascendance of the Likud to power, a massive colonization
process of the occupied territories has been launched. This change marks the onset of a
new dynamism of Israel’s colonization of the OPT; the new dynamism is characterized
with profound ideologically-driven settlement intensive expansion; the introduction of
Tulkarm, Jenin and Ramallah; a southern includes Hebron and Bethlehem; an a third that includes Jericho
and border-crossing to Jordan.
86

Although these settlement constructions followed the lines set up by the Allon Plan, Allon proposed
expanding settlements in areas adjacent to populated Palestinian areas such as the establishment of the
settlement Kiryat Arba near the city of Hebron, and suggested the “Jericho Plan” according to which Israel
would return the city and its surrounding to the Jordanian rule in exchange for an intermediate agreement.
See also Btselem special report “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, 2002.
http://www.macro.org.il/lib/3218049.pdf
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the issue of the OPT into domestic Israeli politics as a matter of political outbidding,
mobilization and legitimization; and the rise of Zionist/Jewish consensus on the vitality
and indispensability of settlements for the survival of Israel and the Zionist objectives in
Palestine.
The climax of Jewish ethno-territoriality
The Likud87 came to power leading a social coalition of forces converged by their
disaffection with Labor Party policies. A disparate group of Israeli social segments voted
for the Likud for different interests: the Mizrahi community in protest of Ashkenazidominated Labor party; the business strata discontent with Labor’s welfare policies; the
religious groupings offended by secular stance of the party; and national-religious forces
unsatisfied with what they perceived as Labor Party’s soft policies with the Palestinians
and especially its slow implementation of settlement policy in the OPT.
With the Likud in power the question of the OPT and its relationship with Israel took the
forefront of political debates within the Israeli polity and society. While the Labor party
maintained a low-profile creeping annexation of the territories without stirring political or
legal confrontations, the Likud announced its adaptation of an overt expansionist policy
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The Likud part is the ideological offspring of the Herut movement, which had originally “asserted that
all of 1917 Palestine, including Jordan, belongs to the Jews by right, and was unjustly divided by the
British.” While most Herut and Likud members came to accept the reality of Jordan as an Arab state east of
the Jordan River, from the mid-1970’s on secular ultra-nationalists from Herut and Likud who believed in
territorial maximalism before all else—now in the entire area west of the Jordan—joined forces with their
religious counterparts in the Gush and the NRP to build Jewish settlements throughout the territory. “These
ideologies
formed
the
core
of
a
‘Greater
Israel’
movement.”
http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/MF_issue6_9-5-04.pdf
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by declaring that Judea and Samaria would never be relinquished (Younis 2000:147) to
any other entity. Likud’s ideology as Avi Shalim puts it “could be summed up into two
words- Greater Israel. According to this ideology, the OPT were an integral part of Eretz
Israel the Land of Israel” (Cited in Oberschall 2007: 131). Likud’s manifesto of 1977
leaves no space for controversy in regard to its rejection of the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the OPT and its unfettered commitment to the Judization of
Palestine88. For Ariel Sharon-the most hawkish Likud leader and the God Father of the
most expansionist settlement projects in the West Bank- Palestinian state is to be
anywhere but not on the W.B. or at least in segregated enclaves within the WB. In the
words of Amos Elon, Sharon “is ready to allow a Palestinian state to be established only
in Gaza and a very few disjoined enclaves in the W.G surrounded by Israeli settlements
and military installations” (Oberschall 2007: 131132).
Likud’s adherence to the notion of “Greater Land of Israel” yielded a certain
unintended consequence: the existence and demographic increase of the Palestinians in
the OPT and the relatively limited numbers of Jewish settlers brought to live in these
territories (comparing to Israel’s plans) coupled with Likud’s annexationist policies were
creating dynamism of integration. Extensive colonization and Israeli domination by
88

Likud’s Manifesto reads “The same Likud that people keep wrongly accusing of not wanting a Pal
state...' says FSM. This is what it actually said: The Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria are the
realization of Zionist values. Settlement of the land is a clear expression of the unassailable right of the
Jewish people to the Land of Israel. Likud will continue to strengthen and develop these communities and
will prevent their uprooting. The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab
state west of the Jordan River. The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but
NOT as an independent and sovereign state. Jerusalem is the eternal, united capital of the State of Israel
and only of Israel. The Likud government will act with vigor to continue Jewish habitation and strengthen
Israeli sovereignty in the eastern parts of the city. That's pretty clear then - Likud OPPOSES a Palestinian
state and wants the land”. http://www.haaretz.com/misc/comment-page/peter-sm-read-the-likud-manifestofirst-19.487304
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means of sovereign power were heading towards the establishment of a single entity
which would undermine the Jewish character of the state. It has become clear that
Likud’s strategy was attempting to attain the unattainable. Israel would not be able to
survive as a “democratic, great, and Jewish state” altogether. As Arye Naor (former
Israeli cabinet secretary) puts it: “Israeli goals of a Jewish, democratic, and large state
were irreconcilable; any two could be met, but never the three simultaneously” (Ibid).
The logic here implies a racist assumption on the precondition of less or no Palestinians
in the region for Israel to maintain its characters as democratic and Jewish. It echoes,
with different language, the notion of transfer (ethnic cleansing) as the remaining solution
for this Israeli dilemma. The sole obstacle to achieving a large, Jewish, and democratic is
the presence of a majority of Palestinians in the OPT and within the envisioned Greater
Israel on the whole of the Mandatory Palestine.
The Likud government came with an all-out settlement agenda that aimed at
consolidating Jewish presence in the OPT making no differentiations between security,
political, or religious settlement enterprise. Years of the Likud government in late 1970s
had witnessed the emergence of the most dedicated settler movements in the history of
the conflict at the time; Gush Emunim. Settlements are now established close to and
around Palestinian residential areas and on hilltop with a tremendous infrastructure
emerged to serve the new settlements and to circumscribe any Palestinian attempts to
develop their rural areas. The policy not only “superimposed an exclusionary physical
and spatial reality onto the occupied territories” (Younis 2000: 148) but more importantly
this policy established the grounds for the creation a dual political, social, physical, and
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legal reality within the OPT: two distinct communities living on the same territory and
ruled by two entirely different sets of laws, norms, and measures; the Palestinian
population and the Jewish settlers.
Thus, segregation was rapidly imposed founding a settler- colonial reality that
turned the OPT into a colonial periphery to Israel within which the colonial buffer that
separate the occupied from the occupier grew more entrenched. At this point the
settlement grid has crossed a threshold: domestically settlement building and
consolidation has become a ‘national priority’ and Jewish consensus. Daniella Weiss;
currently mayor of the settlement Kidumim in the West Bank and one of the most
prominent settler leaders, was amongst the initial wave of settlers, describes the reaction
of the non-believers to the Gush Emunim faithful's actions in settlement expansion:
Who are these strange hallucinating people?' they would ask. 'What are they
doing [in these] Biblical hills? There's nothing there!'... They thought they'd be
able to control us, to keep us in place and watch over us. They thought we'd
grow tired and go back to Tel Aviv… This was the start of Kedumim."89
Likud’s policy of total settlement in the whole of the OPT has blurred the
boundaries: legal, political, and psychological between Israeli proper and these territories
as the result of the wholeness with which settlement construction was sought. During the
1980s through 1990 Likud governments’ political objectives were clear: taking control
over the entire biblical land of Israel that would consolidate the “Greater Israel” under the

89

In his article ‘The real price of Israel's settlements’, Seth Freedman shows the ability of settler
movements to influence Israeli decision makers’ policies on the issues of settlement expansion and
allocating funds for settlement building. As he notices, the Likud period turned settlement activities into a
massive process that each government succeeded the Likud had to follow. His interview with Weiss gives a
flavor of this metamorphosis. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/25/israel-settlementspalestinian-territories-price
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sovereignty of the Jewish people. Yitzhak Shamir; Israel’s Prime Minister in this period
bluntly articulated these objectives:
This is our goal: territorial wholeness. It should not be encroached or
fragmented. This is an a priori principle; it is beyond argument. You should not
ask why. Why this land is ours requires no explanation. Is there any other nation
that argues about its homeland, its size and dimensions, about territories,
territorial compromise, or anything to the effect?”
To realize the wholeness of the settlements Israeli governments of the Likud and
the national unity government of 1984 adopted and implemented three major settlement
plans90 that resulted in the establishment of twenty-three new urban settlements and the
construction of 300-450 Kilometers of roads. The number of settlers brought to these new
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Likud settlement policy was informed and followed two leading plans: The first in 1977 articualted by
Matitiyahu Drobles, head of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division. Drobles prepared a
comprehensive plan for the establishment of colonies throughout the West Bank. Most of the colonies that
were established as part of the Drobles plan were constructed on the central mountain ridge around
Palestinian population centers. The Drobles Plan embraced the aims of Gush Emunim and signaled a
governmental shift away from the Allon Plan. The second presented by the former Israeli Minister of
Agriculture Ariel Sharon (1977-1981) (and former Israeli Prime Minister) modified and expanded the
Drobles Plan and Gush Emunim, by intensifying colonization along the Green Line in order to secure the
borders between the West Bank and Israel.
The Sharon Plan also called for increasing the colonization along the central mountain ridge. According to
the Sharon Plan, only a small number of high density Palestinian communities were not to be under Israeli
sovereignty in the future. The Allon Plan dealt with the 'demographic problem' posed to Israel by the
Palestinian population through avoidance, whereas, the Sharon Plan continued the more aggressive policies
that relied on removal and transfer of the Palestinian population out of the OPT. The ultimate aim of the
Sharon Plan was the annexation of the West Bank, excluding small densely populated Palestinian enclaves.
Following the preparation of Sharon's plan, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Construction
and Housing established ten colonies on the western slopes of the central mountain ridge in the West Bank,
north of Jerusalem. Sharon's vision also included preventing the contiguity of developed Palestinian areas
along the Green Line, by disconnecting and segregating the West Bank in areas north of Nablus, west of
Jenin, and north of Ramallah, from the Palestinian communities adjacent to the Green Line within Israel.
According to his vision, this disconnection would be accomplished by the creation and construction of sets
of Israeli colonies on those areas. Sharon also planned to create corridors of colonies and a network of
bypass roads all over the West Bank, connecting the 1949-Armistice Line (Green Line) with the Jordan
Valley. As a result of the implementation of these plans in the year 1980 alone the Palestinians lost control
over more than 27 per cent of the total area of the WG apart from East Jerusalem, and one-third of the
entire GS, and by the year 1987, 52% and 42% of the land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
respectively, had been expropriated by Israel. Land has been confiscated both for so called 'Security
Reasons' and for the construction of Israeli settlements. http://www.arij.org/atlas40/chapter2.4.html
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settlement reached to 51,000, which fill short of the targeted number according to the
plans which was 80,000 (Btselem 2002:15).
The failure to meet the goals of the plans can be referred to the economic
complications Israel was grappling with in the same period and contributed significantly
to the rise of the Likud and other right wing forces. Thus Sahmir’s statement at one level
reflected deep socio-economic changes and their political repercussions that marked a
drift toward political right, nationalistic, and extremist politics. Those changes have had
a fragmenting effect on the political and party system in Israel that stamped the
ascendance of extremist religious, national-religious, and ultra-nationalist political
parties91. In effect these developments had turned the issue of settlements into a crucial
factor in Israel’s policies in terms of its prevalence as an immutable policy implemented
on a large scale regardless of the party or the coalition of parties in the government.
Differences between different governments were insignificant and affected primarily by
factors other than internal politics namely, Palestinian reactions, regional and
international effects especially the initiation of the peace process.

91

The late 1970s through 1980s was a period of deep economic transformation in the state of Israel;
moving away from the socialist system to a capitalist economy. The liberalization of the economy was
embraced by the two main Zionist streams of thinking: the Labor Party and the Likud party. This process
had left significant portions of the Israeli society behind especially among the poor masses of the Mizrahi
Jewish (Jews from Oriental descent) , the Haredim (ultraorthodox), and Palestinians. Social change resulted
from the process was exacerbated more in the 1990’s with the arrival of one million Russian Jews to Israel.
Liberalization, as in most regions of the world has deepened social disparities, increased levels of poverty
and unemployment. Discontent with the new policy has led the affected masses to affiliate and identify
with nationalist sentiments that the political right embodied, and to religious parties in the sought of redress.
A multiplication of parliamentary parties and a drift to the right have become prevalent in the Israeli polity.
Forming and sustaining governments have become more difficult and institutional instability has created a
crisis (Ishay2011: 76-77)
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Beyond the “ideological threshold”
Israeli governments have never shown any serious intentions to stop, freeze, or
slow the pace of settlement construction. The 1970s and early 1980s had set the tone for a
persistent pattern of colonization that witnessed relative fluctuations due to particular
events and momentary factors. In particular, Israel’s political system had witnessed
profound changes in the course of 1970s that culminated in a two-block politics in the
1980s that replaced Labor’s hegemony. As mentioned earlier, socio-economic changes in
Israel has led to the fragmentation of the political system, which renders governments
formation hard to achieve without offering significant concessions to small parties for a
coalition. Under the circumstances prevailed in the election of 1984 the two big parties
(Labor and Likud) tied up to find themselves in a situation whereby they had to form a
‘national unity government’92.
The most remarkable change in the period was the increase of small parties;
distribution of political power had changed dramatically with the decline of midsize
parties. Building ruling coalition under these new configurations took an ideological path
in which the Likud and the Labor tended to chose small parties from their ideological
camps to form the government (Elazer and Sandler 1994). In effect this strengthened the
political power of small parties especially supporters of Greater Israel ideology; a trend
that would increase in the forthcoming two decades. Likud’s own failures in the late
92

The electoral rise of the Likud started at the 1973 election where it gained 39 seats of the 120 that
consists the parliament comparing to 51 seats for the Labor Party. In 1977 and 1981 elections the Likud
won 43 and 48 seats, respectively sending the Labor to the opposition for the first time since the
establishment of Israel. However, the election of 1984 witnessed Labor’s electoral revival with a gain of 47
seats. Small parties in this period flourished in number to reach a total of 13 parties. Notably, those who
were in the rise were religious parties such as Shas (See Elazer and Sandler 1994).
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1970s and early 1980s (in the economic arena rates of inflations hit a peak that brought
Israel to the prinks of bankruptcy, and Israel’s war in Lebanon turned into a protracted
conflict that led to Likud’s popular decline), and Labors image as the party of the
constitution that aimed at offering territorial concessions to the Arabs, led to a coalition
of necessity. Both parties needed to repair their popularity and gain legitimacy that
resulted (among other things) in tightening Israel’s colonial policies in the OPT. Thus
during the years 1983-1988; last year of Likud’s government and years of National Unity
government between the Labor and the Likud the number of established settlements
increased from 67 to 110 and the number of settlers leaped from 22,800 to 63,600 in the
WB and to 100,000 in East Jerusalem (Btselem 2002: 17-18).
The election of 1988 the Likud and the Labor Parties tied up with 40 and 39 seats,
respectively. The Likud led by Yitzhak Shamir formed the government with a wide
coalition of small parties (National Religious Party, Shas, Agudat Yisrael, Degel
HaTorah, the New Liberal Party, Tehiya, Tzomet, Moledet) all of which conform with
Likud’s Greaterer Israel ideology. In this period the government focused on expanding
the existing settlements (settlement population increased by 60 per cent) and built ten
new settlements (Ishay2011: 76-77). The limited settlement expansion under this
government was the result of the economic crises in Israel on the one hand, and more
importantly it stemmed from the unprecedented pressure the U.S.A exerted on Shamir to
halt settlement expansion. Israeli government involved in a confrontation with H.W.
Bush Administration on the issue as the later sought creating conducive environment for
the initiation of the peace process. Shamir’s refusal to U.S.A demands compelled her to
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freeze loan-guarantees that were promised to assist Israel to absorb Jewish immigrants
from the USSR. The crisis had led to the fall of Shamir’s government especially when
most of the parties in the coalition withdrew protesting Shamir’s participation in the
Madrid peace conference.
The revival of the Labor Party in the election of 1992 (44 seats) that also gave rise
to pro-peace parties such as Meretz gave a measure of hope that creeping territorial
takeover of the OPT would halt. Yitzhak Rabin’s government announced that a change of
‘national priority’ should be carried on; it committed to the U.S.A that it wouldn’t
construct any new settlements or expand any existing ones except for purposes of ‘natural
growth’. Another exception was added that Israel would continue settlement construction
in the area of ‘Greater Jerusalem’ and the Jordan Valley; in conformity with the Allon
Plan. However, these exceptions were all Rabin’s government needed to trick the
America and the rest of the world. Rabin’s government expanded settlements in areas of
post 1967 and annexed to Jerusalem; the natural growth (interpreted not in terms of birth
rate but also in terms of new Jewish immigrants) had been used to construct 9850 new
housing units in the existing settlements and new settlements were established as
neighborhoods of existing settlements. Thus in the period of 1992 to 1995 the number of
settlers rose from 146,000 to 282,000 in the WB and East Jerusalem (Btselem 2002: 1718). Not less important under Rabin’s government Israel started to apply the system of
movement-permit for the Palestinians from the OPT who wanted to move into Israeli
proper. The restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility especially targeted workers, and it
included prohibitions on goods exchange, movement of vehicles and people between the
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WB and GZ and within the WG. Jerusalem was also isolated from the rest of the WB by
military checkpoints and barriers. Using physical methods (military checkpoints, barriers,
and roadblocks) and administrative methods especially the permit regime Israel aimed at
Controlling Palestinian movement and at channeling it to a few major checkpoints,
depending on Israel’s needs. They are intended to keep Palestinian traffic away from the
settlements, main roads used by settlers, and areas where Israel wants to strengthen its
control and exclude Palestinians. Therefore, most of the checkpoints and obstructions are
located on roads leading to Area C (the 60 percent of the West Bank under complete
Israeli control), in East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, enclaves west of the Separation
Barrier, and the settlements in Hebron (Bt`selem 2010).
Thus Rabin’s strategy echoed his realization that Israel need to redefine its
domination in the OPT towards consolidating territorial control couples with segregation
and oppression in response to the profound change the Palestinian intifada brought with it.
The intifada had challenged Israeli domination system and it redrew the boundaries of the
conflict as an ethno-one whereby Israel has to confront a persistent people. As Rabin
explained in 1995:
we had to choose between the Greater Land of Israel, which means a binational
state whose populations would comprise, as of today, 4.5 million Jews and more
than 3 million Palestinians…and a state smaller in area, but which would be a
Jewish state; we chose to be a Jewish state” (Rabin: 1995).
It has become clear that Rabin was referring to an extended Jewish-democratic state that
would encompass vast areas of the OPT. Rabin’s colonial policies and the segregation
system his government entrenched in an unprecedented manner had created the
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foundation of the following rapid and profound measures that consolidate the system of
grand apartheid in the OPT. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in May 1995 was
alarming in the sense that it uncovered the deep extremist currents beneath the Israel’s
society and polity rift to the right; a trend that would take an exponential rise in the rest of
the 1990s and the 2000s until today. Directly affecting Israel’s colonial polices in the
OPT, this rift only consolidated and already comprehensive settlement building during
the peace process. Settlement expansion during the peace process embodies Israel’s
determination to defy the element of time by consolidating its territorial and spatial
hegemony over the land. Rabin’s approach clearly aimed at determining the geographical
parameters of the aspired Palestinian state. So did all Israeli Prime Ministers regardless of
the peace process. The period also uncovered the increasing influence of Israeli right and
extreme right politics on governments’ policies. The chart below shows a striking pattern
of settlement expansion in the periods of negotiations between Israel and the PLO: As
notices above, Rabin’s “change of national priority’ gave a huge boom to settlement
expansion especially in and surrounding East occupied Jerusalem. In 1995, the
endorsement of Oslo Two agreement and the supposed Israeli withdrawal from additional
Palestinian territories and the end of the interim (transitional) period of the Oslo process
territorial control and settlement construction went up. Thus the number of housing units
in the settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip rose from
20,400 to 31,400 − an increase of approximately fifty-four percent in just seven years.
Israel’s persistent territorial expansion in the OPT took another profound level in
1996 by the new electoral victory of the Likud led by his hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu.
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Although the Likud won 32 seats and the Labor 34 Netanyahu was elected separately
from the rest of the parliament members under the new electoral law implemented in this
year for the first time in Israel (to be revoked in the succeeding election). Netanyahu’s
victory exposed the false assumption that years of U.S. efforts to bring political
settlement to the conflict had achieved substantial progress. As a matter of fact
Netanyahu came to power as the man who firmly opposed the Oslo agreements. This
Likud hardliner victory represents the equivalent of the victory of Likud in the year 1977
in terms of the shift in the Israeli political spectrum to the ‘right’ and the trends prevailing
in Israeli society. The election show the increase political power of religious and right
wing parties: Shas gained 10 seats, the National-Religious Party 9 seats, Yisrael (Avigdor
Liberman’s party) BaAliyah 9 while center-to-left Meretz lost 3 seats. With a government
consisted of a narrow coalition of Likud, Tzomit, and Gisher Netanyahu came with new
policy guidelines in regard to the peace process, which is considered to be a substantial
change in the ‘peace process’ terms. A greater and more territorially-based emphasis on
Israeli security was introduced: “Israel should be in a position to take responsibility to its
external security by maintaining forces along the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, and
Rafah border forever. In effect this means that Israel will control all points of entry and
exit to the region; an aspect of sovereignty denied to Arafat (Aruri 2003:107). The
election of 1996 entrenched the increasingly fragmented Israeli political system and
Netanyahu’s strategy set the bar high for any government to come into office concerning
any agreement with the PLO. So, when the Labor gained the election of 1999 it came to
power in a highly fractured parliament with remarkably powerful small right and extreme
right wing parties (Shas and Yisrael BaAliah won 17 and 6 seats, respectively). Ehud
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Barak; the new Prime Minister formed a government of odd bed-fellows: Shas (the
religious Mizrahi party), Meretz (the center-to-left) Oslo proponent party, and Yisrael
BaAliah (Russian immigrants party that identify strongly with the Greater Land of Israel
ideology).
The government announced Barak’s doctrine that drew on all previous efforts to
consolidate Israel’s control of the OPT. Strikingly it also endorsed crucial elements of his
predecessor Netanyahu. Barak announced his ‘four NOs’ as the basis for the achievement
of a permanent peace with the Palestinians: no to any change for unified Jerusalem under
Israeli sovereignty, as the eternal capital of Israel; no withdrawal to 1967 borders (the
green line); most settlement dwellers in Judea and Samaria to remain under Israeli
sovereignty; and no foreign army west of the Jordan River (Oberschall 2007: 150). This
policy narrowed the gap between the two big parties in terms of the future of the OPT
within a political system that has become stratified and the two-blocks politics in Israel
entirely waned. Under these circumstances the two parties took a profoundly strategic
step to unify their positions on the peace process and the limits of Israel concessions in
regard to the OPT. Both parties agreed on the final outcome of any settlement as
precluding Palestinian sovereignty in any portion of historic Palestine…the
concept of limited autonomy, adopted by the Knesset [Israeli Parliament] in
1977…was the centerpiece of Likud’s Camp David. It also became the essence
of Labor’s Oslo agreement, and together they seem to promoting the ongoing
atomization of the West Bank (Cited in: Aruri 2003:115).
The Likud and the Labor parties came along to solidify their rejection of the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state by the agreement they signed in January
1997. The agreement entitled “National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the
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Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians” rules out “Palestinian sovereignty, rejects
the removal of Israeli settlement colonies from the OPT, negotiating the status of
Jerusalem, repatriating the refugees, and dismantling the occupation” (Aruri 2003:218).
Reaching this agreement is the ripe fruit of a long process through which Israeli polity
came to stiffen its position concerning the OPT. The arrival of number of small parties to
the parliament and the government following these developments turned the OPT into the
most sacred issue in Israeli politics. Advocates of transfer (ethnic cleansing) are now
setting in the government especially in the 2000s with the ascendance of the Likud led by
Ariel Sharon and the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000.
The agreement between the Likud and the Labor coupled with the rise of prosettlement political forces in Israel generated a blanket support for the doctrines included
in Netanyahu and Barak strategies concerning the OPT. The events accompanied the
Palestinian intifada especially the high levels of violence contributed to the ongoing rift
to the right in Israeli society and polity; it added to the already established structures of
segregation and colonization established in the 1990s. Regimes of segregation and
territorial control reached a climax by the construction of the separation wall (the barrier
in Israeli terminology, and the apartheid wall in the Palestinian discourse).
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Source: http://www.economist.com/topics/israeli-settlements
Israel’s security necessities used to justify the construction of the wall cannot
survive the question of route and location of the wall. The most important aspect of the
wall is that it has not been established on the ‘Green Line’. According to the UN only 11
per cent of the wall runs along the border line between Israel’s proper and the WB and in
some parts it cuts and curves deep into the WB territory. Moreover, the wall is an
institution of physical configurations and a set of measures and procedures that regulate
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and limit the mobility of Palestinians who live in the buffer zone of the wall 93. As such it
creates another threat to individual and collective well-being and the possibility of an
ordinary life (Roy 2004: 32). During the first phase of the wall’s construction, 51
Palestinian villages were isolated from most of their land, and 25 lost total access to their
land, a critical problem for future economic survival. In the village of Jayous, for
example, 138 of 3,250 acres were taken to build the wall and 2,150 additional acres (twothirds of the village’s land) now lie in the seam zone. Early in the construction process,
approximately 12,000 Palestinians in 14 villages and towns were wedged between the
wall and the Green Line, an area known as the seam zone. They were cut off from the rest
of the West Bank, from essential market outlets, and, to varying degrees, from the
agricultural land they have farmed for generations. The most important issue about the
wall for the purposes of our discussion is that the construction of such a giant institution
has drawn the territorial counters of Israel’s domination within which Israel practices
ultimate control; this area includes the vast majority of Jewish colonial settlements in the
OPT. In this context Israeli state attorney has indicated that the territory between the
Green Line—Israel’s border with the West Bank—and the wall will be declared a “closed
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The wall is not just a wall, the World Bank analysis notes. “Depending upon location, sections will
comprise some (or all) of the following elements: four-meter [12-foot] deep trenches on either side; a dirt
path ‘to which access will be forbidden’ where potential infiltrators would be exposed to IDF [Israeli
Defense Force] fire; a trace path to register footprints; an electronic warning or ‘smart’ fence; a concrete
barrier topped with barbed wire; a concrete wall rising as high as eight meters [24 feet]; a two-lane military
patrol road; and fortified guard towers placed at regular intervals. See the report of the “Mission to the
Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) of the Local aid Corporation Committee (LACC).
http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/wallreport.pdf.
For detailed accounts of the social and economic effects of the wall see: Mission to the Humanitarian and
Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) of the Local aid Corporation Committee (LACC). http://www.nadplo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/wallreport.pdf;
Bt`selem
report
“The
Separation
Barrier”
http://www.btselem.org/topic/separation_barrier; International Commission of Jurists, Geneva report
“Israel’s Separation Barrier Challenges to the rule of law and human rights” http://www.nadplo.org/userfiles/file/Document/walllawhr.pdf.
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military zone” (Roy 2004: 33). Therefore, the wall is designed to swallow the largest
portion of the OPT lands while consolidating the segregation regimes (the dual systems
of domination discussed above). It imposes prohibitive restrictions on the movement of
Palestinians within the West Bank. Its route, continually modified by Israeli authorities,
falls well within the boundaries of the West Bank and is designed to incorporate as many
Israeli West Bank settlements as possible within Israel proper. Furthermore the Wall will
effectively institutionalize the system of closure and restriction that has paralyzed the
West Bank economically since late 2000 and fragmented it territorially since 1992. The
wall in this sense serves a means to consolidate Jewish sovereignty on the majority of the
OPT geography and simultaneously to undercut Palestinians’ sought of independence and
self-determination by dissecting the OPT, territory and population into isolated enclaves.
As such it is a tool of domination and hegemony that targets the Palestinian population as
a whole with profound devastating effects. In essence the wall comes to close a cycle of
simultaneous creeping grand apartheid that targets the territory and space on the one hand,
and irreversibly atomizing the Palestinian Population into enclaves with no significant
ties that preserve and galvanize their collective sense of belonging and collective
aspiration for self-determination. Aruri (2003: 116) puts it eloquently
Now the Arab population lives in subordinated enclaves within a Jewish state.
Oslo II provided Israel with the land without the people, thus meeting Labor’s
requirement of ethnic purity and separation…and at the same time,
accommodating Likud’s proclivity for penetration deep into Arab population
centers. At last, Labor’s presumed ‘territorial settlement’ and Likud’s
‘functional settlement’ were reconciled.

259

Domination and duality
Israel’s refrain from formally annexing the OPT withstanding, the growing number of
the Palestinian population in these territories and their determination to achieve Israeli
withdrawal from their land remain a serious challenge to Israeli occupation and its
policies. Land control and Judizing the space of the Palestinian life in such a sweeping
manner discussed above, wouldn’t have been possible without the implementation of an
equivalent system of domination that seeks to render the Palestinians into manageable
fragmented masses segregated from the colonial society. Israel applied a multi-layered
domination system that primarily aimed at sustaining distinctions between the
Palestinians and the Israeli Jewish settlers in particular and Israeli society in general.
Simultaneously this system was designed to control Palestinians as a fixed menace to
Israeli Jewish original and driving imperatives discussed earlier.
This section examines Israel’s domination policies as derivatives of the primary
overarching strategy of Judizing and colonizing the OPT and superimpose Jewish ethnonational identity on these territories. Thus methods of domination and control have been
the result of the structural elements of Israel’s colonialism that were designed to
“administer the lives of the people and normalize the colonization, while exploiting the
territories resources (in this case land, water, and labor)” (Gordon 2008: xix).
Israeli polices in the OPT and their consequences can be assessed as a coherent
system that works on two levels: (1) a macro level whereby Israel sought to sustain
certain degrees of exclusion and control through land and resources control and economic
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suppression. Alienating the Palestinian from the land and taking over their space is the
most striking in this respect. Beyond ideological precepts and cultural underpinnings
Isarel’s domination system is a tangible and timely phenomenon
that is designed to redistribute wealth in order to draw as many Jews as possible
to this area and to maintain a sustainable control of the Jewish population over a
piece of land which is by nature bi-national” (Hever, 2010);
(2) a micro level in which Israel deployed the various strands of power to dominate the
population as individuals and as a group through a set of military orders, administrative
arrangements, legal procedures and means of oppression.

Alienation and exploitation: Israel’s colonial periphery
The pattern of Israel’s system of exclusion was sustained in the post 1967 phase
of Israeli colonialism. Land control and exclusion would couple with the exploitation of
the OPT (population and resources) to undermined Palestinians’ ability to form a
coherent socio-political configuration that would challenge Israel’s occupation more
successfully. Combined with the fragmentation of the Palestinians in Bantustrans, these
policies are aimed at oppressing the expressions of Palestinian national identity and the
prospects of Palestinian self-determination. Macro policies aimed at undercutting
Palestinians’ ability of organized political action and mass mobilization.
-Land and Resources
Control of the land and alienating Palestinian from it not only reconstitute the
spatial terrain of the land as a Jewish terrain but also it prevents the appearances of
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Palestinian history and past that is tied to the land. Taking over the land in this sense
fragments the Palestinian society and consequently prevents its ability to form a coherent
and organized challenge to Israel. The attempt to cut the ties between the Palestinians and
their land is an attempt to undermine and eliminate the rise of Palestinians as a people
that has the right of self-determination on the land (Gordon 2008: 59). The principle and
right of self-determination is linked to the integrity of the region on which a certain
people has the right to practice this right. In this sense Israel’s land confiscation and
expropriation represents a creeping annexation that “was intended to achieve the
integration of the territories with Israeli terrain of hegemony but without people (Younis
2005: 145), and to deprive the Palestinians from the material geographic bedrock of their
national identity and spatial connections.
Israel’s occupation of the OPT from the outset exhibited similar patterns of
exclusion the Zionist movement had shown before the establishment of the state of Israel:
the possession of more land and territory with a minimum, if any, non-Jewish population.
After 1967 Israeli authorities launched a sweeping regime of land confiscation and
expropriation using a set of mechanism: military orders, ‘legal’ procedures, bureaucratic
regulations. The main tool remains declaring and recording land as “state land” that has
been implemented since 1979. The procedure represents a policy that manipulates the
Ottoman Land Law of 185894 by implementing those provisions of the law that allowed
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The Ottoman Land Code of 21 April 1858 defined five classes of land ownership: milk (individually or
ptivatly owned), waqf (Islamic endowment), m r (public or state land), matr k and maw t (abandoned and
uncultivated). For m r , matr k and maw t, the raqaba is vested in the hands of the state. M r is cultivated
or cultivatable land acquired for the state through conquest or through forfeiture of milk due to a failure of
heirs. An individual could gain rights over m r land by cultivating it and paying taxes; but the state
continued to regulate its transfer and improvement. The tenant's rights to m r were forfeited by failure to
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Israel to play the role of the sovereign (the Ottoman Sultan). Other means included
military orders to size and control land for security needs, declaring land a s abandoned,
and expropriating land for public utilizes.
Thus By 1980 Palestinians in the OPT would lose 27 per cent of the WB land to
Israeli authorities, most of which was reallocated for settlement construction. Using the
Ottoman Law abovementioned between 1979 and 1993 Israel took over 913,000 dunams
(16 percent of the West Bank) using this law (Bt’selem 2010). Settlers, with the
acquiescence of the military authorities practiced de facto methods to take over lands
adjacent to their colonies; during the first intifada settlers and Israeli military surrounded
the settlements with rings of buffers that Palestinians were denied access. Those
remained closed and annexed to the settlements. Using ‘legal’ methods of a kind was the
hallmark of Israel’s land policy that turned most of the land to the exclusive benefit of the
Jewish settlers, which not only violates the Geneva Fourth Convention of 1949 but also it
is ultimately injustice as the duty of the occupying force is “not to ignore the needs of an
entire population and to use land intended for public needs solely to benefit the settlers”
(Bt’selem 2010). Among the different methods of land confiscation and expropriation
Israeli governments resort to secretive measures such as resurrecting the “Absentee Law”
of 1953” to take over land in the OPT (Cook 2005).

cultivate the land; such forfeited land is termed ma l l. In practice, neither the Ottomans nor the British
ever repossessed ma l l. M r included the largest portion of the landed property in Palestine. M r land
could be converted by order of the sultan into matr k ma miyya (property for general public use such as
lakes or roads) or into matr k murfaqa (property for use by a particular community such as market places
and cemeteries). Maw t is wasteland which an individual could (until 1858) turn into milk with the
permission of the sultan and (until 1921) turn into m r by cultivating it for a given period of time and
paying for it.
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The regime of land takeover reinforced the dual system of domination and
segregation that distinguishes between the Palestinian population and the Jewish Israeli
settlers; Palestinians in the West Bank live in a series of roughly eight squalid, ringed
ghettos and are governed by military courts. Jews living in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, like all full Israeli citizens, are subject to Israeli civilian law and constitutional
protection. This differentiation tied to the land and territorial terrains that give
segregation a rigid character. Moreover, changing the landscape of the OPT has been
pervasive and intense as Chris Hedges (2010) observes the spatial outlook of the WB and
East Jerusalem
…has altered dramatically since I first went to Jerusalem over two decades ago.
Huge fortress-like apartment complexes ring East Jerusalem and dominate the
hillsides in the West Bank. The settler population is now more than 462,000,
with 271,400 living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 191,000 living
in and around Jerusalem. The settler population has grown at the rate of 4.6
percent per year since 1990 while the Israeli society taken as a whole has
grown at 1.5 percent.
The pattern noticed in these lines goes for the rest of the West Bank that Israel has
controlled 42 percent of its land until the year 2010; Bt`selem (estimation stands at 50
percent). Most of this land is controlled and/or allocated to the exclusive use of more than
200 Jewish settlements although the virtual area these settlements occupy is estimated at
1 percent of the WB. However, settlement local and regional councils have control over
the 42 percent; (Stewart and Usbors 2010) most of which extend far beyond the built-up
area and defined as "closed military zones" in the military orders. Palestinians are
forbidden to enter these areas without authorization from the Israeli military commander.
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Israeli citizens, Jews from throughout the world and tourists are all permitted to enter
these areas without the need for special permits.
-Economic suppression
Economic effects of Israel’s colonial policies are intertwined with land control
and resources takeover. Israel’s policy of land takeover was reinforced by a lust for
exploiting natural resources especially water. The process has dealt the Palestinian
agricultural sector a serious destructive effect; the share of this sector in Palestinian GNP
and employment has dropped dramatically as a result of land loss, Israeli competition,
and lack of water resources that has been extracted for the benefit of settlers’ agricultural
projects and their life style 95 . Settlement expansion on Palestinian land had already
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In 1967, 2,300 sq km of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under Palestinian cultivation. In 1989 that
figure had been reduced to 1,945 sq km, or 31.5 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Agriculture
comprised 24 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1966, the same percentage as in the 1980-85 (preintifada period). By 1994, the percentage had decreased to less than 15 percent. In 1966, the agricultural
sector provided employment for 55,000 Palestinians, or 43 percent of total employment, whereas in the
1980-85 there were 40,000 people employed in the agricultural sector, comprising 24 percent of employed
Palestinians. In 1993, the percentage of employed persons working in agriculture was 22 percent. These
gross indicators do not lead to specific conclusions regarding the effect of settlements on agricultural
employment or production or land under cultivation, because settlements are only one of a number of
variables that must be considered when assessing these trends such as the competition with a much more
advanced Israeli agricultural sector, Israeli restriction on export of Palestinian products…etc. There exists
no systematic research on the direct effects of settlement on the decline of the Palestinian agricultural
sector. However, there are specific regions, such as the Jordan Valley, where a direct link can be
established between the loss of Palestinians’ agricultural opportunities and Israeli settlements. The
confiscation of agricultural lands and their transfer to settlements result in the loss of agricultural income
and employment, although this has never been quantified beyond anecdotal reporting. Contamination by
sewage also directly affects Palestinian agriculture in the region around Kiryat Arba and elsewhere. There
are also unquantified economic and environmental costs associated with Israeli-owned industries in the
occupied territories, such as a recycling plant for used motor oil, stone quarries, and other plants where
harmful and toxic by-products are produced. The effect of settlement construction is more direct on the
Palestinian loss of water resources, which directly affected the development of agriculture and other vital
aspects of life. Access to water, rather than a scarcity of land, remains the greatest obstacle to Palestinian
agricultural development. For Israel, water has been a vital precondition for achieving its fundamental
challenges—the creation of a vibrant economy to sustain an increasing Jewish community. According to a
1992 report for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences by Miriam Lowi, “almost the entire increase
in Israeli water use since 1967 derives from the waters of the West Bank and the Upper Jordan River.” Not
only Israel is exploiting water for its own population in Israel and the occupied territories, amounting to 15
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reduced the cultivated area in the Palestinian territory from 36 per cent of total land area
in the West Bank in 1966 to 27 per cent in 1984 and from 55 percent in 1966 to 28 per
cent in 1985 in the Gaza Strip (Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4). The decline of this
sector was primarily the result of Israel’s official policy that would provide for “no
development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for
expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel” (Khalidi
and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4). Depriving the Palestinian economy of the main two resources
(land and water) is the primary factor that explains its underdevelopment. As the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009) noticed, Israeli policies in the
OPT since 1967 have evolved from aiming to integrate Palestinian economic resources
(especially land, water and labour) into Israel’s “mainland” economy, to acting to
marginalize and isolate the economy and markets of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”
(Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 1).On the other end of the equation, Israel’s occupation
provides for

percent of total consumption, it has also prevented the Palestinian community from increasing its water use
to barely 20 percent beyond the amount used in 1967—and only for personal use, not for agriculture and
economic development. Since the beginning of bilateral and multilateral negotiations earlier this decade at
Madrid, Israel has sought to protect its continuing control over this resource in the West Bank, which was
described by Israel’s state comptroller in February 1993 as the “principle reservoir of drinking water for the
Dan region, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Beersheba, “and the “most important long-term source in the
[national] water system.” The water requirements of Israel’s settlements are a small segment of this larger
mosaic of Israeli exploitation of the water resources in the occupied territories. At a time when settlers were
barely 10 percent of the population in the West Bank (1987), Palestinian consumption totaled 115 million
cubic meters while settler consumption equaled 97 mcm. A 1993 report by Peace Now noted that “the
Jewish settlers’ per capita irrigated areas are seven and thirteen times larger than the areas accorded to
Palestinians for irrigation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank respectively.” A November 1992 report by the
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), “Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories,” notes that lack of water has forced Palestinian farmers to remove tracts
from cultivation and that the digging of new, deep wells for settlements, particularly in the Jordan Valley,
has caused subsequent shortages for Palestinian farmers. http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/question-32-2
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immense benefits to be derived from rule over more than one million
Palestinians: Israeli producers prospered from the conveniently located and
captive market; employers profited from the pool of cheap, unorganized labor;
and the resulting expansion of industry and services permitted Israeli workers to
advance into better and higher paying jobs, abandoning those least desired to
Palestinian workers from the newly acquired territories (Younis 2000: 145).
The new emerging conditions after 1967 led to a partial economic inclusion of the
Palestinian working class into Israeli market as migrant labor on a daily basis from their
homes in the OPT to their jobs. Opening the Israeli market to the Palestinians from the
occupied territories contributed significantly to decrease in unemployment rates among
the population and resulted in a boost of standards of living thus obfuscating the
economic damage Israeli policies created. It also was aimed at silencing the national
sentiments of the Palestinians and preventing a popular upheaval against occupation
(Gordon 2008: 88). Israel’s initial strategy towards the Palestinian population was aimed
at co-optation and containment
rather than seeking to subjugate them violently. At that stage, consent was
more important than coercion. Nonetheless, Israel prevented the development
of a viable independent Palestinian economy, ensuring the occupied population
was heavily dependent upon Israeli imports, Israeli financial institutions and
employment by Israeli companies” (Snowdon 2010).
The structural contradiction between employment and its ‘positive’ consequences
on the one hand and the systematic destruction of the Palestinian economy kindled
Palestinian willingness to resist the occupation as the consequences of its policies became
more entrenched. Israel’s destruction of the Palestinian economy had left a diverse strata
of the population deprived of sources of living. Landless refugees in camps, small
holding peasants in the countryside who lost their land and/or couldn’t afford the
competition with the Israeli products, artisans, and small traders, turned into laborers in
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the Israeli market by the mid of 1970s: in 1970, 49.3 percent of the WB and 60.0 percent
of the GS workforce were employed for wages. This percentage increased to 57.3 percent
and 67.6 percent, respectively in 1982. Those workers would have to apply for and get a
work permit from local bureaus in the main cities in the OPT. Working permits was a
means to prohibit workers from work any time Israeli authorities or employers saw in
their interests. More important within this profound socio-economic change is that the
majority of this new workforce would be employed inside Israel; by 1982 51.1 percent of
the WB and 63.9 percent of the GS labor were working in the Israeli market. This pattern
continued until the eve of the Oslo peace process and the late years of the intifada of
1987. By then
some 115,000 Palestinians worked in Israel, and unemployment in the
Occupied Territories had declined to under five percent. These workers, who
comprised one-third of the workforce in the Occupied Territories, supported
hundreds of thousands of dependants” (Bt`selem-workers 2010).
Israel’s policy of open borders between the OPT and Israel allowed the Israeli
economy from reaping the benefits of the occupation: Israeli producers are now making
profits from a captive market with low production capacity and a destroyed agricultural
sector; employers in the Israeli market were provided with cheap and poorly organized
labor from the territories; and Israeli Jewish workers were advanced into better and
higher-paying jobs. Palestinian workers were absorbed in sectors and jobs at the low level
of production (construction, sanitation, farming…etc). Introducing exploitation annulled
the Zionist credo of “Hebrew labor only” in favor of a more far-reaching objective
namely, the containment and suppression of Palestinian viability as a people. Thus until
late 1980s the result of this “deliberate “integrationism” was increased vulnerability of
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the Palestinian economy to Israeli economic and political trends. For example, the 1986
recession in the Israeli economy, combined with the Government’s austerity program
which aimed to increase wage and price controls inside Israel, had direct and dire
consequences for the Palestinian labor market, social expenditure, and living conditions:
This was particularly the case given the lack of domestic Palestinian institutions that
could regulate the effect of these external factors” (Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4).
Mechanisms of controlling the Palestinian economy after 1967 were diverse:
Israel imposed a custom union on the OPT with limited movement of the Palestinian
labor across the green line, and Israeli investors were allowed to invest in these territories
mainly in settlement construction and the establishment of industrial zones and
agricultural projects. Moreover, Israel imposed its own currency (the shekel) alongside
the Jordanian Dinar and the US Dollar (Zagha and Zalmut 2004: 121-2). Palestinian
economy was forced to integrate into the Israeli larger and much more advanced
economy in which the exploitation and oppression of Palestinian labor was paramount.
In addition to the discriminatory methods applied on the Palestinian workers in
Israel 96 and economic repercussions of this process on the Palestinian economy,
Palestinian middle class was crushed under the pressure of economic changes and the
Palestinian society was homogenized and confined within their residential areas. Most of
96

Palestinian workers were channeled to lower levels of Israel economy, mostly to jobs that Jewish
workers would not take. They were prohibited to form their independent unions and not allowed to join the
Israeli union (the Histadrut), and Palestinian unions in the OPT were denied representing those workers.
Moreover, they received in average half the wage a Jewish worker has gained for the same job, and were
denied a wide range of social, health, and retirement benefits although their wages were subject to
deductions (20 per cent of the paycheck) that goes to such benefits. In addition, Palestinian workers have
been subject to different types of exploitation and abuse; “Not infrequently, Palestinian workers entering
Israel also fall victim to exploitation by their employers and to abusive and cruel treatment by Israeli police
officers and soldiers. http://www.btselem.org/workers.
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them earned their living as daily immigrant workers (Younis 2005: 150). In effect this
transformation created Palestinian reserves of labor and delayed the emergence of a
national middle-class leadership of the nascent Palestinian national movement in the OPT
and rendered the Palestinian working class politically crippled as a result of its
fragmentation and the conditions of as day-to-day controlled immigrant labor . These
conditions “inflicted huge costs on the Palestinian economy, it also increased its political
dependence closures were increasingly used as a political weapon” (Zagha and Zalmut
2004: 120).
On another level, this process homogenized the Palestinian society within their
reserves and henceforth facilitated the rise of national integration that galvanized national
sentiments and opened venues for mass mobilization against the occupation, which
contributed to the eruption of the first intifada. The 1980s were the worse for Palestinian
economy when the euphoria of high income began to regress due to a combination of
factors: Falling oil prices led to falling demand for Palestinian migrant workers in the
Gulf States; the economic crisis in Israel, as we indicated above,

led to problems for

Palestinian workers in Israel as their income had fallen combined with the tightening of
work opportunities for Palestinians, accompanied by discrimination and abuse. The
growth of Jewish settlements inside the Occupied Territories involved the theft of
Palestinian land, damaging the local economy. And Israeli policy became more
belligerent, shifting away from seeking consent and accommodation. All these factors
influenced the emergence of the first intifada, the militant rebellion by Palestinians
against oppression, which started in 1987 (See Hever, 2010). Not less importantly the
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intifada was a turning point in the sense that the profits Israel’s occupation generated
from exploiting Palestinian land, labor, and resources and outweighed the security
expenditures Israel accrued have turned into a costly endeavor. Israel’s approach to the
population in the OPT would change profoundly into more exclusion and confinement,
which exacerbated rates of poverty and unemployment. Now Israel would opt to closure,
permit regime, and high levels of harsh measures and brutality against a population she
sought its containment and cultivated its co-optation. Therefore Israel’s participation in
the peace process and the acceptance to establish a Palestinian Autonomy in one level
was to get read of the burden of the population while sustaining the core of the Israeli
colonialism: land and resources. The rise of Palestinian nationalism and the perceived
demographic threat (Zagha and Zalmut, 2004 p128) can be seen as vital elements in
Israel’s willingness to sign the Oslo Accords in 1993. This would be clear by Israel’s
change of attitude to the Palestinian labor and the restrictions it imposed on their mobility
and the high rates of oppression and brutality against the population.
Thus the organization of economic relationships with the nascent Palestinian
Authority (PA) was a priority for Israel. The Paris Economic Protocol (PEP) signed
between the PA and Israel came to replace Israel’s integration of the Palestinian economy
by mechanisms of control that turned it into a subordinate zone to Israeli economy. Under
the terms of the PEP the OPT has become part of the “Israeli-Palestine zone” which
enabled the Central bank of Israel to “effectively oversee the monetary union between
Israel and Palestine, which is administered by the Bank of Israel alongside a virtually
toothless Palestinian Monetary Authority” (Daud 2011). and henceforth facilitated
271

Israel’s occupation of the OPT. PEP provisions allowed Israel to monopolies fiscal and
monetary policies of the PA; the Israeli central bank determines all monetary policy for
both Palestine and Israel and the protocols provide no say for Palestinians in Israeli
central bank decisions. So for example if Israel wants to increase short term interest rates
it can do so without regard to the economic situation of the Palestinians. Moreover, the
agreement allowed Israel, as the party controlling the borders of Palestine, to collect and
transfer PNA taxes and custom duties imposed on Palestinian imports from or via Israel.
These arrangements rendered the PA “fatally dependent on Israel rebates of customs and
income taxes…Israel would interpret ‘imports’ into Palestine in a restrictive way” (Zagha
and Zalmut, 2004: 124) that stripped the PA from important sources of revenue on
imports to the OPT.

This asymmetry notwithstanding, the Protocol recognized that

Palestinian would continue to seek employment in Israel and no guarantees provided for
free access. Actually the PEP gave Israel the right to solely determine the conditions for
labor movement from the OPT into the Israeli market.

Needless to say that any

economic union of this type includes labor mobility, this provision of the agreement
denied the Palestinian economy a vital source of revenue. It also provided Israel with a
source of political leverage with a crucial magnitude. Palestinian workers’ accessibility to
the Israeli market was paramount for the functioning of the Palestinian economy. Israeli
authorities, in disregard of the PFP, imposed restrictions on the movement of specific
agricultural products exported by the OPT.
Thus the PEP was utilized by Israel as a means of political subordination and
oppression against the PA and the Palestinian population in the OPT; in addition on the
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restrictions on labor movement, Israel opted to frequently delay and then often freeze the
transfer of tax revenues collected for the Palestinians by Israel , which inflicted huge
costs on the PA and sinuously undercut its ability to fulfill its duties in paying salaries for
its public sector and in providing appropriate public services. Israel’s goal is primarily to
show that the PA survival and political relevancy is in the hands of Israel. Israel has
effectively undermined the emergence and development of the Palestinian economy.
Israeli closures, its military order imposed on the OPT, and the most recent control of PA
economic structures including Israel’s boycott of Palestinian labor
have turned [the Palestinians] into simply an imprisoned population with almost
no capacity for economic activity…a situation that is worse for Palestinians than
Apartheid was for black South Africans” (Daud 2011).
Indeed, Israeli policies in the OPT were primarily aimed at confining the
Palestinian population and undercutting its capabilities in order to render it amenable to
Israel’s colonial expansionism. The development of Israel’s domination in the land,
resources and economic arenas reveals that Israel primarily aimed at preserving and
sustaining its occupation of the OPT. As Khalidi and Tghadisi-Rad (2009) put it
there is no Israeli economic policy towards the Palestinian people or the
occupied territory; rather there is a policy to maintain occupation and
administration of the Palestinian territory by whatever means available,
including economic strategies.

-The invisible apartheid
Israel’s strategy towards the Palestinian population in the OPT has been dynamic
and subject to the level of domination Israel accomplished in terms of Land control and
settlement colonial expansion on the one hand and its ability to suppress and oppress
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Palestinian nationalism in the territories on the other. The more success Israel achieved in
its colonial territorial expansionism, and the more the Palestinians showed nationalist
identification, the more it increased levels of exclusion, oppression and confinement.
Whereas in the pre-1967 borders Israeli was relatively restrained by its own basic law and
couldn’t implement total exclusion against its Palestinian citizens, this was not the case in
the OPT. In 1948 exclusion and domination was achieved initially by the expulsion of
almost two-thirds of the Palestinians which left a small minority that Israel would be able
to manage. The OPT has a Palestinian majority and more importantly the social and
political forces in these territories remained intact to a large extent in spite of the exodus
that accompanied the 1967 war. Israeli’s strategy of exclusion within was designed to
render the Palestinian population marginal and irrelevant (physically, politically and
economically), if not to turn it into a minority on the long run. Israel took advantage of
the loose legal framework in the OPT (a range of laws was in place, Ottoman, British,
and Jordanian) and the effects of Jordanian and Egyptian control of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, respectively to maintain an obscure relationship between the occupied
territories and the occupier. This strategy allowed Israel to implement a set of measures
and procedures that would turn the OPT into zones of control; an open space for
colonization with minimum costs and liabilities. The primary principle that informed
Israeli policies in the OPT is that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable to the
1967 territories and henceforth they are not occupied. Rather they are disputed lands.
Thus Israel recognizes the applicability of humanitarian provision of the Convention
apart from the right of the Palestinians of self-determination, and denies this applicability
on the land (Grodon 2008: 26). In this sense Israel’s strategy of separating the people
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from the land is the overarching principle that informed its strategies in the OP. Focusing
on a set of laws and ‘legal’ measures, Israel presented its control over the people in terms
of order and law in an attempt to give it a sense of normalcy and legitimacy to its policies
and to conceal its colonial nature behind institutionalized and stratified lawful practices.
-Co-optation and normalization
Israeli strategy of total exclusion remained a leading tenet in the post 1967
territories. However, a significant change was introduced to mitigate exclusion of a
majority of Palestinians in the OPT. In 1970s Israel opted to the co-optation of certain
segments of the Palestinian society, particularly the traditional elites. Co-optation,
however was coupled with coercion and oppression of militant forces and organized
political activities, and aimed at creating intermediaries between Israeli authorities and
the population not at political accommodation. In this period the ‘stick and carrot’ was
instrumental in implementing a minimum direct intervention in administering the public
sphere. However, controlling the population would take a dynamic nature beyond ‘stick
and carrot’ in conformity to the rise of the Palestinian national movement and the needs
of Israel’s apparatuses to update its institutional infrastructure of domination and control
(Gordon 2008: 46, and Younis 2005).
Israel strategy at this stage was aimed at normalizing the occupation by adopting a
control system that avoids intervention on a state scale. The policy was to encourage the
population to carry on their life as usual and to make the occupation invisible (Gazit
2006). The locus of domination methods resided in the military commanders of the
region who became the legislator and the executive atop of two military governments,
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one in the WB and the other in the GZ and both were subject to Israeli government
policies. Co-optation was provided by preserving and sustaining particular administrative
institutions that prevailed in the OPT before 1967. Municipal councils, mayors and other
functionary posts were reinforced and reactivated along with the preservation of
Jordanian laws and currency. Setting local administrations in position was instrumental to
avoid Israel’s direct involvement with administration of daily life. In the GS Israel kept
the British mandate laws and regulations in effect. In both cases Israeli authorities
appointed ‘moderate’ members of notable families in civilian posts; a policy that
reproduced the traditional leadership for the role of intermediaries between the
occupation authorities and the population in order to maintain calm and tranquility
(Younis 2005: 113-4). In order to reinforce the policy Israeli government held municipal
election in the WB in 1972 that resulted in the prevalence of Jordanian-affiliated
traditional elites. Meanwhile Israeli policy in the GS differed significantly in terms of its
military coercion stance. This may be referred to the armed resistance that Israeli faced in
the Strip. The presence of the Palestinian Liberation Army (an army that was formed by
Arab states following the establishment of the PLO in 1964) and significant numbers of
armed residents enabled the Palestinians to wage more effective armed resistance from
within the community. Israel responded with a massive offense during which it bulldozed
avenues through residential areas especially refugee camps to quell the resistance.
However, Israeli policies of land confiscation, settlement expansion, and turning
the economy into an open zone for Israeli exploitation have undermined the traditional
elites Israel relied on to deliver tranquility and social order. The destruction of the
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Palestinian economic viability undermined local bourgeoisies’ socio-economic status
(Younis 2005:146) and increased public disillusionment with their role. Nationalist
elements of the middle class especially from rural areas and refugee camps with an antiimperialist and anti-occupation discourse rose as the alternative to the traditional elites
(Robinson 1997). This development was faced with Israeli intolerance; no differences
applied whether in the WB or GS.
Nonetheless, levels of oppression and coercion remained relatively law. However,
Israeli policies in the OPT, particularly the ultimate use of military orders that codified
Israel’s control in a wide range of areas (including imposing restrictions on movement,
curfews, and the use of public parks, currency exchange rates, postal laws, and the
transportation of agricultural products) (Gordon 2008: 27) led to a wave of protest
among the Palestinians especially in the city of Jerusalem as Israel annexed the occupied
Eastern part of the city, which ignited protest and militancy among the Palestinians. In
1972 many religious figures and social prominent leaders and associations in Jerusalem
called for civil disobedience in protesting Israeli measures. Israeli authorities’ prompt
reaction of deporting 514 leaders indicated its firm intentions to crush any signs of
resistance. Israeli authorities issued military orders to eliminate political activism and all
sorts of protest; they categorize all forms of resistance as insurgency97. Israel’s assault on
the rise of protest did not carry the Palestinians to watch passively even after the
deportation; they renewed the attempt to form an internal leadership by forming the
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All manifestations of political activities or/and national sentiments were subject to banishment. This
includes political meetings, raising Palestinian flags or any other national symbols, publishing or
distributing any material with political or national content, singing or listening to national songs, and
acquiring publications (including books) on other national movements or revolutions in the world.
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“Palestinian National Front” (PNF) in 1973. The PNF represented the first politically
organized leadership that was not only endorsed by the PLO but as well had popular
legitimacy for it encompassed a wide range of political and social forces and for its
organizational abilities. The PNF presented itself as a political arm of the PLO and
declared its objective as the establishment of a Palestinian state through diplomatic means
(Younis 2000: 115) and it managed to lead mass demonstrations and protest in 1974-5
before it was outlawed by Israeli authorities.
Municipal election of 1976 and the ‘Land Day’ 98 the same year represented a
watershed in the shift of the structure within which the relationship between Israeli
occupation authorities and the Palestinians in the OPT. Adherents of the PLO had won
the election of most of municipal councils while the Land Day signaled the vibrancy of
national sentiments within the OPT and inside Israel alike as Palestinians took to the
streets to protest Israel’s land confiscation policy. These events dealt a serious blow to
Israel’s strategy of containment and normalization of military occupation and domination.
Palestinians have shown a high degree national identification that had proven to be
persistent and to override other identifications. Israel’s non-interventionist strategy and
its efforts to atomize and neutralize the population failed and the national movement was
able to mobilize and pose a challenge to Israel’s occupation.
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Until today Palestinians in the OPT and their brethren in Israel commemorate the ‘Land Day’ on March
30th. In 1976 Israeli authorities announced its intention to confiscate thousands of dunams Palestinian land
in the Northern Triangle. Palestinians responded with mass marches in the Galilee to the Negev.
Palestinians in the OPT joined the protest in masses especially after Israeli security forces shot dead six
Palestinians citizens of Israel and wounded hundreds.
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-Divide-and-rule
‘Land day’ alarmed Israeli authorities on the degree of Palestinian vigilance and
willingness to challenge its domination and the 1976 turned to be a millstone in the
relationship between the occupied and the occupier. The two adversaries would change
their behavior profoundly in ways that lined the majority of the Palestinians in the face of
an increasingly overt domination and coercion regime of foreign rule. Israel’s strategy
would implement a dual system of coercion and confinement on the one hand and
cultivating alternatives to the PLO in the OPT on the other. Israel established the Civil
Administration in 1981 particularly to increase intervention in Palestinians lives on the
level of the state and the government of Israel alongside other apparatuses that were
already established. The Civil Administration marked Israel’s introduction of its
sovereign power to control the population.
With the Likud Party now in power population was reduced into masses that pose
an obstacle to the achievement of the Greater Israel. The Likud opted to a dual strategy:
applying a heavy hand against PLO supporters, and attempting to cultivate local rural
surrogates to compete the influence of the PLO among the masses. The Likud realized
that turning the population into a politically potent mass is the precondition for the
success of its strategy. Thus, while Israel implemented an “iron fist” against pro-PLO
leaders in the cities, refugee camps and towns (arrests, hose demolishing, and
deportations were ubiquitous) it cultivated an alternative local leadership in the country
side; the ‘Village League’. The latter policy was espoused to impair the linkages between
urban political-active Palestinians and rural residents who started to show strong signs of
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mobilization. This attempt was reinforced in the aftermath of the peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt in 1978; the treaty incorporated the establishment of a Palestinian
autonomy within the OPT; which the Israeli authorities perceived as an opportunity to
undermine the PLO by establishing rural representative bodies and local self-rule regions.
The Civil Administration was established primarily to carry on the Likud plan of
founding Palestinian autonomous enclaves. In this respect Israel encouraged Palestinians
to identify with different local entities (religious, family, clan, and region) and Arab
identification other than the nationalist which would facilitate their control. The Likud
sought the total separation of the Palestinian from their lands and their utter division in
segregated areas. Thus forms of sovereign power were introduced in this period in
addition to the deployed forms of disciplinary and bio-power that meant to control the
population as individuals and as groups. Sovereign power was deployed through the Civil
Administration that had repealed whatever authority Israel allowed municipal councils,
local/village councils, and Chambers of Commerce to practice. Israel also banned fund
transfers to the OPT from the Arab countries as means to undermine the leadership
(Gordon 2005:109). Thus by mid 1980s most city municipals councils were run by Israel
military officers and Israeli military started to impose collective punishment measures
such as curfews, blocking towns and villages, and more extensive house demolishing and
massive arrests especially in the 1982-3. These measures withstanding Israel’s control
strategies remained in place.
Although the phase of overt control during 1977-1987 and the high levels of
oppression and colonization of the Likud differed from the previous phase by the
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introduction if the Civil Administration and the departure from Labor’s ‘invisible
occupation’ it sustained and maintained the main features and methods of control over
the population. Both phases implemented

the strategy of monitoring, controlling, and

the surveillance of Palestinians that had been pervasive and penetrated every aspect of
Palestinians’ lives. The General Security Services (GSS, known as the Shabak) played
the major role in shaping the daily lives of the Palestinians in the OPT; the Shabak
influence decisions about if, when, and where to impose curfews, who to arrest,
who to deport, and which houses would be demolished. It was involved in
hiring and firing of principals and teachers as well as doctors and clerks, and
decided when to open or shut down schools, universities and charitable
organizations” (Gordon 2008: 31).
Another major element of control was adopted by the military institution; the
permit regime. The regime was introduced in the 1967 and consists of a range of military
orders, licensing (for vehicles and drivers), registration of business, building homes. The
permit regime also included other daily activities such as changing address, traveling
abroad, and for growing certain kinds of fruits and vegetables. To gain a permit of any
kind was a long process of paper work, paying fees, and interviewing the Shabak. In
effect the permit regime turned all activities of life in the OPT into a means to generate
discipline as a privilege that the military commander may revoke under the pretext of
enforcing the law.
In 1968 Israel began issuing Identity Cards for the Palestinians at the age of 16.
The Card must be carried all the times to enable the military to track the movement of the
people all the time. This regime has been functional in isolating areas in the OPT from
each other by declaring a particular area a military closed zone; those who are not
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registered in the area have to issue a permit to enter or exit it. The Jordan valley region
has been under such a procedure for more than a decade. Moreover, Israel issued car
registry plates that differ in color from those registered in Israel (blue for the OPT and
yellow for Israel), and those in the OPT held the first litter of the city or region they
registered at. The identity-card regime and car registry functioned as a repressive tool for
the prevention of movement, imprisonment, and collective punishment of individuals and
groups who belong to particular region or city or refugee camp that carries resistance
activities.
These regimes and institutional measures, legal and procedural as they were
presented have controlled the spatial sphere of the Palestinian social, economic, cultural,
educational and political lives. Palestinians, in the name of the law were deprived of all
rights of movement, free enterprise, expression, organization, work, and access to
resources. Furthermore, the system of control atomized and segregated

the Palestinian

society in the OPT by means of differentiation; identity and permit regimes. The
atomization of the population and suppressing Palestinian national sentiments included
Israeli authorities’ control of the Palestinian educational system through monitoring
curriculums prohibited teaching and learning texts about Palestinian national identity.
The only identity affiliation Israel allowed is the identification with an Arab.

In 1987 Israel’s assumptions on the dismemberment of the Palestinians and
fragmenting them that would lead to the decline of their national identification were
blown away as the intifada (shaking off) burst in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East
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Jerusalem. The intifada also had ignited the Palestinians inside Israel who took to the
streets in solidarity with their kin and kith in the OPT. The intifada was characterized
with the high level of popular participation and the democratic means by which it was
organized; it showed the mobilizing capacity of the national movement and its ability to
turn the OPT into an ungovernable zone for the Israeli occupation authorities99. As such it
was the first serious and well organized challenge of Israel’s occupation since 1967.
Under the leadership of Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Israel tried to smash the
intifada with "force, power and blows." Army commanders instructed troops to break the
bones of demonstrators. From 1987 to 1991 Israeli forces killed over 1,000 Palestinians,
including over 200 under the age of sixteen while 16 Israeli civilians and 11 soldiers were
killed by Palestinians. By 1990, most of the UNLU leaders had been arrested or deported
(a total of 418 Palestinians were deported until 1992 including the 415 Hamas affiliated
persons) and the intifada lost its cohesive force, although it continued for several more
years.
The main two effects of the intifada were first that it shattered the status quo that
Israel had established in the OPT. The normalization strategy and the divide and rule
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A full account of the causes and natures of the first intifada of 1987 is beyond the main focus of this
research. Among detailed scholarly accomplished studies Robinson Glenn E. (1997) Building a Palestinian
State: The Incomplete Revolution is a leading effort. Also Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari’s (1990) The
Intifada offers a useful insight from closely affiliated Israeli journalists. , The intifada involved hundreds
of thousands of people from all ages and social affiliations. For the first few years, it involved many forms
of civil disobedience, including massive demonstrations, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of
Israeli products, political graffiti and the establishment of underground schools (since regular schools were
closed by the military as reprisals for the uprising). It also included stone throwing, Molotov cocktails and
the erection of barricades to impede the movement of Israeli military forces. More importantly, the
organization of the uprising reflected democratic elements; the National Unified Leadership of the intifada
was a broad coalition of political organizations and national figures, and local and regional leadership
Popular Committees were established in every corner to give the intifada its popular and participatory
character.
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policy failed to turn the OPT into an impotent political zone. As we mentioned earlier,
the intifada redrew the political geography of the conflict to refocus it on the 1967
borders. Second, it shifted the center of gravity of the Palestinian national movement and
the locus of Palestinian political activity from the exiled leadership of PLO to the OPT;
he intifada had challenged Israel with a strong movement that exists at its doorsteps.
Therefore Israel responded by deploying a large scale and full assault that was
characterized with collective punishment and the ultimate use of coercion and sovereign
power of the state: ordinary civilians found themselves without freedom to pursue even
the most routine daily activities. Curfews were ordered for weeks and thousands of
Palestinians were arrested 100 . Schools and universities were closed by the military
commander of Israel’s troops in and education effectively became illegal and teachers
and students had to resort to “underground” (or popular schools) classes. Homes were
demolished without warning, olive trees and agricultural crops were destroyed, vital
water supplies were redirected to Israel and then water usage restricted so severely,
people had to queue with containers for hours to buy back their own water. Under these
circumstances calls for tightening these measures to force the Palestinians to flee the OPT
arose inside Israel; Israeli Former Military Intelligence Chief General Shlomo Gazit
(1988: 7) said that these measures were intended so that Palestinians would “face
unemployment and a shortage of land and water and thus we can create the necessary
conditions for the departure of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.”
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During the first year of the uprising 1,600 curfews were imposed, so that by the late 1988 more than 60
percent of the population had been confined to their homes for extended periods of time. I the GS the
military imposed permanent night curfew from May 1988 to May 1994 (Gordon 2008: 160).
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The uprising marked peoples’ ability to take the initiative; it empowered the
masses who turned many areas in the OPT into claimed ungovernable zones, and
articulated their own civil services to their communities. The sense of empowerment
changed the relationship between the subordinate people and their oppressor in an
irreversible manner; as Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari (1990) notice in their book The
Intifada, “This was a sharp psychological turnabout for a public that had discovered what
it could do — and how to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses”. Beyond this positional
achievement, the intifada marked the failure of Israel’s strategy of fragmentation and its
efforts to turn the OPT into an economically integrated and subjugated area to the Israeli
economy. It also dealt a serious blow to the normalizing policy that allowed high degrees
of interaction across the green line, all of which came into a sudden halt. In terms of its
responses to the intifada, in addition to oppression and collective punishment
abovementioned, Israel resorted to three major strategic moves: First it increased and
tightened the permit regime to encompass more categories of the population and to widen
the criteria of differentiation among the Palestinians. Working in Israel turned into a
distinguished privilege instead of a right. The new entry-permit (to Israel) was stratified
to create divisions and to deter individuals from taking part in the intifada or even have
any connections with activists and/or political organizations. (Gordon 2008: 160-2).
Second, starting 1990-1991 Israel introduced the regime of closure that targeted the
whole population of the OPT. The new regime sealed off the borders between Israel and
the territories for long periods of time in one-way direction: from the OPT into Israel.
Closure has become the norm in Israeli practices in the OPT and marked the initial phase
of the complete segregation that would follow in the 1990s and in particular after the
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Palestinian second intifada of 2000. Third, within the closure regime and increased
restriction on movement and other draconian military measures Israel launched a massive
settlement expansion (as abovementioned) and started building by-pass roads (Jewish
settlers’ only) and constructing permanent and semi-permanent military checkpoints to
consolidate the lines of segregation between the OPT and Israel on the one hand, and the
Palestinian population and settlement areas inside the territories on the other. Ultimately,
these policies led to the construction of the ‘separation wall’ and the confinement of the
Palestinians in segregated enclaves.

Conclusion
These strategies withstanding, Israel’s domination and control in the OPT is in
indistinguishable from the apartheid of South Africa. Military occupation implies a
temporary or interim phase following a military conflict or war to maintain order and
security until a peace agreement being held. The main difference between Israel’s
occupation and South Africa under apartheid is that the latter had been designed and
implemented as a formal system of racial subordination and discrimination whereas
Israel’s occupation is originally a temporary situation. However, the practices and
policies of Israel’s occupation show its planned perpetuation
in the manner of a colonizing power, under the guise of occupation. It has
permanently seized the territories' most desirable parts — the holy sites in East
Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem and the fertile agricultural lands along the
western border and in the Jordan Valley — and settled its own Jewish
"colonists" throughout the land” (Dugard: 2006).
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Israel’s colonization of the OPT through settlement construction and its takeover
of the territory and separating the Palestinians from their land and controlling their spatial
terrain are typical to colonialism. However, Israel’s policies in regard to the people living
in the OPT have striking characteristics of apartheid in terms of its fragmenting and
segregationist effects. “The West Bank has been fragmented into three areas — north
(Jenin and Nablus), center (Ramallah) and south (Hebron) — which increasingly
resemble the Bantustans of South Africa” (Dugard: 2006). In international law, apartheid
is a general category of state practices and it is prohibited wherever it occurs. The 1973
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
defines the word as acts “designed to divide the population…by the creation of separate
reserves and ghettoes for the members of racial groups, the prohibition of mixed
marriages…[or] the expropriation of landed property” (Peteet

2011). South African

apartheid “pass system” and the so called ‘influx control’ are a strand of the more
ubiquitous and pervasive Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by a rigid
permit system and other control measures we referred to above. Indeed
many aspects of Israel's occupation surpass those of the apartheid regime.
Israel's large-scale destruction of Palestinian homes, leveling of agricultural
lands, military incursions and targeted assassinations of Palestinians far
exceed any similar practices in apartheid South Africa. No wall was ever built
to separate blacks and whites (Peteet 2011).
As noncontiguous as this entity will be, it wouldn’t be able to sustain any
integrated strategy toward services, economic development, labor mobility, and most
crucially Palestinians could not gain access to water sources already under Israeli control.
Furthermore, the incoherency of the Palestinian autonomous enclaves will lead to the
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erosion of Palestinian national coherency. Separated by Israeli settlement blocks, Jewishonly bypass roads, Israeli military checkpoints, and the separation Wall the Palestinians
in the OPT will not be able to establish a viable social, economic, cultural, and political
ties. The PA, already crippled by Israeli measures can manifest only very limited
administrative capacities, which renders its polity and constituency split and factionalized.
All of which are essential to nation and state building.
This state of affairs can hardly be sustained taking into account that Palestinian
demographic growth in the OPT and their growing sense of alienations and strangulation.
The enclaves’ population enduring poverty, mobility constraints, erosion of land
available for residential and agricultural expansion, the narrowness of social spheres of
interaction, all will result in a deep sense of disaffection and lead to the rise of resistance
and violence.
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Map (1)

Source:http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Yom+Kippur+
War+Cease-Fire+Lines-+October+24-+1973.htm
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Map (2)

Source:http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Yom+Kippur+
War+Cease-Fire+Lines-+October+24-+1973.htm
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Map (3)

Kingdom of David and Solomon
Source:http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Yom+Kippur+
War+Cease-Fire+Lines-+October+24-+1973.htm
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Map (4)

Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/allonplan.html
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Chapter IX
The Palestinian national movement and the politics of liberation

Introduction

This chapter examines the emergence, characteristics, and development of the
Palestinian national movement. It shows how the very nature of Zionist and Israel’s
national-territorial nexus and their domination structures affected and shaped the main
features of Palestinian struggle for liberation and then for independence and national selfdetermination.
The sections that follow discuss the consequences of international intervention in
this conflict and the ways in which external forces, through the founding and legitimation
of religious ethno-nationalism as the founding principle of political practices, contributed
to the protractability of the conflict. Ultimately the lack of international convergence over
the question of differentiation and exclusion of Israel domination created ‘Israeli
exceptionalism’ from the norms and principles of universal democracy. The prime goal
of these analyses is to show how territorial/spatial legitimating regimes and the
fragmentation of forces confronting them result in a less likely processes of integration
and the emergence of unitary entities based of secular democratic-civic norms and
principles of governance
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The main argument here is the nature, properties and practices of the Zionist
movement and the strategies adopted by the state of Israel were determinant factors in
shaping the characteristics, political thinking, strategies, and the means the Palestinian
national movement used since the early stages of its formation in the early 1900s.
However, this doesn’t imply that internal effects within the movement were insignificant
in shaping the features of the movement and the transformations it went through. External;
particularly regional effects also have had their influence on the fluctuations and
inconsistency of the political objectives of the movement at certain turning points in the
history of the conflict. Palestinians’ strategic inconsistency is assessed against these
conditions.

Challenging Colonialism and Zionism

British and French colonialism of the Arab East Mediterranean region, Greater
Syria (including Lebanon), Palestine and Jordan at the turn of the 19th century came to
disrupt an embryonic but consistently rising Arab nationalism demanding independence
from the Ottoman rule. Inspired by the writings of intellectuals such as Najib Azuri and
Abdul Rahman Al Kawakibi and provoked by the tyranny of the late Ottoman rule under
Sultan Abdul Hamid, Arab elites in the region waged a nationalist struggle for the
independence of Arab countries (Rogan 2009). The demand for independence has had to
face the challenge of the Ottoman Empire in its decline and the colonial division of the
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region as enshrined in the Sykes Picott agreement 101 . The assignment of British and
French mandate by the Supreme Council of the League of the Nations and its ratification
in the San Remo Conference came to increase Arab disillusionment of the intentions of
Britain and France.
Arab nationalism would rise to challenge both powers in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
Palestinian nationalism, as an integral part of this movement in terms of geography and
identification was caught in a qualitatively different challenge: in addition to the British
Mandate, the advent of the Zionist movement and Jewish immigration represented a
complex challenge. Indeed, this unique challenge would determine the peculiar
Palestinian history that is quite different from Arab history (Said 1992: xxxv). Thus the
early formation of the Palestinian national movement was to a large extent conditioned
by the broader effects of Arab nationalism on the one hand and the struggle against
British colonial government and the Zionist movement on the other. Identification with
Arab nationalism had a divisive effect among the Palestinians in this period. The rivalries
and to some extent the conflicts among Arab national elites on the question of
identification with the Ottoman Caliph as opposed to the visions of Arab unity and
independence were echoed within the Palestinian elites and intellectuals. Ottoman
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Ottoman Empire involvement in the World-War One marked an opportunity for the Entente Powers to
achieve their imperial ambitions towards the region: Great Britain, France, Russia each wanted a foothold
in the East Mediterranean Arab countries. For Britain; the dominant among these powers dividing the
region had to be craved in a way that maintains British simultaneous pledges to different actors. The Sykes
–Picott (referring to Georges-Picott of France and Sir Mark Sykes of Britain) Agreement was the most
important. The agreement was signed in 1916 according to which British and French officials drew lines
for the division of the parts of the region that were coveted by Britain and France during the course of the
war: France reserved the greater part of Syria, a portion of Southern Anatolia and the Mosul district of Iraq.
Britain’s dominion extended from Southern Syria to Baghdad and Basar and the whole region from the
Persian Gulf to the edge of France’s dominion. Britiain’s also included Haifa and Accer. The agreement
left Palestine out of the arrangement as a special international regime of its own (Antonius 1939: 244-5).
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officials played the elites one against the other and henceforth created the chasms
between the notable families who led the movement until the war of 1948: the Khalidies,
the Nashahibies, and the Husseinies. However, with the rise of Turkish nationalism,
repression against Arab nationalist sentiments increased and nationalist demands
(Palestinians included) for independence became prevalent. Palestinian intellectuals were
active in the rising Arab nationalist societies such as Young Arab Society (Al Fatat) and
al-Lamarkaziyya (Decentralization) party. The most prevalent thought was of regional
nationalist identification with Greater Syria (Bilad Al-Sham) including among part of the
Palestinians elites. Palestinian Arab identification remained robust until the increasing
Jewish immigration and British policies gave rise to Palestinian nationalism and “set [it]
apart due to its confrontation with another people claims to the same land” (Pearlman
2011: 27) supported by British colonial government.
The implications of British colonialism in Palestine were more profound and
threatening as it was intertwined with a unique challenge; the Zionist movement and
Jewish immigration. In addition to the demand for independence from British rule,
Palestinians also entertained the future threat of Zionism that was translated into their
comprehension of the tangible and eminent threat of Zionist Jewish immigration to the
life and livelihood of the indigenous population.
Zionism and Palestinian survival

Discerning the effects of British mandate and the influence of the Zionist
movement on British policies in Palestine remains a difficult endeavor. As Antonius
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(1939: 386-389) remarks, pseudo-facts, propaganda, and the secrecy with which British
governments managed its involvement with the Zionist movement, and the clear
influence of pro-Zionists in the British Parliament created a state of inequality between
the positions of the Palestinians and the Zionist. Nonetheless, British colonialism and the
Zionist settlement adventure had increasingly violated the natural rights of the indigenous
Palestinian population: rights “derived from actual and long-standing possession” of the
land of Palestine and the uninterrupted connection they have with their homeland that
goes back to centuries. British colonial policies coupled with massive Jewish immigration
and Zionist policies threatened the mass dispossession and dismemberment of the
Palestinians that violated their natural rights. It also violated their political rights as
indicated in Husain-McMahon Correspondence (Antonius 1939: 390). Violation of these
rights sprung primarily and most effectively by “Zionist success in bringing Jews to
Palestine and constructing a nation for them…meant in loss, dispersion, and catastrophe
for the Palestinian natives” (Said 1992: xxxix).
British policies manipulated and obfuscated the dual process of constructing a
nation and simultaneously negating the already existing one. As Hannah Arendt portrays
it
After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was
considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved –namely, by means of
colonized and hen conquered territory- but…the solution of the Jewish question
merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the
number of the stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people” (Quoted in
Said1992: xxxix).
Thus Palestinian nationalism primarily rose in defiance to these violations and to preserve
these rights and the right of self-determination especially after the revelation of the
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Balfour Declaration content and the imposition of British mandate on Palestine in 1920
(Pearlman 2011: 28). The threat increased as the Palestinians witnessed how the Zionist
movement was out for a Jewish majority and was using the Balfour Declaration, and
European powers’ complicity as a legitimating base for the establishment of a Jewish
state rather than a Jewish homeland.
Fundamentally, Palestinian national movement came into being as a response to
an existential threat. As written in the Arab delegations response to Winston Churchill’s
White Paper of 1922: “The intention to create a Jewish National Home is to cause the
disappearance of the Arab population, culture, and language” (Cited in Sadi 1992: 83).
British policies withstanding and the Zionist movement creeping control of the land,
economy and the resources turned increasing numbers of Palestinians into landless
masses; the reaction to which was the surge of nationalist self-preservation dynamics. As
Antonius (1939: 397) puts it, the Arabs were
determined upon defending their own existence as a majority for the sake of
their existence on the land; when there was no doubt left that the problem was
fundamentally one in which an aspirant nation from abroad aimed at ousting
from its secular holding the nation in possession at home. History shows that a
conflict of that kind, if allowed to develop, can only be resolved in blood”.

Indeed, the nature of the Zionist enterprise pitted the Palestinians in the face of
what they saw as a colonial settler ethno-national force with exclusive and isolationist
nature. The threat was surfaced more acutely following British implementation of the
mandate provisions in 1923: the text of the Mandate reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to
the Balfour Declaration and made no mention of Arab self-determination (Pearlman 2011:
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34)102. Thus the conflict was shaped from the outset as an exclusive ethnic- territorial
struggle that “underline the existential bedrock on which…our [the Palestinians]
experience as a people depends” (Said 1992: xiii) which is the source of violence that
came to distinguish the conflict. However, the years of 1900 to early 1930, although
witnessed violent outbursts especially in 1920s, were marked with the politics of
inclusiveness and peaceful protest under the elitist traditional leadership of the
Palestinians.
Well organized and wealthiest social stratum, members of notable families (a`yan)
took the lead of the nationalist movement by virtue of their previous role in the Arab
nationalist movement and the status they gained under the Ottoman rule. Palestinian
feudal land-based elite had derived its influence and power from family and clan
affiliations and patronage networks and political status they gained as intermediaries
between the population and the Ottoman rule and then the British colonial government
(Robinson 1979: 1). Notables refrained from mobilizing the masses or taking a militant
stance against the colonial government or the Zionist movement. On the one hand
mobilizing the masses would weaken their social and political position, and on the other
it would undermine their role and threaten the privileges they gain from their
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Three Palestinian Arab Congresses were held in 1921-3 with large number of delegates representing the
country’s regions, associations, and religious denominations. At the time the Arab Congress elected an
Executive Committee and a wide range of local and regional associations (commerce and municipal
councils, clubs, and societies) declared that the Congress represents them. This wide support enabled the
Congress to establish a wide network of communication and coordination that embodied the structure of the
movement (Younis 2000: 67-68).
On the eve of 1882 (the first documented Zionist Jewish immigration wave), the religious Jewish
community in Palestine (who were as Palestinians as other religious groups) numbered about 24,000 (5
percent of the population of 500,000). By the conclusion of 1914 (after the second immigration wave) the
number of Jews jumped to 85,000 (Pearlman 2011: 27).
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intermediary role such as public employment, responsibility over crucial endowments,
and the ability to reach to markets abroad.
The politics of this leadership were characterized mainly by its belief in petition,
appeals, and delegations to the British government and other European powers. The
demands were reflected a sound degree of national awareness. As the Third Arab
Congress of 1921 stated them
…a national government responsible to a parliament elected by the native
population Muslims, Christians and Jewish; the abolition of the Jewish Home
principle; and not to separate Palestine from the neighboring Arab states
(Pearlman 2011: 34).

The means above-mentioned and the objectives set forth by traditional national
leadership clearly reflect a certain degree of political wishful thinking: In retrospect,
those elites were acting out a false assumption that Britain was standing at the same
distance between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement. Thus convincing the British
with the fairness of Arab demands would yield. However, all these demands were met
with rejection and instead Britain offered a representative assembly as a consultative
body to the colonial government which the Arab leadership rejected. The offer reiterated
the commitments of Balfour declaration and granted the Jewish community
representation on an equal foot with the Arabs (at the time in 1922 the Jewish population
represented 13 per cent of the total population) (Younis 2000: 58). It is very important to
notice, though, the inclusive stance of Arab demands. Until the 1930s those demands
were not ethnically, religiously, or territorially driven, at least the way they are articulated
in the quote above. To the contrary; the democratic component of Palestinian nationalist
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demand reflects the nation-state (Qutriyya) concept of nationalism that swept the region
at the time, as the term ‘native’ indicates.
Inasmuch as Arab Palestinian nationalists opted to inclusive nation-building they
were aware of the dangers of the Zionist enterprise that would impede the achievement of
democratic and parliamentary elected government. In this sense those demands are
indicative of Palestinians’ awareness of the long-term objective of independence but
failed to understand the immediate threats of colonial policies and Zionist practices that
would soon surpass those demands. The effects of the immediate threats and British
policies would undermine the traditional elite and usher for an era of violence.
The ability of notables to maintain their status and close relationships with the
colonial government was conditioned upon their success in providing social order.
However, colonial government’s policies and the confrontation with the Zionist
movement undermined the notables and increased popular disillusionment with their
leadership, as we discussed earlier. The popular legitimacy of the Executive Committee
of the Arab Congress and its parliamentary, legal, nonviolent tactics was indisputable in
1920s, as Porath (1975) remarks. However, the increased Zionist influence and Jewish
immigration undermined this legitimacy and increased its divisions which exacerbated its
decline. The Notables were divided on the question of nationalism versus social change;
whereas nationalist elites sought to gain political power through independence without
changing the order of social relationships, status elites sought to maintain the political
and the social status quo. Factionalism along these lines would prevail in the hierarchy of
the movement for decades and would be a major source of weakness and inability to
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adopt a cohesive and consistent political strategy or organize an increasingly changing
society.
Profound socio-economic changes were sweeping the Palestinian society.
Landless peasants lost their social status and ability to affect the events, while the attempt
of increasing numbers of them to obtain jobs in the labor market met very limited success.
Working class was small in number and scattered in small industrial projects, which
prevented effective organization or mobilization. British non-recognition of Arab unions
and prohibiting Arab workers from joining the Jewish Union (the Histadrut) left
Palestinian workers to fend for themselves and left behind by the elites. The latter
neglected workers specific class demands and the elitist nature of the national movement
hindered their participation (Younis 2000: 66). Moreover, divisions within the elite found
their proxies in the social structure, which divided the Palestinian society horizontally
along regional belonging and vertically along Family affiliation; usually between the two
main Jerusalemite families; Husseinis and Nashashibis or majlisiya and mu`arada.
Traditional elites’ hegemony in the Palestinian society during this period prevented the
rise of political parties genuinely independent from the influence of notable coalitions. As
Robinson (1997: 7-8) notices, all political parties and institutions of the era were mere
facades of notable politics with one late exception: the formation of the Istiqlal
(independence) Party in Haifa in 1932. Although the leadership of the party was from
notables, it had shown a significant degree of nationalist orientation and militancy. The
party called for the independence from Britain, the end of Zionist settlements, for panArabism, and for greater democratization within Palestinian politics. However, the
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Istiqlal effect was limited and couldn’t change the taming effects of the elites’ politics
that rendered the Palestinian society less politically organized and harder to mobilize.
Thus, the Palestinians entered the 1930s; a period of increased confrontation with
the colonial government and the Zionist movement fragmented and lost between
nationalist political demands and social exigencies of the rapid change accompanied
Jewish immigration and colonial policies that recognized Jewish settlements (Yishuvs) as
self-governing communities while dealt with the Palestinians as Muslims and Christians
rather than a single nations (Pearlman 2011: 35). These circumstances had significantly
undermined the political position of the Palestinians in comparison to that of the Zionist
movement.
The existential connotations of this asymmetry were materialized as the economic
base of the Palestinians development lagged behind the Jewish, and the Palestinian
working class was impoverished and more peasants turned into landless masses, while
the middle class was crushed and lost political viability. The ultimate result was the
inability of the Palestinian national movement to exert significant political pressure on
the British colonial government or to challenge the Zionist movement by tactics of legal
protest. The prophecy of Antonius on the violent development of the conflict would come
true. The policies of the colonial power and the creeping Zionist takeover of the land and
their visible institutional structures that represented a political autonomous entity on the
one hand, and the failure of the Palestinian politics of petition on the other hand explain
the violent developments of 1930s.

303

By 1930s disillusionment with Britain’s policy coupled with the sharp increase of
Jewish immigration and the clashes with the Jews in 1929 ignited Palestinian resistance.
The independence of number of Arab countries in the region made Palestinian
nationalism more assertive on the sought of independence and gaining control over the
mandate Palestine as their national homeland. Political means of protest became more
militant developing from demonstrations, strikes, and sporadic violence into an armed
revolution. The violent events of 1929 especially in Jerusalem revealed the weakness of
the national movement leadership neither to maintain tranquility nor to change British
policies or Zionist threat. Masses disaffection and resentment increased watching
aggressive depilation of their livelihood. In this sense 1929 clashes marked a shift from
restrained mobilization from above to wide range mobilization from below that was
facilitated by the aspects of modernization that changed the socio-economic features of
the Palestinian society (Lesch 1977: 126). Advent social forces within the Palestinian
society accompanied socio-economic transformations and political mobilization
(professionals, artisans, and intelligentsia) in addition to peasants, villagers and workers
who had to pay the highest price as displaced and dispossessed took the initiative from
the traditional elite. The Istiqlal Party role was prominent in setting the popular stage for
the General Strike and the revolution by mobilizing and organizing ‘National Committees’
in nearly all Arab towns before the close of 1935 (Pearlman 2011: 42). Traditional elites
decided to jump into the mobilized nationalist wave and established the Arab Higher
Committee (AHC) that claimed the leadership of an already in-the-making militant and
increasingly armed campaign.
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New political forces changed the structure of social forces in the national
movement by creating an equilibrium that allowed a certain level of convergence over the
main demands of the Palestinians and the means to achieve them. Along with the
continuous British ignorance of the repeated Palestinian demands for independence,
restraining and stopping Jewish immigration and the dynamics of increased dispossession
mid 1930s provided a moment of ripeness for the revolution. However, the ability of
AHC to sustain its leadership regenerated rivalries and fragmentation within the
movement and between different armed factions which undermined Palestinians’
capability to turn the revolution into a political achievement as Pearlman (2011) lucidly
argues. The AHC, in an attempt to co-opt the revolution in favor of its own interests
appealed to the British parliament to establish a legislative council for all inhabitants of
Palestine; a proposal that this leadership rejected in the 1920s as abovementioned. Now
with the increased consolidation of Zionist colonial settlements the proposal seemed the
only way to slow it down from the perspective of the AHC, not the revolution and mass
militancy.
Nonetheless, the armed revolution engulfed nearly every region in Palestine
especially in the countryside. The revolution aggravated mostly those wretched masses in
city suburbs and villages. Political leadership of the national movement, the AHC
neglected the armed resistance and distanced itself from armed struggle although claimed
leadership of the broader uprising and the 6 months strike that accompanied the
revolution. The strike of 1936; the longest in the history of the region, galvanized the
traditional leadership of the national movement and the death of al-Qassam; the most
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prominent revolutionary leader and the decline of armed resistance provided this
leadership with a new opportunity to consolidate its position. The AHC soon organized
another delegation to London appealing for the same demands to which the British
government assigned the Peel Commission of 1937 to explore the causes of the conflict
and to present recommendations for resolution. The Commission recommended the
partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, which the Arabs unanimously rejected.
The proposal provoked a new round of violence for it envisaged the permanent
dislocation of a large Arab population to make room for the Jewish immigrants in the
proposed Jewish state (Antonuis 1939: 406). The Commission, however, noticed that
Palestinian grievances were the same as those triggered previous protest and disturbances
in the 1920s namely, “the desire of the Arabs for national independence” and “their
hatred and fear of the establishment of a Jewish National Home” (Cited in Farsoun and
Zacharia 1997: 107).
The revolution and particularly the wide popular participation and the diversity of
the means of resistance (the general strike, disobedience, noncooperation campaigns, and
the armed struggle) gave the national movement a strong state of convergence and the
Palestinian community a strong sense of purpose. The Peel Commission Partition
proposal embittered the Palestinians and created “a common feeling that they have been
betrayed” (Cited in Pearlman 2011: 48), wrote Lewis Andrews British District
Commissioner in the Galilee; the region where a vast majority of the Palestinians were to
be dislocated according to the Partition proposal. The continuing revolution and British
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harsh measures to curb it, and the divisions within the traditional national elites put the
whole country in a state of random violence and chaos at the turn of 1940s.
Shaping the ethno-territorial boundaries
The second wave of the armed revolution that followed the Peel Commission
recommendation couldn’t sustain under British extreme measures including the
deportation and imprisoned most of the leaders of the national movement. Not less
important an effect was the renewed rivalry within the movement and divisions among
different armed groups. British cooperation with segments of Arab society (local “peace
bands” formed and supported by the Nashashibis) gives an insight in the effect of
divisions. More telling was British-Zionist alliance to curb the wave of armed struggle;
the Zionist Hagana paratroops participated alongside British troops in the fighting.
Coalitions against the revolution show the extent to which it threatened the political and
social status quo within the Palestinian social and political configurations, and between
the Palestinians, on the one hand and the British government and Zionist movement on
the other. The achievements of the revolution: revolutionary forces controlled most of the
rural areas by 1938103, and a new set of demands were adopted in a clear departure from
the traditional leadership demands.
The revolution asserted on economic and political fundamental requests
“including a moratorium on debts, a rent freeze on urban housing and other claims”
103

The year 1938 was also the most violent. The revolutionary factions took control of large stretches of the
country and the British troops waged brutal offensive to quell the revolutionaries, at the time with an
estimated participants of 15,000. The number of British killed in 1938 was 77 comparing to 30 in 1936, and
the number of Jews killed in this year reached 255. Between 1936 to1938 a total of 5,000 Palestinians were
killed (Pearlman 2011: 51).
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(Younis 2000: 62). These demands reflected the emergence of new leadership more
assertive and conscious of its status as being subjugated and dislocated by the British
colonial government and the Zionist movement. Moreover, these demands and
achievements were the ultimate counter-partition plan that Britain adopted and
represented a serious challenge to Zionist plans. While Peels Partition plan would have
drawn the ethno-national territorial formation of the conflict, revolution demands aimed
at empowerment and political independence that would have annulled Zionist project.
Taking into account Zionist parallel territorial achievements reinforced by a well
organized institutional structures (Jewish Agency, authorized by the colonial government
established and consolidated a set of separated social, economic, administrative, political,
and military organizations and institutions that guaranteed a de facto autonomous settler
community, Jewish political authority within the Palestinian Mandate government had
become entrenched as a state-within-a-state” (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 88). At this
point Zionist Jewish structures of separation and ethno-territorial presence provoked
Palestinian reaction as a threatened ethno-national people. This emerging character of the
conflict is yet to be reinforced in the early 1940 by the continuation of violence and the
sharp increase in Jewish immigration and the overt Zionist military actions against the
Palestinians and the British.
The renewal of the armed insurrection in 1938-9, on one level marked the decline
of Palestinian national movement as it became more random and lacked the
organizational coherency and united political leadership; deep cleavages hunted the
movement and traditional elite rivalries revived. The citrus harvest season was also
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approaching; the disruption of the season would have caused an insurmountable cost for
the Palestinian economy.

Arab intervention also contributed to the decline of the

revolution as king Abdullah called for the halt of armed resistance. The dissemination of
the revolution escalated under the British oppression that led not only to the political
quietism of the national movement, but also it weakened the Palestinian society as a
whole. By the imprisonment and deportation of Palestinian leaders that played a crucial
role in the fragmentation of the movement, British collective punishment of the
population undermined society’s collective purpose. Terrorizing the populace by British
brutality weakened its unity and dealt huge damage to its economic viability (Pearlman
2011: 49-50).
On the other side of the divide, the Zionist Jewish community became more
organized politically as the different factions within the movement came to unify their
efforts to face the increase Arab challenge. Their military apparatus (Hagana), well
armed and trained by the British and the British initiative to establish joint British-Jewish
policing force (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 108) gave Zionist settlers the upper hand as
the UN resolution 181 was issued. However, British-Jewish alliance would suffer a fatal
blow as a result of British White Paper of 1939 and its implementation. The White Paper
asserted that Britain had never intended to create a Jewish state in Palestine, and
restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine since, according to the paper, immigrations
rates at the time had met the Balfour Declaration provisions. Furthermore, it pledged to
grant independence to a unitary Palestinian state in ten years. The Zionist reaction was
fierce and immediate: a diplomatic campaign in Europe and the United States coupled
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with a Zionist armed campaign against British troops and institutions in Palestine during
1944-1947104.
The UN resolution 181 launched all-out hostilities between the Palestinians and
the Zionist paratroops while British was preparing to withdraw their last remaining troops
from the country leaving the Palestinians to defend themselves in an asymmetrical
confrontation. The Palestinian society was already drained by the years of the revolution
that left its national movement and social and economic structures in tatters. By contrast,
Zionist movement troops were well armed and trained, and their organizations remained
enact and prepared for an all-out confrontation.

The Zionist movement emerged

victorious even after Arab military intervention in the war of 1948 that was undermined
militarily and politically by the political ambitions of Prince Abdullah of Transjordan
who secretly accepted the Partition resolution. The 1948 events especially the
establishment of Israel (the Nakba, catastrophe in Palestinian Historiography) came not
only to formally and profoundly consolidate a system of exclusion created by the Zionist
movement with the support of the colonial power, but also to announce the failure of the
Palestinian national movement to thwart its adversaries and their objectives. The UN
resolution yielded one state; Israel. The Arab state is yet to be established, and the
Palestinians would endure another major setback in 1967 before they revive their national
struggle. Meanwhile, the minority Jewish community led by the Zionist movement was
turned into a majority overnight within a top-down established state of their own. British
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The Jewish paratroops of Hagana and Irgun launched a campaign of terror and rebellion that was
marked with bombings and assassinations against the British. In 1946 Jewish terrorists blew up the King
David Hotel, the Headquarter of the Mandate government in Jerusalem killing 91 people including Jewish,
British and Palestinians. The military stand-off between the two parties resulted in the death of 169 British
soldiers and 37 Jewish terrorists between 1945-1947 (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997).
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complicity with the Zionist movement and international legitimation of the establishment
of Israel has turned an otherwise heterogeneous settler colonial society into an ethnonational cohort and a sovereign state.
The lost two decades: Re-establishing a captive movement
The events of 1947-8 and the Nakba destroyed the Palestinian society and
national life in every respect: The dispersion of the Palestinians (10 percent remained in
Israel’s proper, 10 percent of the population went to Jordan, 39 percent to the West Bank,
26 percent to the Gaza Strip, 14 percent to Lebanon, 100 percent to Syria, and 1 percent
to Egypt) would structurally condition the development of Palestinian socio-economic
configurations and the revival of the Palestinian national movement. The movement that
lost its political and armed struggle against the Zionist movement partially due to its
factional politics would have to overcome geographical fragmentation of its people.
Moreover, Palestinians refugees -scattered in refugee camps administered by the United
Nation Relief and Works Agency of Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)were expelled from their homes leaving behind them all means of livelihood.
Reestablishing their lives from scratch represented another challenge to resurrect their
national identification and viable social life and political affiliation. Inside Israel, the
Palestinians faced a unique situation: separated from the rest of the Palestinians they had
to maintain their social texture and political life facing discrimination and military rule.
The participation of those Palestinians living in Israel in national struggle was no less of a
challenge than mobilizing Palestinians in the WB and GS and Diaspora. The resurrection
of the movement also confronted the Arab increased intervention in the Palestinian
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question. In particular, Jordan’s control of the West Bank and Egypt’s administrative
authority in the GS following the Nakba represented another odd situation that undercut
the ability of the Palestinians to reconstitute their movement in a collective and cohesive
manner. Arab regimes manipulated the Palestinian cause for their own purposes and to
manage their rivalries while restricted, if not oppressed Palestinian political activities in
their countries especially before the 1967 war.
Palestinian dispersion and Israel’s rejection of the UN resolution 194 denying the
return of the Palestinians to their homes was supposed, as the Israeli leaders hoped to lead
permanently to the assimilation of those refugees in their new locations. This hope was
not completely unfounded as the Palestinian national movement, defeated as it turned,
was in a precarious position taking into account the structural challenges abovementioned
it had to struggle against. The mission confronted the movement was beyond its
organizational abilities and resource in its disposal: the reconstitution of the Palestinian
society and its social and national ties; securing refugees’ right of return, and reversing
the consequences of the Nakba and liberation. Palestinian national movement had to
resurrect a near disintegration Palestinian national existence (Pearlman 2011: 63); an
uphill fight that exceeded the capabilities of the Palestinians.
In exile, dispersal and fragmentation engendered the emergence of competing
political plans as segments of the movement were co-opted by Arab regimes, others
sought to overthrow those regimes as a necessary step in the way to liberate Palestine,
while a third segment espoused the creation of an independent Palestinian movement
(Younis 2000: 100). Moreover, many Palestinian intellectuals, professionals, and
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intelligentsia joined political parties and nationalist movements in the surrounding Arab
countries which increased the difficulty to establish a coherent movement with a certain
sense of unity and centrality. These difficulties withstanding, Palestinian elements in the
WB, GS and the Diaspora started to re-organize the movement in the late 1950s. These
attempts were faced with three systems of oppression and power: Israel, Jordan and
Egypt; each for its own reasons oppressed Palestinian national sentiments and their
sought to revive. The instability created in the neighboring Arab countries following the
Nakba in 1948 (military coups in Egypt and Syria and the advent of Arab nationalism),
and especially the war of 1956 against Egypt under Nasser provided a window of
opportunity for mobilization and revival for the Palestinians.
A new nationalist cohort emerged in GS and the WB that took the lead to
resurrect and

strengthen Palestinian nationalism around the collective feelings of

historical injustice, exile, and alienation from homeland. The consequences of the Nakba
were still fresh in the hearts and the minds of Palestinians. Not surprisingly, those
consequences were the in essence the ground in which the reconstruction of Palestinian
national life was planted. Reuniting the dispersed and fragmented population required a
powerful aggravating centripetal process with a core. Palestine, land and history have
become the ultimate inspiring core of mobilization of Palestinian nationalism regardless
of the location, social status or profession. As Anis al-Qasim puts it
“Every Palestinian was lost…it made no difference whether he left the
homeland or remained in it, whether he was impoverished and lived in a tent or
became rich and purchased gardens, or whether he carried a refugee certificate
or a diplomatic passport” (Cited in Pearlman 2011: 63).
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Exile, loss, homeland, and return became the main identification elements of the
re-emerging Palestinian nationalism and identity. The depopulation of Palestine in the
eve of 1948 and its population with Jewish Settlers resulted in a strong Palestinian
identification with the land as the ultimate sanctuary of social cohesion and political
expression of the common identity. The replacement of Palestinians with hundreds of
thousands of new Jewish immigrants who took their land, businesses, and properties was
echoed in strong identification with land and space; homeland. Therefore Palestinian
refugees and the Palestinian national movement saw in the Right of Return a core
element of collective identification. Return of the refugees “was always a matter of when
and how, not whether they would return” (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 127) that links
national identity with the territory, space, and political rights.
Yet, reshaping the Palestinian collective national identity is one thing and turning
it into a politically organized action is quite another. Unifying the Palestinians; the
‘Nakba generation’ and the ‘generation of revolution’ (to use the Palestinian parlance)
and mobilizing them behind a well-defined objectives and strategy would take almost two
decades of organization. The effort to resurrect the national movement by the ‘generation
of the revolution’ in 1950s and 1960s ushered the emergence of new social forces that
would take the painstaking burden of reconstruction. New conditions coalesced to
produce different socio-economic and political configurations: the Palestinian population
was transformed from agrarian rural and illiterate to urbanized, increasingly
prolitarianized, and literate (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 127). These processes increased
levels of social differentiation and allowed the emergence of new young educated
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middle-class leadership that took the initiative in the 1950s to establish the “National
Liberation Movement” (Fateh). At the time, Fateh echoed the rising nationalist
sentiments and longing for redress, repatriation, and reversing the consequences of the
Nakba. Thus it adopted a nonpartisan organizational scheme and took ‘unity and
liberation’ through armed struggle as the pillars of its agenda. However, the ability of
Ftah to unite the Palestinians in the Diaspora and those remained in Palestine was
compromised not only by geographical fragmentation and dispersion but also by the Arab
regimes’ heavy hand on the Palestinian cause during the 1950s until the Sex-Days war of
1967.
Nascent clandestine Palestinian armed groups in Gaza Strip and the Diaspora
initiated by Fateh in the late 1950s and early 1960s lacked the structural capacity and the
resources to form a coherent and politically effective institutional framework. This
framework was provided through a top-down Arab effort to co-opt the rising trend among
Palestinians to widen and increase armed struggle against Israel. Jamal Abdul-Nasser of
Egypt held the first Arab League summit in 1964 and announced the formation of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Ahmad Shuqayri. Fateh
and other Palestinian armed groups resented the plan not just because they were excluded
from its constitution but as well for Fateh’s mistrust of the intentions of the Arab regimes
and their ability to deliver the goal of liberation. Nonetheless, Shuqayri, following
Nasser’s decision and support succeeded to hold the first Palestinian National Council
(PNC) in Jerusalem the same year. The PNC as the legislative body of the PLO adopted
the first Palestinian National Charter and announced the formation of the Palestinian
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Liberation Army (PLA). The Charter, as the informing document of the goals and means
of struggle reflected a broadly stated agenda. It firmly cites the Palestinian people’s right
in his sacred homeland, Palestine and confirms the inevitable combat for the liberation of
Palestine by mobilizing Palestinian material, military, and spiritual resources in the
sought of this goal.
Although both the PLO and Fateh aspired the same end namely, the liberation of
Palestine neither side spent a serious effort to mobilize the Palestinians masses whether in
the Diaspora or inside Palestine. Fateh’s approach was still in the phase of underground
recruitment while the PLO was meant to contain Palestinian mass mobilization. Fateh
waged a campaign of armed operations inside Israel to show its relevance and the
weakness of the Arab-led PLO. Other armed groups joined the effort to prove their
nationalist credentials (Pearlamn 2011: 66).
Unified by the means of struggle, these groups were divided under the effect of
Arab regimes’ rivalries and antagonisms: Egypt-Jordan tensions on issues of Arab
nationalism and the relationships with Britain and the participation in Baghdad Pact, and
Egypt-Syrian competition to take the lead of the Arab Nationalist movement (See Rogan
2009: 83-92) split Palestinians on the question of the relationship between Arab
Nationalism and the liberation of Palestinian. Fateh insisted on the notion of self-reliance
and the independence of the Palestinian decision; a position that was emboldened after
Israel’s invasion of the GS in 1956 and the armed resistance she faced. Contending that
the liberation of Palestine is the precondition for Arab unity, Fatah gave supremacy to
Palestinian unity and populace politics whereas other Palestinian-Arab-Nationalist groups
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preached for the opposite logic. Fateh published its own journal Filastinuna (our
Palestine) that incorporated the movement’s principles and tenets: as the name of the
journal indicates, Fateh simply sought to “call to life” the Palestinians and to restore their
common purpose, the liberation of homeland105 through the reconstruction of their own
movement independently.
Palestinians were already involved in Arab politics through active participation in
the plethora of political parties and movements emerged after 1948: communists, Muslim
Brotherhood, Ba`thists, and pan-Arab and Arab Nationalist movements aggravated many
Palestinians including those turned in the early 1960s to form autonomous Palestinian
armed groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Arab parties and movements
offered the Palestinians a window of opportunity for political expression and identity that
promised to compensate for the dispersion and fragmentation. Thus at the eve of the 1967
war, Palestinians in the Diaspora and in the WB and GS were struggling primarily to
reassemble the pieces of their shattered social, political, and economic, structures and to
give a sense of identity and direction to their forthcoming liberation mission. The period
from 1948 until the eve of 1967 was strikingly a period of survival and rejuvenation
through which the Palestinian national movement could not exert any significant political
pressure on Israel. The latter consolidated its sovereignty in its proper and strengthened
105

Filastinuna argued in a language of embittered and angry nationalists that “…hysterical or
anaesthetizing broadcasts and rousing speeches, the contents of which we all know in advance…The Arabs
have [bound] the Palestinians’ mouths, tied their hands, deprived them of their freedom of action in what is
left of their country, resisted the idea of their regroupment, turned them into theatrical claque which
applauds this and reviles that…We cannot just sob and wail…we cannot just recite our woes and reiterate
our complains. We must gird ourselves-we alone- to solve our problem in our own way” (Quoted in
Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 175-6).
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its political and military structures to a degree where any military challenge from the
Palestinians or/and Arab neighboring countries would be rebounded.

The rise of Palestinian ethno-territoriality
Falistinuna, cited above echoed Palestinian disillusionment with Arab regimes’
policies towards the Palestinians and Fateh’s sought for political representation and
national revival in the Diaspora and in Palestine. However, a clear plan to deal with the
differences between the conditions of different Palestinian cohorts in different locations
wasn’t articulated. At the eve of the 1967 war Palestinians in the WG and GS endured
both similar and different experience. Jordanian and Egyptian regimes adopted a dual
policy of co-optation and suppression: both regimes co-opted traditional social elites in
their bureaucratic apparatuses as well as in their political institutions in the case of Jordan.
Simultaneously, they suppressed political expression and organization especially in the
WB where the Jordanian monarch practiced sovereign powers.

The emergence of the

middle-class that would take the lead of the national movement in the WB and GS was
had been crippled by these factors. No socioeconomic profound changes took place as the
pattern of weak industry and shrunk market persisted. Most of the Palestinians in these
areas especially in refugee camps were dependent on UNRWA aid and on seasonal jobs
in agriculture. The merger of the WB with Jordan and opening Jordanian economy to the
Palestinians made the development of a national movement weaker. The emerging
middle-class in both areas, however, managed to mobilize popular support, even though

318

slowly, to its radical nationalist and anti-imperialist stance (Younis 2000: 105). In GS
extreme exclusion from the rest of the Palestinians and the Suez war against Egypt of
1956 and Israeli invasion of the Strip triggered a stronger armed resistance movement
against Israel. In the Diaspora, Palestinian armed groups were gaining more ground
whereas the Arab-led PLO was increasing its legitimacy among Arabs and Palestinians
alike. Palestinian armed groups, inspired by the Algerian revolution, Vietnam liberation
wars and Cuban revolution, ignited a new spirit for people’s liberation armed struggle as
the key to redeeming the lost homeland (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 178).
The PLO was gathering political viability in a large context due to the
endorsement of a wide range of popular and professional organizations that were
established after 1948 in an effort to rebuild Palestinian ties and social structures106. Thus,
1960s was a period of revival and rejuvenation for the Palestinian national movement in
spite of factional politics, ideological rivalries and Arab manipulations.

The

Palestinization of the struggle against Israel by means of people’s revolutionary war
became the motto of the newly formed Palestinian factions (Younis 2000: 107) that
started to mobilize and recruit Palestinians and Arab cadres to their ranks.
The war in 1967 marked a turning point in the conflict: now the entirety of
Palestine became under Israel’s control and the WB and GS have turned formally into the
Occupied Palestinian Territories. The war disrupted a process of Palestinian national
106

Early 1960s witnessed the formation of several occupational, sectorial, and public organizations that
subscribed to the PLO and became part of its structures. These organizations were growing in size,
representation and activities: The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), The General Union of
Palestinian Workers (GUPW), The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPWomen), The General
Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT), and the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), were established
and represented the main popular backbone of the PLO
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revival that was in the making accompanied, and indeed resulted from the reconstruction
of Palestinian social networks in exile. The consequences of the war on the Palestinian
political thinking and strategizing were profound. In the first place it confirmed Fateh’s
argument that Palestinians could not rely on Arab states to solve the Palestinian calamity.
Thus the aftermath of the war witnessed immense Palestinian efforts to unify ranks
especially following the battle of Al-Karameh on the Jordanian soil in 1968 in which
Palestinian guerilla fighters and the Jordanian army fought a heroic battle against the
invading Israeli troops that were forced to retreat behind their cease-fire positions of 1967
(Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 182).
The Arab defeat in the war and the renewed Palestinian catastrophe has injected a
new spirit of survival and national identification: “The word ‘Palestinian’ for two decades
synonymous with the downtrodden and displaced came to conjure images of youth,
intelligence, courage and sacrifice” (Pearlman 2011: 67). The new spirit gave a
remarkable opportunity for mobilization and unity as the Arab regimes eased their
restrictions on Palestinian political activities following their defeat. The late sixties and
early seventies ushered Palestinian national resurrection which, in the words of Edward
Said (1992: xx) had been
a painful reconstruction of an exiled Palestinian identity. The efforts of many
Palestinian political workers, fighters, poets, artists, and historians to sustain
Palestinian identity –all of these have teetered alongside the confounding fear of
disappearance, given the grim determination of official Israel to hasten the
process to reduce, minimize, and ensure the absence of Palestinians as a
political and human presence in the Middle Eastern equation.
The torn apart Palestinians in Diaspora were rising in unity and national pride in the wake
of a major loss with a collective sense of purpose as a people; the Palestinian now has
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regained her identity and assured his purpose in liberation of the homeland. In the OPT
steadfastness on the land and its protection and collective self-restoration were supreme
goals in the face of Israel’s colonialism.
More profoundly, Arab defeat and the following events enabled the Palestinian
factions led by Fateh to take over the PLO in 1969. Yasir Arafat was elected as the PLO
Chairman by the PNC and a new era of national unity under the umbrella of the PLO was
ensued marking the revival of the movement within a new structural framework.

Israeli

occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967, ironically,
contributed to the solidification of Palestinian nationalism by pushing them to the wall.
Israel’s dismissal of the Palestinians as ‘Arabs’ and then as a ‘demographic reality” –
never as a people 107 - produced unintended consequences; it provoked Palestinians’
collective instinct for survival and revival. For the Palestinians their very existence as a
relevant political entity was on stack. Simultaneously the mobilization strategy of the
PLO re-established the ties between Palestinians in the newly occupied territories; the
Palestinians remained inside the Israeli proper; and the Palestinian in the Diaspora.
Popular organizations of the PLO and the recruiting efforts of the factions within it made
remarkable achievements in terms of resurrecting Palestinians’ collective sense of
identity and unity as Lustik notices (Cited in Knox & Quirk 2000: 91). However, the
revival of the Palestinian national movement was compromised by the lack of
organizational coherency and factional politics, and strategic inconsistency of the PLO.

107

In 1969, Golda Meir said that there were no Palestinians and her consultants called them ‘Southern
Syrians’. Yitzhak Rabin always referred to the Palestinians as “the so called” Palestinians and his Labor’s
policy sought turning them into Jordanians. Menachem Begin referred to the Palestinians as the “Arabs of
Eretz Israel, Israel’s ‘own’ blacks (Said 1997: 138).
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Perhaps no other national liberation movement has gained the degree of solidarity
all over the world, especially in the Third World that the Palestinian national movement
elicited:
It has been the most successful in obtaining worldwide attention and formal
recognition from governments and international organizations. It is the only
political movement in the recorded history that is formally recognized, by more
governments throughout the world, than its adversary’s government” (Ahmad
2006).
This paradox becomes more perplexing taking into account that at the turn of the twentyfirst century the PLO has to struggle not for liberation but rather to salvage a portion of
the Palestinians’ rights for a portion of the Palestinians on a portion of the Palestinian
land. This “discrepancy between important political, moral, and cultural gains on the one
hand, and, on the other, a droning ground bass of land alienation is at the heart of the
Palestinian dilemma” (Said 1992: viii). It becomes more striking when we think of the
ability of the Palestinian national movement to endure despite not only its inability to
achieve its goals but also to circumscribe the successes of its adversary.
This section discusses the failure of the PLO to adopt and sustain a consistent,
coherent and functioning strategy based on a meaningful ideology or vision that is drawn
from the lessons of confrontation with its adversary since the onset of the conflict. This
misgiving indicates another failure: the inability of the PLO leadership to grasp the
complexity and dynamism of Zionism and the nature of its power, and therefore to adopt
strategies and goals that can challenge Israel’s power and domination. These dysfunctions
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impeded PLO ability to develop and adopt a coherent and consistent winning strategy
that minimizes dangers and maximizes opportunities.
There is a wide agreement among scholars and observers of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict that PLO strategic objectives and the tactics it deployed were distinctly
inconsistent (E.g. Said 1992, Gordon 2008, Pearlman 2011, Ahmad 1996, Klien 2010,
and Abunimah 2006). Writers on this topic notice the volatility of the contexts within
which the conflict developed. Indeed, the two characteristics of PLO strategy shifts and
the volatility of domestic and regional contexts are interlinked at many levels. PLO
inconsistent political aspirations and the lack of a coherent blueprint that it may have
sought persistently since the articulation of the National Charter in 1969 cannot be
explained apart from understanding certain contexts that constituted and reconstituted
PLO political thinking until its sharp turn toward capitulation in 1990s.
PLO Internal dynamics
The Fourth Palestinian National Council of 1968 adopted the Palestinian National
Charter (PNCH)108 that enshrined the objective of the Palestinian national struggle as the
liberation of Palestine from the Zionist colonial grip. The Charter articulated the triad:
“[Palestinian national] unity, [Arab] national mobilization, and liberation (Article 11) that

108

The Charter (or the Covenant in some resources) was declared in July 1968, and it consists of 32 Articles.
It was ratified by all the members of the PNC who included representatives of all Palestinian organizations
and factions. Article 32 states that the Charter is not subject to changes unless within a special session of
the PNC with two-thirds of the members voting in favor of changes. (From the official website of the PNC).
http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=542%3A2011-06-27-0943-21&catid=94%3A2010-05-25-10-53-41&Itemid=357&lang=ar
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intensified the main goals of the movement. Articles 1 and 2 of the charter asserted the
Arab identity of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people. The logic of the
Charter is based on the linkages between the Palestinian people’s right of selfdetermination and the liberation of Palestine (Article 3) as the prerequisite for practicing
this right on the one hand and the illegitimacy of the state of Israel and the partition
resolution of 1947 (Article 19) as antithetical to the Palestinian natural right in their
homeland on the other. Moreover, the Charter annuls the Balfour Declaration and all that
resulted from its implementation, and rejects the historical claims of the Zionist
movement in Palestine as anathema to the facts of history.
The Charter depicts Zionism and the state of Israel as colonial racist entities;
“Judaism is not a nationality but a religion and Jews do not constitute a single people”;
rather they are citizens of the states where they live, as the charter states. Therefore the
Palestinians reject any resolution to their plight short of ultimate liberation of the entire
Palestine as defined geographically by the Mandate (Articles 20, 21, 23).
The PNCH, at least theoretically represents the overarching document that draws
the strategic objectives of the Palestinian national movement. From the articles presented
above it leaves no room for improvising on the rights of the Palestinian people in terms of
their homeland, Palestine and the exclusivity with which it perceives Zionism and the
state of Israel. It represents the conflict as a zero-sum game where Palestinian aspirations
are linked necessarily to abolishing the colonial presence of the adversary. Although it
doesn’t include any religious or mythical connotations and justifications, the PNCH puts
forth the epistemological underpinnings of the conflict in secular materialist nationalist
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terms. Palestinian nationalism in this sense is the negation of the negation that inflicted
upon the Palestinians. It is also inclusive and democratic in terms of the definition that it
presents for the Palestinian as an individual and the Palestinians as a nation; all
Palestinians are equal regardless of their religious, ethnic, gender or any other affiliations.
This philosophy was indeed the antithesis of the Zionist/Israeli religious ethno-national
territorial enterprise.
However, the PNCH turned into a normative scheme that underpins the
aspirations of the movement not the actual political blueprint of all its components.
Taking into account the new facts in Palestine in the wake of 1976 (dubbed the Naksa or
the catastrophe in Palestinian terminology) and the balance of power between the PLO
and Israel, the former assumed a maximalist stance in the face of maximalist Israeli
colonialism. As the political program of Fateh indicated, Israel’s extreme aggression on
the Palestinian land and rights should be met with Palestinian extreme measures; the sole
means of resistance is armed struggle and the goal is to liberate Palestine, the whole
Palestine (see below). The charter, in a large measure, reflected the political thinking of
Fateh as the largest, most popular, and most influential in the PLO, and changes in PLO
political strategy would result mainly from Fateh’s own assessments. Fateh’s hegemony
in the movement was not friction-free and the way the PLO and its factions perceived the
PNCH and the goals of the movement within the overarching objective of the Charter
were crucial in shaping PLO’s politics.
The PLO after 1969 encompassed factions of all ideological strands; secular
nationalist (Fateh), leftist Marxist-Leninist (DFLP), leftist Marxist nationalist (PFLP),
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organizations affiliated with Arab regimes (Sa’iqa, and the Arab Liberation Front) and
the other smaller organizations. Each of those factions and organizations had a high
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the PLO; the structural organization of the PLO hadn’t
included any authoritative leverage over the decisions and actions of those entities.
Added to the regional and geographical dispersion, the existence of many independent
factions compromised PLO’s ability to construct a coherent organizational structure of
command and a consistent political translation of the PNCH. Thus, in spite of the fact
that the Charter set the broader framework for the Palestinian national movement each
faction and organization maintained its own political program that challenged other
programs as a tool of recruitment, mobilization and legitimacy. Ideological and personal
rivalries especially between the three main factions –Fateh, PFLP, and DFLP- impeded
their coordination around common goals and means of struggle. The loose organizational
structure of the PLO that gave each faction a certain degree of autonomy forced the
adoption of a consensus framework of decision making, which turned the PLO into a
political system rather than a structure of national liberation movement. The leadership
could never exercise a degree of monopoly over the national decision that characterizes
most of the successful national movements of the modern-day, as Helena Cobban lucidly
remarks (Cited in Pearlman 2011: 7). The PLO lacked the powers of a sovereign entity
that would have enabled it to enforce binding rules and codes of conduct to compel the
factions and organizations within it to act in a unified fashion. Decision making remained
a matter of consensus Twafuq where leaders of the factions (especially largest ones)
immersed in marathon deliberations to reach a compromise. Competition and rivalry
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among the main factions and their political perspectives overshadowed the ultimate ends
as articulated by the PNCH:
Fateh focused on nationalism as the supreme arena of struggle; avoided social
questions and class-struggle; and rejected the intervention in Arab host states’ own affairs
and denounced international armed operations. It defined the Palestinian struggle in
simple terms; the liberation of the whole of Palestine and the liquidation of the Zionist
entity. This goal is not the sole responsibility of the Palestinians although they play the
central role in it; it is also the obligation of all Arabs. Therefore the conflict is not only
national-Palestinian but also and as much is national-Arab. Fateh also envisioned the
creation of an independent sovereign democratic Palestinian state that preserves the rights
of all its citizens on an equal foot, with Jerusalem as its capital 109. PFLP by contrast,
called for Arab unity, social revolution, and the overthrow of authoritarian Arab regimes,
and practiced armed activities against civilians in the region and beyond.
The political program of the PFLP calls for armed struggle in the sought of the
right of
return, self-determination, and the establishment of the Palestinian sovereign
state en route of defeating the Zionist entity and the liberation of the entire
national soil and the establishment of the democratic state of Palestine in
which all citizens enjoy equal rights without discrimination on racial, gender,
or religious belief, on the way to establish a democratic social society as the
ultimate end. (italics are mine)110.
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See
the
official
website
of
“Al
A`sifa”,
the
armed
http://alma3raka.net/spip.php?article829&lang=ar
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See the official website of the PFLP. http://www.pflp.ps/news.php?id=534
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DFLP adopted the “Staged Program” in 1971 that called for the achievement of
the right of return, self-determination, and the establishment of the Palestinian sovereign
state on the OPT of 1967. On the long run the DFLP espoused the establishment of a
democratic secular state in all Palestine 111 . The DFLP agreed with the PFLP in the
necessity to thwart ‘reactionary’ Arab regimes but it shunned the nationalistic stance of
the PFLP and called for a strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist principle, and took the side
of Fateh in rejecting armed struggle against civilians or international operations. The one
can’t but notice the striking similarities of these programs as to the general goals of the
movements and their differences on the milestones to achieve on the road.
The paradox that PLO leadership confronted was that in order to maintain unity as
a categorical imperative it has had to accommodate all factions and tolerate ideological
rivalry; unity in this context hindered the achievement of a consistent national strategy, a
political blueprint, and stable alliances. Under these organizational circumstances politics
within the PLO became increasingly contentious especially on the two issues of the
relationships with Arab regimes and the acceptance of diplomatic initiatives to reach a
political settlement to the conflict. Fateh, has been able to shift the strategy of the PLO
not by virtue of internal institutional processes of decision making deliberations; rather
by resorting to its hegemonic political position, its popularity, and its ties with Arab
regimes. The rule of consensus was compromised dramatically after PLO departure from
Lebanon in 1982; Yassir Arafat opted to a majority decision making process ignoring
criticism of other organizations in the movement. Although in the 1970s Palestinian
111

See Blasi, Sharaf (2008). The Rise of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=144494
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internal rivalries and disagreement created serious cleavages within the PLO, the unity of
the movement took a supreme imperative. In the aftermath of 1982 expulsion and the
from Lebanon factional contentious politics turned into a divisive stance that reached a
climax in 1992-3 when the PLO signed the Oslo Accords against the will of most the
factions within and out of the PLO. There is nothing indicative of the effects of Arafat
and Fateh’s hegemony than changing the PNCH in 1996, which officially changed the
underpinnings of the PLO as a national liberation movement as we discuss below.

Regional and international dynamics
The fact that the PLO was formed and based in the exile and that the main bulk of
its constituency lived in the refugee camps in the countries surrounding Palestine made
the movement vulnerable to regional politics and Arab states’ rivalries. Soliciting Arab
hosting regimes’ acceptance to operate among Palestinian refugees and using their
territory as a base required the PLO and different factions within it to modify their
policies and discourse in accordance with regimes’ considerations and sensitivities.
Regional politics of the 1960s were an arena of pacts and counter-pacts in which rising
nation-states (Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) sought a supreme status. The
PLO was caught in the middle of these power circles without gaining a strategic and
stable ally among those powers. Quite the opposite, PLO suffered serious strategic
setbacks as a result of the animosities and conflicts with those powers (Said 1992: x-xiii).
In Jordan; the first and closest base to Palestine the PLO and its factions was involved in
an armed conflict with the ruling monarchy following PLO attempt to impose
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revolutionary authority alongside the government. The military confrontation of 1970
that was decisive in determining which party has the upper hand and in solving what
came to be known as a “dual authority” ended with PLO defeat. Leftist organizations
(PFLP and DFLP) were adamant on the necessity to overthrow the Jordanian regime
while Fateh opposed it and called for focusing on the struggle against Israel. Although
the PLO did not trust the regime in Jordan as competing and disputing the legitimate
representation of the Palestinians, the lack of unity and agreement on a strategy triggered
the military confrontation in Jordan (Pearlman 2011: 75). Fateh’s position was taken by
the DFLP and PFLP as a verification of their earlier criticism of Fateh as abandoning the
principle of revolutionizing the Palestinians and Arabs that is necessary for the long term
struggle against Israel. They accused Fateh of having vested interests in allying with
reactionary Arab regimes (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 193).
The confrontation with the Jordanian regime resulted in major strategic loss of the
most important, widest, closest to Palestine and most populated area of Palestinian
refugees. The PLO had relocated in Lebanon where it was more successful in establishing
its status as a political power in internal Lebanese politics. The weak state in Lebanon
enabled the PLO in 1969 to strike an accord with the Lebanese government that granted
the latter control over the refugee camps and the right to wage armed struggle against
Israel from southern Lebanon. For the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon this was a source
of relief after years of oppression by the Lebanese security apparatuses and
discrimination as they were treated as “alien residents”. The PLO consolidated its
position in Lebanon vis-à-vis the government by building a resistance coalition with
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Lebanese progressive movements creating an atmosphere of revolutionary sentiments
that gave boost to armed operations against Israel. However, this interference coasted the
PLO another heavy political and strategic price when it involved in a long and bloody
Lebanese civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1981(Younis 2000:159-161, Farsoun and
Zacharia, 1997:184-5, and Pearlman 2011: 74-76) and resulted in complicating the
relationship between the PLO and the Syrian regime, and the increase of mistrust and
animosity between the Palestinian national movement and Jordan.
Regional development in the 1970s introduced opportunities and restraints to the
Palestinian national movement. Arab military offensive against Israel in the 1973 war
coupled with Arab ‘oil embargo’ against Western states revived Palestinians’ hopes and
expectation for the liberation of their homeland. The war showed Israel’s vulnerability
but also revealed the limits of Arab military power and their political willingness to
challenge Israel’s great power ally; the U.S.A. Under the pressure of the American
diplomacy Arab combatants signed cease fire agreements with Israel. The agreements as
well as the resulted UN resolution 338112 sidelined the Palestinian element of the conflict
and offered Israel a de facto recognition by Arabs who accepted the resolution as the
basis for solving the conflict. For the first time since 1948 Egypt, Syria, and Jordan
accepted UN invitation to participate in the Geneva peace conference alongside Israel.
112

In response to the Ramdan War (Yum Kipor in Israeli historiography) in which Egypt, and Syria
initiated a surprising war against Israel, the UN Security Council issues the resolution 338 of October 1973.
The resolution includes three articles distinguished with a strong language to stop the war and start peace
negotiations based on resolution 242 of 1967: it called all the parties to “cease all firing and terminate all
military activity immediately, not later than 12 hours” after the adoption of the resolution. The resolution
also called the parties to start implementing resolution 242 in all its parts right after cease fire. The Security
Council also “Decid[ed] that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in
the
Middle
East”
(http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/65/IMG/NR028865.pdf?OpenElement).

331

UN resolutions 242 and 338 ignorance of the Palestinians and their rights was further
entrenched by Israeli refusal of PLO participation in the conference. More to the
resentment of the PLO, the USA refloated the idea that Jordan was the representative of
the Palestinian people. Under the pressure of these critical diplomatic developments the
PLO, to the resentment of the PFLP and other smaller organizations and under through a
coalition between Fateh and the DFLP, supported by delegates from the West Bank and
Gaza strip -participating for the first time in PNC meetings- took the first and major
strategic shift of its agenda in both the objectives and the means of the struggle.
In the 1974 Twelfth Meeting of PNC the PLO adopted a new strategy that
abandoned the goal of a ‘democratic’ secular state and the liberation of Palestine in favor
of establishing a Palestinian ‘national authority’ on any liberated part of Palestine. The
10-Point Transitional Program in Point 1 reconfirmed the PLO rejection of UN resolution
242 and in Point 2 called for the establishment of a national authority in any Palestinian
areas liberated from or evacuated by Israel as a ‘phased’ plan en route to total liberation.
The new blueprint also endorsed the use of all means of struggle and thus sanctioned the
resort to diplomatic alongside armed struggle to achieve this goal and reiterated the PLO
commitment to achieve all Palestinian legitimate rights especially the right of return113.
Arab regimes pressure and their new strategy compelled the PLO to make a profound
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The PNC, in the introduction of the decisions taken in the meeting confirmed the drivers of the shift in
policy as “the new political developments and circumstances emerged in 1972-3 (referring to the 1973 war).
It is important to notice that the PLO in order to show that the new strategy does not imply capitulation
included articles that confirm the refusal of any political initiatives that provide Israel with recognition or
grant it secure borders or reconciliation and reaffirmed its commitment to achieving all Palestinian rights
especially the right of self-determination (From the official website of the PNC).
http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=542%3A2011-06-27-0943-21&catid=94%3A2010-05-25-10-53-41&Itemid=357&lang=ar
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transformation from a guerrilla revolutionary movement to a political and they rewarded
this transformation by the recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people in the 1974 Arab League summit in Rabat
(Morocco). PLO quest for recognition made another breakthrough following this shift;
the UN granted it observer status. In a deeper level, this shift marked the beginning of a
redefinition of the PLO as a national liberation movement.

The involvement of the PLO in the diplomatic processes that aimed at a political
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the consequences of the 1967 war implied
the de facto transformation into a national independence rather than a national liberation
movement. This question, however, was not answered fully as Said (1992 p134) until the
current day as the PLO is still oscillating between its inability to achieve neither objective.
Thus in 1977 the PNC clarified the 10-Point Program of 1974 by stating that the
‘national authority’ objective means the acceptance of a state in these borders. The PLO
went further to show its willingness to coexist with Israel: leaders of the PLO started
holding meetings with Israeli peace activists and initiated indirect dialogue with the
United States (Pearlman, 2011 p86). Two major events at the turn of 1970s reinforced the
transformation of the PLO and its explicit acceptance of the two-state solution, with the
implicit recognition of Israel: First, The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 under the
auspices of the U.S.A. The treaty changed significantly the regional balance of power in
favor of Israel the treaty ushered by depriving the Arabs, and the Palestinians in
particular, the most militarily powerful state that could challenge Israel and deter its
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aggression (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 203). Moreover, the provisions of the treaty on
the Palestinian question endorsed Israel’s –particularly the Likud- vision that espoused
creating Palestinian autonomy within populated areas in the OPT (autonomy over the
population not the land). Second, Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 that led to the
departure of the PLO from Lebanon and to moving its headquarter to Tunisia while the
most of the military infrastructure of the Palestinian organizations and the PLO was
depilated and the remnants of it were dispersed in different Arab states. Now the balance
of power between Israel and the PLO witnessed a new level of asymmetry in favor of
Israel. The military threat of the PLO through the Lebanese borders was curtailed to a
large extent and the political viability of the PLO and its ability to maintain relevancy
were significantly undermined.
The rapid decline of the PLO contributed to the PLO unified acceptance of the
Fez Arab League summit peace plan of 1983. The plan specified the terms for achieving
peace in the Middle East as the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the
WB and GS. It also confirmed the right of all states, including the proposed Palestinian
state, to live in peace and security (Ibid p203). The Arab peace initiative virtually adopted
the basic elements of the Saudi King Fahd’s ‘Eight-Points Plan’ of 1982114. The Fez plan
implicitly recognized the state of Israel. Development of this magnitude was welcomed

114

The elements of the plan were familiar, and loosely based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338: Israel to
withdraw from 1967-captured territories, including East Jerusalem (but not the whole city), dismantling of
settlements, recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian representative, establishment of an independent
Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, and secure guarantees of peace. Fahd’s plan was not popular
at home with the Saudi intelligentsia, middle class, and clergy who were strongly critical of any proposal
that recognized Israel. http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_fahd_1981.php
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by the United States as a breakthrough while rejected by Israel who was at the time
battling its way on the Lebanese soil to reach Beirut.
Israeli continuous military invasion of Lebanon undercut the Fez peace plan. However,
the consequences of PLO departure from Lebanon were yet to be translated into more
shifts in Palestinian political behavior in the same direction. The 16th PNC meeting in
February 1983 accepted the Fez peace plan as the minimum requirement for Arab
political strategy; it also noticed the positive aspects of President Regan plan for peace
that he initiated at the wake of the Lebanese war. However, the PNC dismissed Regan
plan as inadequate for achieving a just and durable solution for the Palestinian cause.
Israeli and U.S.A ignorance of the Fez peace initiative and PLO new stance coupled with
the deterioration of PLO in this period and the financial crisis it endured pushed the
leadership, Yassir Arafat and Fateh in particular to seek a political and diplomatic revival.
For this leadership sustaining the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people had become an end in itself and sustaining its role as an accepted
player in the region became a priority. Ignoring internal huge opposition 115 , Arafat
continued his diplomatic endeavor and reached an agreement with King Husain of Jordan
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PLO sense of threat on its own survival and political relevancy as a main actor in region’s politics can
be noticed in the language and the substance of the 16th PNC decisions. The PNC stressed “the rejection of
all plans that aim at undermining PLO right in representing the Palestinian people” and reiterated the
centrality of sustaining “the independent Palestinian decision” (Official website of the PNC).
http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=556&Itemid=345&lang=ar
In 1983-4 the PLO was divided as never before; the internal consequences of PLO strategic shift after 1982
were manifested in polarizing political forces along the entire spectrum of Palestinian factions and
organizations within and outside the PLO. The PFLP, DFLP, and other factions formed the Democratic
Alliance that opposed Arafat’s leaning towards Jordan and advocated a policy of alliance with Syria.
However, they maintained their position of sustaining the unity of the PLO. The PFLP-General Command
of Ahmad Jebriel, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Fateh defectors (the Revolutionary
Council) and the Sa`iqa (all of which Syria’s allies) formed the “National Alliance” and rejected the PLO
under Arafat’s leadership. Arafat and Fateh remained the major block in the PLO (Pearlman 2011: 90).
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in 1984. Amman Accord announced Jordan-PLO a comprehensive peace in exchange for
withdrawal from the OPT. The Accord deepened the chasm within the PLO; all
opposition organization apart from the DFLP and the West Bank-based Communist party
(later on the Palestinian People’s Party PPP) came to form the “Palestinian National
Salvation Front” as the alternative to the PLO. For those Arafat’s explicit acceptance of
the two-state solution was nothing less than treason. The main opposition organizations,
the DFLP and the PFLP boycotted the next meeting of the PNC that rectified Amman
Accord. The PLO would remain divided and the PNC wouldn’t be assembled again until
1987 when the Palestinian intifada in the OPT erupted; the later development was another
turning point in the history of the PLO and the Palestinian strategic political thinking.
The intifada: restoring ethno-territoriality
The accumulated experiences of the national movement in the OPT and Israeli
occupation policies created the background for the revival of Palestinian nationalism.
One of the main consequences of Israel’s occupation is that it rekindled national
awareness of those Palestinians who became under its direct military rule as a people
bound to other Palestinians in Israel and the Diaspora with a distinguished connection.
They are not any more the ‘Arabs’ Israel expelled and dispossessed, now they reemerge
under Israeli oppression as nationalist and patriot Palestinians (Sadi 1992: 137) whose
self-consciousness re-emerged and consolidated particularly in the face of Israeli
negation and ignorance. This consciousness had been gradually translated to political
actions in the OPT, as we discussed earlier, by early 1970s. Israeli policies and regional
developments abovementioned drove people en mass to identify with the PLO and
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different factions under its umbrella. Socio-economic transformations of the Palestinian
society in the OPT that sprung from Israeli policies contributed significantly to the rise of
nationalism: Robinson (1997) notices that Palestinian labor in Israeli market and
employees’ remittances from expatriate and refugee Palestinians in the Gulf raised living
standards for many Palestinians. Real GDP increased by 1119.5 percent in the WG and
86.4 percent in the GS from 1967-1987.
These changes undermined the traditional social base of affiliation; conservative
and patron-client social structures waned and replaced with growing middle-class
configurations. Inequality, Palestinian labor working conditions in Israel, subjugating
Palestinians to oppression and taxes…etc created a ripe soil for political activism and
militancy against Israel’s occupation. The mobilization effort and success gave the
movement more confidence and opened the eyes of the exile leadership on the crucial
role of mass mobilization and organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fateh,
following the example effort of leftist organizations, had involved in the establishment of
mass organizations for students, women, workers, artisans, teachers…etc. Mobilizing the
masses through these politically-oriented and top-down-led organizations in the 1970s
and 1980s had created the organizational structure within which the intifada of 1987 took
place. The role of the “inside” (Ad-Dakhil) is not any more perceived in terms of
steadfastness but also as crucial in resistance to occupation through direct actions and
militancy (Pearlamn 2011: 96). Although factionalization and rivalry of the PLO were
transferred to these popular frameworks as Younis (2000: 168) notices, the pressure and
daily confrontation with Israeli system mitigated the effects of fragmentation. The
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flourishing mass organizations contributed to the rise of democratic norms of leadership
and participation that gave the movement more political relevance and strength in
challenging Israeli domination and rule by establishing the power of people. Gaining a
political and moral leverage over Israel’s occupation would reach its peak in 1987 with
the onset of the Intifada.
This pattern of national mobilization and political militancy was deepened in
response to main two events that ignited Palestinian protest: the Israeli-Egyptian Camp
David peace treaty and Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Camp David peace
treaty sidelined the Palestinian question and reduced the rights of the Palestinians to mere
“autonomy” (or self-rule) over the population. By ignoring the PLO Israel, Egypt, and the
U.S.A stroke a deal on behalf of the Palestinians while excluding their representative.
Thus the Palestinian question was left to Israeli own discretion. Palestinians were left to
the Likud aggressive colonial policies were escalated as Begin now had a free hand to
conquer his ideological precepts. Israel colonial machine, now under the supervision of
Erik Sharon (a minister in Begins Cabinet), was unleashed to construct a network of bypass roads, settlements, and military bases on the purpose of confining Palestinians.
Ultimately, this process was creating a continuous Zionist presence in the OPT and a
discontinuous Palestinian existence. Autonomy plan coupled with Likud’s colonial
offensive
left in the minds of the Palestinians that the autonomy could never become
anything more than a carefully regulated, minutely controlled reservation for
confining them, and an authority on Palestinian nationalism…for eliminating
their national aspirations” (Said 1997: 207).
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It further created a sense of abandonment and neglect by the most powerful Arab
state that was until recently the vanguard of Arab nationalism and Palestinian rights. The
treaty triggered a wave of demonstrations that Israeli security forces curbed forcefully;
killing protesters, imposing curfews, and mass arrests were used to silence the protest.
Related to the Camp David treaty, as Begin felt the free hand and taking the
opportunity of sidelining the Egyptian balancing power, Israel initiated its war on the
PLO in Lebanon in 1982. Accompanied the war an Israeli massive and harsh oppression
in the OPT against the GNC and the upheaval that erupted in protest of Israeli military
assault in Lebanon. As we discussed above, the war left the PLO in a political and
organizational debacle that was exacerbated by the divisions within its ranks. Arab
political and financial support to the PLO also declined significantly in the years
following the war116: the Arab summit of 1987 ignored the Palestinian issue altogether in
its deliberations. It was the first time since the establishment of the Arab League in 1945
that the Palestinian question did not dominate the Arab political agenda, which alarmed
the Palestinians especially the PLO for the necessity to take action in order to restore its
status as major player in the region. These developments positioned the OPT as the main
arena for the PLO to reconstruct its political viability and to revive Palestinian ability to
sustain the Palestinian question as a core, if not the core issue in the turbulent Arab
region in the 1980s.
116

The decline of Arab financial support to the PLO can be seen as a result of the economic crisis of the
1980s that stemmed from the decline of oil prices; oil prices that plummeted from a high of $42 per barrel
in 1982 to $8 in 1986. Arab and world exporting countries were in serious economic retrenchment and
recession. PLO main source of financial aid was seriously decreased. Moreover, Arab regimes were
preoccupied with Egypt’s exit from the Arab politics and Arab league following its peace treaty with Israel
and the Iraqi-Iran war. Lebanese continuing civil war was still a main issue in Arab politics. All these
issues contributed to the Arab position in the summit (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 204).
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Palestinian vigilance and willingness to mobilize and organize in the OPT
following the political objectives of the PLO was the last resort of the PLO leadership
now operating from Tunisia; a decisive challenge that required restoring the movement’s
unity and political/diplomatic relevance. The split in the PLO following Amman Accord
and the devastating internal armed conflict within Fateh left the whole movement in
disarray (Younis 2000: 162). In short, the very legitimacy of the PLO was on stack.
Under these conditions reliance on the role of the Palestinians in the OPT became
paramount, which entailed shifting the emphasis and political and operational energies
from the Diaspora to the interior (ad-dakhil). The shift changed the political map of the
conflict whereby the main arena of confrontation would be inside Palestine117. The 18th
meeting of the PNC in April 1987 -5 months before the eruption of the intifada- restored
the unity of the PLO especially after dismissing Amman Accord. Retaining Palestinian
consensus on the challenges and objectives of the struggle in this period reawakened the
PLO and reinforced its popular support among the Palestinians especially in the OPT.
The meeting reassured the “commitment to achieving the immutable national rights of the
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From my own observation of the atmosphere in the OPT in the mid 1980s as an undergrad in An-Najah
National University in the city of Nablus and a political activist I can register the euphoria of national
revival. The war in Lebanon, and particularly Israel’s siege of Beirut and the heroic resistance of the
Palestinian factions and PLO and the Lebanese nationalist forces ignited the masses in the OPT. The image
of Palestinian freedom fighters in Lebanon captured the minds and hearts of the people and provoked
action. PLO’s debacle in Lebanon and Arab silence while Beirut was under Israeli assault especially in the
wake of the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila had outraged people and
created a fertile soil for mobilization and recruitment. Simultaneously, Israeli occupation authorities
launched a massive security campaign to undercut the increasing wave of nationalism; arrests on a large
scale, house demolishing, curfews were deployed. Collective punishment had become the norm especially
in response to stone-throwing and cocktail bomb attacks. In 1985 Israel revived the efficacy of the British
emergency law of 1945 that gives local military commanders wide range of jurisdiction to enact all kinds of
procedures against the population including shutting down schools and universities. The latter were
targeted in specific for students’ leading role in the events. Relying on the 1945 law Israel detained and
deported 10s of activists and kept hundreds under Administrative Detention for indefinite periods of time.
Israel’s draconian measures only increased resentment and willingness to militant confrontation among
increasing numbers of Palestinians especially the youth.
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Palestinian people”. It also reconfirmed that “the PLO is the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people” and the rejection of intervening in Palestinian
own affairs and/or the attempts to create an alternative to the PLO. Alluding to the Camp
David treaty, the PNC reiterated the rejection of UN resolution 242 and all other plans
that aim at the liquidation of the Palestinian cause118.
Thus the moment was ripened in 1987 for a mass uprising. The intifada itself
reflected the overwhelming sense of unity and political strength generated by the
restoration of Palestinian common goal as the achievement of national self-determination.
The degree of organization and militancy of the intifada gave the Palestinian national
movement the first and most important achievement since the 1948: it gained political
leverage over Israel. Israel was not able to curb the uprising regardless of the extreme
measures it took, which raised questions within Israeli polity and society on the
political, moral and economic costs of upholding the occupation…It became clear
that the existing forms of control were not producing the desired calm and that
another strategy was needed” (Gordon 2008: 169).
Political leverage the Palestinians gained was primarily and to a large extent the
result of the convergence of Palestinian struggle against Israel’s occupation. Convergence
was evident on two main levels: political and organizational.
On the political level the intifada reaffirmed the oneness of the Palestinian people
in Palestine and the Diaspora under the leadership of the PLO. Thus it gave credibility
and vibrancy to the PNC resolutions few months before its onset. Slogans and periodic
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http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=558&Itemid=345&lang=ar
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communiqué of the National United Leadership of the Intifada (NULU) stressed the
Palestinian people’s right in self-determination, the right of return and the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state in the OPT. The NULU also reasserted that the PLO is
the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; this was the consensus as
90 percent of the Palestinians in the OPT claimed the PLO as their representative
according to polls (Pearlman 2011: 101).These objectives and proclamations echoed the
pillars of the PLO strategy thus far. The NULU expressed the popular will of the vast
majority of the Palestinians in the WB and GS who demanded an end to the Israel’s
military occupation of their land. The intifada united the “inside”, the “outside”, the
factions, the society en mass, and the political leadership behind single and clearly
articulated demands for the first time.
On the organizational level the intifada turned almost instantly from outrageous
upheaval to a very well organized effort with levels of command and popular institutions
under the NULU. The ability of NULU to establish the organizational elements of the
uprising was not surprising taking into account the years of mobilization and organization
of popular committees and organizations, as we discussed above. In the words of Joost
Hilterman who was in the city of Ramallah at the time
remarkable… that the entire population could be mobilized simultaneously, and However,
NULU was remarkable in terms of its ability to create a vertical hierarchy that
encompassed the main components of PLO factions in the OPT (Ftaeh, PFLP, DFLP,
PPP) and prominent social figures.
A horizontal structure for popular participation and organization was established
by constructing the “Popular Committees of the Intifada” (PC) in every city, village,
refugee camp, and in neighborhoods within these residential areas. Thus the NULU,
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being in direct connection with PLO leadership in Tunisia, brought the “outside” with the
“inside” in one organizational process. Moreover the NULU was not only the legitimate
leadership and the “highest law of the land” but also it devolved decision making to
“Popular Committees” to choose their own members and to carry activities within the
broader political and programmatic framework of the NULU.
Ultimately, the vigor with which the NULU and the “Popular Committees” led
the intifada “inspired and was inspired by an invigorate sense of collective purpose in
society. A society that participated in the intifada through the PCs in defiance campaigns,
street demonstrations, displaying national symbols, general strikes, boycotting Israeli
goods, social solidarity activities, civilian protection and security groups…etc, had shown
exceptional ability to sustain and redraw the geographical politics of the conflict as a
struggle for national-territorial self-determination on the OPT. Images of Israeli soldiers
breaking the bones of Palestinian protesters, and youth throwing stones in confrontation
with heavily armed Israeli troops captured media outlets all over the world and generated
a sweeping movement of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. From the Palestinian
perspective moment seemed ripen for a political breakthrough to take advantage of this
unique change of the political balance of power.
One Year through the intifada the PNC was called for an extraordinary meeting in
Algeria mid November 1988. Resolutions taken by 18th PNC conference (The 19th in
some sources that do count the Amman meeting of 1985) (The Session of the Intifada,
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National Independence, and the Martyr Khalil Al Wazir119 ) were a landmark in terms of
the extent to which PLO was willing to reach in the dubbed “Palestinian Peace
Offensive”. As the name given to the conference suggests PLO transformation to an
independence movement was the hallmark of the peace offensive. In addition to the
“Declaration of Independence” that the meeting issued it recognized UN resolutions 242
and 338 and the ‘Land for Peace’ formula proclaiming the state of Palestine with the
occupied territories as its patrimony and East Jerusalem as its capital. The image of
Yassir Arafat in the midst of a storm of applause declaring “…in the name of God and
the name of the Arab-Palestinian people we declare the establishment of the state of
Palestine on our Palestinian land…” conquered the headlines and Palestinian zeal in the
OPT reached a climax. The Palestinian new position included an implicit recognition of
Israel that is embedded in the UN resolutions 242 and 338, and called for an international
conference under the auspices of the UN to settle the conflict in the ME. The PNC was
clear in the demand for Israeli withdrawal from the OPT and to annul Jewish settlements
and all other forms of annexation in the OPT (PNC official website).
In effect the PNC also recognized the UN Partition resolution of 1947. Factions
and organizations who opposed PNC new policy, especially the PFLP maintained their
position for the record but abided by the majority and refrained from defecting the PLO.
119

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was one of the founding leaders of Fateh and considered to be the Second
in ranking following Yassir Arafat. Abu Jihad was known as one of the most talented military commanders
and has led the Fateh’s most important armed brigades, AL-Qita` al-Gharbi (The Western Sector) that was
specialized in armed attacks inside Palestine. Israeli intelligence affiliated the man with the eruption of the
intifada. In addition to his history in armed struggle Israel assassinated al-Wazir in his mansion in Tunisia
on April 16 1988. Israeli commandos were deployed on the Tunisian shores headed by Ihud Barak stormed
the house and carried the killing. His assassination stirred a wave of rage and anger in the OPT where the
intifada was already in its heyday. For the Palestinians Israel aimed at cutting off the intifada by removing
one of its masterminds. Massive demonstrations were launched in every corner of the WB and GS and
Israel imposed curfew on almost the entire OPT.
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The meeting authorized the Executive Committee of the PLO and Chairman Arafat to
pursue and exhaust diplomatic initiatives in order to give the Palestinian offensive
international and regional efficacy and momentum. Arafat and PLO legitimacy was as
high as never before: the PNC reunited the PLO and gave Arafat a free hand to seek
diplomacy and the support from the OPT and the NULU galvanized his position. Soon
thereafter, and depending on the Palestinian consensus the PLO issued a joint statement
at the close of a meeting with U.S Jewish delegation in Stockholm. The statement further
indicates the length to which Arafat took the PNC resolutions. It stated that the both sides
agreed to inter into peace negotiations at an international conference under the
auspices of the UN; establish the independent state of Palestine and the
acceptance the existence of Israel as a state in the region; the PLO declared its
rejection and condemnation of terrorism in all its forms including state terrorism;
they called for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with
international laws and practices and relevant UN resolutions (including right of
return or compensation) (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997 p206).
The Palestinian “Peace Initiative” gave the PLO a new international recognition
as more than 100 states recognized the Palestinian state, and Arafat was invited to give a
speech to the UN General Assembly. The U.S.A Government denied Arafat a visa and
the UN moved the session to Geneva where he addressed the UN reiterating the elements
of the Palestinian peace initiative and stressed PLO condemnation of terror.
However, the Palestinian imitative receded for many reasons, the most important
among which was Israeli rejection. Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir and the
Likud did not reciprocate. Rather it dismissed the initiative as a mere show of deception
by Arafat. The U.S.A followed on the Israeli path and demanded Arafat to abandon
ambiguous language and recognize the right of Israel to exist and to renounce terror not
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merely to condemn it. Moreover, by the turn of 1990 the intifada was in decline due to
Israeli oppression that left its organizational structures in tatters.

These developments

were followed by the Gulf crisis and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that led to the first Gulf
war of 1991 in which Yassir Arafat took the Side of Iraq against U.S-led invasion.
Arafat’s position pitted Gulf States and U.S against him. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities
imposed the extremist security and military measures in the OPT (long term and wide
range curfew was imposed and transportation and mobility were impeded and an
unprecedented campaign of arrests was carried out) when Iraq was bombarding Israeli
cities with long-range missiles. The PLO and the Palestinians found themselves in a
precarious position as the war ended with the U.S.-led coalition triumphed at the time
when the Soviet Union was collapsing, which marked a dramatic change in international
and regional balance of power in favor of the U.S and its allies; Israel being among the
those.
The Madrid Peace conference of 1992 was one manifestation of the new power
configurations in the region following the Gulf war and ushered the beginning of a new
phase of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict under the Palestinian Authority that would
become the main outcome of the Oslo peace accords signed by the PLO and Israeli
government. This phase strikingly marked the decline of the Palestinian national
movement and PLO backtracking even on the independence scheme. The PLO came into
terms with Israeli conditions as it accepted to establish a nominal authority that
accomplished merely part of the Palestinian national and political rights (as the PLO
espoused them), for part of the Palestinian people (those who live in the main cities of the
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OPT marked as “A” areas in Oslo agreements), on part of the Palestinian soil (the OPT
and particularly parts of the WB and GS), to which we return in the conclusion of this
whole part of the study.

To wrap up one may say that the experience of modern Palestinian national
movement as represented by the PLO was born within and conditioned by certain
structures that shaped its main characteristics and crippled its ability to exert serious
challenge to Israel’s domination. The first and most important of which is the
consequences of Israel’s success in controlling the entire territory of Palestine in 1948
(expulsion, fragmentation, and dispersion) and 1967 (alienation, exclusion, and
exploitation). In the first place Zionist and Israeli exclusionism and the system of colonial
segregation they established generated a maximalist Palestinian stance that aimed at
abolishing Israel’s aggression and its illegitimate takeover of Palestine. This had resulted
in a Palestinian rigid nationalism that sought total reclamation of what was lost namely,
homeland.
Israel’s entrenched colonial buffer that it established deprived the Palestinian
national movement from the geographical base to engage the domination system of its
adversary from within. The rise of a democratic national liberation struggle while the
Palestinian community is shuttered and dispersed was hindered by these structural
conditions. Although the PLO in the late 1960s adopted a democratic liberation agenda,
the limited access it had to the space and geography of Palestine undermined its ability to
unify and mobilize the Palestinians in a democratic struggle. Following the 1967 the PLO
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suffered another strategic loss that deepened the asymmetrical power relationship
between the Palestinians and Israeli rule in favor of the latter. The dynamics of the
conflict have consolidated its ethno-nationalist and territorial nature. Two parallel
trajectories were in the making: Israel’s territorial maximalist stance, and the PLO’s
territorial minimalist demands. The prospects for a democratic struggle were sidelined
and a struggle for independence prevailed as the two adversaries consolidated their ethnonational ethos within spatial and territorial boundaries.
The structures of Israeli colonialism, however, do not explain the entire Palestinian shifts
in strategy; Palestinian national movement’s own structures and social build-up played a
crucial role. The movement and the PLO is the youngest in the Middle East. Time has
important implications in this respect in terms of the decision making mechanisms,
organizational traditions, and ideological underpinnings; all of which contributed to the
peculiar volatility and inconsistency of PLO’s political thinking and shifts of strategic
planning. PLO is a coalition of disparate factions led by Arafat. Each of which has its
own politics and led by the same manner Arafat led the movement; vertical hierarchy and
personified leadership. Fraction and rivalries, the lack of structural and organizational
center, and different agendas have undermined the movement ability to adopt a unified
blueprint and seek it persistently. Moreover, PLO’s emphasis of the armed struggle had
put the political arena of struggle in the second place and with it the role of the masses
especially in the main arena of struggle, Palestine. It also postponed the rise of people’s
political will and power to engage in a mass organization to turn Israeli occupation into a
costly enterprise politically, morally, and economically. The main arena of struggle,
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Palestine has not witnessed the emergence of the Palestinian challenge that would have
turned the OPT into an ungovernable terrain for Israel until mid-1980s. Downplaying the
role of masses and popular resistant contributed to fixating the struggle as between two
political entities and henceforth undercut the democratic dimension that could have
developed. Perhaps the most important outcome of PLO characteristics and political
thinking is the failure to establish the necessary organizational constructs to elevate
Palestinian struggle as one people that should have encompassed the Palestinian inside
Israeli proper; the absence of this dimension gave Israel the political and legal ability to
divorce its Palestinian citizens from the broader movement of Palestinian struggle for
liberation. PLO style and political attributes contributed significantly to the development
of the conflict in the ethno-territorial direction it took and reached to the point of
capitulation for Israel’s terms and conditions in who and how to determine the territorial
institutional boundaries of Palestinian independence.
Israeli exceptionalism
Systems in general collapse either by internal dynamics of decay, erosion and
structural contradictions, or by external effects. In many occasions both effects overlap to
lead a system decline especially social systems for the fact that they are interactive and
dynamic. Under certain circumstances external effects play an enabling role that
reinforces the internal dynamics of change; South African apartheid regime is an example.
As Sisk (1995) notices, the apartheid regime collapsed primarily as a result of its own
dynamics whereas regional developments (the rise of anti-colonial nationalist regimes in
Southern Africa and South Africa’s military adventures) contributed significantly to the
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salience of apartheid on international agenda. The latter waged a series of sanctions and
boycotts against the regime that changed the decision making environment of the regime.
More importantly, international tools of pressure on the regime were diverse and steadily
developed to converge in one direction. Except for the United States of America who
joined international campaign later on, a front of governmental and non-governmental
forces all over the world pooled their effort to de-legitimize the regime in South Africa.
In this respect world’s efforts, almost consensus, on the illegitimacy of an ethno-racial
regime to which the sole alternative is a unitary democratic no-racial regime also
converged with internal struggle seeking the very same objective.
The South African case shows the crucial importance of international
convergence on universal principles that overlapped with domestic struggle for the same
universal norms namely, the principle and right of self-determination; the
impermissibility of racial, ethnic, religious, or any kind of domination; and the
prevalence of Human Rights, equality, and universal democracy as the acceptable norms
of governance and nation-building. International de-legitimating of the South African
regime, although took place against the background of the demise of the Cold War and
the changes accompanied it, which created new strategic constellations of global power,
was instrumental in the collapse of apartheid.
Obviously, the nature of the international order has changed in post-Cold War era
and with it the nature of conflicts and international intervention approach. The
willingness of powerful states in the world to intervene in many conflicts has decreased,
which has serious implications when it comes to the duration and violence of many
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conflicts as Zartman (1997: 5) notices. Spheres of influence that characterized the Cold
War and drove superpowers to intervene in order to maintain their respective spheres
have changed; regions of importance in the new distribution of world power also changed.
Ethnic and civil wars, intrastate disputes, and irredentist movements flourished.
International reluctance to intervene poses serious questions: “How much unconstrained
conflict and brutality will the international community allow? How widespread is the
right of self-determination, and who may claim it?” (Zartman (1997: 5). And more
particularly, in the ear of post-totalitarian regimes and the collapse of authoritarianism,
how acceptable is the domination of one ethno-national group/people on another ethnonational group/people? In this respect, the Palestinian case is unique; it is the last case
(along with Kashmir) to which the decolonization principle of self-determination applies
to. It is the most internationalized national liberations case (taking into account heavy
international presence in the conflict since 1917 through all phases of the conflict).
However, international efforts to solve the conflict only exacerbated its rigidity, and
superpowers’ support of one party, Israel impeded the emergence of international
consensus or convergence on the requirements to resolve the conflict.
In post-Cold War the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cuts deep into the
abovementioned questions. It begs answers to the question: What drives the world of
today to legitimate a system of religious ethno-national differentiation namely, Israel’s
ethnocracy? And how, in spite of all changes in the structures of the international system
Israel has maintained its position as an exception of the universal understanding of
inclusive democracy? Parallel to this Israeli source of power and impunity is an ongoing
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Palestinian plight having to fight an exceptionally favored regime in the international
arena. What is the main source of Israel’s ability to sustain such close ties with
international dominating powers and generate identification with the Zionist and Israeli
enterprise in Palestine? In spite of major changes in regional and international
constellations of power and changes in geopolitical and security configurations Israel
maintained its privileged status in the western countries especially in the U.S.A; what
accounts for this phenomenon?
First this section examines the peculiar type of relationship between a selfsustained colony with global centers of power. Remarkably, Israel and the Zionist
movement succeeded to continuously situate their existence and viability within
international power dynamics in the ME as indispensable regional hegemony. The
peculiarity of the Israeli quasi-colony is that Israel obtains a high level of autonomy and
ability to exert leverage over its sponsors. Among the most important consequences of
this type of relationship is the discrepancy between the internationalized nature of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the inability of international institutions to intervene
effectively to resolve it. Second, we entertain the relationship between the United States
of America and Israel as one of the major obstacles to reach a political settlement to the
conflict. US policies in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict play a major role in
impeding the emergence of a convergent international position and policy that would
contribute to the resolution of the conflict. American strategic relationship with Israel
contributes significantly to crippling international institutions’ ability to fulfill its role and
abide Israel by the resolutions of the UN and provisions of International law pertaining to
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the conflict. Ultimately, American support to Israel and shielding it from international
intervention put the Palestinians and the PLO in a precarious position facing a powerful
strategic alliance that gives their adversary unprecedented impunity. The two
considerations we discuss ultimately contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the
ethno-national territorial character of the conflict, and consolidated Israel’s selfidentification as an ethnocracy, which stands anathema to a democratic outcome of the
conflict.

Israel and super-powers: a quasi-colony-metropolis link
The conceptual framework (Chapter II) discussed the peculiar nature of settlercolonial societies as distinct from classic types of military foreign colonization. The
former gain life of their own and gradually, usually in a long period of time, they
transform into an ethno-national group in and for itself. In this sense their relationship
with their metropolis changes and they achieve more independent. French colonizers of
Algeria, for example and their adherents in France became a political and institutional
power in French politics and succeeded to postpone French withdrawal from Algeria for
a long time. The price was heavily bloody, though. In South Africa, the Afrikaner white
state although was formally established by Britain, it sought independence from British
influence ferociously. Those had been self-sustained settler societies who sought the
metropolis political, diplomatic, and military support as autonomous colonies. Selfsufficiency of settlers’ societies had been reinforced and solidified systematically by
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asserting sovereignty and righteousness vis-à-vis the external world and segregation visà-vis the native nations they conquered.
The case of Israeli is peculiar in this respect. The Zionist movement was not a
colonial settler society that belongs to the colonizing power citizens. Rather, British
preferred the Zionist movement to colonize Palestine and the Zionist movement brought
Jewish immigrants from all over Europe and molded them (or milted them) into one
religious ethno-national group. Although, Zionism relied on British support and
legitimation (recall that the Balfour Declaration was the first and most important juridical
basis of Zionist claims in Palestine) Zionist Jews did not hesitate to turn against Britain
once the latter showed reluctance to allow more Jewish immigration. Zionism at this
point was turning its energy to the U.S.A, the rising global power. This reorientation of
international strategy was consolidated following World War II and resituated Israel
within the new world order as a western fortress in the face of the communist threat and
nationalist sentiments.
Zionist movement and the state of Israel have waged the struggle for their
purposes in the international arena with the same, if not more persistent and importance,
they gave to their efforts in Palestine. Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann is a leading
example, realized that their objective should be raised and planted in the interests and
moral identification in the great capitals of the western countries (Farsoun and Zacharia
1997: 322). Zionist most prominent thinkers such as Moses Hess, Theodor Herzl, and
Joachim Prinz (see page 27-8) submit that Zionism is to be carried out by the Jews
themselves with the assistance and support of major European powers. They argued that
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Zionist plans for Palestine would reinforce European powers’ position in the ME.
Zionism, in this sense was presented as a colonial agent that would mediate between
European civilization and the backward region by establishing Zionism as a Jewish entity.
Thus European powers’ most crucial complicity with Zionism was nurturing the
perspective by which Palestine, a territory outside the metropolitan Europe was declared
empty and available to white European settlers to civilize it. Two factors were functional
for the ability of Zionism and Israel to fit within the western global dynamics of power,
colonization and most recently with U.S.A. hegemony: presenting Zionism as a national
liberation movement that conforms to the liberal ideas of Europe and the U.S.A, and
Israel’s democratic discourse and it’s the notion of Israel’s indispensability for the
protection and existence of the Jewish people. We turn now to each of these two factors.
First: Zionist movement introduced itself as a national liberation and anti-colonial
movement that was fighting the British colonial rule and a minor penniless residue of
Arabs. The struggle against the wishes and the rights of the indigenous population was
suppressed and concealed from western nations whereas notions of higher purpose and
civilization were emphasized. Zionist discourse and justifications for colonizing Palestine
conformed to European colonial precepts. We noticed earlier the European colonial
element of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. The extension of the colonial logic relied
particularly on argument pertaining to the idea of a “higher more worthy, more modern,
more fitting interest, cause, or mission” (Said 1992: 15) that supersedes the indigenous
Palestinian existence and the right of native Palestinians. The higher interest was not only
Zionism’s but as well British. In the Words of Balfour himself promising Palestine for
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Jewish Homeland serves interests that render indigenous rights and opinion irrelevant:
“…in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes
of the present inhabitants of the country” (Quoted in Said 1992:16).
This discourse overlaps, as Tilley (2005) remarks with the history of the Jewish
problem in Europe and the USA that is still producing some hard self-critique in these
countries as a result of the atrocities perpetrated against the Jews in the first half of the
Twentieth century. Western and especially European powers’ long-standing moral deficit
vis-à-vis Jews is one of the main sources of these countries’ exceptional treatment to
Israel. Even before the Holocaust, opposing Zionist appeal for the reconstruction of
Palestine as a Jewish homeland would have been considered anti-Semitic especially after
the advent of fascism. Taking into account that Zionism not only linked its objective to
colonial justifications (claiming Palestine as a backward and uninhibited territory) but
also as the place where Jews could reestablish their unique historical linkages with their
promised land. In this sense Zionist ideas resonate to the Christian-ethnic and religious
belief that Palestine is a biblical land plays an important role in the support Israel receives
in these countries. Palestine for Millions of Christians in the West is a proto-Christian
terrain, and the Jewish people of Israel is seen as the carriers of the Judeo-Christian
values and therefore nullifying the indegeneity of other religious or ethnic peoples lived
or living in Palestine.
Zionist enterprise in Palestine fits neatly with the precepts and justifications of
white colonialism of Northern America in particular. Clearly, Zionist propaganda
conformed to the same mentality that motivated and drove white settler-colonial practices
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in these areas. Indeed, Zionism and Israel “enjoyed an astonishing dominance in matters
of scholarship, political discourse, international presence, and valorization” (Said 1992:
xiv). However, propaganda does not create states and nations; it did not establish Zionism
and Israel as well but it enabled diffusion the ideas on Zionist-Jewish successes as a
pioneering movement, with exceptional institutional and moral enthusiasm that turned
Palestine into a blossoming land. This Jewish model plays a crucial role in the
perceptions of the western nations on Palestine, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon culture
and mentality. American people, as a society of pioneering settlers find it easy to identify
with the Zionist model. Suppressing Arab Palestinian existence and social, cultural, and
laborious life in their land has been part of the diffusion of the idea of ‘higher purpose’ of
Zionism that corresponds to the White colonialism in Northern America that applied the
same diffusion of ideas about Native Americans that accompanied and justified the
destruction of native civilizations in the USA and Canada. In Northern America, as in
Central and Southern America, white
pioneering colonialism seeks to exclude and eliminate the native inhabitants
rather than to occupy and exploit them…it is a form of colonialism that offers
refuge to the disinherited, to persecuted minorities and to the surplus,
marginals, and misfits created by industrialism and modernization in the
metropolis” (Ahmad 2006: 303).
The epistemology of colonial settler enterprise that negates the native Palestinians and
seeks to suppress their existence resonates with the colonial past of the Europeans within
Europe and in the Western hemisphere.
The idea of higher purpose turned to be that the Jewish ought to rule in Palestine
as a distinct, and indeed exceptional, religious ethnic-national people. In essence, British
357

and Zionist agreement on the irrelevance of the indigenous and “downplaying them as
somehow secondary and negligible” (Said 1992) remained a core element in the Western
world and particularly in USA policy towards the Palestinians. Supplanting the Zionist
movement as its institutional expression, the state of Israel has become the supreme focus
of the west and the U.S.A. Thus, western countries not only created the state of Israel but
also pledged to its survival and strength until the current day.
The prevalence of the Zionist discourse in the west yielded its most important
fruits in 1948; UN recognition of the state of Israel ignored totally demographical facts
and social and ethnic texture of Palestine. When Israel was declared a state, Jewish
immigrants and the Zionists legally owned 6 percent of the land. These facts seemed
irrelevant from an Occidental point of view that distinguishes European colonial
mentality; the natives as backward, less human, less valuable, and their rights are inferior
to those of the European settler and to the Zionists as bearers of European civilization. In
essence UN resolution legitimized state and nation building that was an anachronism:
legitimating a settler-colonial society as an ethno-national sovereign state in the era of
decolonization. This brings us to the second point, Israel.
Second, international position and political discourse especially in the West
spring, at least partially, from the ability of the Zionist movement to link its legitimacy
with the existence of the Jewish state as a prerequisite to prevent genocidal intents against
the Jews people. Israel’s “right to exist” and Israel’s security” represent the overarching
mantra under which Israeli exceptionalism is being justified. This linkage underlies the
argument that criticizing Israel undermines the legitimacy of Jewish people’s right to
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exist and defend itself, therefore “either a Jewish state will survive or Jewish annihilation
will follow” (Tilley 2005: 133).
Jewish history in Europe plays a major role in this connection; persecution of the
Jews, discrimination they endured, and the Holocaust generated a paradigm within which
Zionism was equated to Jewish survival, and Israel equated with sanctuary. Criticizing
either Israel or Zionism can easily be considered anti-Semitic. Israel’s legitimacy and
exceptional status it enjoys in the western world relies heavily on the epistemological
underpinnings we presented as they pertain to liberalism. The ability of Zionism and the
state of Israel to conceal its racist character, its expansionist colonial endeavor, and its
ethno-religious nationalist tenets originate primarily from Israel’s image as a democratic
regime fighting an insurgence movement, and then a terrorist menace, rather than a
national movement seeking national self-determination. At different turning point of the
history of the Palestinian-Israel conflict, Israel, Zionist movement, and their adherents
invoked the infamous mantra: “Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East”; the only
regime that conforms and identifies with western values in the desert of Islamic and Arab
dictatorship. Thus, “Zionism and Israel were associated with liberalism, with freedom
and democracy, with knowledge and light with what “we” [in the West] understand and
fight for” (Said 1992: 29). To be sure, Israel is the only state that can claim a religiousethnic identity and a liberal democratic. In both accounts there is no room for non-Jews
who cannot afford liberalism and democracy.
The extent to which Israeli political system could be considered Western
democracies plays a crucial role in justifying their policies towards their adversaries. As a
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majority in domination, Israel established its political system as a liberal democracy; for
Jews only though as we discussed earlier. The most important consequence of this
identification has been shielding Israel against comparisons. Israeli exceptionalism, in
this sense, becomes clearer as many Israeli and Zionist leaders supported by allies in the
West defy the comparability of Israeli domination over the Palestinians with other
systems of domination elsewhere where ethnically and racially based nation and state
building was rejected and defeated. International tolerance of Israeli nationhood as
essentially a
permanent Jewish-national domination over state institutions and governance
within a territorial state…ha[s] rendered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
uniquely resistant to peacemaking methods applied elsewhere” (Tilley 2005:
134).
In comparison to other conflicts that have settler-colonial origins; charged with rival
discourses of idegineity; characterized with mutual ethnic or racial fears; and have similar
structures of deep domination and discrimination, international powers accept Israeli
ethno-religious domination over Palestinians while pushed for a democratic solution in
other cases such as South Africa and Northern Ireland. The castigation of the South
African apartheid by global powers targeted its fundamental underpinnings of white
domination as an ominous extension of racism; it challenged the foundation of the state
and its moral standing. In contrast, Zionist and Israeli system of apartheid had been
legitimized and justified by international acceptance of the very foundation of Israel as a
Jewish state.
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Consequences of Israeli exceptionalism
This research assesses the implications and consequences of Israel’s
exceptionalism in terms of its quasi-colony correspondence with western global powers
and more particularly with American hegemony in world politics especially U.S. Middle
East foreign policy. The linkages and privileged status of Zionism and the state of Israel
in the west turned them by choice, and necessity into an appendage, or a quasi colony for
the USA following the decline of Britain and especially after 1967 as we discuss below.
Israel has turned into a major actor in strategic calculations of western superpowers
starting with Britain, and then for a short period of time with France in the 1950s. In the
wake of 1967 war Israel emerged as a main ally to the rising superpower; the United
States of America. As we discuss below, American foreign policy in the ME would
develop steadily in congruence with the development of the ally with Israel. The primary
outcome of this development has been more marginalization of the Palestinians and their
national movement that, within US policy, turned into a burden not an actor. Developing
the ally with the USA, Israel has deepened its reliance on a metropolis assistant and
support.
However, the quasi-colony position of Israel and its increased dependent of
American economic, financial, political, military, and diplomatic backup implied that
Israeli policies would be constrained generally by U.S. requirements and considerations.
However, on the Palestinian question American administrations have shown a striking
acceptance of Israel’s conditions and terms for a settlement of the conflict. Thus the U.S.
rebuffed all Arab and PLO peace initiatives in 1970s and 1980s and in 2000s for these
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initiatives recognized Palestinian people’s rights; included a certain level of international
intervention in the form of international conferences or referring to UN resolutions. The
quasi-colony relationship that links Israel with its sponsor, the U.S is part of the system
of power and hegemony the U.S. established in the region, which gave Israel the ability
to practice political leverage over U.S. policies in specific issues especially the
Palestinian question regardless of considerations of international law or international
community political will.
The governments of Israel have long been assertive in defying external pressure
and international law, and have shown a great deal of insensitivity to international critics
to their policies. This stance is congruent with domestic policies, namely treating all
outsider parties as hostile; a policy that has proven to be domestically productive. By
refusing to compromise and by rebuffing international castigation and demands for
recognizing Palestinian right of national self-determination Israel produced a warrant of
its own value: the righteousness of Israel and Jewish people are denounced and attacked
by the unrighteous who seek the destruction of Israel and the Jewish people.
A major consequence of Israel’s ability to correspond its existence and strategic
importance to superpowers hegemony in the region and thus its ability to defy
international law, norms, and rules is that the role of international institutions in resolving
the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian question in particular was reduced
to a mere arena for demonstrating norms and ideals of international law and universal
principles. Western, and especially U.S support of Israel’s rejectionist behavior has
crippled UN ability to act and

granted Israel a certain degree of impunity against
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international intervention and universal norms including UN Charter itself. In particular,
rejecting relevant international conventions and international law provisions that apply to
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
deprived the Palestinians from a crucial source of strength facing a powerful foe.
Thus while international community (except Israel) gave South African apartheid
the cold shoulder and refused to recognize the Bantustans as independent political entities
(Sisk 2010) this community took sidelines watching Israel turning the OPT into
Bantustans and isolated enclaves . In Israel-Palestine, there is a long history of warm
world support for the concepts of territorial partition and ethno-religious separation. The
UN formally endorsed partition in 1947, and today every major effort to bring peace to
Israel-Palestine or engender amity between its peoples is predicated upon the two-state
solution that endorses the ethnic-territorial foundation of Israel. More to the point, the
international community in the Oslo era including the “Quartet” of the US, the European
Union, Russia and the UN secretariat is promoting a peace process that calls for neither a
complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 nor the dismantlement
of the bulk of the settlements built since then. Nor it endorses or calls for a democratic
one state thus it has given its blessing to the idea of a non-contiguous Palestinian entity
on parts of the OPT.
The linkages between Israel and the existence of the Jewish people have never
been expanded and stretched the way they became in the 1990s and 2000s where Israel’s
security justifies apartheid. Israel’s segregation wall and Israel’s blockade on Gaza are
two striking examples of international community’s acceptance of Israel’s expansionism
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and aggression. The US harshly rejected the 2004 advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice against the wall in East Jerusalem and the West Bank on the grounds that
the wall is a necessary and legitimate means of deterring Palestinian attacks on Israel, a
defense it extends to checkpoints, restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, home
demolitions, extrajudicial executions and other violations of international law. Most
dramatically, the US, with the tacit backing of European and Arab allies, has eagerly
enforced the years-long siege on Gaza and acquiesced in several Israeli assaults upon the
territory, including the egregious Operation Cast Lead over the winter of 2008-2009.
Thus slicing the OPT and the amputation of Gaza doesn’t seem to the international
community as an impediment to the establishment of “viable Palestinian state” as Julie
Peteet contends. These remarks bring us to the last and most important source of Israel’s
impunity and exceptioanlism in international arena namely, Israeli-United States
relationship. This relationship stands as a huge challenge to the Palestinians who have to
find an answer to the question: How to succeed against a regime that has been able to
sustain legitimacy through the pretense of democracy; the image of victim, and the
unconditional support of the most powerful state in the world?
U.S.-Israeli strategic ally from the perspective of Palestinian rights
The strategic relationship between Israel and the U.S.A in terms of its
determinants and regional and international implications is beyond the scope and
purposes of our inquiry. Rather we focus on the underpinnings and consequences of this
relationship in so far as it pertains to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and particularly to
Palestinian people’s rights in self-determination, ending Israeli occupation, and
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compelling Israel to abide by international law and international community’s will as
presented by UN resolutions and peace initiatives. Although regional and international
implications of the Israeli-American ally overlaps with its repercussions on the conflict,
we focus our attention on the latter while incorporating the broader implications of
regional considerations.
Our main task is to show how the unprecedented American support of Israel has
established an institution of rejectionist policy of all initiatives to realize a political
settlement to the conflict that accommodate Palestinian rights. The U.S. has rejected any
initiative that doesn’t meet Israel’s own conditions and terms even though such
rejectionist policy has compromised America’s own interests in some instances. As
Mearsheimer and Walt, (2006:1) contend
For the past several decades, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the
centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel…
This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United
States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the interests
of another state?”
By the same token, U.S. exceptional support to Israel flies in the face of international
efforts to establish a consensus or at least a convergent position on the accepted
requirements for a peace settlement of the conflict. The Obstructionist role the U.S.
played to impede international and Arab convergence has resulted in Israeli increased
intransigent position, which enabled it to sustain, maintain and consolidate its colonial
settler grip on the OPT. Moreover, America’s unconditional support to Israel helped the
latter to turn its demands from the Palestinians into international prerequisites and thus
creating a convergence that subjugate the Palestinians to Israel’s terms. Ultimately, this
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state of affairs also obstructed the necessary conditions for the establishment of a
sovereign Palestinian state on the OPT and simultaneously reinforced Israeli selfidentification as a Jewish, ethnocratic state which stands as a structural hindrance against
the emergence of a democratic resolution of the conflict.

United States’ presence in the region developed into a paramount priority that
turned it into institutional presence as early as the 1956 Triad War that included Israel,
Britain, and France allied against Egypt. The U.S.A, realizing the increased importance
of the region in the Cold War and its natural resources especially oil had driven
Eisenhower’s administration to exert a significant pressure of the allied states to cease
fire and withdraw their forces (Rogan 2009: 283-285). Following the Arab-Israeli war of
1967 American presence as Said (1992: xv) notices, was coupled with cementing the
strategic ally with Israel as tailored by the Nixon administration and consolidated during
Regan’s administration.
The Nixon Administration re-supplied Israeli war machine during the October
War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet intervention while US deep
involvement in the negotiations between the combatants not only ended that war but also
led to the Disengagement agreements that granted Israel a political victory (Mearsheimer,
and Walt 2006: 1). Arab military achievements in this war were circumscribed by U.S.
pressure for a cease fire that reiterated the UN resolution 242 as the basis for resolving
the conflict. In effect American position sidelined the Palestinian rights and shielded
Israel from a diplomatic loss. The strategic alliance between Israel and the United States
366

was, however, conditioned by the balance of power between USA and the Soviet Union,
which granted Israel a strategic role in U.S. containment policy. Israel’s need for U.S
support in a hostile region and America’s reliance on Israeli role in the region especially
in the face of nationalist movement enabled Israel to obtain monopoly over the
Palestinian question.
Thus Israel was able to defy international demands and resolution even when the
US holds a different position. In early 1970s, for example, the USA position in regard to
the interpretation of UN resolution 242 was close to the European one: 242 implied
Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories of 1967 with minor and mutual
adjustments. The US, as Arthur Goldberg; US ambassador to the UN clarified, asserted
on the principle of mutual and minimal adjustments “that would not, of necessity, be
detrimental to the Arab states” (Chomsky 1994: 208). Israel refused this principle and
defied UN initiative for peace based on 242; Israeli government declared that no
withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders will happen. Events and developments of 1970s show
clear evidence that the quasi-colony link between Israel and the U.S. gave the former a
political leverage over the latter especially on the Palestinian issue. Particularly, U.S.
policy in the region would center on achieving Israeli’s supremacy and impunity vis-à-vis
its Arab adversaries and especially Palestinians; American diplomats would
unconditionally accept Israel’s own terms as U.S imperatives.
Following the war of 1973 and under Nixon-Kissinger’s US policy in the region
changed to accommodate Sadat’s regime to conform with US interests. Thus the US
accepted Sadat’s peace initiative of 1977 after eliminating its call for recognition of the
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Palestinian national rights echoing Israel’s own position. Kissinger’s strategy in the ME
as cited by Chomsky (Chomsky 1994: 212-213) aimed to keep the soviets out of the
diplomatic arena, “to isolate the Palestinians” so that they would not be a factor in the
outcome, and “to break up the Arab united Arab united front” thus allowing Israel “to
deal separately with each of its neighbors. The first major success of this policy was the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of Cam David in 1978. Although American alliance with
Israel in the 1970s coasted U.S. a high price in terms of its relationships with Arab allies;
Arab oil embargo during the war of 1973 was provoked primarily by US military and
financial back-up to Israel and had triggered economic and financial crisis in the U.S and
worldwide.
The main achievement of Camp David peace treaty for Israel and American
policy, as Kissinger espoused, was dividing the Arab world and containing Egyptian
challenge to Israel. Now Israel not only has the upper hand over Arab adversaries and
Palestinians but also neutralized the main source of power that deterred its ability to
militarily attack its neighbors. Shortly afterwards Israel invaded Lebanon under the
pretext of eliminating PLO threat to Israel northern borders. However, isolating the
Palestinians and destroying their political viability was the main aim of the war: taking
into account that the PLO was gaining increased international and regional recognition as
a result of strategic change it adopted was a source of threat to Israel’s position.
Moreover, PLO political position and new agenda of 1974 opened a new venue for a
political settlement of the conflict that recognizes Palestinian people’s rights.
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Thus in spite of these development U.S. and Israel persistently worked to annul
international consensus on the acceptance of a Palestinian state on the OPT that
developed in 1970s. In 1976 Arab “confrontation states” (Jordan, Egypt, and Syria) and
the PLO proposed a political settlement base on the international consensus and presented
to the UN. The proposal reiterated most of the provisions of resolution 242 except for
adding the recognition of Palestinian political rights and the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Israel showed a strong rejection to the resolution and refused to attend
the session that discussed the proposal, and the USA vetoed the proposal in the Security
Council and eliminated a serious breakthrough to resolve the conflict. Resorting to the
veto turned into a powerful tool to obstruct international role and granted Israel impunity
beyond the reach of international instructions, law and conventions. Since 1972 the US
has vetoed 71 UN Security Council resolution on the Israeli Palestinian conflict and
Israeli policies in the OPT and the region. Those resolutions confirmed the Palestinian
people’s right of self-determination, condemn Israel for settlement building in the OPT,
condemn Israeli human rights record in the OPT, discuss sovereignty over natural
resources in the OPT, concerning the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their
homes, concerning Israel’s use of excessive force against the Palestinians, call for the end
of Israeli 22 day attack on Gaza in 2009…etc.
This pattern of American-Israel rejection of international initiatives to solve the
conflict that doesn’t meet their terms aimed at depriving the Palestinian from the only
source of leverage and a reliable reference in their legal, diplomatic, and political struggle
against Israel. The pattern also shows a persistent policy in monopolizing diplomatic
369

arena on which the conflict being treated; Israel and the United States rebuffed all
proposals for international conferences, annulled UN attempts to play a significant role as
America vetoed almost each Security Council resolution that would empower the UN to
take action, and ultimately enabled Israel itself to gain monopoly on the requisites for
reaching peace with the Palestinians. The pattern reached a peak in the Oslo process. A
cursory look to U.S.A policies toward the Palestinians and the PLO shows that its
position has been, to a large extent an extensions to Israeli policy: American
administrations rejected to recognize of the PLO at the time when the latter was changing
its strategy and gaining regional and international recognition, as we discussed above, it
rebuffed all peace initiatives proposed by Arab states and/or international actors, and in
1988 US Secretary of State George Shultz denied Yassir Arafat a visa to inter the US to
address the UN. Simultaneously, American authorities required the closing of the
Palestinian Observation Mission at UN, which was defeated by in US District Court.
Arafat’s speech to the UN took place in Geneva and presented PLO peace
initiative that resulted from the new dynamism created by the Palestinian first intifada.
Although Arafat’s initiative was dismissed by Israel and the U.S, the later with the
consent of Israeli government accepted to open an informal dialogue with the PLO based
on three conditions: that the PLO abandon its call for an international conference
included in its initiative, and to stop violence i.e. the intifada as an act of terror against
Israel, and that Arafat should not only condemn but also renouncing terror. Humiliating
Arafat was the main aim of the policy as George Shultz asserted (Chomsky 1994: 228).
Humiliating the PLO leader was accompanied by turning a blind eye to Israel’s brutal
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oppression of the Palestinian intifada. Obviously, beyond humiliating Arafat Israel and
the U.S. aimed at bringing Palestinians into terms with Israel’s conditions. U.S.
representative to the PLO dialogue, Ambassador Robert Pelletreau presented to Arafat
what were actually Israel’s conditions as the Israeli semi-official the Jerusalem Post daily
stated (Chomsky 1994: 228).
Thus until the eve of the first Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union; the
demise of the Cold War, Israel’s quasi-colonial ties with the United States enabled Israeli
to maintain its conditions for a political settlement with Arab states, to isolate the PLO
and deny Palestinians political and national rights, and to sideline international
institutions. This phenomenon among other Israeli successes in diverting U.S. foreign
policy in the region poses a question on the immutability of Israeli importance for
American national interests and strategy in the Middle East regardless of the international
and regional changes. We turn now to the competing explanations of American
unprecedented support to Israel and the development of a strategic ally between the two
parties. Within the driving forces of this ally we emphasize the dynamics that led to U.S.
policies in regard to the peace process between the PLO and Israel and how Israel
succeeded to bring the U.S. to accept and defend Israel’s territorial expansionism, the
establishment of a segregated apartheid-like system in the OPT, and to turn the OPT into
Bantustans that executed the two-state solution.
Containing the PLO and reducing Palestinian rights 1992-2000s
For many accredited scholars (E.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, Christinson 2002,
Ahmad 2006, Chomsky 1994) Israel’s strategic importance for the USA and the interests
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of western powers is not as it had been during the Cold War and especially after the Six
Day War of 1967. Israel’s role in the containment strategy against the Soviet Union
extended the ability of the US to circumscribe Egypt and Syrian nationalist stance and
their close relations with the Communist Block. At the turn of 1990s, as Mearsheimer and
Walt (2006) contend Israel’s importance for U.S strategy and national interests has
declined especially following its role in the Gulf crises of 1991 and 2003. While in the
first instance Israel was a burden and needed US protection and assistance against Iraqi
missile attacks, in the second it was told to take the sideline. In both cases IsraeliAmerican special relationship could have jeopardize America’s strategy by provoking
Arab resentment and rupturing US-led coalitions against Iraq. Furthermore, Israel’s
policies in the OPT at crucial turning points were anathema to US foreign policy, so the
argument goes.
After September 11 attacks in the USA American efforts were fully concentrated
on building a wide international coalition in its declared war against terror; Arab regimes
include. Erik Sharon’s government took the opportunity to wage a sweeping military
attack against the PA in the main cities in the OPT. For many Arab regimes, who were
facing increased public anti-American sentiments particularly because of Israel’s policies;
being part of US aspired coalition could have complicated their participation. Arab
regimes announced that “if America wanted Arab support in its fight against Bin Laden’s
terrorism, it had first to put an end to the state terrorism of its protégé (Mansour 2002).
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) and Said (1992) the source of Israeli ability to
maintain its relationship with the USA is not due to common strategic interests or moral
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imperatives. Rather it derives strength and durability from American domestic politics
namely, the effect of the Israeli lobby on American internal politics. As Said (1992: xxiv)
puts it “Palestine was a domestic American issue, dominated since 1948, almost without
demurral anywhere in the society, by the Israeli lobby” led by the American Israeli Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Although the effect of the Israeli lobby is strikingly blunt,
understandably, on the Palestinian question it also affects American foreign policy in the
whole region where it
…managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American
national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing
Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical”
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).
While Israel’s actual importance to America’s interests dwindled in the post-Cold War
era it maintained an increased level of support by the U.S., which reflects to a large
extent the power of Israeli lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt argue persuasively that the four
justifications upon which Israeli backers establish their case for an unqualified U.S
support to Israel are unfounded. They contend that “Viewed objectively, Israel’s past and
present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians” and the
explanation lies in the unprecedented ability of Israeli lobby to mobilize support. As they
put it “Were it not for the Lobby’s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is
today”.
Furthermore and beyond the direct effect of the Israeli lobby, there exists a
chilling atmosphere in the USA when it comes to any public debate of the AmericanIsraeli relationship or Israeli policies. This exceptional sensitivity of the Israeli-American
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ties impedes public discussion and resulted in public avoidance whereby “most
Americans have decided that it is simply safer to leave Israel out of the discourse. So,
unconditional support continues without much review or debate (Porter 2011) which left
American unconditional support to Israel unchallenged. Lack of public debate gave the
Israeli lobby a bigger chance to dominate the agenda in regard to the Palestinian issue.
Moreover, Perceptions on Palestine and the Palestinians in the USA were affected
profoundly, more than any other western country with Zionism and Israel’s image as a
liberal, enlightened. Zionism corresponds completely with American ideas about man and
society and criticizing Zionism not only odd but also equally denounced as anti-Semitism.
In her groundbreaking study Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle
East Policy, Kathleen Christison (1999) shows the preposterous nature of the perceptions
prevailing in U.S. among the public and decision makers alike on Palestine. She argues
depending on detailed examination and evidence from the nineteenth century until
George W. Bush administrations that there are two pre-existed assumptions that direct
decision makers and the public: first, Palestinian national aspirations are mischievous,
and second the source of the Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict is Arab refusal to
recognize Israel’s right to exist. Added to a certain degree of ignorance on the history of
the conflict American perceptions and approach to the conflict has always been perceive
through Israeli lens. The sheer magnitude of this problem, as she concludes resulted in
absolute denial of Palestinian rights and many wars and bloodshed.
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Changing the strategy and the advent of the Peace Process
Without undermining the role of Israeli lobby and the prevailing perspectives in
the U.S, seen from another perspective the end of the Cold War and the advent of U.S.
uncontested influence in the Middle East Israel regained its strategic significance to
American interests. As Chomsky (1994) argues the major shift in American foreign
policy in the Middle East in this era has been driven by economical imperatives. In
particular, America opted to a strategy that deploys military force to protect economically
critical regions for its interests. The decline of the USSR made military power a useful
foreign policy tool for the US in the region that aims ultimately to enlarge American
sphere of influence instead of focusing on containment. Thus America must intervene
militarily to defend this objective including the intervention in regional conflicts that may
have consequences to the new strategy (Chomsky 1994: 31-32, 69-71). From this
perspective, Israel has maintained its strategic importance to the US as a military power.
One of the greatest fears of the US after World War II namely, the spillover of nationalist
ideas and movements to the Gulf Arab states was renewed in the post Cold War era; an
ear of democratic transitions. Democratic transition in the Arab world hadn’t been part of
US foreign policy in the region; it hasn’t been in the 1990s and currently as well.
Therefore, Palestinian rights, plight, and Israel’s occupation of their land and its
discrimination against them have a very minor importance in US policy in the past and in
the present alike. In the structure of power that US established in post World War II and
post Cold War Palestinians had no significant whatsoever, whereas Israel remains
significant from the point view of the American hegemony in the region. Thus the new
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order that U.S. sought to found has reestablished the strategic importance of Israel.
Israel’s acceptance to involve in the Madrid peace conference and Arab-Israeli talks in
1992 fit into this strategy through which U.S attempt to rearrange the security and
geopolitical sphere to guarantee its interests. The role of Israel in the new strategy is
obviously crucial and Israeli decision makers realized the change and grasped on the
opportunity.
Accepting a limited autonomy for the Palestinians within this context seemed a
minor price comparing to the position Israel would gain in the region. As Shlomo Gazit
(2006) stated
Israel’s main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance.
Its location at the center of the Arab Muslim Easy predestines Israel to be a
devoted guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its [role] is to
protect the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalization
and to block the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry.
Indeed, at the turn of the of the 1990’s, the eve of Oslo Accords, Israel has never been
more important;
never before had Israel had a cart blanche from Washington –to confiscate Arab
land, build settlements, enlarge Jerusalem, terrorize the Lebanese, pauperize
Palestinians, and sustain such transgressions with U.S. taxpayer funds, UN
Security Council vetoes and Congressional standing ovations (Aruri 2003: 103).
The new position Israel claimed in U.S. security strategy in the region turned it
into a special state for the interests of America. American support to Israel has continued
uncompromised and reached unprecedented levels in terms of financial/economic,
diplomatic, and military aid regardless of America’s financial and economic crises or the
burden it lays on American tax payers. Understood within American new strategy the
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peace process between Israel and the PLO (the Oslo process) aimed at silencing the
conflict; manage it to conform to the broader purposes of U.S. and Israel. American
conduct and policies since the endorsement of the DOP in 1993 shows that American
administration without exception accepted Israeli interpretations of the agreements,
pushed toward changing international accepted requirements to reach a resolution to the
conflict, and monopolized the role of broker; a dishonest broker though as Aruri (2003)
contends. U.S. monopoly over the peace process only led to deploy monopoly to Israeli
governments.
A quick survey to the role of the U.S in the profound changes in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict shows that US administrations’ most remarkable contribution to the
“peace process” is “preclude effective international action on the [conflict] by always
promising but never reaching its serious discussion” (Tilley 2005: 127). American
complicity with Israeli policies reveals the built-in hindrances they created in the process
itself that wouldn’t allow any meaningful resolution to the conflict that accommodate
Palestinian national and political rights. By engineering the whole process around Israel’s
security and downplaying Palestinian rights to mere autonomy, as Aruri (2003) argues
the process changed the requirements for a just and durable peace; it “have dealt a
crippling blow to the foundation of the global consensus on the solution of the question
of Palestine”, which was the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside
Israel.
International divergence on how to approach Israeli occupation and thus its
inability to exert meaningful and effective pressure on Israel to adhere to international
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law has been instrumental in the ability of Israel to manage the ethnic-religious founding
principles of domination under the auspices of the peace process. In essence the process
provided Israel with a cost effective and diplomatically comfortable environment to
managing the presence of the ethno-national existence and demands of the Palestinians
by “outsourcing the occupation”, as we discuss in the conclusion of this part. U.S role in
this change has been substantial and instrumental especially in the wake of September 11
terrorist attacks.
One can’t but notice how gradually, but steadily U.S. administrations yielded to
Israel’s terms; in the words one American participant at Camp David talks of 2000 "far
too often, we functioned . . . as Israel’s lawyer." Thus, under Bill Clinton’s administration
before the Camp David the U.S. changed its position on opposing any unilateral actions such as Israeli settlements- that are aimed at determining the final status of the OPT and
the city of Jerusalem. Clinton was the first president to refer to the OPT as disputed
territories and announced in March 13, 1994 that he opposes any reference to Jerusalem
as an occupied territory (Aruri 2003: 139). Clinton administration for the first time ceded
to Israel (by then under Netanyahu in 1996) in writing, the sole right to determine the
extent of any further Israeli redeployments in the OPT which came to assure Israel the
acceptance of its own interpretation of the resolution 242.
The failure of the Oslo process became clear as the Palestinian intifada of 2000
irrupted, which triggered an international debate in the UN to seek mechanisms that
would out the process on the track especially with the increased Israeli oppression and
killing in the OPT. Thus the UN Security Council convened to consider a resolution to
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deploy unarmed international observers to the OPT. The resolution was strongly rejected
by Israel and vetoed by the U.S. Under the pressure of increased violence on the ground
and international disaffection with U.S. position, Clinton administration formed the
Mitchell Committee and the resulted Road Map that was sidelined by Israel’s increased
military oppression.
The most dramatic change in U.S. policy in this respect came after September 11
where George W. Bush administration ceded to Erik Sharon’s government the final say in
the progress of the peace process and accepted Israeli military assault on the Palestinians
as a self-defense act. More importantly, the U.S. US administration accepted Sharon’s
definition of violence and cease fire. Sharon conditioned the cease fire upon the PA
ability to maintain a series of security conditions, the least of which is to sustain a total
tranquility in the areas under PA jurisdiction and the detention of Palestinians whose
name would be provided by Israeli security forces. The two administrations maintained a
low level of direct involvement and conceded to the Israeli government the decision
whether the PA has abided by Sharon’s conditions of cease fire or not. Bush
administration’s main concern was not about bringing the Palestinians and Israelis back
to the track of negotiations. Rather it aimed at appeasing the confrontation and preventing
its spillover effects in the region (Mansour, 2002).
The primary effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the United States
reinforced the view, already prevalent in the US, Israel, and the western countries, that
lumps all international terrorist groups with local terrorist actions, national liberation
struggle with terrorism, opposition movements, political Islam, Palestinian nationalism,
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Turkish Kurds, and so on in one category. This view contributed significantly to the allout war against terror. It played in the hands of Erik Sharon as “carte blanche to set the
rules of the game in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere and that the red lines no longer
applied”; within two days after September 11 Israeli troops launched a massive attack on
most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip cities and Sharon declared Arafat as Israel’s BenLadin. US position supporting Israel’s military measures against the Palestinians gave
Sharon the needed green light to go and change the rules of the game with the PA.
Sharon’s assault on the PA and the main cities under its jurisdiction following two
suicide-bomb attacks in Israel sidelined American new initiative to bring both sides back
to the negotiating table. President Bush announced from the podium of the UN General
Assembly that he favors a two-state solution. Ten days later His Secretary of State Colin
Powell added other elements to this declaration, speaking of the “Israeli occupation” and
the need to end it on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242, the importance of
a just and realistic solution to the refugee problem, and a solution for Jerusalem that takes
into account the religious and political concerns of the two sides (Aruri 2003: 142).
However, American new imitative faced adamant Israeli qualifications that culminated in
G.W. Bush acceptance of Sharon’s own definition of an acceptable solution to the
conflict; in their meeting in April 2004 Bush introduced a new unprecedented American
position assuring Israel that the borders of 1967 are not the reference for achieving peace
and that Israeli settlements are facts that have to be taken into account for any agreement.
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The Palestinian interregnum

On the morning of March 3, 2012 Palestinians in the big cities of the West Bank
(Nablus, Jineen, Tulkarm, and Ramallah) were surprised with an advertisement on
billboards at main city entrances; huge signs calling for a one state solution. “One
Democratic state for 5 million Arabs and 6 million Jews”, the advertisement stated, and
signed by an anonymous called “a-Ttakamul (integration) for the one-state solution”. The
same night and the following morning groups of Palestinian activists, self-identified as
Fateh members and/or ‘youth for Palestine’, brought them down, torn them apart and
stepped on them. The angry youngsters chanted slogans against what they depicted as
“normalization” with Israel and denounced those stand behind the stickers. The party/s
responsible for the advertisement remained unknown until the moment. Without reading
too much into such an event, the fact that no official statement was made by the PLO or
the PA on the slogan, and that Fateh Youth Organization (Al-Shabibah) took the initiative
to remove the stickers indicates the dilemma that the Palestinian polity endure. After
almost two decades of negotiations and countless rounds of talks and several agreements
the Palestinians gained nothing but geographically fractured zones of nominal autonomy;
engineered enclaves that have no viability. Furthermore, the reaction to the advertisement,
hints to a profound chasm between two distinct ethno-national identities, the Palestinian
and the Israeli Jewish: for the Palestinians, Israeli domination and its geographical,
territorial and spatial aggrandizement is seen as an existential threat. The dynamics of
territorial-national politics for a threatened and subjugated majority (Palestinians in the
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OPT) generated a rigid national identity that seeks separation and ultimate national
expression; national self-determination.
The reaction abovementioned is a snapshot of the new structure of domination
Israel established during the last twenty years. Israel’s type of apartheid in the OPT raised
Palestinian public fears of a future similar to that of Native Americans. The Palestinians
are facing an impending reality of a one Jewish state where they constitute a minority
subordinated and oppressed by a powerful regime of segregation and enclavization.
Indeed, Israel’s settlement grid in the OPT and other methods and means of strangulation
is similar to the “American ‘winning’ of the Native American territory across North
America, as indigenous populations were surrounded, boxed in and in effect suffocated
and subjugated” (Falah 2007). Turning Palestinian main cities into isolated and
suffocated enclaves ala South African apartheid Bantustans while expanding the spatial
and territorial control of the Jewish settler existence almost shattered the spatial and
territorial base for the Palestinian state and any attempt to escape this logic by invoking
the idea of one-state solution would be considered as sell-out and a formula for perpetual
subjugation. The answer to Israel’s ethno-territorial hegemony in the OPT wouldn’t be
less exclusive and self-protecting than asserting Palestinian national-territorial
distinctiveness. Clearly the dynamics of Israeli ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’
shaped the properties of the conflict once and again and climaxed in the 2000.
‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ examined
In essence, the conditions prevailed during the peace process show the plausibility
of the theoretical accounts we presented in our conceptual framework: Murphy (2002)
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notices that the outcome of ethno-national territorial conflicts depends on state “forces
against which minority and stateless movements are struggling”, namely, the national
territorial ideologies of the state in power. The means through which they articulate the
linkages between their senses of people-hood and their senses of territoriality is a
decisive element. Israel ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ (institutions, practices, and
discourses that discussed in chapter II) especially in the after the first intifada of 1987 and
more intensely after 2000 invoke the three ideological arguments that Murphy identifies
as the framework of territorial-ideology that designed to give legitimacy to territorial
aggrandizement and spatial control of the OPT: that the Land of Israel (Eritz Israel) is a
manifestation of the historic homeland of the Jewish people as an ethno-cultural group;
and the Land of Israel is a distinctive physical-environmental unit that is indivisible; and
that Israel, as the Jewish state that embody these ideologies is the modern incarnation of a
long standing political territorial entity.

Indeed, once more as we discussed in the

conceptual framework, at the moment Israel joined the modern state-nation system it was
defined and indentified with ethno-territorial exclusivism ideologically and legally. Its
longstanding territorial legitimating regimes ever since it was established invoke and
construct the Jewish ethno-territoriality as a state system of a peculiar apartheid regime.
As the following statement made by Shulamit Aloni, former Israeli Knesset member
depicts, Israel has established its own type of apartheid in the OPT
“On one occasion I witnessed such an encounter between a driver and a
soldier who was taking down the details before confiscating the vehicle and
sending its owner away. ‘Why?’ I asked the soldier. ‘It’s an order—this is a
Jews-only road,’ he replied. I inquired as to where was the sign indicating this
fact and instructing [other] drivers not to use it. His answer was nothing short of
amazing. ‘It is his responsibility to know it, and besides, what do you want us to
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do, put up a sign here and let some anti-Semitic reporter or journalist take a
photo so that can show the world apartheid exists here?”
Theory of ‘state contraction’ provides us with a very useful tool to understand the
territorial imperatives of Israel’s domination system in the OPT. Although Lustick,
writing at the early 1990s, accounts for Israeli redeployment in limited areas in the OPT
as an action of state contraction, the years that followed show that this action was a tactic
to gain hold on most of the OPT. The set of institutions, practices, and discourse Israel
established granted the OPT a meaning that goes beyond the ‘ideological threshold’ at
which state contraction turns devastating to state’s own political coherency. Israeli state,
as an institution has become defined and determined by its presence in the entire territory
of Palestine, the Jewish homeland. Israel’s imagined and institutionalized correspondence
to the OPT stands as the major obstacle to Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Indeed, Israel’s limited territorial contraction is best captured by the
concept of ‘outsourcing the occupation’: a redeployment of military forces and allowing
for a certain level of autonomy can only be understood as a component of a broader
strategy of state expansion rather than contraction. Not less significant is the challenging
group’s capabilities and chance to control the territory and its belief in the legitimacy of
its cause.
Palestinian nationalism as the counter forces to domination and power
asymmetries emerged and challenged the state of Israel on the grounds that the latter
created: as an ethno-territorial national movement seeking national self-determination in
a well-defined space and geography namely, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and Gaza Strip. These dynamics were structurally determined by Israeli systematic
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destruction of the Palestinian territorial and spatial spheres twice: in 1948 and in 1967,
which impedes the realization of both the two-state and the one-state solutions by
entrenching the ethno-territorial rigidity of the conflict and by metamorphosing the
Jewish existence in the OPT into a matter of existence for the Jewish entity as a whole.
For the Palestinians, Israeli policies mean political and national annihilation, an utter
politicide.

Major patterns of Israel’s apartheid
As noticed in the last section (Israel’s Exceptionalism), Israeli government
reluctantly accepted to involve in the peace process. For Israeli ruling class, political
parties and the military institution, the broader strategic gain Israel would accrue justified
the minor cost it had to incur namely, accepting the creation of a Palestinian limited
autonomy: limited particularly in terms of its territorial and spatial boundaries, and its
political and juridical scope. The terms and conditions in which Israeli consecutive
governments carried Israel’s territorial and spatial policies under the auspices of the
peace process show three major patterns that were developed and consolidated since the
endorsement of the Oslo Accords (DOP) in 1993: asymmetrical power relations,
separation within colonial control and occupation, and the systematic destruction of
Palestinian spatial and territorial spheres (segregation). We turn to these patterns and
their implications one by one:
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First: The peace process reflects, by and large the dynamics of domination
relations. As Sisk (1999) argues asymmetry of power relations is a high risk to productive
conflict resolution whatever the nature and goals of this process. While Israel is under
less pressure than the Palestinians to make concessions and benefits much more than
them from the status quo, the Palestinians find themselves under the pressure to try and
reduce the power asymmetry by any means in their disposal, including violence and
coercion. However, this endeavor puts Palestinians in a destructive stalemate vis-à-vis the
Israelis. The latter has the power and resources to deepen the structures of domination
taking advantage of the stagnant peace process. The asymmetry is evident in the formula
of “land for peace”; while holding the land by Israel is tangible, peace is just a promise.
Israel has been negotiating with the PA/PLO in 2000s with the aim of annexing more
than half of the OPT. Negotiating while eating up Palestinian land reflects to a large
extent the dynamics of asymmetrical power relations that enables Israel to act unilaterally
to change the facts on the ground in an irreversible way. In effect Israel’s unilateralism
especially in the 2000s has been deployed to implement a dual strategy: unilateral
separation from the Palestinian population, and territorial dismemberment and alienation
(segregation). First Israel intensified and extended the regimes of segregation and
separation within the OPT in a way that red Israel from direct rule of the population, the
second it systematically destroyed the spatial and territorial spheres of the Palestinian
entity leaving it unfit for the establishment of a functioning sovereign state.
Second: the dynamics of Israel’s methods of domination during the peace process
namely, separation and territorial control have entrenched the ethno-territorial core of the
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conflict; “original causes of the conflict persist and are exacerbated by new grievances
sparked by the peace process” (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 3). Indeed, the IsraeliPalestinian peace process has changed the macro features of domination and
subordination into a deeper and more invisible type. The peace process has contributed to
an Israeli strategy of making occupation invisible: by suppressing the distinction between
the occupied and the occupier, the powerful and the powerless the Oslo process created
an unusual situation whereby the abnormal (foreign military occupation) is being
normalized. The fundamental change Israel introduced to its domination system since
1993 is transforming its relationship with the Palestinians from direct military occupation
into a separation system. Separating the main body of the population from Israeli Jewish
settler community and from Israeli administrative control gives a sense of normalcy to
the presence of military occupation outside highly populated Palestinian areas.
Simultaneously, Palestinian population became dealt with on pure security basis
including those who live in Palestinian enclaves called area ‘A’ under PA jurisdiction.
Gordon’s (2008: 169) concept of ‘outsourcing the occupation’ captures this pattern.
‘Outsourcing’ depicts a “technique employed by power to conceal its own mechanisms”
and it shows Israel’s “unwavering effort to endure and remain in control”. Thus Israeli
strategy espoused to rearrange its power and domination through segregation as the
sovereign power methods Israel deployed in the second before and during the first
intifada failed to suppress Palestinian national aspirations or to turn the OPT into an
extension of Israeli-Jewish sovereignty.
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As the South African apartheid regime “sought to perpetuate a belief system
based on the view that ‘good secured fences make good’ neighbors.” (Knox and Quirk
2000: 163), Israeli political ruling class invoked the motto: ‘they are there and we are her’
to mark the new strategy of unilateral disengagement from the population not from the
territory. This strategy in effect implies that indeed the Palestinians ‘are there’ and Israeli
Jewish ‘are here’, and there as well.

Segregation in this sense doesn’t imply the

withdrawal of Israeli power and domination from the OPT. Rather it means that Israel
rearranged this power and domination in a way to preserve its colonization and control
over the land while ceasing the management of the population except as security threat.
Colonization and segregation have not excluded one another. Changing the strategy
towards separation went hand in hand with intensive colonization of the land and
resources that created Palestinian pauperized, deprived and clustered enclaves on the one
hand and Jewish Israel expanding and prosperous colonies on the other. Antecedently,
Israel never entertained the incorporation of the Palestinian population of the OPT into its
political, social, and economic system.
The colonial buffer it established was created wide and institutionalized and
designed primarily to exclude Palestinians. We have discussed how Israel authorities
since 1976 sought to constitute the Palestinians as non-nationals and subject to its power
through oppression, alienation, divisions and homogenization. Jewish colonial
settlements “created a new spatial reality for the dispossessed Palestinians whose living
space was dramatically circumscribed” (Gordon 2008:

34) by indiscriminate land

confiscation and expropriation that turned increasing numbers of the population into
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dispossesses and displaced cohorts. The process showed that Israel’s occupation was not
temporary but ubiquitous and indiscriminate, which widened and deepened Palestinian
national sentiments and willingness to fight; a national fight that has been focused on
land protection and resistant to Israel’s colonialism and reached a peak in the Palestinian
intifada of 1987. Following the intifada, as we have shown Israel introduced the
separation method as means of control. Separation has been entrenched and
institutionally consolidated during the long years of the peace process; the principle: “we
are her and they are there” is being carried on the imperative of not going back to the pre1967 borders.
The Oslo process was based on the logic of separation and control; outsourcings
the responsibility over the population for the PA while controlling and colonizing the
land and space. Dividing the OPT in the Oslo agreement into A, B, and C areas in the
WB; H1 and H2 in the city of Hebron; and Yellow and White areas in Gaza strip created
internal borders of domination and control that institutionalized separation. Separation in
this sense embodies a creeping apartheid system under which Israel has established a
legal and institutional hierarchy of rights and obligations based on ethnic affiliation and
location. A Palestinian whether lives in the OPT or in the Israeli proper is being confined
and dealt with on the bases of his ethno-nationality and the place where she lives; the set
of discriminatory and racial laws and legislation enacted by the Israeli Knesset against
Israel’s Palestinian citizens withstanding especially after the those took to the streets in
solidarity with their brethren in the OPT during the second intifada.
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One might argue that during the 2000s Israel was not merely separating
Palestinians and segregating them. Rather, Erik Sharon’s unilateral ‘disengagement’ from
Gaza Strip and the evacuation of two small and geographically isolated colonies in the
Northern part of the WB is a step towards contraction and partition. Reading Sharon’s
plans from the perspective of ‘regime of territorial legitimation’ and ethno-territorial
control, the plan is a package that includes the entrenchment of Israel’s colonization of
most the West Bank. Primarily, the plan aimed at cutting off all discussion on the
Palestinian state that was the currency of diplomatic efforts at the time including U.S.A.
It aimed at extending the stalemate under which it is much easier to strengthen Israel’s
hold on the WB. As Dov Wiesglass, Sharon’s senior advisor puts it
the significant of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace
process…to prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders, and Jerusalem.
Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it
entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda…All with U.S
permission [president and congress] (Quoted in Yiftachel 2005:128).
American administration’s endorsement to Sharon’s plan was an explicit
legitimation of Israel’s unilateralism and indeed permission for Israel to preserve its
colonial control over most of the West Bank.
Sharon took the American endorsement to its extreme logical extent by asserting
that Israel will never go back to pre-1967 borders and that Israel will hold in perpetuity
over “territory which is essential to our [Israeli] existence…if we do not want to be
pushed back to the 1967 lines, the territory should be divided”, as Sharon stated in the
Knesset. In another speech he gave later he clarified: “Israel will strengthen its control
over those same areas in the Land of Israel which will constitute an inseparable part of
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the state of Israel in any future agreement” (Quoted in Falah, 2007:1348). As a matter of
fact the ‘disengagement’ plan turned Gaza Strip into an officially demarcated Bantustan
formally sealing a process of dismemberment of the Strip that started in early 1990s. The
implications of Sharon’s plan in particular and Israel’s separation strategy and apartheid
become more striking when looked upon from the perspective of the systematic
destruction of the Palestinian space and territorial terrain.
Third: The years of the peace process have given Israel the opportunity to
consolidate its control over the Palestinians territory while culminating a long process of
territorial and spatial fragmentation of the Palestinian terrain. The strategy of separation
and colonization is coupled with dynamics of strangulation and dismemberment that
destroyed the base of the two-state solution. Spatial and territorial engineering that Israel
launched since early 1970s has turned the OPT into segregated enclaves and reserves that
are dependent economically on Israel and subjugated politically to Israel’s power. The
Bantustanization of the OPT has been in the making since 1976 as Israeli authorities
sought to ‘manage’ the inevitable; the Palestinian demographic dominance in the OPT.
Thus the foundation of the structural territorial and spatial fragmentation was found in
1977; instead of segregating Palestinians at this early stage Israel sought to annul
Palestinian existence as an ethno-national group through the establishment of colonies,
land confiscation, and other means of domination that we discussed earlier. Israel’s main
goal was the integration of Palestinian territory to the Israeli proper while excluding the
population and exploiting the resources and economy of the OPT through military orders.
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The first Palestinian intifada, as we noticed, had change the geopolitics of the
conflict by focusing the struggle on the green line as the ethno-territorial divide, which
Israel realized as threat to its efforts to control and extend its ethnocratic regime to the
OPT. Israel’s strategy in the 1990s focused on answering the dilemma of colonizing a
populated territory. The question for Israel became: if Israel recognizes ‘pragmatically’
that at the present Jews will not be able to settle throughout the OPT territory for
demographical and geographical reasons and therefore the full redemption of the Jewish
land cannot be achieved, then what would be the most prudent and expedient strategy that
would preserve Jewish sovereignty over the largest portion of the Land of Israel while
sustaining the core Zionist belief of Greater Land of Israel? Confining the Palestinians to
enclaves segregated from each other and depriving these enclaves form spatial, territorial,
social, and economic correspondence is the answer. Enclavization and Bantunization in
this respect refer to the process of institutionalization of
cutting off spatial interflow and heightening [territorial] control. It also has
the effect of sundering enclaved space from other spatial areas, thus
confining and drastically weakening the population economically, politically
and socially-in effect ‘neutralizing its challenge as a potential opponent”
(Falah 2007: 1344).
This process was intensified and extended in the 1980s and entered a phase of
consolidation n 1990s mainly through settlement expansion, bypass roads, territorial
zoning and gerrymandering. Ultimately it aimed at consolidating territorial and spatial
dismemberment in order to expand a state with undetermined territorial boundaries. The
fragmentation of the OPT has been the mechanism through which Israel can tame the
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sources of Palestinian opposition to its regimes of territorial legitmation based on
expansionism.
Oslo agreements paved the way for the Bantustanization and enclavization of the
OPT; in effect it provided the answer for the Israeli dilemma above-mentioned by
bridging the contradictory between Israel’s territorial integration of the OPT and its social
and political separation (Farsakh, 2005: 238). Indeed the Oslo process founded the legal
and structural bases for fragmenting the OPT and giving Israel the final say on the future
of most of the OPT: First, the agreements failed to include any provisions that guarantee
Israeli withdrawal from the OPT and ending the occupation; second by dividing the OPT
into separate areas each of which subject to different territorial-legal treatment; and third
by not affirming the supremacy of international law and conventions pertaining to the
conflict. Thus the Oslo process has institutionalized the already established demarcations
between Palestinian reserves.
In 2000s Israel took advantage of the violence and open confrontation with the
Palestinians to entrench its ethno-territorial control over land, resources, and space of the
Palestinians. This dynamism applies to the Palestinians in the West Bank as well in the
state of Israel. As Yiftachel (2011) remarks, Israeli governments since the eruption of the
Palestinian Intifada –taking advantage of the increased anti-Arab sentiments that
accompanied violence- have been involved in a massive ethnic-territorial alteration of the
Palestinian space in Israel and in the OPT. As we noticed earlier Palestinian Citizens of
the state of Israel are facing unprecedented discrimination as an ethno-national group
including, and especially, in terms of land possession and access to resources, and
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citizenship rights. Palestinian citizens of Israel, particularly in the Negev region are
facing a silent deportation from their lands. Israeli governments resorted to all means to
expel the Arab Bedouins of this area from the region including spraying their corps with
poisonous chemicals. The Israeli official explanation to this extreme measure as aiming
at preventing non-Jewish threat to the Jewish land leaves no room for speculation on the
racially driven policies of Israel that have been increased in the last two decades.
The interregnum persists
The manipulation of ethnic geography and space with the goal of Judaizing Arab
areas in the OPT has gathered unprecedented levels during 1990-2000s by imposing an
overwhelming set of military, administrative, and “legal” measures. The core character of
these measures is the control of the land, while dispensing with its (non-Jewish)
population. There is no case for a viable nation-state that can function as segregated
enclaves controlled militarily, territorially and spatially by a powerful infiltrating foreign
state. Under the circumstances of spatial and territorial fragmentation no viable
circulation system will be possible. With regard to social, economic, and political flows,
the system of circulation is an important element in the functioning of a state (Falah
2007:1346). Palestinian state would not be more than a mockery of state unless the
settlement grid and all other aspects of territorial control and systems of privileges
attached to it are dismantled. This can’t be achieved until the colonial and ideological
underpinnings that create this project being transformed. A cursory look at the current
structural facts in the OPT makes clear that the talk about the establishment of a
Palestinian state is unfounded:
394

•

Israel is almost done with construction of the separation wall that extends to more

than 700 Km (85 percent of the wall runs deep in the OPT) while intensifying Jewish
settlement on both sides adjacent to the 1967 borders on both sides. For many
Palestinians, including citizens of Israel, Netanyahu’s government policy in this respect
de facto erases the green line and aims to prevent the geographical contiguity of
Palestinian life and future state. The wall and the settlements with network of bypass
roads are drawing the boundaries of the Jewish state; boundaries that are otherwise
undetermined and anchored to Jewish colonial capacity in the entirety of Palestine. The
power asymmetry we discussed grants Israel the capability to determine the extent of
territorial and spatial expansion. Thus the green line and other boundaries established
within the OPT even by the peace process are provisional from Israeli perspective and
subject to the Israeli capacity to Judize and colonize territory;
•

Israeli military measures (segregating and separating the OPT) are systematically

destroying Palestinian economy. In the most recent estimations presented by the
Palestinian Minister of Planning and Administrative Development, Ali Jirbawi Israeli
restrictions have coasted the Palestinians $ 7 billion in 2010 alone, which comes close to
the Palestinian GNP. The minister asserted that Israel is looting Palestinian natural
resources systematically which rules out the viability of a Palestinian state;
•

While Palestinians in the OPT can only use 40 per cent of their land Israeli

authorities continued the policy of deportation against Palestinian communities in the
Southern plains of the West Bank and the Palestinian side of the Jordan Valley.
According to the Coordinator of the UN Humanitarian Mission in the OPT, Maxwell
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Jilard Israeli house demolishing policy turned more than 1100 (after demolishing their
266) houses Palestinians homeless in the year 2011 alone. In the Jordan Valley Israel
demolished 76 houses in 2011 displacing 113 people. Israeli depopulation of the Jordan
Valley since 1976 by means of land confiscation, settlement expansion, and military
measures caused a decrease of the Palestinians live in this area from over 300,000 in
1967 to little more than 50,000 in 2011(UCHA 2012)120 . In a broader and more profound
sense, these policies enabled Israel to create empty buffers along its borders with the OPT
that are being occupied by Israeli Jewish settlers and became subject to Israel’s future
claims in any final status negotiations.
•

Depriving the Palestinians from their own natural resources is coupled with Israeli

illegal overuse and extraction of these resources. In February 2012 the Israeli Higher
Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s extraction and domination over the Palestinian stone
quarries in the OPT is legal. The Palestinian Land Research indicates that this policy
violated the Geneva Fourth Convention and deprives Palestinians from their legal rights
in national resources on and under their lands. The Israeli Court ruled that these sites will
keep working until the achievement of a peace agreement. The report clarified that 94 per
cent of the product from these sites goes to Israeli market to cover 25 per cent of its
annual demand. In his remarks responding to the Higher Court decision, Maher Ghunaim,
the Palestinian Minister for Settlement Issues remarks that Israel has been illegally
looting all Palestinian resources especially water. Israeli authorities extract an annual 7
million tons of gravel and stones and 800 cubic square of water (Ghunaim 2012). In a
120

For a full account on the issue visit: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/6e21b659-959e-48b9-94f905ad52b74011
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recent and unique report, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French parliament
released a report in the first week of January 2012 that firmly accused Israel of
implementing apartheid policies in the OPT in regard to water extraction and
consumption. The report noticed that Israel is using water as a weapon in the serves of
the “new apartheid” whereby Israeli military authorities deny Palestinians access to water
resources.
These conditions withstanding the ethnocratic logic of Israel’s domination system
prevails and with it unattainable neither Palestinian national self-determination nor a
democratic solution in a single civic state. Taking into account Palestinians inability to
practice a serious challenge to Israeli power coupled with their assertion of their own
ethno-national territorial claim to the OPT and independence the status quo remains more
likely. The status quo has actually turned into an interregnum that is fraught with
dangerous dynamics, the least of which that the circumstances abovementioned would
lead to one form or another of transfer (the euphemism of ethnic cleansing) of a
significant portion of the Palestinians from the OPT. The existence of a great numbers of
the Palestinians in the OPT, although being rounded up and weakened, is still the most
adamant challenge to the achievement of Israel’s expansionist strategy. By neither
annexing them as Israeli citizens, nor recognizing their right of national selfdetermination Israel’s policies minimize the options remained, transfer is a serious option.
The conditions for the emergence of a civic-democratic state as the final outcome
of the conflict are being continuously obstructed by Israel’s self-identification as an
ethno-territorial entity preoccupied with exclusion and colonial expansionism. Under the
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conditions discussed here forging a common national identity necessary for a unitary
nation-building process is dim. As a religious ethno-nationality Israeli polity is a coherent
group established and crystallized around an ethnic core that diminished internal
differentiations through ethnocratic nation-building based on religion, language, history
and most importantly ethnic-territoriality. Thus territorial and spatial separation and
exclusion was not sought as an instrumental tool for political manipulation and
exploitation. Rather it is an end that is inextricably linked to close the circle of Jewish
identification as a distinct people. Following 1967 the ethnic-territorial imperative of
Israeli Jewish domination was reinforced and entrenched not only by deploying the
structures and methods of territorial and spatial control and fragmentation but not less
importantly by politically and strategically defeating its adversary; the Palestinian
national movement. The latter couldn’t maintain a consistent strategy of liberation,
democratization, or independence and actually is enduring a precarious position to
prevent more losses. The Palestinian interregnum of the current day carries within it the
dynamics of apartheid that may culminate in a struggle for civic self-determination.
However, that implies defeating Israel’s colonial project politically, morally and
diplomatically, which starts necessary in compelling Israel to withdraw from the OPT
and recognize the Palestinians as nationals.
Meanwhile the inability of the Palestinians to shift the balance of power in their
favor, and the increased strangulation of Palestinian space coupled with Israeli polity and
society drift to the right the discourse of transfer is becoming increasingly prevalence;
“Several Knesset members and ministers have adopted the idea, often with feeble
398

qualifications such as "if the need arises," or "only as a voluntary plan." (Yiftachel, 2011)
The racist transfer idea is now echoing aloud, gaining growing legitimacy among the
Jewish public as well.
Yiftachel (2011) provides a panoramic survey of the extent to which transfer cheerleaders
within the Israeli polity are gaining credibility. They are not any more marginal voice;
rather they gain popular and electoral gains and reach the Israeli cabinet.

Avigdor

Lieberman; Israeli foreign minister expressed the idea most bluntly
There is nothing undemocratic about transfer. Even in Europe millions were
transferred from one place to another and it helped to bring peace... [T]he
separation, like surgery, helps healing. When I see Arabs going to blow
themselves up in Haifa or Nahariyya, or Arabs who donate to terrorists'
families -- if it were up to me, they wouldn't have stayed here one minute,
them and their families.
Cabinet member Efraim Eitam echoed the transfer discourse in a different capacity
stating that “Jordan and Sinai are, in the final analysis, the territorial address for meeting
the national aspirations of the Palestinians. Israel should control forever the entire
territory between Jordan and sea. We should offer the Palestinians a choice between
enlightened residency (with no voting rights) in Israel, or primitive Arab citizenship. The
Arabs in Israel are a ticking time bomb... [T]hey resemble a cancerous growth. We shall
have to consider the ability of the Israeli democracy to continue the Arabs' participation.
Both positions quoted here fall within the accepted political and ideological debates in
Israel today not an odd and marginal precept. More striking is that they refer not only to
the Palestinians in the OPT but as well to those live inside and hold Israeli citizenship.
Transfer calls also come from the Labor political camp. In March 2002 the minister of
transportation, Labor's Efraim Sneh proposed a plan to resolve the conflict according to
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which the future Palestinian state annexes “Arab localities” close to the Green Line in the
Israeli proper [Israeli citizens] in return for the annexation of West Bank settlement blocs
by Israel. The plan was described by its initiator as democratic and human
No Arab will have to move from his/her home. We are offering them
annexation to the Palestinian nation, with which they openly identify. All we
say is: the 1967 borders are not sacred... [L]et's modify them to create a better
ethnic political geography: Jews in the West Bank will be part of the Jewish
state, and Arabs (who declare day and night that they are Palestinians) will
become part of the Palestinian state, staying on their own lands. What is more
simple?”

Moreover, the idea also penetrated ‘liberal’ Zionist circles and intellectual and
academic discourse. Thus Ruth Gavison, former head of the Israeli Association of Human
Rights, authors A.B. Yehoshua and Amos Oz and geographer Arnon Soffer all are
leading voices express the "need" to reshape Israel's borders according to "ethnic
principles." Recent surveys show that this idea is gaining popularity, reaching approval
rates of 50-55 percent among Jews, and even 20-30 percent among Palestinian citizens.
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Chapter X
Comparative analysis and findings

From case analysis to theory

This dissertation approached the two conflicts in South Africa and Palestine from
the perspective of settler-colonial domination systems. Analyses provided aimed to
achieve two interrelated objectives: First, to show the complexity and the degree of
discipline of settler-colonial domination systems in terms of the dynamics and conditions
that lead to transforming a settler-colonial society into an ethno-national entity in its
specificity and peculiarity. This represents one way to explain the phenomenon whereby
similar domination systems in a settler-colonial setting take different paths and obtain
divergent ends.

Second, to uncover similarities and shared as well as differences

properties of these systems in order to establish a useful comparison between the two
cases. This endeavor, however, focused on the differences between the Palestinian-Israeli
and the Southern African conflicts to isolate the conditions (factors and forces) that
account for the divergence of outcome in the two contexts.
This approach suggests that historical contexts and major structures of settlercolonialism matter and offer plausible explanations. It also recognizes the importance of
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uniqueness and the role of interactions and events in the developments of each case.
Contingency, in this sense represents the dialectical relationship between structures on
the one hand and events and human agency on the other. Thus comparative conclusions
and derivatives provided below are generalizations bound to the two contexts and
contingent in so far as the broad phenomenon of ethno-national conflicts is concerned.
However, it is plausible to conclude that settler-colonial societies in general and
the two cases concerned in this research in particular face three major vulnerabilities.
These weak nods are inherited in the edifice of all settler-colonial ethno-national entities
as externally imposed societies facing the other indigenous. Overcoming each of these
weaknesses is a necessary condition for settler-colonial ethno-nationalist peoples to
survive and endure. As suggested in the conceptual framework of this research linkages
between “regimes of territorial legitimation” and the national-territorial nexus in the one
hand and systems of domination and the responses to them on the other determine, to a
large extent, the trajectory and transformation of the conflict. The three vulnerabilities
illustrated below uncover the saliency of these linkages as they are dialectically linked to
questions of territory, space, minority-majority dynamics, and external effects. Having
achieved significant accomplishments in any of those vulnerability is a necessary but not
sufficient in itself for the dominant group to overcome the uncertainties embedded in the
conflict and its internal and external environments:
(A) To find a permanent solution to the problem of the existence of the
indigenous people on the same territory: The solution is determined on the one hand by
the nature and imperatives of the settler-colonial society: the regimes of territorial
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letgitimation upon which it is established, levels and degrees of exclusion it practices,
and on the other hand by indigenous national movement responses: its characteristics, its
understanding and reaction to systems of territorial separation, and the ability it shows to
preserve a consistent political strategy for either liberation and democratization or ethnoterritorial self-determination;
In South Africa, Black Africans remained a majority that is structurally integrated
in the economic system of the white economy. Segregation and territorial separation
(apartheid) could not overcome this structural reality. Nor the white society was able to
find a source of immigration to compensate for its minority status. As a minority, the
Afrikaners relied heavily on police and oppressive methods to keep the African
nationalist sentiments and actions circumscribed. The minority status of the white society
allowed neither to accommodate the indigenous in the political system fearing the
tyranny of the majority nor to totally expel them as they were indispensable for the
economy. While white society’s weak national-territorial nexus, the divisions it endured,
and its minority status weakened its hegemony and domination systems,

African

nationalist movement consistency in pursuing self-determination within a democratic
South Africa undercut regimes ability to provide a permanent solution to the indigenous
question. Thus the domination system remained starkly one of partial inclusion and
exploitation before apartheid and separation and exploitation under apartheid.
By contrast, the founding principles of Zionism impeded inclusion of the
indigenous at any level of social, economic, and political life. The establishment of the
state of Israel was premised upon total exclusion. To overcome the dilemmas of majority403

minority dynamics Zionism and Israel resorted to ethnic cleansing that rendered the
Palestinians a manageable minority inside the state. At this stage Israel overcame the
question of indigenous within its territorial boundaries of 1948. After 1967, the problem
of the indigenous became strikingly prevalent. The same principles and factors that
enabled Zionism and Israel to maintain hegemony in 1948 were sustained in post-1967:
the consolidation of the Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel and to control the
territorial and spatial terrains of the Palestinians.
Now a majority in the entire land of Palestine Israel deployed a diverse and multilayered system of dual domination against the indigenous amongst its own citizenry and
those in the OPT. The majority status of the Israeli Jews provided for the diversity with
which Israel dominated its adversary by deploying the three strands of power
(disciplinary, bio, and sovereign) rather than relying mainly on oppression. The
introduction of legal, administrative, military, institutional methods of domination within
a claimed democratic system enabled Israel to conceal its peculiar apartheid within its
own borders and in the OPT.
Domination systems Israel established in its proper and in the OPT remained
ethno-territorially-based: controlling the land and space and managing the population. In
the OPT, Israel partially succeeded in confining, enclavizing, and segregating the
Palestinians, which fragmented their ability to challenge Israeli hegemony. This partial
success encourages Israel to enact more measures to further push the Palestinians into a
creeping apartheid system. Palestinian national movement ethno-territoriality contributed
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to the persistent of the political-geography of the conflict as one over separated ethnonationally based entities.
(B) To achieve hegemony over the surrounding region or alternatively to realize
normal relationships with neighboring states: white South African and Israeli regimes
show a significant level of regional hegemonic propensity especially in tandem of their
respective attempts to permanently resolve the question of the indigenous: after 1948 for
South Africa, and starting 1967 in the Israeli case. Both regimes resorted to military
aggression against their neighbors each for particularistic reasons but primarily for
maintaining an edge that allow for a free hand in domestic issues. While South Africa
achieved military hegemony in the region of Southern Africa and at some point deployed
its military power to eliminate African nationalist threats in its surrounding, Israel
resorted to a dual strategy of military aggression and diplomatic engagement. The role of
the USA was pivotal in both endeavors. Thus, Israel has partially normalized its
relationships with the region by reaching peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, while
partially tamed threats stemming from Lebanese borders, Syria, and beyond from Iran.
Within this strategic, oversimplified depiction, the question of the Palestinian population
and indeed the conflict as a whole has become less urgent for Israel to engage.
(C) To gain a certain degree of independence from a superpower or a
metropolitan. Until finding answers to the first two vulnerabilities settler-colonial
societies remain dependent on a metropolitan support. Both settler-colonial societies were
in their rise and consolidation European in the essence of their economic system as
advanced industrial societies. They possessed numerous financial resources and equipped
405

with technologies and expertise that the indigenous populations lacked. Depending on its
own resources South Africa gained economic and military capabilities from any super
power which enabled her to stand on strong grounds to bargain its interests. Even under
overwhelming international sanctions and boycott campaigns the regime in South Africa
established its military might and managed to survive.
South Africa’s less internationalized conflict and the high degree of independence
of the regime on international support have a contradictory effect that facilitated
significant international pressure on the regime on the one hand, and encouraged African
national movement to sustain its political and moral high ground vis-à-vis the regime.
The international community did not have any normative commitments towards the
regime in South Africa, and the support it gained from western states was contingent
upon the circumstances of the Cold War and the particular regional developments. Thus
changes in these circumstances facilitated western countries’ change of policy toward
South Africa whereby the regime was treated as a pariah state: a repressive-aggressive
state that should be castigated and disciplined. The nature of the ties and relationships
between the white South African regime and the international community facilitated
categorizing the regime as a rogue state as its internal repressive and external aggressive
conduct attested.
Israel, by contrast, gained one of main factors of success in creating and
sustaining a relationship of interrelated interests and influence with an imperial or
superpower sponsor. As we illustrate below, at their foundation and formation the two
regimes differ significantly in regard of international involvement in conferring
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legitimacy on their respective regimes of territorial legitimation. Israel has a peculiar
relationship of dependence with the USA and other western countries. But at the same
time Israel has developed certain mechanisms of influence on these actors’ decisionmaking processes, which makes it partially independent from the metropolis. This unique
position enabled Israel to isolate its adversary on the international arena and to gain
legitimacy for its ethno-national territorial foundations.

The persistent Palestinian-Israeli impasse

The abovementioned vulnerabilities withstanding, the ability of the South African
regime to endure was primarily compromised by its internal structural contradictions that
rendered regional achievements and independence vis-à-vis international superpowers
insufficient for the survival of the regime. Rather, regional and international effects
conversely worked against regimes intentions as internal contradictions turned violent
and explicitly violated major international norms and principles. International pressure
converged with internal developments towards the recreation of South Africa as a
democratic state. In contrast, the durability of Israeli regime is primarily refers to its
internal coherency and ability to form and transform the conflict according to its
“regimes of territorial legitimation”. Thus Israel’s partial achievements on the three fronts
(vulnerabilities) especially reducing the challenge of the Palestinian national movement
comparing to the failure of the white regime in South Africa indicates the vitality of its
ethno-national territorial system of domination, its ability to manage the demographic
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aspects of the conflict, and its exceptional stand vis-à-vis the international community. In
the follow I draw the comparative findings in congruent fashion with the conceptual
framework of the research : (1) the complexity of settler –colonial systems in terms of
their national-territorial nexus and the regimes of territorial legitimation that underlies
them; (2) the nature and properties of systems of domination derived from the nationalterritorial imperatives and the responses they face by the challenging national movement;
and (3) External effects that pertain to the acceptance or rejection of the dominant
regime. The table below summarizes the findings of the research

National-territorial
nexus

South Africa

Palestine

Contingent Findings

Weak ethnoterritorial
identification

Religious ethnoterritoriality is
defining

Failing ethnonational constitution
vs. ethno-religious
nation-building

Structures of
Domination and
Responses

International
Legitimation

Contextual, and
adaptive Vs.
consistent
democratic
liberation
Convergent in delegitimizing the
regime

Blueprint,
transformative Vs.
inconsistent and
ethno-territorially
driven
Convergent,
sponsors
exceptionalism and
regime legitimating

Staged eradication
vs. endurance

External
contingency Vs.
decisive
legitimation

Prevalence of civic
self-determination

Prevalence of
national selfdetermination
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First: The complexity of settler-colonial systems in South Africa and Palestine
and their respective regimes of territorial legetimiation have been decisive in determining
the trajectory of each conflict and creating the conditions conducive to democratization in
South Africa. The magnitude we grant to ethno-territorial nexus is justified theoretically
as the defining factor that determines ‘regimes of territorial ideology’ and the spatial
aspects of ethno-national conflicts. As such it also determines levels of exclusion and
inclusion, and the nature of domination systems that aim at sustaining a certain ethnoterritorial system of differentiation and subordination.
The foundation of the modern state in South Africa did not espouse any ethnoterritorial underpinnings as we noticed and the legitimation of the state was derived from
the system of social differentiation it created. For segregation before apartheid was not
territorially determined and the regime sought the exploitation of the indigenous
exclusion was partial. Nor the Afrikaners attempted to ethnically cleanse the Black
Africans as the latter role in the economic processes was structurally intertwined with
their confinement and subordination.
By contrast, exclusion of the indigenous people that characterized the Zionist
movement Palestine was absolute and represented a pre-condition for the implantation of
Jewish immigrants in the place of the indigenous; the expulsion of more than 700,000
Palestinians in 1947-8 outside the border of the state of Israel as it was designated by the
UN Resolution 181 turned the Jewish community into a majority overnight. Zionism
gained international and institutional recognition and legitimacy on the grounds of ethnoterritorial definition of the state. Again, at the moment it was established the regimes of
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territorial legitimation of the state of Israel embodied three interrelated ideologies: (a)
that the Land of Israel (Eritz Israel) is the historical and cultural expression of the Jewish
people; (b) this land is a single indivisible and distinct space; and (c) Israel is the
incarnation of this unity. Israel as modern state came to carry on the objectives and goals
of a movement that finds its justification within a rigid ethno-territorial ideology uplifted
by religious convictions. As such Zionism and Israel succeeded in reconstructing Jewish
immigrants in a single religious ethno-nationality bound to determined territorial and
spatial boundaries whereas the settler-colonial state in South Africa fill short of bridging
the structural chasm between two white dominant and rival groups.
The dynamics of the conflicts in both cases diverge on this condition: religious
ethno-territoriality of the Zionist movement and Israel resulted in total exclusion. In
effect this impeded all aspects of interpenetration of the settler and indigenous economies
and societies which meant that the two remained significantly separated on physical,
legal, institutional, and psychological levels. In South Africa, the economic inclusion of
the indigenous Africans and the limited political accommodation of Coloureds and at
some stage certain segments of Africans created structural conditions that gave the
Africans a significant political leverage on the white community from within the
structures of domination it established. Thus, Israel today appears committed to the
territorial boundaries of its initial legetimation within the borders of 1948. On many other
aspects, however, it practices virtual administrative, institutional, and sovereign powers
in the whole of mandatory Palestine, which in effect reestablished Palestine as a single
unit under a single hegemony: the political-geography of the conflict in this sense has
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been reversed to its original boundaries whereas political. Legal, and territorial/spatial
properties of the conflict where transformed.
The transformation of the two conflicts at two major turning points has profound
effects on the conditions that led to democratization in South Africa and the persistent of
separation in the Palestinian-Israel conflicts: in the former introducing apartheid and the
Bantustan policy against the reality of partial integration and the dynamics of weak
ethno-territorial identification riggered a chain of events that allowed a staged decline and
eclipse of the regime. In Palestine, Israel’s occupation of the OPT led to the consolidation
of the religious ethno-territorial identification of the state and the Israeli Hewish society:
social, economic, legal, and legislative resources have been dedicated to turn the Jewish
colonial settlements in the OPT into a semi-state. This state of affairs prevents not only
the establishment of a meaningful Palestinian state but it also

impedes partitioning ala

the ‘homeland’ policy of the South African apartheid: the ‘homeland’ or Bantustanization
policy aimed at partitioning the country and the creation of pseudo-sovereign entities on
the periphery of the white state. While South African apartheid sought to solve the
problem of the indigenous by dismembering them with their territory from the state,
Israeli apartheid is dismembering the population apart from the land, absorbing territory
and occupying space while suffocating the population and eliminating the fruition of its
political and national aspirations. Thus, the correspondence between geography,
demographic attributes, and the ethno-national nexus of the conflict (on both sides of the
divide) increases Israeli intransigence position against Palestinian rights, and it
galvanizes Palestinian persistent struggle for national self-determination; a situation that
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would prolong the interregnum and with it the propensity for violence and extreme
measures.
Second: political consistency, convergence of purpose and reaction to ethnonational and regimes of territorial ideology constitute a crucial factor in shaping the
properties of the conflict. I argued that these aspects develop within a dialectical
relationship between the dominant state and the challenger national movement. The two
cases of South Africa and Palestine show the validity of this argument: in the first place
the organizational coherency and clarity of purpose play a decisive role in movement’s
ability to represent a profound political challenge to the regime. Indeed, the most crucial
periods of the two conflicts in 1980s show striking similarities in the organization of
political militancy and mobilization that characterized the two movements in terms of
their highly popular and well democratically organized uprisings. However, the counterhegemonic social-political project of the South African national movement that embodied
the convergence of a wide range of social elements within a single political front against
apartheid, as we discussed in Chapter Three was not paralleled in the Palestinian case.
The independent-driven Palestinian national movement was able to converge and
mobilize one portion of its constituency; the Palestinians in the OPT. Objectively, this
resulted from the factors of geographical fragmentation, properties of Israel’s settlercolonial enterprise after 1967 and the regional circumstances. Indeed, the nature of
regime domination systems and their ethno-territorial underpinnings enabled the ANC
and anti-apartheid movement to challenge the regime from within its own structures. This
structural condition offered the African national movement a genuine opportunity to gain
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political leverage over the regime as a democratization force. The Palestinian national
movement, and the vast majority of the Palestinians were excluded from the structures of
power within the state of Israel and have had to challenge it from without; the
identification with a total liberation and democratization was initially stripped of its
geographical and institutional base.
Eventually, the PLO, contrary of the ANC, failed to negotiate the end of Israeli
occupation and rather involved in negotiating the establishment of limited autonomy
under the auspices of Israeli rule. The Oslo Accords have lead to the metamorphosis of
the occupation and then the increased difficulty to realize Palestinian national selfdetermination. Oslo agreements amounted to a political defeat for the PLO as it couldn’t
maintain a consistent political strategy or sustain a well organized and mass mobilized
momentum for its declared goals. By contrast, the South African National movement has
shown a remarkable degree of consistency and persistence on its goals to overthrow
apartheid. The ANC rejected and fought the Bantustan policy and mobilized to thwart it
whereas the PLO was transformed from a national liberation movement into a kind of
subordinate client to Israel, delivering gendarme services in segregated and isolated areas
of the OPT. In comparison to ANC, initiatives to achieve peace had not changed the
nature, goals, and role of the national liberation movements.
Third: international legitimation or castigation of ethno-territorial underpinnings
of domination is a crucial factor that may categorize a settler-colonial system as a pariah
or a rouge state based on its oppressive and aggressive essence. The effects are profound
in delegitimizing the regime and to give rise to national movement’s democratic
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orientation. Conversely legitimizing the regime contributes to the persistence of ethnoterritoriality as an acceptable basis for political organization and rule, which cripples the
democratic dynamics of the struggle for self-determination. As I discussed in the last
section of Chapter Eight, in contrast to Israel, the international community did not give a
soft shoulder to the South African regime while Israel enjoys unprecedented levels of
support and protection from western regimes. While apartheid in South Africa was
condemned as a rogue state Israel has gained the recognition of the U.S.A as a Jewish
state although the definition of rogue states applies to both regimes as regimes of
apartheid. The recognition of Israel as Jewish state further entrenched its exclusiveist
regimes of territorial legitimation and encouraged it to extend this ideology well into the
OPT.
In this respect it is important to notice that Afrikaners’ regime did not have the
advantage of a supportive Diaspora that Israel and the Zionist movement have especially
in North America. The support of Jewish communities Western countries has been
crucial in driving the policies of these countries in regard to the conflict, as I showed.
Diaspora Zionist organizations represent an important actor in Israeli domestic and
international politics not just for their instrumentality in generating political, financial,
and diplomatic support for Israel, but also for the state of Israel is seen as their supraterritorial homeland. “Diaspora Jews” participate in nurturing the Zionist dream of
“return” and share the Israeli Jewish the same aspirations by cultural, political, and
organizational efforts within their communities. Although Israeli policies in the occupied
territories, and particularly settlement policy, do not have a blanket support of all Jewish
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communities, a significant part does. Furthermore, the vast majority of those, even the
most liberal, oppose the democratic one-state as a solution for it implies the demise of
Israel as a Jewish state.

One can conclude that none of the conditions prevailed in South Africa and led to
democratization are available in the Palestinian context. However, the developments of
the last twenty years show that those conditions are in the making especially in the sense
that Israeli policies in the OPT and discrimination against its Palestinian citizens are
creating similar conditions that would culminate in conditions that trigger dynamics of
democratization. Meanwhile, having circumscribed its adversary, Israel accelerated and
intensified the patterns of its territorial control and the domination over the population.
The three major patterns of Israel’s domination system show the unfounded
grounds for the two-state diplomacy: (a) the deepening of the asymmetrical power
relationships; (b) transforming the occupation into a form of segregation and exclusive
system within the OPT itself. In this sense the Palestinian threat as a strategic challenge
was minimized. While ecnlaving the Palestinians in the OPT only strengthened their
identification with their ethno-territorial aspirations their struggle is aiming the
redemption of a territory and space that have been already Judized; (c) Israeli answer to
the Palestinian demography turned the Palestinians into fractions of minimally connected
collectivities, and narrowly linked territorially. These patterns are the structures that
render any attempt to establish a Palestinian state unfounded. In fact, Israel has
constructed a system of ethnic hierarchy in the entire mandatory Palestine; a system of
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apartheid that works in different capacities inside Israel and in the OPT. It is based on
legal, institutional and legislative measures that assign rights and obligations to people
according to their ethnicity and according to their geographical location.
The persistent colonial-settler enterprise of Zionism and Israel that transformed
more than 80 per cent of Palestine into a Jewish space and territorially controlled Israeli
proper; the exceptional organizational and institutional capacities it deploys to achieve
this end and cultivate international legitimacy for its practices; its ability to isolate and
castigate the Palestinians; and the unconditional support it receives for the U.S.A and
other western powers, implies that Israel is not in a position to give any significant
consideration to withdraw from the OPT and allow the Palestinians to practice their right
of national self-determination. Nor it allow for the emergence of unitary democratic
entity. It is only in this sense that the one-state solution addresses aggressively the heart
of the conflict: Israeli and Zionist politics, rather than avoiding it by separation themes.
Israel’s occupation of the OPT is a manifestation of Zionist and Israel territorial ideology
and therefore even the struggle for Israel’s withdrawal from these territories requires, by
necessity this confrontation if we seek to have a better understanding and to realize a
democratic solution to the conflict or an Israel acceptance of Palestinians national and
political rights.
Israel’s settler-colonial underpinning and policies is the core of the conflict.
Israel’s deeply-established links between the Jewishness of the state of Israel and the
preservation of the settlement grid in the OPT renders Israeli ability to abandon the OPT
or to accept the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state unconceivable for any Israeli
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leadership. In other words, state contraction under these circumstances can be costly
more than the ability of any government to afford. Israel has crossed the ideological
threshold in its ties with the OPT, which implies that disengagement is less likely and
confronting Israel as an apartheid regime in the entire Palestine is inevitable. Challenging
central Zionist doctrine of Jewish ethnic statehood; the kernel of Israeli sense of
nationhood by a coherent and well organized Palestinian effort seems the only answer for
the question of Palestine in the near future.
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